Rethinking Polar Sea–Another Alternative–Renovate, Simplify, Make Her Arctic Station Ship

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USCGC Polar Sea (WAGB-11): US Coast Guard Photo
The question of whether the Polar Sea should be reactivated has been kicking around for a while. After all, the Navy and the Coast Guard have been saying the country needs three heavy and three medium icebreakers. The proposed new icebreaker is projected to cost about $1B and will not increase the size of our icebreaker fleet. It will simply arrive in time to replace the Polar Star. The renovation of the Polar Sea was projected to cost on the order of $100M and provide seven to ten years of additional life. If you compare that to $1B for 30 years for a new icebreaker that sounds like a good trade-off, so why not?
FierceHomelandSecurity is reporting that the Coast Guard has told Congress they can do without her,
“Although a second heavy icebreaker would provide redundancy, the cost of this redundant capability would come at the expense of more pressing and immediate operational demands.
This is the conclusion of a report to Congress entitled “USCGC Polar Sea Business Case Analysis” dated November 07, 2013, that I will refer to simply as the analysis. download (pdf): Their summarized findings:

“A total of 43 mission critical systems in five general categories were assessed and assigned a condition rating. Overall, Propulsion, Auxiliary and Prime Mission Equipment are rated Poor to Fair, while Structure and Habitability are rated Fair to Good. POLAR SEA reactivation is estimated to cost $99.2 million (excluding annual operations and support costs) to provide 7-10 years of service to the Coast Guard. Given the age of the icebreaker, operations and support costs are projected to rise from $36.6 million in the first year of operation to $52.8 million in the tenth year of operation. Combining reactivation costs and point estimates for operating costs, reactivation would cost $573.9 million. Accounting for operational and technical uncertainties, using a 90% Confidence Level Risk Analysis, the total potential cost rises to $751.7 million.

“Arctic seasonal icebreaking demands through 2022 can be met with existing and planned Coast Guard assets, as current requirements do not justify the need for heavy icebreaking capability in the Arctic. Heavy icebreaker capability is needed to perform Operation Deep Freeze in Antarctica, but Coast Guard assets may not be the only option available to the National Science Foundation to support this activity. Although a second heavy icebreaker would provide redundancy, the cost of this redundant capability would come at the expense of more pressing and immediate operational demands. POLAR STAR, when fully reactivated, will provide heavy icebreaker capability until a new icebreaker can be delivered to meet both current and emerging requirements.”

It does not take much reading between the lines to see that the real issue here is not the one time renovation cost, it is the high annual cost of maintaining a complex plant that is increasingly unsupportable. Congress might fund the renovation costs, but the annual maintenance costs are likely to be taken out of hide and the projected $36.6M to $52.8M per year is just too much for the increased capability. The conclusion that restoring her to her original configuration is not a viable option is probably reasonable, but it is the only alternative. Because

Polar Sea’s basic structure is sound. Quoting the analysis,

“Based on the results of the inspection, the structure is rated EXCELLENT and the average remaining service life for the structure remains 25+ years. No significant wastage or corrosion was noted and no major repairs have been necessary since the last report.”

Maine Engines and Propellers:

The Polar Class have always been “maintenance intensive” and a good part of the reason is the complexity of her nine engine propulsion system and her controlable pitch propellers (CPP).
The complexity of her six diesel engines and three gas turbines is rather self explanatory. That they are now old and virtually unsupportable makes the problems even more obvious, but the propellers merit additional explanation. Quoting from the analysis (p.16),
“The CPPs are rated POOR.

