“Russia Selects India Over China To Construct Its ‘Cutting-Edge’ Icebreaker Ships; But Why Delhi Over Beijing?” –Eurasian Times

Russian Icebreaker Viktor Chernomyrdin, the largest diesel-electric icebreaker ever built by a Russian shipyard

The Eurasian Times reports,

Russia has chosen India over China for its non-nuclear icebreaker construction program. This decision comes as Russia seeks to develop its Northern Sea Route (NSR) and navigate the challenges posed by Western sanctions…In a significant move towards strengthening maritime cooperation, the Indian government is in talks with two shipbuilders—one state-owned and the other private—to construct four non-nuclear icebreaker ships valued at over Rs 6,000 crores ($750 million).

Does this really signify a preference for India over China? Not really, “…shipyards in China, South Korea, and Japan are fully booked until at least 2028.” India is probably eager for the business. Relations between Russia and India have been good for decades. While India has moved closer to the US in response to Chinese aggressiveness, India has maintained ties with Russia.

India has been developing their ship building industry, and logically they have the cheap labor that could make them very competitive, but they still lag far behind China, S. Korea, and Japan. That Russia is not building these ships in Russia is an indication of the weakness of their own shipbuilding industry.

I don’t think India has ever built an icebreaker. There is no indication of how large or powerful these icebreakers would be other than the price, four for $750M. (That is four icebreakers for about half the price of a Polar Security Cutter.) If this happens, it will be worth watching.

Russian and Chinese Coast Guards Exercise Together and Form Combined Task Force / The CCG Cutters

Recently the China Coast Guard and the Russian Coast Guard held joint exercises in the Peter the Great Gulf near Vladivostok. After the exercise, they formed a joint task force. 

Also wanted to identify the China Coast Guard Cutters seen in the video.

They are Zhaoduan class Type 818, derived from the PLAN Type 054A frigates. According to the Office of Naval Intelligence, (lots of information at the link. The China Coast Guard has the largest coast guard fleet in the world) there are at least six of the class. They are almost as large as National Security Cutters (NSC), reportedly 4,000 tons full load, 134 meters (440′) in length, 16 meters (52.5′) of beam, speed 27 knots, range 8,000 miles.

In addition to the 76mm gun, they have a pair of 30mm Gatling guns. It is not clear if they have a fire control system that would make the 30mm guns effective as CIWS, but they could certainly do serious damage to surface targets at close range in a very short time.

“U.S. Coast Guard encounters Russian naval vessels near Point Hope, Alaska” — CG News

“The crew of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Stratton (WMSL 752) encountered and shadowed four Russian Federation Navy (RFN) vessels 57 miles northwest of Point Hope, Alaska, Sept. 15, 2024. The Russian Surface Action Group consisted of a Severodvinsk-class submarine, a Dolgorukiy-class submarine, a Steregushchiy– class Frigate, and a Seliva-class tug. Stratton patrolled under Operation Frontier Sentinel, a Coast Guard operation designed to meet presence with presence when strategic competitors operate in and around U.S. waters. (U.S. Coast Guard courtesy photo)”

Below is a news release from Coast Guard news.

Point Hope, Alaska is well North of the Bering Strait and the Arctic Circle, bordering the Chukchi Sea, 312 miles SW of Utqiagvik (formerly Pt. Barrow) and almost a thousand miles North of Dutch Harbor. None of my Alaska Patrols ever got that far North.

Russian Yasen class SSGN

The Severodvinsk or Yasen class submarine is a nuclear submarine equipped with eight missile silos for up to 32 cruise missiles and ten torpedo tubes.

Russian Borei class SSBN

The Dolgorukiy or Borei class submarine is a SSBN with 16 silos for ballistic missiles.

The surface combatant seems to have been miss identified. It is Gremyashchiy (337) lead ship of her class of 2,500 ton Project 20385 corvettes (NATO considers them frigates).

Note, USCGC Stratton is not an ice strengthened vessel.

This may have been a transfer of the SSGN and SSBN to the Russian Pacific Fleet.

The post story seems to indicate Stratton stumbled across this group. Shouldn’t we have known they were there?


Sept. 16, 2024

JUNEAU, Alaska — The U.S. Coast Guard located four Russian Federation Navy (RFN) vessels Sunday, 57 miles northwest of Point Hope, Alaska.

