There is a new report, “A Ten-Year Prioritization of Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic,” prepared by The U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System Arctic Marine Transportation Integrated Action Team for the U.S. Department of Transportation.

I have quoted a portion of the Executive Summary below”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“This document, “A Ten-Year Prioritization of Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic” (Prioritization Framework), presents a framework to address Arctic infrastructure gaps by identifying needs that are considered to be critical requirements for a safe and secure U.S. Arctic Marine Transportation System (MTS) over the next decade.

“This report by the U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS) fulfills directive 1.1.2 under the White House National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR) 2014 Implementation Plan objective to “Prepare for Increased Activity in the Maritime Domain.” The deliverable for 1.1.2 is to “Deliver a 10-year prioritization framework to coordinate the phased development of Federal infrastructure through Department and Agency validated needs assessment by the end of 2016.” Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx tasked this action to the CMTS in a May 2014 memorandum.

“Using the CMTS 2013 report U.S. Arctic Marine Transportation System: Overview and Priorities for Action (CMTS 2013 Arctic Report) definitions, this Prioritization Framework organizes the U.S. Arctic MTS into five core components:

• Navigable Waterways
• Physical Infrastructure
• Information Infrastructure
• Response Services
• Vessels

“The recommendations set forth for consideration in this report are grouped into three categories under each of the five primary components: (1) infrastructure considerations that require both near-term planning and implementation; (2) infrastructure considerations requiring near term planning for mid- to long-term implementation; and (3) infrastructure considerations requiring long-term planning and implementation. This categorization facilitates the discussion of many coordinated infrastructure needs while acknowledging planning and funding requirements and limitations.

“Over the past five years, with the continuing trend in diminishing Arctic sea ice, discussions and projections for the Arctic as a new international trade route have increased. Some vessels, particularly smaller recreational vessels, currently operating in the Arctic are neither designed nor equipped for hazardous Arctic conditions. 2 As sea ice retreats, the lack of U.S. Arctic infrastructure to support increased maritime activity grows more apparent. Limited nautical charts, aids to navigation, communication, emergency response, and rescue capabilities make operations difficult and potentially dangerous. Other elements contributing to accident risks in the Arctic include inadequate maritime infrastructure and environmental and economic uncertainties, all major challenges identified in the CMTS 2013 Arctic Report.

“To address some of these risks, a number of studies have examined the gaps and potential infrastructure needs of the U.S. Arctic MTS. These needs include not only physical infrastructure such as ports, support vessels, and communication networks, but also the informational infrastructure enabling mariners to operate safely, such as nautical charts and electronic aids to navigation. The NSAR Implementation Plan (IP) identifies separate actions related to Arctic communications and aviation infrastructure [Objectives 1.2 Sustain and Support Evolving Aviation Requirements; and 1.3 Develop Communication Infrastructure in the Arctic]. This report synthesizes existing information on Arctic MTS infrastructure and gaps in order to distill requirements for future infrastructure needs over the next decade.

“There are 43 recommendations put forward in this report for necessary elements of a comprehensive Arctic MTS. This framework necessarily involves elements of the traditional definition of infrastructure, but also includes communication, planning, management, environmental policies, regulatory implementation, and the human element, all of which are required for safe, secure, and successful maritime transportation.

“Of the total list of recommendations, 25 are near-term recommendations to address the current gaps in U.S. Arctic infrastructure.

Presumably there will be interest in what they say about icebreakers. There are mentions elsewhere in the document, but this is a quote of the specific icebreaker section.

“The current Federal fleet of Polar icebreakers consists of one medium icebreaker (USCGC Healy) and one heavy icebreaker (USCGC Polar Star). The Polar Star is the only active heavy icebreaker and is primarily used in the Antarctic. The Healy is used primarily to support science missions in the Arctic, but may also be used to support other Coast Guard statutory missions such as search and rescue or provide persistent command and control capability, as required.

“It is important to note that capabilities of Coast Guard icebreakers often far exceed minimum international standards for icebreaking vessels, such as International Association for Classing Societies. These standards identify minimum power and structural survivability requirements of a single purpose vessel operating in ice infested waters. Unlike commercial vessels that are built to perform single missions with minimal crews, Coast Guard assets are multi-purpose vessels that incorporate aviation support, command and control, and additional power and endurance requirements necessary to perform all missions. The Coast Guard has assessed all available commercial icebreakers and has determined no currently operating vessel meets these critical mission and performance requirements for either a heavy or medium icebreaker. As a result, acquisition of new assets is the only viable option for obtaining additional icebreaking capacity.

“The Coast Guard currently has an acquisition program that will replace the capabilities of the Polar Star when complete. Due to lengthy design and production and anticipated decommissioning of the Polar Star, the Coast Guard will not provide additional capacity within the 10-year horizon. While Coast Guard icebreaking support has been used to facilitate commerce in emergency situations, such as the 2014 fuel resupply in Nome, the Coast Guard does not intend to use these vessels to facilitate routine commercial maritime traffic or to support commercial drilling operations.”

So does not look like we will even be considering vessels like the AIVIQ or the icebreakers that had been being built for Shell Oil construction of which has been suspended.

In addition to icebreakers, it looks like this will have implications for SAR, AtoN, Communications, and Marine Environmental Protection.

The Acquisitions Directorate has announced the award of a contract for the 26 remaining planned Webber Class Fast Response Cutters to Bollinger Shipyards LLC. Rather than the Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) I had hoped for, but really did not expect, this is a $318.6M contract for six with options for the remaining twenty in groups of four to six. It is really not to late to think about a MYP in FY2017 or 2018 since right now, neither the shipyard nor the Coast Guard have any definitive assurance that the remaining ships, beyond the first six in the contract, will be completed. Each additional year’s increment is dependent on future appropriations.