“The following discussion is quoted from the Polar Service Life Extension Project (SLEP), Option A, Scope and Feasibility Analysis submitted by M. Rosenblatt and Son! AMSEC LLC, May 2006 and is an excellent description of the challenges that still confront the CPP system: Controllable Pitch Propellers and Associated Hydraulic Systems. This remains the most significant problem that must be solved if the cutters are to continue to provide reliable service. The propellers are subject to particularly severe conditions during heavy icebreaking conditions and a significant failure may lead to cancellation of a mission, as well as presenting the potential for leakage of hydraulic fluid to the environment. There are issues relating both to the propeller hubs themselves and the internal hydraulic system components. The following discussion will continue to address the propeller hubs separately from the rest of the CPP system for three reasons: 1) their current condition is  different than the rest of the system, 2) the likelihood for a known fix is different, and 3) the propeller hubs cannot be repaired while the ship is deployed or while in the water which vastly impacts operational availability.
“Propeller Hubs. The hubs are rated POOR. In recent years, it has been necessary to dry dock the cutters and inspect the propeller hubs after every heavy icebreaking deployment. Throughout the 50 years of experience with the two Polar Class ships, the interval between hub overhauls has never been more than two heavy icebreaking missions. According to the Coast Guard Technical Point of Contact for the CPP hub overhaul contract, every time the hubs have been overhauled there has been some unusual wear, scoring, cracking, leaking, broken parts or other indicator that it was appropriate that the hubs be overhauled before an additional heavy icebreaking mission was attempted. In other words, there has been no indication that overhauls were unnecessarily being performed at too short an interval. Over the past 25 years, dozens of modifications have been made to the hubs attempting to eliminate the negative conditions found. Typically corrections in one spot have lead to new symptoms in another location. Sizes, clearances, and material strengths are in critical balance. While the hubs have undoubtedly been improved over the past 25 years, their service life without overhaul remains relatively short.
Overall Condition:
The following is the “Reader’s Digest” version of the Analysis’ report on the summary of the ship’s condition:
POOR:
Overall main propulsion system
Main propulsion diesel engines
Controllable Pitch Propellers (CPP)
Ship Service Diesel Engine
Uncontaminated Seawater System
Electrical distribution system (parts and technical support)
Cargo Cranes
FAIR:
Propulsion Gas Generators and Turbines
Propulsion Control System: Switchgear, Rectifiers, and Exciters
Machinery Control and Monitoring System (MCAMS)
Ship Service Diesel Generator (SSDG)
Steering Gear
Ventilation System
Fire Main and Flushing (Seawater) System
Sanitary Systems
Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) Systems
Central Hydraulic System (CHS)
Anchor Windlass
Bus transfer switches
Electrical distribution system (preservation).
Habitability
GOOD:
Propulsion Generators
Aft Stem Tube Bearings (as yet untested)
Forward Stem Tube Bearings
Cooper Split Roller Bearing
Lube Oil Purifiers
Evaporators
Incinerator
Oily Water Separator
Fresh Water Systems
Chilled Water System
Halon Systems
400 Hz Switchboard
Electrical distribution system (mechanical)
EXCELLENT:
Reduction Gears
Propulsion Shafting
Thrust Bearing
Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
Auxiliary Boilers
Helicopter Power Supply
Local Monitoring & Alarm System
Diesel Fuel Transfer & Purification System
Structural
UNTESTED:
Boat Davits
REMOVED:
Electronics systems
Outfit and spares
An Opportunity in the form of a Problem:
The Coast Guard has been using a National Security Cutter over the last two summers to provide the equivalent of a Coast Guard Section afloat in the absence of infrastructure ashore, effectively a helicopter airstation, a small boat station, communications, and command and control. These very expensive ships certainly have a number of desirable characteristics, but they are hardly what one would envision if planning an Arctic station ship from scratch. The hull is simply not strong enough for the environment. Not only is it not an icebreaker, it is not even ice strengthened.
If we take advantage of the Polar Sea’s still robust hull, by spending more money up front (Congress would have to appropriate it, it could not come out of hide) and replace the engineering plant with good choices that both reduce manning and increase reliability, we might have effectively an additional medium icebreaker for up to 25 years.
Yes, it would take more planning and more money up front, but with a bit of redesign and reconstruction it appears the Coast Guard could have an icebreaker of at least 18,000 horsepower with fixed pitch props that could be tailored for an Arctic Station Ship role freeing the NSCs and/or the Polar Star for more normal patrol functions. The six main prop diesel generators could be replaced by perhaps three modern diesel generators, and the three turbines removed altogether. Used as main propulsion generators, three MTU 20V 1163 diesels like the ones on the Bertholf Class would allow any two engines to drive the three existing electric motors at full power. Allowing the existing motors to run in reverse would probably require a new propulsion control system, but the existing system is only rated as fair now anyway. A new digital system would almost certainly be more flexible and easier to maintain and would probably require fewer watch standers. 18,000 horsepower using the existing motors, is way down from her current designed combined diesel and gas turbine output, is more than many of the world’s icebreakers, and more than either of the National Science Foundation’s icebreakers. If more power were deemed essential, it might be possible to put one LM2500 on the center shaft and still get the benefits of a greatly simplified and modernized engineering plant. The Ship Service electrical system might also be updated to provide the capability for one generator to handle the entire load, something the ship does not currently have. It might even be possible to add retractable fin stabilizers (removal of the turbines having made more room in the hull) or at least a rudder roll stabilization system added (the rudders system does need work). Stabilization is desirable in that it would allow her to operate boats and helicopters in more severe conditions.
By re-engining the Polar Sea, the Coast Guard would not only get a more reliable ship, requiring a smaller crew, potentially cheaper to operate than a National Security Cutter, it would also leave free up the Polar Sea’s existing engines and propellers and possibly other systems to use as spares to keep Polar Star functional and free her from duties in the Arctic.

