Ten Steps to Raise Our Profile in the Polar Regions

The August edition of US Naval Institute Proceedings has a short article by retired Captain Lawson Brigham under in the “Nobody Asked Me But…” section that list of ten suggested steps “to ensure that our many polar maritime interests are given proper attention.”

He touches on the need for Arctic Patrol ships but this is not really about hardware justification. These proposals impact virtually every mission area. I think it’s worth a read.

New “Voyage of the Damned”

Looks like the Coast guard may be involved in a situation where a ship loaded with people claiming to be refugees of an oppressive regime sail about from port to port and they are repeatedly refused entry.

This recalls an incident in 1939 that damaged the Coast Guard’s image in the eyes of many, the voyage of the motor vessel St Louis carrying 937 mostly Jewish refugees seeking asylum from the Nazis. The story was made into a movie, “Voyage of the Damned,” in 1976.

The Coast Guard historian’s take on the incident, which seems to show our bad press was not justified is here.

Ramblings on “Maritime Domain Awareness”

Some random thoughts on “Maritime Domain Awareness,” prompted by a Congressional mandate, Canada’s recent action regarding the North West Passage, and China’s “enforcement” of their EEZ.
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“Maritime Domain Awareness.” It is a nice catch phrase, but where are we going with this? What is the objective? What level of detail is enough?

We want ships bound for US ports to report their intentions, what if they don’t? What’s the punishment? What about those that pass just outside our territorial sea, and might suddenly veer into a US port,  but aren’t required to check in? Are we being effective, or is this yet another attempt to be seen to be doing something, that is actually nothing more than an inconvenience to the law abiding mariners while making us no safer?
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Having read Ryan’s article about the Coast Guard Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, this amendment caught my eye:

H.AMDT.472 to H.R.3619 Section 1332 -“Directs the Secretary to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat the illicit flow of narcotics, weapons, bulk cash, and other contraband through the use of submersible and semi-submersible vessels.”

My first reaction–I foolishly assumed that what was being mandated was a system that would have a high probability of detecting any submersible or semi-submersible approaching the US.

–I would love to see us have this capability.
–All our other “Maritime Domain Awareness” problems are likely to be solved by any system that could do this.
–Let’s see, we would need a field of acoustic sensors wrapped around the US coast line, and then we would need some visual way to identify the contacts picked up–we could probably use UAVs for that…

But then–Do they have any idea how incredibly hard this is? This may be harder than tracking Ballistic Missile submarines. The Navy with all their resources can’t do this. We can’t even monitor our land border. It could easily require the entire CG budget.

Maybe the Secretary’s plan ought to be to “let the Navy do it.”

My next thought–Even having read it, I don’t really know what it means. Looking at it again, are we talking about these craft coming into US waters? Or are we expected to stop this illegal traffic wherever it exists, if the fruits of the trade might end up in the US? It’s not specific. As I understand it, most of these semisubmersibles go to Mexico, not directly to the US.

And finally, what is the point, if we are not also monitoring every sail and motor boat who might also bring in “narcotics, weapons, bulk cash, and other contraband?”
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Then the Canadian government put the world on notice that ships entering that country’s Arctic waters will be subject to new mandatory vessel-tracking rules aimed at preventing terrorist activity and pollution while improving search-and-rescue capabilities in the Far North. The Canadian plan requires mandatory registration for ships of 300 tonnes or more, for tugs with a two-ship weight of 500 tonnes or more and for any vessel carrying dangerous goods or potential pollutants. Read more here and here. For an overview of the Canadian position, link here.
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Then there are the Chinese, whose interpretation of the Law of the Sea, seems very different from our own. They seem to view the EEZ as little different from their territorial sea–a bit of history. Very recently they objected to our exercising with South Korea in the Yellow Sea even though presumably the exercises would not have even entered their EEZ. The Chinese have also been harassing the Japanese Coast Guard in their own EEZ (more here and here). The US Naval Institute blog is discussing the latest flap between the US and China in an article entitled “Poking China in the Chest.” The Chinese have been making a lot of friends lately and they are a member of the security council, so don’t be surprised to see something like their view of the rights of coastal states being raised in the UN.
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I think we are going to see more changes to the EEZ. I can see points like this being made:

–How can you argue with the desire to limit pollution and quickly respond to maritime disasters as the Canadians state they want to do?
–How can a state monitor the economic exploitation of their EEZ if they don’t know who is there? Is a requirement to report entry into the EEZ any different from requiring name, flag, and homeport be displayed?
How could anyone engaged in legitimate activity object?
–Isn’t preventing terrorism an element of managing economic resources within the EEZ? Can’t we say the same about preventing a Naval attack?

While the Navy will probably want none of this, as the Coast Guard, there might be elements worth considering here.

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It would be nice to have a system that showed us everything within the EEZ, but it is unlikely we will see that anytime soon.