While on a routine patrol in the Chukchi Sea, the crew of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Stratton (WMSL 752) observed the RFN vessels transiting southeast along the Russian side of the Maritime Boundary Line (MBL).

The crew of the Stratton witnessed the RFN vessels cross the MBL into the U.S. Arctic and moved to observe the vessels. The Russian vessels were assessed to be avoiding sea ice on the Russian side of the MBL and operated in accordance with international rules and customs as they transited approximately 30 miles into the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone.

“We are actively patrolling our maritime border in the Bering Sea, Bering Strait, and Chukchi Sea, with our largest and most capable cutters and aircraft, to protect U.S. sovereign interests, U.S. fish stocks, and to promote international maritime norms,” said Rear Adm. Megan Dean, Commander of Coast Guard District Seventeen. “Coast Guard Cutter Stratton ensured there were no disruptions to U.S. interests.”

The Russian Surface Action Group consisted of a Severodvinsk-class submarine, Dolgorukiy-class submarine, Steregushchiy– class Frigate, and Seliva-class tug.

The Stratton is patrolling under Operation Frontier Sentinel, an operation designed to meet presence with presence when strategic competitors operate in and around U.S. waters. The Coast Guard’s presence strengthens the international rules-based order and promotes the conduct of operations in a manner that follows international law and norms.

Coast Guard Cutter Stratton is a 418-foot legend class national security cutter homeported in Alameda, Calif.

Vertical Launch AAW Missiles on a New Russian Coast Guard Cutter?

The Army Recognition Group’s Global Defense News organization reports,

According to Tehnoomsk on June 28, 2024, Russia is currently developing a new patrol ship using the Karakurt class as a platform. Shipbuilders from the Leningrad shipyard “Pella” and engineers from the Central Marine Design Bureau “Almaz” are working on this project for the Coast Guard of the Border Service of the FSB of Russia. This project leverages the established design of the Project 22800 Karakurt class missile corvette. The new vessel will be equipped with the Resurs 3K96-3E multi-channel anti-aircraft missile system and various other weapon systems.

We should note that this does not report there has been a contract awarded for construction, but if these are built and armed as described, it would mark a return to Cold War practice we have not seen for more than three decades and despite their small size, these cutters could be the most powerfully armed coast guard vessels in the world.

Russian Rubin class (Project 22460) patrol vessel Rasul Gamzatov, typical of recent Russian Coast Guard construction of a similar size ship.  It is armed with a single 30mm six-barrel Gatling gun. (Picture source: Военный Осведомитель)

During the Cold War the Soviet coast guard counterpart frequently operated variants of Soviet Navy vessel classes. The Russian Coast Guard still has a pair of Krivak III frigates and a Pauk class corvette that came out of this era, but since that time Russian Coast Guard patrol cutters have had no Navy counterpart. Their armament has not been much different from that of typical Offshore Patrol Vessels. I have seen no indication of either Anti-Ship missiles or Anti-Aircraft missiles (other than man portable air defense missiles) on Russian Coast Guard vessels.

Russian Project 22800 Karakurt class corvette with 76.2 mm 59-caliber AK-176MA gun and Pantsir-M gun and missile CIWS. Vertical launch system for surface to surface missiles visible amidships. Photo Source: Reddit (Warship Porn)

The ships that this proposal is based on are the Project 22800 Karakurt class missile corvette, two of which appear to have been lost in the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. Members of the class have been able to reinforce the Russian Black Sea Fleet even after Turkey closed the Dardanelles by using the Russian river and canal system.

The Reported Coast Guard version of the Project 22800 class would apparently replace the cruise missile vertical launch system with vertical launch systems for the 9M96E and 9M100 AAW missile systems.

The 9M96E missile is smaller than any of the Standard Missiles. In sizes it is closer to the ESSM, longer but with a smaller diameter.

The smaller IR homing 9M100 missile, which can be quad-packed into the launcher, replacing the larger missile on a 4 to 1 basis, is about the size of an AIM-9 Sidewinder, another IR homing missile, in length and diameter, but reportedly considerably heavier.

Why the Change?

