Rewrite of Seapower 21 Coming–Opportunity for More Clarity?

As noted by Brian McGrath, over at Informationdissemination, the CNO has issued a “Position Report.” (pdf) It’s only three pages and updates his “Navigation Plan.”

This quote caught my eye, “With the other sea services we will revise our maritime strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”, to address the challenges and threats facing us in the near future.”

While there may be commitments in a war plan. Most Coasties don’t seem to have an idea what their war time roles would be. Perhaps this is an opportunity to address the apparent ambiguity. As discussed recently, a more explicit explanation of wartime roles for the Coast Guard could go a long way toward informing choices in the procurement of platforms and equipment, particularly the Offshore Patrol Cutter.

A second line, while addressed specifically at the Navy’s close formal relationship with the Marine Corps, suggest there will be an effort to  minimize duplication of effort, “We will develop concepts to guide future amphibious operations, building on the ongoing “Single Naval Battle” effort with the Marine Corps.”

Where might we eliminated duplication of tasks and platforms between the Navy and Coast Guard?

As a side note one of the items addressed as a “fundamental responsibility” under the principle “Warfighting First.”

”” We deployed (and will keep) in the Arabian Gulf new mine hunting and neutralizing equipment, improved torpedoes; advance electromagnetic sensors, “up-gunned” patrol craft (emphasis applied–Chuck), and USS PONCE as an afloat forward staging base.

The reference to patrol craft may be exclusively to the Navy’s Cyclone Class, but some of the patrol craft in the vicinity are USCG. I haven’t seen anything indicating that their armament has been changed. Also have not seen any indication the Coasties are coming home. Could this become a long term standing commitment? Will the 110s be replaced by Webber class Fast Response Cutters?

Air Force Helo Buy with Possible CG Impact

Defense News reports, the Air Force is again trying to buy a new Combat SAR helicopter to replace their HH-60s. This will not be an easy program. It ran into legal problems during an earlier attempt, but this is one the CG may want to watch. The program is expected to span 14 years, and the CG MH-60s are now expected to require replacement beginning in 2022. If the program is successful, the CG may be able to ride the coattails of a mature program.

Counting Ships

The dust-up between Governor Romney and President Obama about the size of the Navy has lit off a flurry of debates. If you want to take a peak, here are some of the discussions, I’ve looked in on.

The general consensus seems to be that while comparing gross numbers to the fleet of 1916 may not be a good measure, the fleet may need more ships. Today’s fleet is enormously powerful, much more so than any of its competitors, but there simply may not be enough ships to be in all the places where they are needed for many of the relatively mundane tasks that are part of exercising command of the sea.

What does all this have to do with the Coast Guard?

  • We may be loosing some of our Navy support for drug interdiction, and
  • There may be increased reliance on the Coast Guard for low level naval tasks.

The FFGs which have been the platform of choice for drug interdiction operations are disappearing rapidly. They may be replaced by Littoral Combat ships, but LCS are being built more slowly that the FFGs are disappearing, and they are relatively short legged ships. There is the possibility of using the numerous MSC manned ships, including the new Joint High Speed Vessels, for drug interdiction, but it would require a change of policy.

The Coast Guard is an element of American Sea Power. Under Secretary of the Navy Bob Work never fails to mention the Coast Guard when he talks about American Sea Power. The Coast Guard is the US Navy’s closest ally and their most immediately available reserve. In terms of personnel, the CG is larger than the Royal Navy, but the size of our fleet has also been going down too. Additionally, because of their age, many of the ships we do have are sketchy for distant deployment.

In many situations, including maritime interdiction operations (MIO) like Market Time or the Cuban Missile Crisis Quarantine quantity can be more important than quality. As EagleSpeak notes there are, or will soon be, only 108 surface combatants (cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and Littoral Combat Ships) in the USN. In addition there are only 11 Cyclone class patrol craft (PC). If you subtract all the units that are out of area, in maintenance or workup, or required for other on-going tasks, the number of ships that might be available to undertake a new operation is pretty small and the 38 large patrol ships and the over 130 WPBs and WPCs in the Coast Guard start to look significant. (Beside, putting a $2B DDG in the vicinity of an apparently innocent but potentially hostile vessel, may not be the best use of a precious resource when a single torpedo could take it out for months, if not sink it.)

Does the Coast Guard get any visibility, or more importantly funding, for this role? Not so much. “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” talks about a “National Fleet,” but whenever fleet size is discussed, only the Navy ships are included. Why is this? Does the Navy want to avoid the possibility of Congress seeing the Coast Guard as an alternative to the Navy? Certainly there are institutional and structural impediments to thinking in those terms. Are our ships too insignificant to count? They are not aircraft carriers, but in terms of cost and capability they are in the same league as LCS, Mine Warfare, and Auxiliary ships that are included.

Within the Coast Guard itself, there is also a reluctance on the part of many to claim a wartime role and even consider it as a basis for funding either directly or through the Navy Department, even though wartime missions might justify platforms that are more capable for peacetime roles as well. Frankly, I find it galling to see how richly the Navy is endowed against imagined eventualities while the Coast Guard goes begging to fill actual everyday needs.
The Coast Guard needs to work on getting its wartime roles recognized, in the Navy Department, the DHS, and the Congress. Maritime Interdiction Operations is an obvious fit but there may be other niches the Coast Guard could fill in wartime that perhaps should be incorporated in procurement decisions.