CIMSEC has posted an interesting article, “A Feast of Cabbage and Salami: Part I – The Vocabulary of Asian Maritime Disputes” for anyone interested in the current maritime disputes in East Asia, and, in fact, for anyone interested in international maritime law. It is apparently the first of a series and includes a wealth of links for further study.
Photo credit: NavyRecognition. Thales CAPTAS 1
As expected, the EuroNaval 2014 trade show is offering some interesting products. This one might be of interest if the Coast Guard ever decides to get back into the ASW mission. Thales, maker of some of the most highly respected sonars in the world, is offering both hull mounted and towed active/passive sonars for vessels as small as 300 tons. The towed sonar is the CAPTAS 1, joining two previous members of a family of systems that share common technology. The Largest of these, the CAPTAS 4 is being evaluated for the ASW module for the LCS.
Coast Guard News release:
WASHINGTON – Senior leaders from the U.S. Coast Guard and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) signed a Fleet Plan and Officer Exchange memorandum of understanding (MOU) on Wednesday at a ceremony at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters.
Coast Guard Vice Adm. Charles Michel, deputy commandant for operations, and NOAA Vice Adm. Michael Devany, deputy under secretary for operations, were the signing officials for the joint letter of promulgation.
The Coast Guard and NOAA have collaborated for over 200 years. The Fleet Plan supplements the Cooperative Maritime Strategy (CMS) that was signed in February 2013 and establishes a course of action to guide cooperation in the operation and maintenance of marine and aviation platforms. This direction also expands valuable inter-agency work currently underway, such as repairing NOAA ships at the Coast Guard Yard and advancing Arctic preparedness through collaboration with the Coast Guard’s Arctic Shield test and evaluation program.
The Officer Exchange MOU supports both the CMS and the Fleet Plan by allowing the exchange of officer personnel for the purpose of sharing professional knowledge, expertise, doctrine, and for the professional development of officers. Coast Guard officer candidates and the NOAA Corps already train together at the Coast Guard Academy in New London, Conn.
“The Fleet Plan and Officer Exchange MOU builds on the long history of cooperation between NOAA and the Coast Guard. Our shared responsibilities in serving the American people’s interests in the maritime domain are fortified by our even closer relationship,” said Michel.
“NOAA and the Coast Guard share a commitment to providing the highest level of service to the nation,” said Devany. “These important agreements provide a framework for leveraging our respective resources and enhancing collaboration where we have common interests regarding personnel, fleet operations, research and development.”
More information about the NOAA Commissioned Officer Corps is available at http://www.noaacorps.noaa.gov/
I have considering suggesting that there should be a closer relationship between the Coast Guard and NOAA. Oceanography used to be a regular Coast Guard activity. The ships sometime look similar. We seem to have a lot in common or at least in parallel.
Naval Open Source Intelligence pointed me to a report by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) on the use of multiple unmanned surface assets to protect an asset and if necessary initiate a coordinated attack.
“The technology—called CARACaS (Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing)—is under development by ONR, and can be put into a transportable kit and installed on almost any boat. It allows boats to operate autonomously, without a Sailor physically needing to be at the controls—including operating in sync with other unmanned vessels; choosing their own routes; swarming to interdict enemy vessels; and escorting/protecting naval assets.”
Why should the Coast Guard care? The Coast Guard also protects vital maritime assets including passenger ships, vessels with dangerous cargos, and Navy assets including major ships and ballistic missile submarines so there is that direct application.
The system also appears capable of providing a persistent patrol capability that might be useful in Interdiction Operations. We cannot put a boat crew in a RHIB and send them off to operated as an independent extended sensor for 24 hours, but we could do that with an automated RHIB.
gCaptain has an interesting little tidbit on developing technology for inspecting the underwater body of ships and boats.
We only have a limited sample of the effects of modern weapon systems, so I think they are worthy of consideration.
gCaptain has a report on the recent test launch of a Naval Strike Missile from LCS-4, USS Coronado, I would like to point out the video that shows the result of a hit by this type missile in an earlier test that is included in gCaptain’s report and posted above, and talk about not the damage that was done, but the damage that was not done.