Why would the Russian Coast Guard be suddenly adding AAW missiles to their cutters? It probably has something to do with the emergence of unmanned systems as a threat. If the intent was simply self-defense, I would think they would use the Pantsir-M gun and missile CIWS as mounted on all but the first two Navy Karakurt class. Instead, they will have two 30mm gatling guns. The AAW system they are getting is the same one used on the currently in production Project 20381/20385 subclasses of Steregushchiy-class corvettes where it replaced the Kashtan CIWS. 

I am guessing these cutters might be used for force protection or as mobile AAW missile batteries. There is no indication of an ASW capability on either Navy or Coast Guard versions of the Project 22800.

The Pantsir-M was presented at Army 2017

“Ukraine Sinks Russian Navy Missile Corvette In Drone Boat Attack” –The War Zone

The War Zone reports,

“A dramatic new view released by the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) shows several of its uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) strike and sink the Russian Tarantul-III class missile corvette Ivanovets. The attack took place Wednesday night local time on the Black Sea near Lake Donuzlav in western Crimea, the GUR said on its Telegram channel.

“A 128-second video posted on Twitter shows what appears to be a complex attack on the Ivanovets by what Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, commander of GUR, told us were Maritime Autonomous Guard Unmanned Robotic Apparatus (MAGURA V5) USVs operated by the GUR’s Group 13 drone unit.”

Tarantul-class corvette

The vessel in the video is a Tarantul class missile corvette. These vessels are powered by four engines totaling 32,000 HP making them very fast (42 knots). The hot gas turbine exhausts on either side of the transom glow brightly early in the video.

They have a pair of 30mm gatling guns on the aft superstructure with a clear field of fire aft.

This ship appears well equipped to defeat an unmanned surface vessel (USV) attack.

The Drive post analyses the attack, but I would point out that I don’t see as many splashes as I would have expected, if the 30mm guns were functioning. I don’t see muzzle flashes. What I did see appeared to be from heavy machine guns (12.7 or 14.5mm) rather than 30mm.

Many USVs were involved in this attack. The Ukrainians claimed six USVs hit the little corvette. Still other USVs filmed the ultimate explosion and sinking.

Perhaps the 30mm guns had run out of ammunition engaging other USVs by the time the drone in the first video recorded attack gets as close as seen in the video.

The report included this statement,

““The Ivanovets MRK sank while repelling a night attack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Sevastopol,” the Russian VoenkorKotenok Telegram channel wrote.”

The Russians have historically stationed a “guard ship” off their ports to prevent surprise attack. Ivanovets may have been stationed off Sevastopol specifically as a counter to a drone attack.

“Russian and Chinese naval exercises: Reading between the lines” –The Watch

A Coast Guard Cutter Kimball crewmember observing a Russian Destroyer in the Bering Sea, September 19, 2022. Coast Guard Photo

The Watch provides an opinion piece by ADAM LAJEUNESSE, PHD, an associate professor in the public policy and governance program, at St. Francis Xavier University in Canada.

He discusses why the Russians and Chinese decided to extend their exercise into waters near Alaska, and what the US response should be to such demonstrations.

Managing the response is therefore a balancing act. These activities cannot be ignored or even downplayed, but emphasis should be put on short-circuiting adversary messaging. Beijing is anxious to paint U.S. FONOPs as shams. While the U.S. government has been disciplined in its messaging as it was during a similar voyage in 2021, more emphasis should be placed on the PRC’s right to be there. Though it may seem counterintuitive, there is a benefit to overtly recognizing Chinese ships’ right to be in the region. While that may be politically tricky, it should be possible to warn of the dangers posed by the PRC’s navy generally, while also emphasizing its right to be anywhere on the high seas.

Russia’s attempt to portray itself as a great power equal, capable of threatening the U.S. homeland can, likewise, be turned back upon itself. The reality is that Moscow’s weakness has forced it to increasingly rely on the PRC for economic and political support. Its naval partnership should be addressed more explicitly for what it is, the gradual replacing of Russian power in the North Pacific and, potentially, the Arctic by the PRC.

His evaluation is a perfect explanation of why having such exercises monitored by Coast Guard cutters, as had been done in 2021 and 2022, was a perfect response. (In fact, Chinese warships transited US territorial waters in 2015.)

Why the change in 2023?

To some extent at least, I think the Navy response, specifically sending DDGs to shadow the group, was because they were stung by unfair criticism, that we looked weak because there had been no obvious US Navy presence previously.

