Category Archives: Operations

PATFORSWA Lessons Learned, Expeditionary WPCs

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We have had some discussion recently about how lessons of expeditionary deployment of patrol craft are lost and must be relearned. I’m opening this post in hopes it will be a temporary repository for discussion of what went well and what needed improvement. There are a number of possible topics that come to mind.

Augmentation
Command Relationships
Communications
Equipment
Logistics
Medical
Orientation
Personnel policies
Rules of Engagement
Spares
Training
Weapons

For starters I will quote Craig Allen Jr.’s comments on an earlier post:

“…the Coast Guard not capturing it’s lessons-learned from Vietnam–I agree! There is very little to document that extraordinary expeditionary USCG operation. I fear the same hard-won knowledge from 12+ years of USCG OCO mission in the AG will also fade into obscurity unless there is an effort made to preserve it. The skillsets for MIP/MIO/SFA and operating in semi-permissive environments should not have to be reinvented every time they’re required.

“There are some organizational obstacles to internalizing the PATFORSWA lessons-learned though. One is that the mission is tied to OCO funding, which the USCG does not know whether it will get or not. (Every year the rumor is that the new P4 crew will be the ones to turn out the lights and lock up when the mission stands down.) Investing the effort/$ into making long-term organizational improvements in training, equipment, tactics, etc. when the future of the mission is so uncertain can be a tough sell. Second obstacle is the one-year tour length. Makes it difficult to gain the experience/knowledge required to internalize lessons-learned. By the time a P4 team adjusts to the battle rhythm and can start to see where improvements can be made, its already time to start preparing for handoff to their reliefs. Does the CG have 12 years of recent OCO experience or 1 year of experience repeated 12 times?

“Right now there are a few hundred PATFORSWA vets with recent first-hand knowledge of an important niche mission for the CG (and some at LANTAREA who have managed the program and know how its evolved over time.) So… are there lessons worth capturing to better prepare the CG to fulfill similar missions in the future? Have they been adequately discussed and recorded? If not, how do we ensure that they are?

“One hopes that, ten years from now, we’re not trying to figure out how to do these kinds of missions all over again. My suggestion that the USCG and USN establish an expeditionary PC training facility was one idea for how we might keep the skills sharp in anticipation of their likely demand in the future.”

Whaling Conundrum

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gCaptain reports that the Japanese will resume whaling in spite of rulings against it by the International Court of Justice and the International Whaling Commission.

Mostly, whaling has been done in the waters off Antarctica, although there has been some Arctic Whaling, where the US currently makes no specific territorial claim, but has reserved the right to make claims at a later date. Leaving the policing of these waters by others may be seen as weakening any future US claim and strengthening the hand of Nations that actually police these waters.

Will the US in the person of the Coast Guard attempt to stop Japanese whaling in either the Arctic or the Antarctic?

Video Screens as Communications Devices

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CIMSEC has an interesting post that talks about using video devices for a number of unconventional purposes in the naval environment, “Camouflage: You Ain’t Screen Nothin’ Yet.”

The post includes several innovative ideas that might stimulates thinking, but one relatively simple idea caught my eye, that of using video displays (think jumbo-tron) to communicate with another vessel possibly using multiple languages or graphics. Might be useful in boarding situations involving non-English speakers to supplement the methods currently used.

C4ISR Upgrades

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The Coast Guard’s Acquisitions Directorate (CG-9) is reporting that

The Coast Guard awarded a $31 million contract to Lockheed Martin Aug. 21, 2014, to purchase equipment to upgrade the electronic systems known as C4ISR – or Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance – on three National Security Cutters and at the NSC C4ISR training facility.

This is part of a larger Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Project.

“The C4ISR upgrade focuses on improving “interoperability,” or the ability of Coast Guard operating units to share information and coordinate operations with each other, with shore-based command centers and with other government agencies and allies. Other components will allow cutters (and aircraft?–Chuck) to send and receive tactical information including sensor, navigational and planning data to other U.S. military units as well as tactical sharing with international assets.”

“Features
•For NSCs, networked communications, radio direction finding and other capabilities to integrate with Navy battle groups and the broader U.S. government intelligence community
•For NSCs, HC-144As and HC-130Js, an advanced C4ISR suite that includes a common baseline across assets and transitions to an open architecture system of Coast Guard-controlled components with government software data rights
•The OPC’s C4ISR suite will be derived from the baseline used for NSC and other new platforms
•For in-service cutters, installation of commercial satellite communications and AIS
•For 378-foot and 270-foot cutters, Seawatch C2 system”

All well and good, but does it include Link 16? If so why not say so? If not why not? It seems to be very common and affordable. It is installed on boats smaller than the Webber class and on a wide range of aircraft including helicopters so it is certainly doable.

Martime Facilities Security–Swimmer Defense

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The Israelis are marketing a anti-swimmer sensor system that claims increased range, believed necessary because increased speed of swimmer delivery systems shortens reaction time.

“The AquaShield ER offers unprecedented detection ranges against all marine threats. The AquaShield ER passed rigorous sea trials achieving detection ranges of up to 3.5 kilometer for Swimmer Delivery Vehicle targets, 1.8 kilometers for Open Circuit Divers and 1.2 kilometers for divers using closed-circuit apparatus.”