The result, is shown on the video at time 0:55. The target of this earlier test was a decommissioned Norwegian Oslo class frigate. These are relatively small ships, 317 feet long and 2,100 tons full load, only a little larger than a Bear class cutter and considerably smaller than the average merchant ship.
The Naval Strike Missile has a 125 kG warhead, smaller than that of a Harpoon (just under 500 pounds), but still respectable. The explosion and the resulting smoke are impressive. The damage would almost certainly have caused a mission kill, wiping out critical command and control, sensor, and fire control systems.
On the other hand, it appears the hull is largely intact. In fact, the target did not sink, it was subsequently towed back into port. I have observed that sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles always seem to strike about 20 feet or more above the waterline. This may be necessary to ensure they do not strike waves as they make their final approach, but it also seems to limit hull damage. This kind of hit might not have damaged the propulsion or steering gear, particularly on a larger ship.
If the Coast Guard is required to stop a medium to large ship, bent on doing some mischief, I don’t think even a cruise missile like NSM, could assure immobilization of the threat.
Photo: French Patrol Vessel, L’Adroit, DCNS photo
Almost two years ago I made a proposal for an alternative fleet mix. Since then the cutter recapitalization program has moved along. Funding of the eighth and final National Security Cutter is expected in FY2015. 30 Webber class WPCs have been funded and the contract with Bollinger has run its course. The Administration has asked for funding of two more in FY2015. If the Congress does what they have done in the past the Coast Guard may get funding for as many as six.
Like the original post, the purpose here is to offer another possible cutter fleet mix that might be procured at the same cost as the “Program of Record” (POR) that would include approximately the same number of units but provide more large “cruising cutters”, eg, over 1000 tons (49 vs 33), while hopefully replacing the existing WMEC fleet earlier, avoiding the worst of the disastrous drop in the number of major cutters that appears likely in the 2020s, and providing more cutter days while requiring fewer or at least no more personnel than either the legacy fleet or the POR.
The original post was largely in response to a Department of Homeland Security study modeling the effectiveness of alternative fleet mixes, “Options for the Future USCG Cutter Fleet Performance Trade-Offs with Fixed Acquisition Cost,” by Alarik Fritz • Raymond Gelhaus • Kent Nordstromr (.pdf). My hope was to offer a better alternative that might be evaluated by a follow-on study.
What comes through loud and clear, from that study is that:
◾The Coast Guard need some ships with the capability to do boat and helicopter ops in State Five Seas particularly for operations in the Northeast and Alaska.
◾In the Southeast and West, where the primary missions are Drug Enforcement and Migrant Interdiction, we are a long way from a point of diminishing returns, that is, mission performance is directly linked to the number of cutters, effectiveness increasing in almost direct proportion to the number of cutters available.
◾The cutters’ ability to launch boats and helicopters in State Five conditions are much less important in the West and Southeast where most of the cutters are normally deployed.
Meanwhile the Coast Guard’s responsibilities continue to grow.
The concept of Cutter X was basically to take the equipment and crew of the Webber class and put them in a larger, higher endurance, more seaworthy hull and augment the crew only as necessary to deal with the additional endurance, the availability of two boats and helicopter and/or UAV operations. The original post provided several examples of similar ships, and since then I have posted another example. Basically the result is a relatively simple vessel, only a bit more sophisticated than a 210 but grown about 50% larger with the possibility of a hangar in addition to the flight deck. My presumption would be that these ships would rely more on shore based aircraft rather than an organic air search capability, meaning the tempo of air operations would be lower than for larger cutters. They might operate more frequently with UAVs rather than helicopters. In other words, a ship of about 1,500 tons, about half the size of the OPC, closer in size to a 270 than a 210 (but perhaps longer than the 270, L’Adroit at 1,450 tons full load is over 285 feet long), and about four times bigger than a Webber class WPC. Other characteristics I would expect are a speed of approximately 24 knots, a range of 5,000 miles or more, and an endurance of at least three weeks. Weapons would initially be limited to a single Mk38 mod2 25mm and crew served .50 cal.
Photo: L’Adroit, looking forward from the flight deck toward the superstructure and the hangar.