If NORTHCOM wanted to take out the Chinese/Russian surface action group (SAG), air assets could have done the job. That the US Navy SAG never exceeded four units, if anything does make us look weak.

Perhaps a USAF B-1 fly-over on a day when no live fire exercises were scheduled might have been an appropriate response. (B-1s with LRASM are a particularly deadly anti-ship combination.)

If there had been hostilities, putting a numerically inferior US Navy SAG close to a potentially hostile SAG, might have just resulted in a friendly fire incident, if the Air Force confused US units with Chinese or Russian units.

Also, we should never miss an opportunity to remind the Russians, they have reason to fear China more than the US. The Russian ships in the SAG were all either older or smaller than their Chinese counterparts, and I am sure the Chinese made it abundantly clear to the Russians, that they had outgrown any Russian tutoring.

“Top Ten Navies by Aggregate Displacement, 1 January 2024” –Analysis and diagram by Phoenix_jz

Two years ago, I did a post with a similar title from the same source. Somehow, I missed the 2023 edition. As I said in the earlier post, I don’t know , but the data appears to be credible, and it looks like readers are checking his figures. 

It is very difficult to read the tonnages at the bottom of the graph unless you are using a computer and click on the graph to see it in a larger size. 

The creator’s notes and some additional comments are below. 


Hello all!

Well, 2024 is upon us, and as such so is the third edition of my top ten navy list. For those unfamiliar, here are links to 2022 and 2023, with a general explainer of the whole concept in the 2022 version.

The long and short of it is that this graph reflects a personal tracker I keep of almost every large and moderately sized navy, and calculates the aggregate displacement of these navies. It’s not a perfect way to display the size of navies – far from it in fact – but it is at least more representative than counting numbers of hulls alone, in my opinion.

To break down what each of these categories mean;

  • Surface Warships is an aggregate of all above-water warships and major aviation and amphibious assault platforms. This category includes CVNs, CVs, CVLs, LHDs, LHAs, LPDs, CGs, DDGs, FFGs, corvettes, OPVs, CPVs, lighter patrol craft, and MCM vessels.
  • Submarines is what it says on the tin – SSBNs, SSGNs, SSNs, SSKs, and for select nations where applicable (and where information is available), special purpose submarines. Please note dedicated training submarines are counted separately.
  • AORs includes all major fleet replenishment vessels (coastal vessels do not count, however).
  • Other Auxiliaries is a very wide net that essentially captures everything else. Special mission ships, support vessels, minor amphibious assault vessels (LSDs, LSTs, LCAC’s, LCM’s, LCU’s), training vessels, tugs, coastal support vessels, hydrography ships – all essential parts of navies, but generally often paid less attention to as they’re not as flashy as the warships proper.

Interesting trends in data that I thought I would share for various navies, and thoughts and observations otherwise;

The USN is, unsurprisingly, still top dog by a huge margin. In spite a net decommissioning of five ships this year, the USN has grown overall by about 32,000 tons – four ‘cruisers’, two SSNs, four LCS, and five patrol craft decommissioned against the introduction of three destroyers, an SSN, five LCS, and a replenishment ship. It is worth noting that 2023 is the first year since 2010 that the USN has commissioned three destroyers in a year, though a repeat performance in the next couple years is unlikely – these ships were launched in 2020 and 2021, and only one destroyer per year was launched in 2022 and 2023.

No one will be surprised to hear that the PLAN has grown for the nth consecutive year, adding the final Type 055 batch I and the remaining Type 054A Batch V, for almost 50,000 tons of new surface combatants. Much of the remaining increase in displacement for this year (which totaled nearly 90,000 tons) reflected a steady pace of modernization in mine warfare, landing forces, and logistical support/other auxiliaries. As with last year, the number of minor patrol craft continue to plummet as the PLAN continues to divest many of its obsolescent brown-water combatants, or relegates them to training duties.