In addition to getting projected ETA at our ports, if we were prepared to accept, catalog, store, and redistribute the information to those who could use the information, it might be helpful to ask all vessels entering our EEZ to identify themselves, to help us classify the contacts we do detect, but under the present regime I don’t think we have any recourse, if those who claim to be in innocent passage refuse.

Short of a robust detection capability to find those not reporting, additional reporting may be only a paper exercise of little utility. If the detection capability were truly robust, we would not need reporting.

The weapons of mass destruction we worry about, as well as “narcotics, weapons, bulk cash, and other contraband,” are not limited to large ships or semisubmersibles. They can come in on boats that appear no different from the thousands of recreational boats that enter and leave our harbors every day.

Trouble in Latin America

Because the Coast Guard regularly operates in the waters off Latin America, and flies patrols from bases there, we probably want to pay attention to what is happening in region.

Venezuela recently broke off diplomatic relations with Columbia, after Colombian accusations that Venezuela was sheltering FARC rebels.

There was already an uproar about the recent agreement between the US and Costa Rica allowing the US military limited access to Costa Rica to refuel ships and pursue drug traffickers. There was substantial opposition within Costa Rica and much speculation from the anti-American quarters that the US would use Costa Rica as an avenue to attack Nicaragua or Venezuela.

Before that, there were accusations that the US was behind the 2009 coup in Honduras that removed a pro-Venezuelan President.

We are seeing the solidification of anti-American feeling exemplified by the emergence of the “Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America” or ALBA, which began as an economic alliance between Cuba and Venezuela and now also includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint vincent and the Grenadines.

All the chest pounding and anger against the US and Colombia is probably more for domestic consumption than any indication of immediate intent, but we might see some of this hostility in port and sometime angry words are translated into action by young men, acting without their government’s blessing.  Our people are in a potentially dangerous region where not everyone sees us as the good guys.

As they say, “Be careful out there.”

USCGC Death Star

Back in May, I mentioned that a laser equipped Phalanx CIWS had successfully shot down a drone target, “What’s Next, a Laser Death Ray for Our Major Cutters?” Now we have the video and more details from Scientific American.

Since this was done with commercially available lasers and is expected to be operational as early as 2016, it is clear that beam weapons are coming on faster than we might have expected. A capability not addressed in any of the articles I have seen so far is the ability to blind pilots of manned aircraft even if it does not destroy the aircraft directly. There is also the possibility of having very precise ability to disable boats, or the ability to apply it in a low powered, non-lethal way to force compliance by making individuals very uncomfortable, in addition to use against cruise missiles and small boat swarms. It might even be used against incoming artillery shells.

Thinking about implications for the future, this does suggest we may want to make sure our future ships have ample electrical generating capacity. Having diesel electric propulsion would make that relatively simple.

“Searchwater” Palletized Airborne Radar System

There is a new radar system that we might want to take a look at (perhaps the Department, Customs and Border Protection, and DEA as well). It is palletized and looks like it would fit on our H-60s or C-144s, and certainly on our C-130s. It is claimed to provide both a capability against very small, fleeting surface targets like periscopes, even in high clutter,  which would, of course include semi-submersibles or snorkels, and air targets, a capability I don’t think we have had since the retirement of the Coast Guard E-2s.

It was developed for the Royal Navy to replace their existing Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system, but Boeing is looking at it for the US market, including the MV-22, as well. There is a brief description of the radar here, there is a two page downloadable pdf here, digilander.libero.it/humboldt/pdf/searchwater.pdf, that is probably the best description, or if you would like a slide show that was part of an AEW seminar, start here then continue to press next to the end of the section.

The same seminar had a section on a UAV based system that seemed to have incredible resolution that might also be interesting. It starts here.

Is the Fleet Shrinking?

Is the Fleet Shrinking?

I got curious and did a small survey of the fleet size using resources I had at hand (that’s why I used 1982 instead of the more logical 1980). So here is a comparison of the  fleet composition in 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2010 with some notes about the future. To make the information more meaningful, I have grouped the ships in categories by displacement and provided subtotals of all the ships in that category or larger. There is a more specific evaluation of patrol vessels near the bottom.  My sources are at the foot.

(note: loa is length over all.  tons (fl) is full load displacement)

Type         Class               loa    tons (fl)      1982    1990    2000    2010

WAGB     Healy              420    16,000          –           –             1           1
WAGB     Polar               399    12,087           2          2            2           2
WAGB     Glacier            310      8,449           1           –            –            –
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=> 8,000 tons                                                  3         2           3           3
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WAGB     Wind               269      6,515            2          –             –            –
WAGB     Mackinaw      290      5,252             1          1            1            –
WMSL     Bertholf          418      4,306              –          –            –            2
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Maritime Domain Awareness–a possible major component

Onera, a French Aerospace research center, claims to have developed a “surface wave radar” that follows the curvature of the Earth and provides coverage out to at least 400 kilometers (about 220 nautical miles). It is claimed to detect air as well as surface targets, with ranges limited only by transmitter power. The system was tested in June 2010 at Biscarosse in Southwestern France. They tell their story here.