New International Cooperation

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Photo credit: DelamontagneNL, via Wikipedia, Zeeland’s sistership HNLMS Holland
Putting Law Enforcement Detachments on foreign ships is now relatively routine, but a reader (thanks Gils) has informed me of a new level of cooperation. “HNLMS Zeeland, one the new Dutch (Holland class–Chuck) OPVs, left for the Dutch Caribbean yesterday. They will first go to Key West to pick up a USCG helicopter.
Additionally he tells me, “On January 11 the Facebook page of the Dutch MoD in the Caribbean & Caribbean Coast Guard (section) posted the following text: Yesterday a formal agreement has been agreed upon between the United States and the Netherlands to station helicopters from the U.S. Coast Guard on Dutch ships engaged in counter-narcotics operations.  The ultimate form of cooperation for safety on and from the sea!”
The Holland class are a new class of relatively large OPVs. At 3,750 tons full load they are sized between the Hamilton class and the Bertholfs. Zeeland was commissioned only last year. Deliveries of new NH90 NATO frigate helicopters to the Netherlands Navy have been delayed, this explains the need for a Coast Guard helicopter.

Chinese to Build World’s Largest Cutter

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Japanese Coast Guard Cutter Shikishima, this class of two are currently the largest offshore patrol vessels in the world. Photo from Japanese Wikipedia; ja:ファイル:JapanCoastGuard Shikishima.jpg

German Navy blog “Marine Forum” reports (21 January) that the

China Ship-building Industry Corporation has been contracted with developing and building a 10,000-ton and another 4,000-ton surveillance ship.
(rmks: for paramilitary China Coast Guard or China Marine Surveillance)

Meanwhile, in a move designed to bolster their claims in the South China Sea, they also report,

With Vietnam: China will expand paramilitary infrastructure at Sansha City (Paracel Archipelago) in the South China Sea … permanently base a 5,000-ts patrol ship (rmks: prob. China Marine Surveillance – CMS) and begin regular patrols.

Don’t expect China’s new 10,000 ton cutter to look like a US Coast Guard Cutter. The Chinese seem to measure their Coast Guard primarily in comparison to the Japanese Coast Guard which has until now operated the largest cutters in the world, two 9,350 full load, Shikishima class high endurance helicopter carrying cutters. Like their Japanese counterparts, they are likely to be built to merchant standards, will be only lightly armed, but will have excellent aviation facilities. The additional tonnage is likely to give them an advantage if they get in a “shoving match” with opposing coast guards, and they are likely to have a secondary military transport role. With a relatively large number of boats, they could probably land a fair number of personnel in a relatively short time. By way of comparison the National Security Cutters are 4,500 tons full load.

Coast Guard to help the Forrest Service–Fire Aviation

Fire Aviation is reporting an interesting wrinkle in the story of the transfer of Coast Guard C-130s to the Forrest Service,

“We were surprised to hear from Mrs. Jones (a Public Affairs Specialist for the Forest Service at the National Interagency Fire Center-Chuck) …that a joint U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Forest Service program office will provide logistics, operations, training, maintenance, and support for the C-130H aircraft. The Coast Guard has been managing a fleet of C-130s since 1959, using them for long range search and rescue, drug interdiction, illegal migrant patrols, homeland security, and logistics. They have 24 older C-130Hs which are being upgraded with new center wing boxes and cockpit equipment with new multi-function displays. In 2008 they began replacing some of the C-130Hs with new C-130Js; they have six now with three more on order. All these numbers were valid before the Coast Guard agreed to send seven C-130Hs to the USFS if the Coast Guard could get the 14 almost new C-27J aircraft from the military that had been earmarked for the Forest Service.”

A Quick Look at Guam.