Moving on to ongoing construction, progress on the new destroyer batches continues at pace. At least two Type 055 Batch II appear to be under construction, and the overall number of Type 052D Batch IV appears to be at least ten. The first ship actually launched at the very end of 2022 (at Jiangnan), and two further have been launched by the same yard as well as three at Dalian. Two more remain under construction at each yard. The first of these ships to be launched appears to be on trials and will likely commission this coming year. The Type 054A program of the navy appears to have finally wrapped up (construction of the hull for the China Coast Guard continues), and the Type 054B program has continued at pace if not scale – two ships were launched this year, but modules of further units have been scarce. Rounding things out for major surface vessels, a new Type 075 LHD was launched this past December. Conspicuously absent has been sightings of any modules for new carriers. Considering Fujian (Type 003) began construction at some point from 2015 to 2017, one has to wonder if we will see China launch another carrier before the end of the decade.

Perhaps most consequential of all, however, has been the completion of new production facilities at Bohai and a resumption of Type 093 SSN launches. The first of the new Type 093B launched in 2022, and has been followed up by two more launches this year (possibly up to three). A sustained pace of two submarines a year, or even just three submarines every two years, would quickly add up could see anywhere from nine to eleven new SSNs launched by the end of 2027, and in service by early 2030s. Only time will tell what the actual drumbeat of production will be.

Russia’s VMF woes in the Black Sea have continued unabated, except less at sea and largely fueled by the Franco-British SCALP cruise missile. The most dramatic loss by far was the destruction of the Project 636.3 ‘Improved’ Kilo Rostov-on-Don in drydock at Sevastopol, but similar attacks claimed the destruction or constructive loss of a Karakurt-class corvette (under construction, not in service) and two Ropucha-class LSTs. The infamous TB-2 made a brief return to destroy a Serna-class LCU, and two other LCU’s may have finally become the first victims of Kamikaze USVs this past November, for a total of 11,407 tonnes lost.

In regards to the more regular cycle of commissioning and decommissioning, one frigate, one MCM vessel, and three corvettes were brought into service, as well as a new SSGN, SSBN, and SSK each. Against this a corvette, SSGN, SSBN, and SSK were decommissioned. Overall, in spite of losses the VMF managed a net gain of 6,324 tonnes of surface warships and submarines. Anyone who checks against my figures from last year will note that the increase in the VMF’s overall tonnage this year is far more substantial, due to the auxiliary category. Though some of this was from new vessels, this was mostly down to a badly needed overhaul and reorganization of that part of my tracker, particularly for the tug fleet. Did you know the Russian navy tug fleet displaces more than either the Argentine or Canadian navies? Now you do! Seriously – it would be the 20th largest navy in the world by itself.

As a final note on the VMF – it is worth remembering that ships commissioned in the Russian navy are not always actually in service, as ships can often languish in near-terminal refits or simply be left inactive without a formal decommissioning. Almost half the remaining Projekt 877 Kilo’s, for example, appear to be inactive at this point (5 of 10).

(In comments the author noted the following, “Russian naval losses during the war have totalled 13 vessels for 29,870 tonnes. Quite a bit – but also only about 1.4% of their current overall tonnage.” –Chuck)

The British Royal Navy observes a second year of marginal reduction in overall tonnage (-2,640t, or -0.3%), losing another Type 23 frigate as well as the last Echo-class survey ship. Against this the RFA brought into service the first MROSS, ProteusProteus represents a considerable increase in subsurface capability, though the loss of a frigate with no replacement ship to replace it for another thee to four years is painful, especially given how many of the remaining eleven ships are deep in LIFEX/Post-LIFEX refits. With that said, their new frigate programs are moving on steadily. Steel was cut on two new frigates this year – the future HMS Birmingham (4th Type 26) and HMS Active (2nd Type 31), bringing the total construction volume to five frigates building and one fitting out.

The JMSDF continues to grow, albeit at a more moderate pace this year (+6,530t, or +0.9%), inducting a new Mogami-class frigate and Taigei-class attack submarine, while shifting another Oyashio-class from the active fleet to a training role. Two more FFM were launched this year, though surprisingly they have not started construction on the next pair. This past November, it was announced that the Mogami-class FFM would be curtailed at 12 units (of 22 planned), and followed on by an evolution of the design known as FMF-AAW. The FMF-AAW will feature greater air and surface warfare capabilities. Twelve such ships are planned.

The Indian Navy’s growth in 2023 was far less dramatic than in 2022, but still noteworthy (+9,200t, or +1.5%), as adding a new conventional attack submarine and destroyer to the fleet has finally pushed them over the 600,000-tonne line.

