The Japanese recently released the captain of a Chinese fishing boat that had rammed two Japan Coast Guard vessels. They probably thought that tempers would cool, but it looks like the Chinese aren’t satisfied. They have sent three of their fisheries patrol vessels to the disputed waters to defend what they see as their rights.
French shipbuilder DCNS apparently has designs on our Offshore Patrol Cutter Project. The picture is pretty, but the text is in French. Translation anyone?
Coasties frequently compare the size of their service to the New York City Police Force. The Marines think they are a small service, but Coast Guard is only one fifth their size. We usually only see comparisons with Navies in terms of how old our ships are, but how do we stack up in terms of numbers of people?
Would it surprise you to know that with over 42,000 active duty Coast Guardsmen, we have as many, or more people, than the British or French Navies?
The following list is not exhaustive and I can’t guarantee it’s 100% accurate (Wikipedia), but it is representative of the personnel numbers for some significant Navies around the world. As near as possible I’ve only included active duty. In some cases, even when not marked, the figure includes Marines.
U.S. Navy: 330,729
People’s Republic of China : 250,000
Russia: 161,000
India: 56,000
Japan: 46,000
(North) Korean People’s Army Naval Force: 46,000
France: 42,550
Spain: 47,300 including Marines
Republic of Korea (South): 68,000 including 27,000 Marines
Royal Navy: 39,100 including 7,500 Marines
Italy: 35,200
Chile: 25,000
Pakistan: 24,000
Republic of China: 23,000
Argentina: 17,200
Germany 17,000
Australia: 12,500
Netherlands: 10,000
Canada: 9,000
The US Navy is shrinking. We seem to be included in Navy planning more than in the past, but it still seems the services potential as a “naval reserve” frequently goes unrecognized and the potential of relatively modest expenditures to enhance that role are not considered.
Over at www.informationdissemination.net I got into an off topic discussion of the NSC deliveries, when another poster, “RhodeIslander,” asked me why the contract for the for the fourth National Security Cutter had not been awarded.
He shared this with me,
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“Chuck, one of my old co-workers down in Mississippi sent me an interesting Build Schedule for NSC. Evidently this is only for… (STRATTON) 752 which is next to be finished off for USCG.
“At the moment of Contract start, there begins a 4 year cycle for WMSL-752:
“FIRST YEAR: Pre-fab begins down in Mississippi yard. While down in Washington D.C. the USCG orders long lead time stuff, like engines, generators, gears, etc. After about 2 months, “Start Fabrication” commences. And scattered all around the large Mississippi shipyard, many various modules are being constructed.
“SECOND YEAR: Keep is “laid” which now-a-days means the shipyard starts moving all those modules slowly down to the waterfront and welds them all together. This erection process goes fairly quickly and the cutter is all put together outwardly in less than 7 months. Production continues inside the cutter while on land.
“THIRD YEAR: The cutter is “launched” with really means “float off” in modern yards like the one in Pascagoula, Mississippi. Production continues in the water, electrical cables and Command and Control soon start testing. Then diesels engines get lite off, followed by generators and gas turbine.
“FOURTH YEAR: Sea Trials and Dockyard Trials are conducted at the beginning of Year #4, and the cutter is soon delivered to the Coast Guard. The crew moves onboard, trains up, does a few short underway periods. The Mississippi shipyard corrects some deficiencies and finally the new cutter sails away for California. Once in their permanent homeport, the ship gets a short post shakedown overhaul period, where the Mississippi Northrop Grumman yard does Warranty work. At the very end of the fourth year, the Warranty period expires and the Cutter is no longer ever associated with DEEPWATER INC. again.”
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“RhodeIslander” was disappointed in the time required from award to completion. My concern was more that we were falling behind on even a one per year delivery schedule. If we awarded a contract every year and we were using the four year cycle as a routine, you would think there would be four or at least three ships in the pipeline. That does not seem to be happening.
Acquisition directorate says “The U.S. Coast Guard commissioned the second National Security Cutter, Waesche (WMSL 751), on May 7, 2010. Stratton (WMSL 752) was christened on July 23, 2010 and is 59% complete.”