File:Guam in Oceania (-mini map -rivers).svg

BreakingDefense has a post on the inadequacies of Guam’s infrastructure for support of additional Military presence. I’m referencing it here because, I think in the long run we are going to need to put more assets in Guam, to look after the huge Western Pacific EEZ. Ultimately I think it would be a good idea to base two or three Offshore Patrol Cutters there. Right now the Coast Guard has a 225 foot buoy tender and two 110s. The Navy supplies SAR helicopter assets in lieu of CG air assets.

To see how much of our EEZ is in the Western Pacific, look here, and keep in mind that Mercator projections are deceptive, making areas in the high lattitudes looks disproportionately large. The US has the Largest EEZ in the World and 85% of it is in PACAREA.

Late addition: Incidentally, it is about 3300 nautical miles from Guam to Hawaii, long way. The HC-130Js can fly that far unrefueled, if we had any in the Pacific, but the older “H” models at CGAS Barbers Point can’t. Even the “J”s would not have a lot of excess for doing searches flying between Oahu and Andersen AFB. It is almost 600 miles further from Kodiak. Maybe we ought to have some fixed wing there too.

What is a Corvette? and What Next?

I wrote this for another blog, Center for Maritime Security or CIMSEC, where I was asked to coordinate a week of discussion on corvettes. What does that have to do with the Coast Guard? Essentially the only difference I see between large CG cutters and corvettes is a bit of equipment. I explain below. Couldn’t hep but put in a little Coast Guard history. Anyway the discussion will continue there, but I will cross post my two posts here. Later in the week I’ll talk about the “Offshore Patrol Cutter, the other Littoral Combat Ship.”

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Classification of surface warships as cruisers, destroyers, frigates, or corvettes, has become like pornography. There are no generally accepted definitions, but “I know it when I see it”–except that everyone sees it a little differently.

Since this is “Corvette Week” what are we really talking about?

(Note: unless otherwise specified, lengths are over all and displacements are full load)

My Combat Fleets of the World, 16th Edition, which I have used here extensively for reference, defines Corvettes as, “Surface Combatants of less than 1,500 tons but more than 1,000 full load displacement–essentially, fourth rate surface combatants.”  but goes on to note that “…the designation as used here essentially refers to smaller frigates and does not correspond to the European concept of corvettes as any warship larger than a patrol craft but smaller than a frigate.” I feel to confine the definition within a 500 ton range is too restrictive. in fact it would have excluded the Castle class corvettes of WWII as too large, and other corvettes as too small.

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Royal Navy Photograph of Castle class corvette HMS Denbigh Castle (K696)

Pre-WWII

During the age of sail, corvettes were originally warships typically smaller than a frigate, but larger than a sloop, usually with guns on a single deck. Some ships continued to be called corvettes as steam was introduced, but in the Royal Navy, in 1877, corvettes along with sloops and frigates were subsumed under the new designation “cruisers.” Corvettes, as a type, essentially disappeared from the English naval lexicon until 1939. The term was kept alive in some navies (including the French, German, and Italian) as a rank that translated corvette-captain, a rank generally equal to Lieutenant Commander.

World War II:

Corvettes as a type reemerged just prior to WWII. As it became clear that U-boats would be a major threat, Britain saw the need for an escort vessel that could be built quickly and in large numbers, in yards that had not been considered capable of building warships. Just before WWII, they ordered the first of 267 “Flower Class” corvettes that were built in the UK and Canada. They modified the design for a whale catcher named Southern Pride, enlarging it to 205 feet overall and a displacement of 1245 to 1390 tons. They were terrible warships, weakly armed, cramped, uncomfortable, and slow. Single screw, reciprocating steam propulsion gave them a maximum speed of only 16.5 knots, a knot slower than a typical (Type VII) surfaced U-boat. They were originally intended only for coastal operations, but because of their long range, they were thrown into the Battle of the Atlantic, where they were by far the most numerous transatlantic convoy escorts for the critical early years, taking slow merchant convoys across the mid-Atlantic air gap, while the Home Fleet’s more capable fleet destroyers were generally held back to escort the battle fleet or met convoys only as they approached the British Isles.

