Despite the title, don’t expect a recitation of Coast Guard priorities. Most of the material is familiar, but there were a few interesting comments, including some that might be surprising. A number of things the Commandant said here made news.
That the NSCs could be made into frigates.
That the Polar Icebreaker would cost less than $1B
His support of transgender CG personnel.
I’ll give a quick outline of what was talked about. At the end I will rant a bit about some of my pet peeves.
The Commandant’s prepared statement is relatively short beginning at time 2m45s and ending about 11m.
6m00 In our listing of missions, the Commandant said Defense Operations should be listed first. He noted that there are 20 ships chopped to Combatant Commanders including eleven ships operating under SOUTHCOM.
Q&A begins at 11:00.
16m20s The Commandant noted there is a Chinese ship rider on a USCG cutter off Japan and that Coast Guard aircraft are flying out of Japan.
17m30s Boarder protection/drug interdiction
20m Called the OPCs “light frigates”
22m As for priorities the Commandant noted a need to invest in ISR and Cyber
23m Cyber threat.
24m Expect return to sea duty because of length of training.
26m30s “Demise of the cutterman”/Human Capital Plan–fewer moves–removed the stigma of geographic stability
29m25s Highest percentage of retention of all services–40% of enlisted and 50% of officers will still be in the service after 20 years
30m Law of the Sea. Extended continental shelf in the Arctic.
32m30s Need for presence in the Arctic.
36m ISR, 38m15s Firescout. An interesting side note was that the Commandant seemed to quash any possibility of using the MQ-8 Firescout. He noted when they deployed on a cutter 20 people came with the system. He called it unoccupied but not unmanned.
40m Icebreakers
43m30s Comments on transgender members
45m15s Icebreakers–will drive the price down below $1B.
47m NSC as frigate–no conversations with the Navy about this. Performance of Hamilton.
49m50s Count the NSCs toward the 355 ship Navy.
50m30s Illegal migration and virulent infectious disease
53m35s CG training teams in the Philippines and Vietnam to provide competency to operate platforms to be provided by Japan. Two patrol boats going to Costa Rica. Other efforts to build capacity.
56m DHS is the right place for the CG.
The Commandant touched on a couple of my pet peeves, specifically
He called the OPCs “Light Frigates,” so why aren’t they designated that way? WMSM and WMSL are just wrong in too many ways. Give our ships a designation our partners and politicians can understand. A WLB is a cutter and also a buoy tender. The OPC can be both a cutter and a light frigate. I have suggested WPF. Maybe WFF for the Bertholfs and WFL for the Offshore Patrol Cutters. If we want to be thought of as a military service, we need to start using designations that will be seen and understood as military.
He mentioned the possibility of including the Bertholfs in the 355 ship fleet total. Coast Guard combatants should be included when the country counts its fleet. No, the cutters are not aircraft carriers or destroyers, but the current fleet of about 275 ships includes about 70 ships that have no weapons larger than a .50 cal. These include eleven MCM ships and about 60 ships manned by civilian crews such as tugs, high speed transports, salvage ships, underway replenishment ships, and surveillance ships. Counting the Cutters as part of the National Fleet would raise our profile as a military service. The Navy might not like it, but it does give a better idea of our actually available assets for wartime, which is the point of such a listing.
The House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation hearing recorded above is a follow-on to one already discussed. The video does not actually begin until minute 10:40. It is basically done in two parts as indicated below.
Panel I
Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, Commandant, United States Coast Guard | Written Testimony
Panel II
Rear Admiral Michael J. Haycock, Assistant Commandant for Acquisition and Chief Acquisition Officer, United States Coast Guard | Written Testimony
Ms. Marie A. Mak, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office | Written Testimony
Rear Admiral Richard D. West (Navy Ret.), Chair, Committee on Polar Icebreaker Assessment, National Academy of Sciences | Written Testimony
Mr. Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service | Written Testimony
Elsewhere the Coast Guard reported on the Commandant’s testimony, but what we really need to listen to is what the Congressional Sub-Committee members are telling us. They seem to love and respect the Coast Guard (you may have noticed Congress keeps giving us more than we ask for), but they are not pleased with the planning documents they are getting from the Coast Guard. I would particularly recommend you watch the opening comments of Representatives Hunter (10:40 to 13:30), Garamendi (to 17:00), and DeFazio (to 21:20). It will probably make you mad. You should be mad. We have to identify the problem and fix it.
If you want only a taste, here is a short version:
So what is discussed?:
27:00 Great Lakes icebreakers, line item for design of a Great Lakes Icebreaker is being budgeted but no plan for buying one.
29:30 Five Year plan “reflects Fiscal guidance.” That is, we are being told, we have to fit our budget request into predetermined ceilings, so it is less than we really need.
35:00 We are asking DOD to fund six FRCs CENTCOM has requested to replace the 110s currently assigned.
37:00 Graph comparing AC&I funding as requested, authorized, and funded.
39:00 Twenty year plan which was due to Congress at the end of June has not been submitted to Department.
44:00 DOD does not see icebreakers as a National Defense resource. Navy will not pay for the first icebreakers.
54:00 Strong support for icebreakers among the representatives.
57:30 Question on icebreaker lease. Ice trials issue still on the table.
1h02:00 Discussion of Cyber.
1h09 Why not a block buy on the first ship?
1h18m Commandant’s testimony ended
1h34m.Particularly watch Ronald O’Rourke’s testimony, he suggests accelerating the OPC program may be an alternative to WMEC life extension program.
1h43m Sub-Committee liked getting the fleet mix study, but that was several years ago.
Block Buy Report due in Dec.
Expected cost of heavy icebreaker has dropped about $200M.
2h07m again, “no military requirement for an icebreaker.” Representatives feel that question should be studied.