It appears that the NSC2 is in the last 2 months of the cycle (although it has lasted more than four years) and that NSC3 is in the third year. This means we have more than a two year gap (instead of only one year).
Here are some of the milestones for the first three ships. All three were nominally ordered in 2001 and were/are being built at Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, Mississippi:
NSC 1: Bertholf
Laid down: March 29, 2005
Launched: September 29, 2006
Christened: November 11, 2006
Commissioned: August 4, 2008
Formally Accepted: May 8, 2009
NSC 2: Waesche
Laid down: September 11, 2006
Launched: July 12, 2008
Delivered: Nov. 6, 2009
Commissioned: May 7, 2010
NSC 3: Dorothy C. Stratton
Contract awarded: Aug. 8, 2007
Laid down: July 20, 2009
Christened: July 23, 2010
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7c/USCGC_Waesche_by_Yerba_Buena_Island.jpg
From Wikipedia, “‘On 7 July 2009, the Government Accountability Office reported that delays in the NSC program are likely to result in “the loss of thousands of cutter operational days for conducting missions through 2017.’ The GAO also that month reported that problems in the NSC program have delayed the OPC program by five years.”
Frankly I think we will continue to see the ripples of this disaster until at least 2027 when it looks like the last OPC might be finished. By that time the newest 270 will be 39 years old. When the youngest 210 is replaced it will likely be at least 54 years old. And if the Acushnet can last until she is replaced by the first OPC she will be 75 years old. (While the average Navy ship is something like 14 years old.)
Here is RhodeIslander’s latest comment, “…WAESCHE NSC-2 is evidently in California getting her post delivery overhaul and last of warranty. Stratton is supposed to Deliver towards end of next summer. That means NSC-4 Hamilton, if and when they ever commence her, will break up the “assembly line” of NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTERS that has finally started to look pretty good down at the Pascagoula yard. So NSC-4 will gap and some expertise will be lost forever, early retirement, taking jobs on other Navy ships, moving to the offshore oil well industry, etc. Even worse than breaking up the “assembly line”, will be the big gap between delivery of NSC-3 and NSC-4 to USCG…Too bad that NSC-4 is not already under construction, and finishing her first year, and beginning to start KEEL LAYING. It’s both a mystery and a shame for the Coast Guard sailors on those ancient High Endurance cutters.”
What really bothers me is that I don’t see that there is any attempt to play catch-up on the part of the Administration, the Congress, or the Coast Guard. I hope I’m wrong, but at the rate we are going, the eighth NSC will not be operational for at least nine years and possibly longer, meaning the newest 378 will be at least 47 years old when it is replaced. We really ought to be awarding a multi-year contract and building more than one ship a year. If we want to award contracts for the OPCs in FY2014 and we don’t want to have to award a contract for NSC(s) in the same FY, it means that we will need to contract for NSCs 5-8 in FY 2012/2013. (Perhaps more evidence we ought to be looking at getting other ships to fill the gap.)
I know Acquisition Directorate is still getting their feet on the ground, and they are short of people, but I hope we will recognize the urgency and that we will get some support from the Administration and Congress. We have to do a lot better than we have so far.
The Navy History and Heritage Command notes that on this date in 1943 the Navy accepted its first helicopter. Note that the pilot was a Coastie. The Coast Guard was responsible for much of the early work with helicopters. The Cobb (WPG-181) was the first ship specifically outfitted to operate helicopters.
The GAO did a study of US anti-piracy efforts and the results are not good.
“…from 2007 to 2009, the most recent year for which complete data were available, the total number of hijackings reported to the International Maritime Bureau increased, ransoms paid by the shipping industry increased sharply, and attacks spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden–the focus of the Action Plan–to the vast Indian Ocean.”
Seems we don’t know how much piracy costs or how much our countermeasures cost. We have made some progress in international cooperation, but we haven’t done very well at coordinating efforts within the US government.