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Flower Class Corvette HMS Polyanthus, Source =www.oldships.org.uk, Author =Leidseplein Date =1943-09-

Reportedly Winston Churchill had a hand it designating this new class “corvettes,” probably in an attempt to make them appear more glamorous than the term “patrol vessels” which had been applied to similar vessels previously. Two years after the re-introduction of the term “corvette,” the term “frigate” was also resurrected to describe another war emergency escort program, this one more complex and more capable but still using reciprocating steam propulsion. Larger commercial yards converted to making frigates (301 to 307 ft, 1920 to 2420 ton), but smaller yards continued to make corvettes of the improved Castle class (252 ft, 1590 to 1630 tons), while naval yards continued to produce small numbers of sloops like the Black Swan class that were the true premier ASW escorts of the Royal Navy.

Australia also built corvettes, 60 ships of the similar but even smaller, slower Bathurst Class (186 ft). Initially they were classified as minesweepers, but found more employment as escorts, so were more frequently referred to as corvettes.

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Bathurst-class corvette, HMAS Fremantle, State Library of Victoria

Japan, Germany, and Italy all made similar escort ships, but only the numerous Italian  Gabbiano class (193 foot, 728 tons, with combined diesel or electric propulsion no less),  were actually referred to as corvettes.

All of the WWII corvettes were primarily ASW escorts, but their were a number of classes of vessels, many built prior to the war, that share DNA with today’s missile armed corvettes. These were small, fast, torpedo armed vessels that resembled destroyers, but most had a standard displacement of 1000 tons or less. Usually they were referred to as “torpedo boats.”  Japan built twelve, The Germans built 48 (the last 15 were large enough to have been considered destroyers in other navies). The French Navy completed twelve. The Italians completed 69 (some of which were closer to frigates or destroyer escorts). The Italian Spica class (269 ft, 885 to 1,030 ton, 34 knots) may serve as an example.

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Italian Spica Class torpedo boat

Generally, the war emergency programs had one thing in common. They were not the ships these navies would have chosen to build in peacetime. In wartime priorities change; planning horizons contract. Producibility may trump quality. They were all compromised in some fashion–in their speed, survivability, weapons, or economy of operation. Corvettes filled a need for large numbers of escorts, but after the war, most were quickly discarded.

The MCM Connection:

The Flower Class Corvettes were originally also equipped to sweep mines. As noted the Australian Bathurst Class began life as minesweepers. While the US built no “corvettes” during the war, the minesweepers of the Raven (220 foot/1040 tons), Auk (221 foot/1,250 tons), and Admirable ((180 foot) classes frequently functioned in this role. In fact, with minor modification Admirable class ships were redesignated PCEs (Patrol Craft, Escort). All these minesweepers were built with sonar. By the end of the war, most were equipped with hedgehogs, depth charge projectors (K-guns) and dual depth charge racks, having enjoyed priority for ASW equipment second only to destroyer escorts.

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Former Auk class minesweeper still serving in the Philippine Navy as Corvette BRP Rizal (PS-74), US Government photo, 050822-N-6264C-145 Sulu Sea (Aug. 22, 2005)

Post WW II:

Since the end of WWII corvettes have generally fallen into two categories, with some designs attempting to incorporate elements both types. They tend to be either:
—Small, fast, missile armed vessels optimized for ASuW, like Sweden’s Visby Class (40 knots, 239 ft, 650 tons) usually expected to operate in groups, either with others of their kind or acting as flagships for even smaller missile boats, or
—Smaller versions of frigates with moderate speed optimized for patrol and presence in peacetime and escort during wartime like the Damen designed SIGMAs or  India’s Kamorta Class (25 knots, 358 foot oa, 3100 tons).

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Visby class Corvette, HMS Härnösand, Source: Xiziz at en.wikipedia

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SIGMA class corvette

Largest Operators of Corvettes:

The largest operator of corvettes is Russia with approximately 53 (3 Buyan, 1 Buyan M, 7 Parchim II, 23 Grisha V, 4 Grisha III, 2 Dergach Project 1239, 13 Nanuchka) (80 if you count the 27 Tarantuls that fall slightly below the 500 ton threshold I have assumed).
India, China, South Korea, Indonesia, and Italy also maintain large numbers of corvettes.

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Chinese Type 056 corvette 583 Ganzhou, by 樱井千一

Corvettes in the USN:

While the US Navy has never built corvettes for its own use, the type is not without precedence in the US.

In the early days of WWII, when the US navy was desperately short of escorts, 18 Flower class corvettes were transferred to the USN. Eight of those were manned by USCG crews.