Currently the program has delivered 17 vessels. 15 more are under construction or have been funded. The 26 expected to be procured under this contract will complete the 58 in the program of record.

These vessels are 154×26.6×9.5 ft. 28 knots, with a crew of 22 (normally actually 24). They are armed with Mk38 mod2 or mod3 stabilized 25mm gun and four crew served .50 cal.

Eaglespeak has brought to my attention a quarterly magazine that is available on line, that I had not been previously aware of: Naval Science and Technology, “Future Force”

It has a number of interesting articles, including:

• Weather satellites
• Wave Prediction
• Ice prediction
• Using unmanned ground vehicles for maritime interdiction boardings, and
• Detecting Lasers

I have added the magazine to the recommended blog lis for future reference.

The following from the German Navy blog, Marine Forum, 13 March, “IVORY COAST, Islamist terrorists (reportedly al Qaida affiliated) stormed a beach resort in Ivory Coast … attack beaches and three hotels and kill at least 16 people … six attackers also killed … … unconfirmed reports allege US government delegation may have been targeted.

On 9 March 1944, one of the 30 destroyer escorts the Coast Guard manned during WWII, USS Leopold (DE-319), was sunk south of Iceland, in the midst of a Gale, by what was then a new, cutting edge weapon, an acoustic homing torpedo.

All of the Leopold’s 13 officers and 158 of her complement of 186 enlisted men were lost.  There were only 28 survivors.

This was the second largest loss of life (171) in a single incident in Coast Guard history, exceeded only by the Explosion of the USS Serpens (AK-97) which killed 196 Coastguardsmen. It is more than the USCGC Tampa (111), the Escanaba (103), or the USCGC Muskeget (116) and many more than D-Day of the Normandy invasion (13).

USS Joyce (DE-317), also Coast Guard manned, was Leopold’s sistership. She rescued 28 survivors from a crew of 199.

Photo: Leopold’s CO, LCdr Phillips 

Specifications for the Leopold and Joyce. Edsall Class Destroyer Escort

• Displacement: 1,253 tons standard; 1,590 tons full load
• Length: 306’ (93.3 m) oa
• Beam: 36’7” (11.2 m)
• Draft: 10′ 5′ (3.2 m) full load
• Machinery: 2-shaft Fairbanks Morse diesels, 6,000 bhp
• Range:  10,800 nmi at 12 knots
• Top Speed: 21 knots
• Complement: 186 
• Armament: 3 x 3”/50; 2 x 40mm; 8 x 20mm; 3 x 21″ torpedo tubes; 2 x depth charge tracks; 8 x depth charge projectors; 1 x hedge hog.

Twelve of this class were transferred to the Coast Guard 1951 to 1954 for service as Ocean Station Vessels. Ten of those had been Coast Guard manned during WWII. This class had the logistics and training advantage, that they had the same engines as the 311 foot cutters

gCaptain reports that MIT claims to have developed an algorithm that can provide warning of incoming rogue waves two to three minutes before they arrive.

“Rogue waves can measure eight times higher than the surrounding seas and can strike in otherwise calm waters, with virtually no warning … To put the algorithm into practice, he says ships and offshore platforms will have to utilize high-resolution scanning technologies such as LIDAR and radar to measure the surrounding waves.”

Having been on the old Mackinaw on a relatively calm day and suddenly taking a 53 degree role without any warning, I am a believer.

CoastGuardNews brought to my attention, a planned memorial for the approximately 1500 enlisted Coast Guardsmen who have died on duty since the establishment of the service in 1915.

Unfortunately this was the first I had heard of the project. You can see more information about the design of the memorial here. The home page for the CG Enlisted Memorial Foundation is here.

The Enlisted Memorial Foundation also maintains a data base. The Combat Deaths section was particularly interesting, although it did fail to include the men from the Seneca that were lost in WWI, it did bring to my attention an element of Coast Guard participation in WWII, I was not aware of. Six Coast Guardsmen were lost on the Navy destroyer transports (APD) Colhoun, Little, and Gregory during the early phase of the Guadalcanal campaign. These ships were WWI vintage destroyers that had boilers, weapons, and all their torpedoes removed so that they could serve as high speed transports. Presumably the Coastguardsmen were boat crew for the landing craft the destroyer transports used to land supplies and Marine Raiders.

USS Gregory (APD-3) early 1942, US Navy photo. Four of this class supported the early Guadalcanal campaign. Three were sunk, Colhoun by aircraft, Little and Gregory by Japanese destroyers. 

There is an FY2017 Budget Fact Sheet here. Notably it does include long lead time items for the OPC and funding for four more Webber class Fast Responce Cutters.

There is also a Coast Guard provided “Appropriation Summary” table comparing “FY2015 revised enacted,” “FY2016 enacted,” and the “FY2017 President’s budget” here. In an earlier post I tracked how the 2016 budget had changed.

Perhaps not surprisingly the AC&I request ($$1.14B) is way down from the FY2016 budget ($1.95B) which funded a ninth National Security Cutter and accelerated the OPC and icebreaker programs, but it is a bit more than the original FY2016 request ($1.02B). The total 2017 budget ($10.32B) appears to be down significantly compared to the 2016 appropriation ($11.1B) but this is attributable primarily to the decline in the AC&I account.

I would hate to see AC&I funding, again drop well below a reasonable sustained funding rate, which is about $2-$2.5B. Would love to see some of the funding for the OPC or Icebreaker moved forward into the FY2017 budget so that a $2B AC&I budget would be seen as the new norm. The Acquisitions Directorate really needs to work to make that an option.