2h15m if we wait a number of years between the first and second WAGB contract results in loss of expertise and additional cost.
The discussion was dominated by three topics,
Coast Guard long term planning,
block buys for the OPC and Icebreakers,
whether we should build three or four heavy icebreakers.
Three or four heavy icebreakers: The proposal to build four heavy icebreakers rather than three came from a study by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. It is largely based on the reasonable assumption that heavy icebreaker #4 will cost less than medium icebreaker #1, as a result of the learning curve savings on heavy icebreakers and first of class costs for the medium icebreakers. I have not read the study but they don’t seem to have addressed the question, of the need for a total of six icebreakers found in the high altitude study. Assuming we build four of a single class of icebreakers, should we then start on a new class of two medium icebreakers with its attendant start-up costs or should we go ahead and build six heavies?
Block Buys for OPC and Icebreakers: The Congress has authorized the Coast Guard to use “Block Buy” funding for its shipbuilding programs. The Coast Guard seems hesitant to even ask to do this. In the case of the OPC, it might save us more than $1B. We could have (and I believe should have) asked to use multi-year procurement for the second phase of the Webber class WPC buy, but we did not.
The National Academy of Sciences study recommends we use block buy procurement for four icebreakers. The current contract for the OPCs is a contract for the first with options for eight more to be funded through FY2023. Until the options are executed we have the option of seeking a block buy contract for future construction.
Block buys commit Congress to fully fund all vessels included in a program to the extent of the contract. If they back out there are penalties incurred. From the Coast Guard’s point of view it would seem a commitment from Congress would be a good thing.
Because of that commitment, shipyards are likely more willing to invest in productivity improvements, resulting in lower costs.
The Commandant’s remarks on the Icebreaker seem to indicate we will wait until we finish and evaluate operations of the first new Polar Icebreaker before seeking funding for a second. If that happens not only will we miss the potential savings of the a block buy, we will also lose the experience the shipyard gained building the first. Long delays between the first few NSCs was largely why we did not see a significant price drop after the first ship.
Coast Guard long term planning: Our current program of record is a continuation of the “Deep Water” program which originated in 2002 and updated in 2005 following 9/11. A fleet mix study (apparently completed in 2009) confirmed that the Program of Record, if executed, would be an improvement of the fleet as it existed in 2007, but it also showed that it fell well short of meeting all the Coast Guard’s statutory requirements with many missions at risk. Additionally the fleet mix study assumed 230 days away from homeport for both the NSCs and the OPC using the “Crew Rotation Concept.”
We still have a very long way to go before we can achieve the Program of Record. There has been no meaningful test of the “Crew Rotation Concept” in spite of the fact that virtually every test of rotating multiple crews among multiple ships has proven problematic and has failed to realize the claimed benefits. Aircraft are also not achieving utilization hours planned. The OPCs, if constructed as currently planned, will not be completed until 2034.
In short our planning is out of date and the current planning seems to be limited to answering the question, “What will fit in the predetermined, but inadequate budget?”
If five-year plan is subject to “fiscal guidance” then why would the 20 year plan not also be subject to “fiscal guidance.” If we are to provide a true picture of what we need we need to change what we are doing.
What do we need to do?:
We need to know what we need.
We need to know the consequences of not getting what we need.
We need to be able to communicate both what we need and the consequences of inadequate funding to the Congress and Administration.
As noted in the introduction to the executive summary of the Offshore and Aviation Fleet Mix Analysis.
To support its role as Systems Integrator (SI), the Coast Guard (CG) needs to establish and continually update a strategic plan for the acquisition, operation, and sustainment of capabilities necessary in achieving organizational goals. Key to this strategic plan is a repeatable, comprehensive process that identifies alternative capabilities and Fleet mix solutions that will meet future mission requirements in an efficient, effective, and affordable manner.
This should not be a one time thing. We need to do this regularly as a repetitive process that is improved over time. We also really need to look at alternatives, not just already chosen solutions.
Once we know where we want to go we can come up with a 20 year (or better yet a 30 year) plan, beginning with what are we going to lose.
It might be best if the long-term plan did not include cost figures. Then we don’t have to comply with preconceptions of cost limits. Identify generic platform types with the capabilities we need.
NavalToday reports New Zealand and Chile have concluded an agreement delineating SAR responsibility over an area of roughly 60 million square kilometers that extends all the way to the South Pole and includes area Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers will routinely transit on the way to Antarctica.
Ultimately this may have some impact on territorial claims to Antarctica.
An interesting post on China’s actions and intentions, particularly with regard to Antarctica, from the Lowy Institute, an Australian international policy think tank.
The Chinese government currently spends more than any other Antarctic state on new infrastructure such as bases, planes, and icebreakers. China has doubled its number of bases in Antarctica and now has four research stations, two field camps, and three air fields there, and it is getting ready to build a fifth base in the Ross Sea region, not far from the USA’s McMurdo Station. China has the second largest number of citizens visiting and working in Antarctica. Chinese polar scientists have made significant geographical discoveries and named hundreds of geographical sites. The Chinese Antarctic science programme has fully self-sufficient air, land, and sea capabilities in Antarctica. It has two ice-strengthened vessels operating in Antarctic waters, with a further vessel under construction. China’s icebreaker has circumnavigated the continent twice, mapping uncharted Antarctic waters.
The Office of Naval Research’s online magazine, “Future Force,” has some insights into how they are approaching the task of helping to design the Coast Guard’s new heavy icebreakers.
It also seems to indicate the Navy is increasingly thinking about operating surface ships in the Polar regions and that they are realizing, its very hard.
They are looking at the capabilities of non-ice-strengthened ships in polar regions and at the effects of ice loading. Considering we have been sending National Security Cutters into the Arctic their findings should also be of some interest to us.