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Coast Guard manned Flower Class Corvette USS Intensity (PG-93), mid-1943. Former  HMCS Fennel (K194) [http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h97000/h97406.jpg]

In the 50s the Navy was interested in experimenting with types that might be built hurriedly in an emergency. The result was the four ships of the Claude Jones class (DE-1033-1036) built by Avondale between 1956 and 1959. At 312 feet long and 2000 tons, they were essentially the same size as the preceding Dealey Class, but they were  simplified, diesel powered, slower, and more lightly armed. These ships were really a update of the corvette concept of a cheap simple escorts that lent itself to rapid construction. (Similarly about the same time the British were building 14 HMS Blackwood Class  (Type 14) that were “2nd Rate Frigates” of 1536 tons, powered by a single shaft steam turbine plant with no gun larger then 40mm.)

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USS Claude Jones (DE-1033), US Navy photo, http://www.navsource.org

In the late 1960s the US built four corvettes, given US hull numbers PF-103 to PF-106, that were immediately turned over to the Iranian Navy. They became the Bayandor Class (275 feet long, 1,135 tons).

In the early ’70s, two additional PF-103 class ships (PF-107 and 108), built to a modified design, were delivered to Thailand’s Navy. These were the Tapi Class.

Between 1977 and 1983 Tacoma Boat built a class of four CODOG powered “PCG” for Saudi Arabia, the Badr class, 245 feet, 1,038 tons, 30 knots.

Between 1983 and 1987 Tacoma Boat built two diesel powered “PFMMs” for the Thai Navy Ratanakosin class 252 foot, 960 tons, 26 knots.

Between 1989 and 1995 Northrop Grumman Litton built three CODOG Corvettes for the Israeli Navy, the Sa’ar 5 class, (281 foot, 1,275 tons, 33 knots).

File:Three Sa'ar 5 Class Missile Corvettes Going For a Cruise.jpg

American built Israeli SA’AR5 corvettes, http://www.flickr.com/photos/idfonline/6871983192/in/photostream

Between 2008 and 2013, VT Halter Marine has been building a class of four missile corvettes for the Egyptian Navy, the  Ambassador MkIII class (205 feet, 700 tons, 41 knots). The first has already been delivered.

An undated photo of the ENS S. Ezzat, an Egyptian Fast Missile Craft. VT Halter Marine Photo

An undated photo of the ENS S. Ezzat, an Egyptian Fast Missile Craft. VT Halter Marine Photo

While the Littoral Combat Ships are not normally considered corvettes, on June 10, 2013, Rear Admiral John F. Kirby, the Chief of Information for the Navy called them Corvettes. Without a mission module or aviation detachment, they are really more like OPVs. But when the Mine Warfare module is mounted they become MCM vessels. When an ASW or ASuW module is mounted, they start to look like corvettes.

The Claude Jones class ships were transferred to the Indonesian Navy and continued in service there until 2006. Of the six PF-103 class ships, two Iranian ships were lost in combat with Iraq, but the remaining four are still in service with the Iranian and Thai Navies and have been updated. The Badr class and the  Ratanakosin class are still in service with their respective navies, and the Sa’ar Vs are still the most advanced surface ships in the Israeli Navy. All but the two Thai Navy Ratanakosin class (PF-107 and 108) have been equipped to launch anti-ship cruise missiles.

The Coast Guard Connection:

During WWII Coast Guard Cutters were frequently used as ASW escorts, some quite successfully, filling corvette and frigate roles. After the war, new construction frequently included provision for ASW systems either as built or as planned upgrades in the case of a major conflict.

The 16 Reliance class Medium Endurance Cutters (210 feet, 1,050 tons, 18 knots) delivered 1964 to 1969, were built with provision for adding sonar, hedge hogs, and torpedo tubes. They were originally to have been designated PCs. a designation shared with the sub chasers of WWII.

The 12 Hamilton Class High Endurance cutters (378 feet, 3,050 tons, 29 knots) completed 1967 to 1972, were built with ASW systems installed and their systems were upgraded and provision for harpoon installed 1989 to 1992. As built, they were not the equal of contemporary Destroyer Escorts with their AN/SQS-26 sonars, but were comparable to those built only a few years before. An argument can be made that these ships, as built and later modified, could be considered, if not frigates, at least corvettes.

USCGC Mellon after upgrades including Harpoon, CIWS, and support for LAMPS

The thirteen Bear class cutters (270 feet, 1,780 tons, 19.5 knots) completed 1983 to 1990, were built without ASW systems, but had provision for adding a towed array and supporting a LAMPS I helicopter. If these systems had been provided, then the ships might have also been considered corvettes.

