Return of the Swarm

A couple of interesting posts over at Information Dissemination today that bear on unconventional naval warfare in general, and Iran’s swarm tactics in particular.

First there is a discussion of how the Sri Lankan military defeated similar tactics by the Tamil Tigers separatist group, essentially by developing a swarm of there own, and by putting security teams on merchant ships.

There is also a discussion of why the US Navy appears unprepared to deal with these tactics.

We touched on this earlier. If there was an urgent need to develop a “swarm” of our own, it’s likely the Navy would again turn to the Coast Guard as a source for a large number of trained coxswains and small boat operators. They might even want some of our boats.

I can’t see our navy using swarm tactics offensively. They would use helicopters for that. But I can see them using them defensively, to protect vessels transiting the Straits of Hormuz.

Possible New Ships at a Bargain Price

Following a change of government, Trinidad and Tobago is attempting to renege on a 150M pound (US$237.8 M) contract for the purchase of three 90Meter (297ft) Offshore Patrol Vessels built by BAE in Britain. The contract included training the crews and five years of support. Two of the three ships have already completed sea trials and the third has been launched.

Some additional information on the contract, released upon completion of the sea trials of the second ship, is here.

Photos of the second ship are here (I think the speed quoted here is a mistake) and a nice video here:

At 150M UK pounds for three ships, that is less than $80M/ship, compared to over $600M per National Security Cutter and over $40M each for the much smaller Fast Response Cutter.

We are looking at a severe shortage of ships. The 210s will be about 54 years old before they are replaced. Maybe we ought to at least consider taking over the contract. We might even get them at a reduced price. They may not exactly fit the description of a OPC but they are very close and they compare favorably with our existing MECs. 2,000 tons, 25 knots, 5,500 NMi Range, helo deck (but no hanger), three auto cannon, two RHIBs and a crew of only 60.

If we don’t want to keep them permanently, we could use them only until the OPC project is complete and then sell them, but that is still probably at least 15 years away.

Denial of innocent passage–could this be a trend?

In a move to isolate the British on the Falklands (Malvinas), the Argentines are requiring vessels bound to or from the Falklands through their EEZ to obtain prior approval. Recently a Spanish vessel was denied the right of innocent passage from the waters off the Falklands to Uruguay, because they had not formally requested permission a week ahead as required by Argentina’s “decree 256.” Argentine restrictions are hurting businesses in both Uruguay and Chile (as well as Argentina).

As noted earlier, this is not the first incidence of a coastal state requiring notice of transit. The Canadians want vessels to ask permission to transit the North West Passage. The Chinese are claiming sovereignty over virtually all of the South China Sea, talking as if it were territorial sea. The Coast Guard initiated the Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) and it is only useful if it covers ships transiting the EEZ as well as those going to US ports.

Perhaps it is inevitable that when a state assumes the authority to demand notification of passage though the EEZ, it will also occasionally exercise the “right” to deny passage, but this is the first time I have heard of it happening.

(In a related move, as a sign of solidarity with Argentina, Uruguay rescinded permission for a Montevideo port visit by a Royal Navy Destroyer en route to the Falklands only hours before its scheduled arrival.)

Japanese Coast Guard at Center of Sino-Japanese Dispute

Japan, China, and Taiwan are in a dispute over islands that convey ownership of potentially oil and gas rich offshore areas. The Japanese Coast Guard finds itself in the middle of the dispute. In the latest move it looks as if the Chinese may be moving drilling equipment into the disputed area. This is on the heals of apparently more aggressive fisheries enforcement by the Japanese Coast Guard that resulted in two Japanese cutters being rammed and a Chinese vessel seized with its captain still being held for prosecution. Some additional background here.

Breaking–Marines Recapture Ship Taken by Pirates

Looks like the US is taking a tougher stand against pirates:

At approximately 5 a.m. local time, Sept. 9, 24 U.S. Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s Maritime Raid Force (MRF) aboard USS Dubuque (LPD 8) operating under Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), boarded and seized control of Antigua-Barbuda-flagged, German–owned vessel M/V Magellan Star from pirates who attacked and boarded the vessel early Sept 8. See the Navy’s news release here.

Looks like 15th MEU had trained for a year specifically for a situation like this.

Passages North

56 years ago, on 4 September 1954, the icebreakers USCGC Northwind and USS Burton Island completed the first transit of the Northwest passage through McClure Strait.

There has been a lot more activity in the North lately (more here and here), with the promise that if the melting continues, passages from Northern Europe to Asia may be cut by up to half (link includes a nice comparisons of the routes). The Russians expect to make some money on fees for passage and the use of their icebreakers.

There is even talk that it may substantially hurt business at the Suez Canal and allow ships to avoid pirates off Somalia. Looks like that is still a few years off since the season is very limited and only ice strengthened vessels can use the route now.

Still other people are planning ahead. China is building their second polar icebreaker and positioning itself to exploit the Arctic. Maybe a little healthy competition is the wake up call we need.

Arming Merchant Ships, Yes, err–No!

An interesting bit of bureaucratic conflict here. It seems we want merchant ships carrying our cargoes off Somalia to hire armed guards on one hand, but then we make it difficult and add to the cost. There is also the question of letting armed vessels into US waters. There are many aspects to this issue, including action by the Coast Guard that was reversed.

China’s Coast Guards

Information Dissemination has an article about the Coast Guard’s counterparts in China. Five agencies share the Coast Guard’s missions: China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC), Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) of the Ministry of Transport, the anti-smuggling force of the General Administration of Customs, and their “Coast Guard” (aka Maritime Police in Chinese). All seem to be expanding, particularly China Maritime Surveillance and the Maritime Safety Administration.

The article talks almost exclusively about their cutters, including new construction. Apparently they don’t have many aircraft. There is no comprehensive list of personnel. Individually each is smaller than the USCG, but it sounds like collectively, they may have more personnel than the Coast Guard.