The Marine Nationale grew by almost 9,000 tonnes (2.1%) this year, largely down to the retirement and replacement of a patrol ship, nuclear attack submarine, and tugs with an equal number of replacements. Though it is worth noting that the new attack submarine is not fully operational yet – that will happen in 2024 – so technically the MN’s attack submarine fleet is really four boats at this point in time.

The saga of eight and ninth place swapping around continues, as the ROKN has managed to move back to the position of eighth largest navy in the world. In 2023 they added a net 15,374t (+4.3%), commissioning four Daegu-class frigates, a second KSS-III class attack submarine, an MCM vessel and a pair of LCACs, against the decommissioning of two corvettes and five PKM’s.

In contrast, the Marina Militare continues to feel the bite from the two FREMM sold to Egypt, as well as delays in brining the LHD Trieste into service – intended for 2023 but again pushed back, now to the spring of 2024. The first PPA ‘Light+’, Raimondo Montecuccoli, was brought into service in 2023 – an OPV on paper, but light frigate in practice. Against this one of the elderly Maestrale-class frigates, Zeffiro, was retired, as was one of the fleet’s AORs (Vesuvio) and a water tanker (Bormida), resulting in a real drop of 7,073 tonnes (-1.9%). The drop seen versus the chart versus last year is more dramatic (totals 16,632 tonnes), which reflects both cleaning up data on old auxiliary platforms for which information is scarce, and correcting some minor sheet errors, which totaled 9,559 tonnes.

The outlook should be looking up in the future – as previously mentioned, the LHD Trieste should enter service this year, as should the fourth and fifth PPA. The first of two replacement FREMM (GPe) was launched in late 2023 and a second will follow this spring, with both being slated to enter service in 2025 alongside the sixth PPA and second Vulcano-class replenishment ship – barring any delays.

Finally, the Indonesian Navy saw another year of growth, adding a net 9,930 tonnes (+3.1%), with another hospital ship commissioned, a new survey ship, corvette, and two new MCM vessels and FACs each, as well as several patrol boats. The TNIAL continues a steady program of domestic construction of patrol craft, and construction is ongoing on two Iver Huitfelt derivative frigates, with the keel of the first vessel laid down this past August. They have also cut steel on a new hydrography ship, which will launch in Indonesia and complete fitting out in Germany.

What comes next in terms of major platforms for the TNIAL is somewhat up in the air. As with the year prior, there has been no progress made on the procurement of six FREMM from Italy, despite a contract being signed two and a half years ago (June 2021). In spite of this, they have expressed interest in procuring two PPA to bolster their patrol fleet. In the interest of expediting procurement, they are looking at two ‘Light+’ configuration vessels currently fitting out at Muggiano – Marcantonio Colonna (due for delivery to the MMI in the latter half of 2024) and Ruggiero di Lauria (due for delivery to the MMI in mid-2025). According to the General Manager of Fincantieri’s Naval Vessels Division, Dario Deste, a contract for the two vessels could be signed in the first half of 2024.

(In answer to a question the author added this in the comments–Chuck)

No.11 to 20 are as follows for 1 January 2024;

  • 11: Turkey – 297,298t
  • 12: Taiwan – 268,958t
  • 13 Egypt – 232,046t
  • 14: Spain- 229,373t
  • 15: Germany – 226,655t
  • 16: Australia – 224,074t (decided to add the National Support Squadron, which added about 30kt)
  • 17: Greece – 189,184t
  • 18: Brazil – 162,29t
  • 19: Chile – 161,404t
  • 20: Argentina – 138,620t
(A reader, , added this–Chuck)

Listed by ranking for this year:

Nation Change from 2023 (tonnes) 2023 Ranking Change from 2022 (tonnes) 2022 Ranking
United States +55,658 1st +250,308 1st
China +93,567 2nd +99,299 2nd
Russia + 211,333 3rd +166,682 3rd
United Kingdom -2,640 4th -5,815 4th
Japan +6,530 5th +23,790 5th
India +9,200 6th +62,349 6th
France +8,925 7th +12,145 7th
South Korea +15,374 9th +7,153 8th
Italy -16,632 8th -3,452 9th
Indonesia -70 10th +17,709 10th

Probably not surprising given all these nations are competing more or less with each other, but the rankings have basically remained the same except for Italy and South Korea trading places in 2023, then reverting to their 2022 places again this year. Nobody previous top 10 navy has left the club either.