The Coast Guard’s National Security Cutters, of the Bertholf class (eight ships planned, 418 ft/4,500 tons) have no installed ASW systems or ASCMs, but they do have excellent aviation support facilities and the ship has been marketed as the basis for a frigate program. Aside from Exocets carried by the French ships, they are in most respects more capable warships than the Floreal “light surveillance frigates” (307 ft/2950 tons) and similar to the French Lafayette Class frigates (410 ft/3,600 tons) which also currently have no sonar.

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USCGC Waesche, U.S. Coast Guard photo ID: 100228-G-2129M-004

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French frigate Floréal-class Ventôse (F733)

The Coast Guard is in the process of procuring a new class to replace its Medium Endurance Cutters. The resulting ship is likely to be similar to the Floreal class (90 to 100 meters in length and 2500 to 3500 tons) but faster and will share sensors and some weapons with the Bertholf class and the Littoral Combat Ships. Addition of ASW or ASCM systems would result in ships many would classify as light frigates or corvettes.

Bottom Line–What is a Corvette?:

Corvettes slot under frigates but above patrol boats or missile boats as a classification of surface combatants. To me, this means that they are the smallest or perhaps least capable ocean-going warships. This is a bit of a stretch for Corvettes like the Visby, but in fact the Swedes have deployed even smaller warships to the Indian Ocean for counter piracy operations. That sets the low end of the the displacement range at about 500 tons, but when we look for an upper limit, it seems a moving target, with no similar performance based limit.

The US and Britain already build destroyers the size of WWII cruisers. Germany and in the near future Britain will build frigates over 6,000 tons full load. Japan’s Coast Guard has OPVs displacing 9,350 tons full load.  If we tripled the displacement of WWII corvettes as we have done with WWII Frigates and Destroyers, Corvettes could displace almost 5,000 tons, so I don’t think displacement is a reliable determinant.

Strict naval vessel construction standards don’t necessarily distinguish a corvette from an OPV either. They were not applied to the original “Flower” class, and they don’t apply to the Damen designed Sigma class, built or building for Indonesia, Morocco, and Vietnam, or to the French Lafayette class (also operated by Taiwan, Singapore, and Saudi Arabia) and Floreal class (also operated by the Moroccan Navy) which are rated as frigates but which it might be argued are actually corvettes.

The only metric that doesn’t seem to have changed much over the last 70 years is crew size. Corvettes generally have crews of 120 or less, frigates from 120 to perhaps a bit over 200, while destroyer crews begin slightly under 200 and go up to about 350, and cruiser crews are larger still. The DDG1000s will apparently have a frigate sized crew, but their final crew may be larger than currently planned. OPV crews tend to be corvette sized or smaller.

Just as the difference between Spruance Class Destroyers and Ticonderoga Class cruisers was mission and associated equipment, not displacement, the differentiation between the various types of warships and between Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) and corvettes may simply comes down to their missions and equipment. OPVs include a wide range of ships, but the common thread, generally accepted, is that they have no ASW weapons, no heavy anti-ship cruise missiles, and only a self-defense AAW capability. Adding an ASW capability and/or cruise missiles would convert an OPV into a corvette. Perhaps they would not make very good warships, but then the original Corvettes weren’t very good warships either, but they served a vital role. Conversely an old frigate or corvette, stripped of all its weapons except a medium caliber gun and heavy machine guns would become an OPV, even if it nominally retained its frigate or corvette designation as in the case of Portugal’s Joao Coutinho and Baptista de Andrade class or some of Italy’s Minerva class.

If we had no history, and we could start ship designations on “a clean sheet of paper” we might define ships types based on their missions and equipment, saying destroyers are vessels designed with robust capacity to perform well in all three major surface combatant warfare areas, AAW, ASuW, and ASW. Frigates are designed to perform well in only two missions areas  (with possibly modest self defense capability in the third). Corvettes would be single mission specialists with only modest capability in the other two missions (if at all). OPVs would be vessels equipped for missions that did not require robust capabilities in any of these three mission areas. All four types might be called generically “cruisers” which would bring that designation back to its original meaning, a vessel smaller than a ship of the line that can operate independently.