Basically my assumption was and is that the tradeoffs between ship typed would work something like this:
1 NSC = 2 OPCs = 4 “X” class = 12 FRCs
This equates to approx. prices of: $700M/NSC, $350/OPC, $175M/Cutter X, and $60M/FRC.
It is no longer possible to trade-off NSCs for X class cutters, so the new alternative mix would look like this:
8 NSCs, 15 OPCs, 26 “X” class, and 42 FRCs
This gives us as many vessels as the program of record (91), more “cruising cutters” capable of sustained distant operation (49 vs 33) including 23 ships (8 NSCs and 15 OPCs) that are capable operating boats and aircraft in sea state 5 for Alaska and the Northeast, and 15 OPCs with ice strengthened hulls for operation in the Arctic and potentially the Antarctic.
Like the previous post I’ll compare this possible fleet mix to the Coast Guard Fleet as it existed in 2000/2001 (which was larger than the existing fleet) and the fleet in the Program of Record (POR), on the basis of cutter days available and crewing requirements using both conventional and augmented crewing.
Crewing:
For the analysis below I have used the following as the personnel allowances for the new classes:
◾NSC 122
◾OPC 90 (still to be firmed up)
◾FRC 24 (includes two extra junior officers assigned to gain experience)
While some of the vessels cited in my previous post as comparable to Cutter X are crewed by as few as 30, which I will use as a lower limit, I believe the Coast Guard would use more, if only as an opportunity to provide more at sea experience. At most, the personnel allowance should not be more than that of the 210s. My figures may be out of date, but at least at one point that was a crew of 62. I’ll use this as the upper limit.
Cutter Days AFHP and Crew Requirements:
The 2000/2001 fleet: Theoretically the 2000/2001 fleet could have provided 8,140 cruising cutter days away from homeport (AFHP) (44 cruising cutters x 185 days) and would have required a total personnel allowance of 5,477 (1.49 cutter days/crew member).
The Program of Record: Without augmentation, the program of record would theoretically provide 6,105 cruising cutter days AFHP (33 cruising cutters x 185 days) and require a total personnel allowance of 4,618(1.32 cutter days/crew member).
With Augmentation (increasing their personnel allowance by a third and running the cruising cutters 230 days/year) the program of record would theoretically provide 7,590 cruising cutter days and require a total personnel allowance of 5,693 (1.33 cutter days/crew member).
Proposed Mix: Without augmentation, the proposed mix would theoretically provide 9,065 cruising cutter days AFHP (49 cruising cutters x 185 days) and require a total personnel allowance of between 4,114 (assuming a crew of only 30 for Cutter X, 2.2 cutter days/crew member) and 4,946 (assuming a crew of 62 for Cutter X, 1.83 cutter days/crew member).
With Augmentation (increasing the personnel allowance of the cruising cutters by a third and running them 230 days/year) the proposed mix would theoretically provide 11270 cruising cutter days AFHP (49 cruising cutters x 230 days) and require a total personnel allowance of between 5,150 (assuming a crew of only 30 for Cutter X, 2.19 cutter days/crew member) and 6,259 (assuming a crew of 62 for Cutter X, 1.80 cutter days/crew member).
What about the loss of FRCs? The proposal would trim 16 FRC from the POR. They are projected to operate up to 2500 hours per day. If we assumed that all 2500 hours were devoted to offshore cruising for the 16 additional units, that would add 1667 days AFHP to the POR for a total of 7,772 days AFHP for the un-augmented fleet (1.68 cutter days/crew member) and 9,257 days AFHP for the augmented POR (1.63 cutter days/crew member)(disregarding the 42 additional FRC that are included in both the POR and my proposed fleet mix).
In summary Cutter Days Available:
◾————————————–————–Un-Augmented———Augmented by 1/3
◾2000/20001 (cruising cutters only)—————–8,140———————N/A
◾POR (cruising cutters only)—————————6,105——————-7,590
◾POR (w/1,667 additional FRC day AFHP)——-7,772——————–9,257
◾Proposed Mix w/Cutter X (cruising cutters only)9,065—————–11,270
It looks like this alternative provides an improvement of at least 16.6% over the program of record, possibly as much as 48.5% depending on how you view the FRCs as a patrol asset. It appears that the un-augmented version gives virtually the same number of ship days away from homeport (within 2% assuming both we count the additional WPCs as cruising cutters and that the augmented ships provide 230 days AFHP. If they provide only 225 days AFHP even this small advantage goes away) as that of the augmented version of the program of record while requiring 13 to 28% fewer crewmembers (several hundred to over 1,000). And without the possibly problematic requirement for augmentation.