Perhaps I am reading to much into this, but this capability may have played a part in intercepting five Hamas commandos who swam ashore in Israel recently as reported here.

I have been out of the loop for a long time, but I suspect the Coast Guard is still not integrated into a multiservice network capable of reacting to a terrorist incursion the way the Israelis reported did.

The Tammuz missile referred to in the report is in the same class as the Hellfire, but with a much longer range (25 km, that is more range than a WWII light cruiser). It has been previously referred to as the Spike NLOS (Non-line of Sight). Since they referred to this being mounted on an OPV rather than a corvette or missile boat, I suspect they are talking about it having been mounted on something relatively small, about the size of an 87 footer.

Other “Coast Guards'” New Ships and Early Disposals

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Some news on fleet changes in the UK and New Zealand Navies with regard to their ships that do Coast Guard type work.

The Brits are building three new offshore patrol vessels. They will be built (before the first USCG Offshore Patrol Cutter) to essentially the same design as the three Offshore Patrol Vessels built for Trinidad and Tobago (video above) that I encouraged the Coast Guard to buy or lease four years ago when Trinidad and Tobago refused to pay for the ships they had contracted and BAE was looking for a buyer. Brazil subsequently purchased the vessels and the rights to the design. The remarkable thing about this decision is that the vessels are being built primarily to keep a ship yard busy and they will replace three River class offshore patrol vessels that were commissioned in 2003.


Photo Credit Benchill, Protector-class inshore patrol boat HMNZS Hawea (P3571) entering Otago Harbour, New Zealand

DefenseNews is reporting that New Zealand is considering disposing of two recently build Protector Class Inshore Patrol Vessels that entered service in only 2009 (similar to the Webber class FRCs) and building an additional much larger Offshore Patrol Vessel presumably a third Otago class.

What will happen to these five relatively new ships?

–Australia, in the middle of an alien migrant interdiction crisis, just had a fire on HMAS Bundaberg, a vessel very similar to the New Zealand Protector Class Inshore Patrol Vessels, that is likely to result in total loss. Perhaps they will take the excess New Zealand vessels, they were after all built in an Australian shipyard, but they really need something larger, perhaps the excess British River class.
–The Philippine Navy and Coast Guard also needs more modern patrol vessels to deal with Chinese incursions into their EEZ. The Philippine Coast Guard already has 56 meter vessels built in the same yard that made the New Zealand vessels but they could also use larger vessels like the Rivers.

Antarctic Land Rush?

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512px-Antarctica_CIA_svg
Photo credit: CIA

DefenseNews reports on the growing South American interest in Antarctica and the proliferation of polar ships that support these interests. The increased interest is fueled by anticipation that changes in the Antarctic Treaty system will allow resource exploitation.

If the current treaty is altered or abrogated, a number of nations have already made claims to Antarctic territory, held in abeyance by the current treaty. Some of these claims overlap. Interestingly neither the US or Russia has made any specific claims but have reserved the right to make them in the future. (Click on the map above to enlarge and see where the various stations are located.)

There is already much animosity between Argentina and the UK and between Argentina and Chile. The existing treaty system could breakdown at any time. This looks like another good argument for both a new Icebreaker and for bringing back the Polar Sea.
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CIMSEC–Narco Subs

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CIMSEC continues their series on “non-navies” with “Narco-Submarines: Drug Cartels’ Innovative Technology,” by Byron Ramirez. It provides an overview of the state of narco-sub development, employment, and countermeasures. It also announces the imminent publication of an unclassified study, “Narco-Submarines – Specially Fabricated Vessels Used For Drug Smuggling Purposes,” to be released by the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO).

Coasties in the Royal Navy

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Recently the “Coast Guard Compass” reported that an agreement had been struck with the Royal Navy that some Coast Guard enlisted volunteers (MKs and EMs) would be assigned accompanied tours on Royal Navy frigates.

I passed this along to a friend in the UK who blogs at “ThinkDefence.” He passed it along to his readerrship. I think you might find the comments interesting.

CIMSEC Talks Fisheries Crimes

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CIMSEC continues their “Non-Navy” discussion with “Fisheries Crime: Bridging the Conceptual Gap and Practical Response.”

They address more than just Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing. They talk about problems highlighted in a study conducted by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on transnational criminal activities in the fishing industry :

•Fishers trafficked for the purpose of forced labor on board fishing vessels are severely abused;
•There is frequency of child trafficking in the fishing industry;
•Transnational organized criminal groups are engaged in marine living resource crimes in relation to high value, low volume species such as abalone;
•Some transnational fishing operators launder illegally caught fish through transshipments at sea and fraudulent catch documentation;
•Fishing licensing and control system is vulnerable to corruption;
•Fishing vessels are used for the purpose of smuggling of migrants, illicit traffic in drugs (primarily cocaine), illicit traffic in weapons, and acts of terrorism; and
•Fishers are often recruited by organized criminal groups due to their skills and knowledge of the sea and are seldom masterminds behind organized criminal activities involving the fishing industry or fishing vessels.[1]

The Coast Guard is most likely to encounter these problems in the EEZ in the Western Pacific, including the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument that is expected to expanded and in the EEZs of friendly island nations that rely on the US to assist with enforcement. Unfortunately assets for enforcement in these areas have been extremely limited.