At least one commentator thinks the process of learning to work internationally may be more important than the actual results. He also kicked off some additional discussion here and here, including discussion of how this reflects on the Cooperative Strategy 21. (It does look like the Brits are showing some initiative.)
The Coast Guard has already been deeply involved in this issue, from LEDETs on scene to recommending best practices to mariners, and if it ever to be successfully addressed, it will be part of the solution.
Earlier I suggested we look at buying three 90 Meter (297ft) Offshore Patrol Vessels newly built by BAE built for Trinidad and Tobago, that they no longer want.
It just occurred to me that there might be an option to lease or charter the vessels rather than an outright purchase, perhaps with a rent-to-own or purchase option. These vessels might be specifically tagged as temporary replacements for the Acushnet and as rolling replacements for two of the most problematic ships (378 or WMEC) until all the true replacements are completed
This option might allow us to avoid the AC&I complications.
Reading the reports of the murder of Texan David Hartley by “pirates” (legally this is not piracy) on Falcon Lake on the border between the US and Mexico, I’ve seen no mention of the Coast Guard in connection with the case, perhaps because we haven’t been allowed to search on the Mexican side of the Lake.
The 25 mile long, three mile wide lake is artificial, resulting from the damming of the Rio Grande, but the resulting waterway is in some ways analogous to the Great Lakes. It also appears to be a ready route for smuggling people, drugs and guns. Do we have any units on Falcon Lake? If not, should we?
The idea of “influence squadrons” has been kicking around the Navy for a while now. The idea is an expansion of the “partnership” stations that the Coast Guard has participated in (here), (here), and (here). Information Dissemination offers some background and has a proposal for implementing these concepts and he sees the Coast Guard as an integral part of it.
Specifically he suggests that we test the concept off the Horn of Africa (Somalia and adjacent territory) by deploying an influence squadron in October of 2011. In addition to the LEDETs and Deployable Operations Group personnel you would expect, he would like to include, “The USCGC Bertholf (WMSL 750), which will work in cooperation with regional Coast Guards to establish fishery protection operations and training around Somalia.” He did not mention the Fast Response Cutter, but vessels like these were including in the original concept of the influence squadron and they are the type of small ships that we might offer our allies in the area through the Foreign Military Sales program (aircraft) (boats). This not only helps the ally, increasing the total size of procurement can lower the unit cost for the Coast Guard as well.
In “New Fiscal Year Reflections ” there is also a call for the Navy to “put its money where its mouth is” in terms of implementing a cooperative strategy or support someone who will (the Coast Guard).
“Either the US Navy needs to make the strategic commitment to the low end and have this reflected in shipbuilding with vessels more appropriately sized for engagement with Coast Guard sized fleets of regional partners, or advocate for a larger US Coast Guard to take up that responsibility as part of the National Fleet. Including smaller vessels as part of the US Navy fleet isn’t a tactical choice as it is framed by Naval leaders; it is a strategic choice the US Navy decided against, despite the rhetoric of their own strategy.”
Reuters is reporting some new countermeasures are emerging in response to piracy in the Indian Ocean. .
First there is the idea of providing a “panic room” where the crew can take refuge, preventing the pirates from taking them as hostages before help can arrive and the second is the possibility of contracted security or, “private navies.”
“The ships will be armed with deck mounted machine guns, more formidable than anything currently used by the pirates. They may also have unmanned drones and a small airship for surveillance.”
Using the engine room as a “panic room” made possible the recapture of the Antigua-Barbuda-flagged, German–owned vessel M/V Magellan Star by U. S. Marines from USS Dubuque (LPD 8).
Referring to “panic rooms” or “citadels” the article talks about the “need to be bullet-proof, contain food stocks, communications equipment and ideally a system to immobilize the ship.”
I don’t think anyone is armoring bulkheads to make them bullet proof, but water tight bulkheads and substantial chunks of steel like engine blocks can provide a lot of protection.
Provision for comms is important. In the case of the Magellan Star the only communication was by cell phone and the battery died just before the Marines assaulted, meaning it was several hours before the Marines were able to let the crew know they had been rescued and the Marines had to damage the ship the to reach the crew.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 