Is it doable? What is the timing? How would it effect with other programs?
The eight NSC should be essentially fully funded by the end of FY 2015. Thirty FRC are already funded. Funding twelve more to bring the total to the proposed 42 by the end of FY2017 would only require funding four per year, and might be done in only two years if Congress continues funding six a year, meaning funding for construction of X class cutters could begin in FY2018.
I think the funding could look something like this
————-OPC—X class
FY 2017—–1
FY 2018—–1——–1
FY 2019—–1——–1
FY 2020—–1——–1
FY 2022—–1——–2
FY 2023—–1——–3
FY 2024—–1——–3
FY 2025—–1——–3
FY 2026—–1——–3
FY 2027—–1——–3
FY 2028—–1——–3
FY 2029—–1——–3
FY 2030—–2——–0
FY 2031—–1——–0
The proposed mix funds 33 new generation large cutters by FY 2026, four years before the POM. The cutter X program would be fully funded in FY2029. Through FY2030, when the Program of Record is expected to be completed, it will have funded 48 new generation large cutters compared to the 33 new cutters of the Program of Record. In FY 2031 the proposal will add a 49th cutter. Since the X class cutters are nearer the size of existing cutters, they might also reduce the expense of modifying the shore establishment to support a larger number of OPCs. Additionally eliminating the requirement for augmentation will minimize new construction ashore to support the augmentation crews.
Other Considerations:
The proposed fleet mix has a pyramidal structure that may work well as a training ground for COs, e.g., assuming O-3s command the 42 Webber class (I know currently we have been using O-4s), O-4s command the 26 X class, O-5s command the 15 OPCs, and O-6s command the 8 NSCs.
Politically it is probably better for the Coast Guard to have two concurrent shipbuilding programs (OPC & X class) rather than just one, since that will normally lead to budgetary support from two Congressional delegations.
Photo Credit: Marine Conservatory Institute, Click to enlarge.
We knew this was coming. gCaptain reports implementation and gives more detail.
“The proclamation expands the existing Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument to six times its current size, resulting in 490,000 square miles (about 390,000 square nautical miles) of protected environment around tropical islands and atolls in the south-central Pacific Ocean. At that size, it is now the largest protected area on the planet, land or sea. The protected area encompasses the seven islands and reefs of Wake, Johnston, Baker, Howland, Kingman, Jarvis and Palmyra, as well as the ocean around them.”
If I read this right, the area encompassed in larger than the entire US Atlantic Coast EEZ (considering Gulf of Mexico separate) and the difficulty policing it is exacerbated by the fact that it is in several pieces separated by hundreds of miles. As I noted earlier, this sure looks like justification for at least one more cutter in Hawaii, and possibly other additional ships and air assets there or in Guam. A ninth NSC added to the FY2016 budget appears well justified.
Coast Guard Compass has reported the release of the “Coast Guard Western Hemisphere Strategy.” I have only made a very cursory scan. At this point I will only note that one thing I frequently see in strategies (including this one) is an apparent presumption that a “multi-layer” strategy is always better, when actually a comprehensive, well executed single layer may be better than a porous multi-layered approach which dilutes our effort. The illegal importers of drugs prove on an almost daily basis that our current multi-layered efforts are far less than 100% effective. By extension we cannot expect them to be effective in intercepting potentially more disastrous security threats.
gCaptain reports, “The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Key Largo collided with the 42-foot commercial fishing vessel Sea Shepherd (not that Sea Shepherd–Chuck) earlier today (Sept 23, 2014–Chuck), sinking the vessel approximately nine nautical miles east northeast of Vieques, Puerto Rico according to a USCG report.”
Presumably we will hear more about this.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 