Screen grab from page 2 of the DOD Arctic Strategy, 2024

Here is a link to the new DOD Arctic Strategy here. I found it disappointing. There isn’t much strategy here. I would sum it up as–we are going to keep doing what we are doing, but we are going to do it better. (See critique below.)

“This strategy will strengthen the ability of the United States to build integrated deterrence and effectively manage risk to U.S. interests in the Arctic region by enhancing our domain awareness and Arctic capabilities; engaging with Allies, partners, and key stakeholders; and exercising tailored presence.”

About the US Coast Guard:

The US Coast Guard or USCG was mentioned in three places, once in a caption of a picture of USCGC Healy and these two paragraphs.

DoD will partner with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including through the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), which plays a vital role in maintaining U.S. presence in the Arctic region and supporting domain awareness. The USCG is responsible for operating and maintaining the United States’ icebreaking capability, and DoD will continue to support the USCG’s long-term acquisition of at least eight polar icebreakers that will provide needed icebreaking capability for both military and civilian purposes, including PR/SAR. While disaster response is not a force sizing or shaping requirement, DoD remains ready to support DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the event of disaster, terrorist attack, or other mass-casualty incident in the Arctic when directed by the President or when requested by a lead Federal department or agency and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Service-specific, Joint, Interagency, and Combined Exercises. Security and stability in the Arctic depend, in  part, on the Joint Force’s ability to respond rapidly and   effectively to threats in the region. Exercises increase interoperability with Allies and partners, validate plans, train our ability to rapidly deploy to all parts of the Arctic region, and provide an opportunity to test equipment in Arctic conditions. As such, the Joint Force will continue to exercise frequently in the Arctic through Service specific training, joint exercises —to include with USCG— and
combined exercises with our Allies and partners. DoD will
ensure CCMDs with Arctic equities work toward global integration through joint exercises and ensure key exercise lessons inform capability requirements and strategic planning.

That’s it.

About Icebreakers: Icebreakers are mentioned twice, it the paragraph above and here,

The PRC seeks to bolster its operational expertise in the Arctic, where its presence, while limited, is increasing. The PRC operates three icebreakers—the Xue Long, Xue Long 2, and Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di—which enable the PRC’s dual civil-military research efforts in the Arctic. Over the course of the PRC’s 13 Arctic research expeditions to date, the vessels have tested unmanned underwater vehicles and polar-capable fixed-wing aircraft, among other activities. People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels have also  demonstrated the capability and intent to operate in and around the Arctic region through exercises alongside the Russian Navy over the past several years.

Critique:

“DoD will reach this end state through a monitor-and-respond approach.”

In other words, we will be reactive rather than proactive. 

The threat to Europe in the Polar regions is just part of the long running NATO defense problem. No real change there, except the formal extension of NATO into Sweden and Finland.

The Air Threat over the Pole to North America is looked after by NORAD. Apparently, NORAD does not look after Greenland, but that does not seem to be a central problem.

Ground operations in the Arctic are always going to be difficult. There may be small unit operations but no need to worry about an invasion of North America coming over the pole. NORTHCOM is exercising both land and air assets that would be needed to deal with realistic threats.

The North Slope oil fields and the associated pipeline are probably a target if we become engaged in a long-term conflict that involves combat in or over the arctic. The oil fields are not mentioned in the strategy,

What has changed?

The opening of the Arctic Ocean to maritime commerce has made it a possible avenue for logistics between Russia and China with the potential for militarily valuable shipments moving both ways between the Russian Arctic coast on one end and the Russian Pacific Coast, North Korea, or China on the other. The weakness of Russian transcontinental land transportation systems makes the Northern Sea Route particularly important.

The door to be shut or left open is the Bering Strait.

Bering Strait. 44 Nautical miles (82km) wide, with the Diomede Islands in the center.

The “strategy” mentions the Bering Straits only as a choke point,

The Arctic includes multiple strategically significant maritime chokepoints. Reduction in sea ice
due to climate change means chokepoints such as the Bering Strait between Alaska and Russia and the Barents Sea north of Norway, are becoming more navigable and more economically and militarily significant.

We would certainly want to deny use of the Strait by our enemies and ensure that we and our allies have the option to transit through the Strait.

The planned deep-water port in Nome (currently on hold) will be essential to forces that might be used to control access to the Bering Strait. We would also want to make sure St Lawrence Island and Little Diomede remain in US hands. The US might also want to seize Big Diomede. None of these strategic locations are mentioned in the plan.

Diomede Islands: Little Diomede Island or Kruzenstern Island (left) and Big Diomede Island or Ratmanov Island in the Bering Sea. Photo is from the north. Photo by Dave Cohoe.

But who is in charge?

First look at the map at the head of this post. They have divided the Arctic so that operations there are under three different Unified Combatant Commands, USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USNORTHCOM. In other words, no one below the President is in charge over the whole area.

These are the Unified Combatant Commander’s Areas of Responsibility. What is not made clear in this graphic is that all of Russia including the larger Asian part is under USEUCOM.

Perhaps most critically, the Pacific interface with the Arctic is under all three COCOMs.

• USEUCOM is responsible for the Russian land areas in spite of the fact that the Bering Strait is 4521 statute miles from the COCOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, and that is the shorter distance West from Stuttgart across the Atlantic and over the US, rather than over Russia. –This has got to be wrong.
• USNORTHCOM has the Bering Strait and the Eastern half of the Bering Sea but normally they have no significant naval force. Their primary responsibility is the air defense of the US and Canada.
• USINDOPACOM, which has the naval assets in the Pacific that might be used to attack Russian assets in Asia has responsibility for only the Western half of the Bering Sea below the Bering Strait.

This division of responsibility, placing Russian Asia under USEUCOM, also means that if the US should be at war with both China and Russia, then at least officially, conducting the war in the Pacific would be under two or perhaps three different COCOMs. I doubt this would actually work this way.