However, do note that not all of the year-to-year tonnage differences are due to actual changes in fleet size/composition. As Phoenix mentioned in his post, the Russians in particular got a huge tonnage jump this year because he changed the way he counts auxiliaries, and given the discrepancy between his reported +32k figure for the USN and the numbers, there’s probably some math correction involved there too.

 

Coast Guard Submarine?

Covert Shores reports the Rubin Design Bureau, which has designed most of Russia and the Soviet Union’s submarines, has proposed a submarine for the Russian Coast Guard.

“The BOSS (Border and Offshore Submersible Sentry) submarine is a concept which has been around for a few years. It is unlikely that Russia will ever build it, but it is all the same an interesting possibility.”

Apparently, the Russian Coast Guard did not ask for a submarine, but the design bureau thinks, even if they don’t want it, it might be exportable.

It’s small, about the size of a World War II vintage German Type VII U-boat, “…60 – 70 meters (197 – 230 feet) long depending on customer configuration, and displaces around 1,000 tons.” Being submersible it could submerge to wait out rough weather.

I do kind of like the way it’s equipped, boat for boarding, VTOL UAS for search, gun for firing warning shots, 10 km range small surface to surface missiles for engaging small fast highly maneuverable targets, and torpedoes capable of forcibly stopping any size vessel.

“Chinese Submariner Appointed Head of People’s Liberation Army Navy” -USNI

The infographic above is from a May 2023 post, “China’s PLAN Surface and Sub Order of Battle

The US Naval Institute News Service reports,

“China’s President Xi Jinping appointed a new Chief for the People’s Liberation Army Navy in a Monday ceremony in Beijing…Adm. Hu Zhongming…Hu was previously the PLAN Chief of Staff and is a submarine officer though details of his career are sparse, a Chinese media report in 2015 stated that Hu had a served in the PLA 92730 unit, which operates China’s nuclear submarine.”

I have not been able to confirm it, but as I recall the previous head of the PLAN was also a submariner.

It is worth noting that in October 2020 the USNI reported that China was doubling its nuclear submarine building capacity.

It appears that the Chinese intend to match or exceed the US’s normal two nuclear submarine per year build rate, while continuing to build a substantial fleet of conventionally powered air-independent submarines.

Meanwhile NORTHCOM says Russia is close to having cruise missile launching nuclear submarines cruising persistently off the US coasts.

It is becoming apparent, that in any future major conflict, submarines will be a threat, not just in distant waters, but in virtually any ocean right up to the US coast.

It is time for the Coast Guard and Navy to cooperate in redeveloping a Coast Guard role in ASW, whether it be permanently installed or containerized add-ons with Navy helicopter and personnel augmentation.

“Ukraine hits Russian Buyan cruise missile carrier and Pavel Derzhavin vessel with drones” –Ukrainska Pravda

©Sea Baby dron. screenshot.
© Ukrainska Pravda

Ukrainska Pravda reports,

The Security Service of Ukraine, together with the Ukrainian Navy, has attacked the Buyan cruise missile carrier and the ship Pavel Derzhavin using experimental weapons on uncrewed surface vessels…both vessels were hit by Sea Baby drones with experimental weapons.

The Buyan cruise missile carrier or Buyan-M (that is the name of the class, not a specific ship) is a small, 949 ton full load, 75 meter (246′) corvette armed with up to eight cruise missiles similar in capability to the American Tomahawk.

Buyan-M class corvette, Volgodonsk in Astrakhan. Author Anton Blinov, via Wikipedia.

Pavel Derzhavin is a Project 22160 class patrol ship, a bit bigger than the Buyan-M at 94 meters (308 ft) in length, but not as heavily armed.

Russian Project 22160 Patrol Ship Dmitriy Rogachyov in Sevastopol, 12 April 2019. Photo from Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation.

I found the reference to “Sea Baby drones with experimental weapons” interesting, not that the Sea Baby drone was experimental, so I presume the warhead was experimental. Various reports seem to indicate the explosion was extremely loud and created a great deal of smoke. This could have been the result of secondary explosions.

It is not clear if the two ships were sunk.

Information about the source here.