The Future of Corvettes:

WWII corvettes were small ships packed with crew and weapons.They were small because there was an urgent need for many ships that could not be met by the shipyards that normally built warships. They were a way of making the small commercial yards serve the war effort. If we are ever engaged in a prolonged conflict against a near peer adversary we may again resort to a similar expedience. If so, the resulting corvette is more likely to be based on a petroleum industry offshore support vessel rather than a whaling or fishing vessel.

But when ships are built in peace time, for a 20 to 40 year life, other factors beside construction cost start to dominate. In the West, crew costs weigh heavily, while increasing hull size appears less important, provided we do not load up the larger hull with additional systems which will in turn drive up crew costs. Larger hulls are more seaworthy, allow greater endurance, and may be made quieter. They may even be more economical to operate and maintain because of easier access.

Some European Countries that formally operated a number of Corvettes seem to have abandoned the type in favor of ships with more range and better seakeeping including The Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Denmark has instead produced frigates and a novel class of ships, the Absalon Class “support ships,” (450 ft/6,600 tons) that include a relatively large hull of modest speed, with a relatively small crew of about 100, and a large reconfigurable spaces–an open one topside midships where missile systems can be placed and a “garage” area under the flight deck that can accommodate vehicles and containerized loads. These ships are perhaps too large to be considered corvettes, but they are not nearly so well armed as the frigates of the similarly sized Iver Huitfeldt-class. They do have characteristics I would expect to see on future corvettes, a relatively commodious hull (because “steel is cheap and air is free”), a relatively small crew (because that is the most expensive component over the life-cycle of the ship), and reconfigurable spaces and weapon systems, that allow the ships to be adapted to different missions (because that is allow us to hedge our bets regarding what capabilities will be needed, while allowing that minimal crew over most of the life of the ship).

Because Corvettes are always compromised, they are likely to be controversial. Many will not agree with the compromises accepted. That is certainly true of the new American Corvette, the Littoral Combat ship.

In some respects the LCSs may be the prototype of the future corvette, in that it is not particularly small, but they were made cheap to operate with a minimal crew, and they are single mission ships, but with the advantage that the mission can be changed over time, although not as quickly as once advertised. Other aspects of the ship were perhaps not as well thought out, but they will serve a purpose, and perhaps the next generation LCS  or convertible corvette will better meet our needs.

DOD Arctic Strategy

Nov. 22 the DOD released its Arctic strategy. The news release is here. but I have quoted it in full below:

“Department of Defense Announces Arctic Strategy

“Today the Department of Defense released its Arctic Strategy during a speech by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel at the Halifax International Security Forum in Nova Scotia, Canada. The strategy document may be viewed at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_Arctic_Strategy.pdf.

“Secretary Hagel’s speech can be read here.”

The strategy itself is actually pretty short, only 16 glossy pages. The readers digest version breaks down to, the DOD will work with allies and partners both internationally and domestically to assure the Arctic remains,

“…a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges.”

The Coast Guard released its own, much more detailed strategy earlier, reported here.

Worth noting, DOD Strategy’s definition of the Arctic, like that of the National and Coast Guard strategies, extends well south of the Arctic Circle:

“The DoD strategy uses a broad definition of the Arctic, codified in 15 U.S.C. 4111, that includes all U.S. and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all U.S. territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas, and the Aleutian islands chain.”

This might be of particular interest to the Coast Guard:

“Department will work through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to maintain air tracking capabilities in the Arctic. As the maritime domain becomes increasingly accessible, the Department will seek to improve its maritime detection and tracking in coordination with DHS and other departments and agencies as well as through public/private partnerships. The Department of the Navy, in its role as DoD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness, will lead DoD coordination on maritime detection and tracking. Where possible, DoD will also collaborate with international partners to employ, acquire, share, or develop the means required to improve sensing, data collection and fusion, analysis, and information-sharing to enhance domain awareness appropriately in the Arctic. Monitoring regional activity and analyzing emerging trends are key to informing future investments in Arctic capabilities and ensuring they keep pace with increasing human activity in the region over time.”

There is a footnote on page ten of the document (page 12 of the pdf) that might provide a justification for DOD funding of icebreakers for the Coast Guard:

“11As expressed by Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and Commander, USNORTHCOM, in a May 2008 memorandum, the United States needs assured access to support U.S. national interests in the Arctic. Although this imperative could be met by regular U.S. Government ships in open water up to the marginal ice zone, only ice-capable ships provide assured sovereign presence throughout the region and throughout the year. Assured access in areas of pack ice could also be met by other means, including submarines and aircraft.”