If you haven’t seen Escanaba’s blog, it is very nicely done. It provides a good window on their operations including some very nice pictures.
USCGC Escanaba’s Blog
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“Top 10 Recent Failures of the Coast Guard”
When people voluntarily give you a critique, you probably ought to at least listen. Below are links to a critique offered by a mariner, apparently one of considerable experience. I personally don’t feel qualified to comment on most of it, because it relates to mission areas where I have had little or no experience, but perhaps some of you will get something from it.
Part 1: http://gcaptain.com/maritime/blog/places-uscg-dropping-ball-part/
Part 2: http://gcaptain.com/maritime/blog/top-10-recent-failures-of-the-uscg-part-2/#more-13783
Arctic Patrol Vessel
With all the talk of the Arctic opening up, I’d like to pick you brains about the sort of ships we need. How will we balance of numbers and capability?
Do we need a new design? An ice strengthened OPC? Can 225s do the job? A salt water Mackinaw? (Anybody know if the new Mackinaw is restricted to fresh water?)
Do we perhaps need a new type of vessel–maybe an icebreaking helo carrier with hanger space that can alternately be used for containers of different types from scientific or personnel support to mine warfare modules?
Should we reactivate the Glacier as an interim measure?
There is some background here.
What do you think?
MSSTs and Irregular Naval Warfare
We have all probably read that five Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST) are to be dissolved. There is good background in a recent article in The Navy League’s magazine, “Sea Power”.
For those that would like a little more background on the potential threats, here are some links to historical employment of irregular naval warfare:
- Italian Naval Special Forces
- British X-craft
- The Limpet Mine
- Swimmer delivery vehicles/human torpedoes
- USS Card
- Vietnam-era incidents
There were many more attacks in Vietnam. So called “sapper” attacks were fairly common.
GPS and development of technology for underwater work and recreation have made these capabilities much easier to achieve.
I’ve heard statements to the effect that others can do the mission better, but I don’t see anyone else stepping up to do the job, at least not in US ports other than Navy bases.
I have very mixed feelings about the underwater port security mission. It is really almost an impossible job to do with a high probability of success. There are too many potential targets, not unlike trying to protect subways or buses from suicide bombers. It’s a job the needs to be done, but it is most likely to be recognized only when there is a failure.
Cruise missiles from Container Ships
Interesting article here: The Problem with Proliferation: Cruise Missile Edition, highlights an emerging capability to arm container ships with cruise missiles.
For more information about the launch system including a short animated film with US equipment in the hands of the bad guys, lookhttps://www.youtube.com/embed/mbUU_9bOcnM“> here.
Fast Response Cutters (FRC) to be named for enlisted heroes
If you haven’t seen the ALCOAST yet, the FRCs are to be named after enlisted heroes.
http://www.uscg.mil/announcements/alcoast/132-10_alcoast.txt
I love it.
WMEC270 to OPC
As another way to look at what we need in the new ship, start with the 270 and tell me how it should be improved.
Guns for the Offshore Patrol Cutters
In the interest of saving a big chunk of money, I think the Coast Guard and Navy should reconsider the proposed fitting of the 57 mm gun to the new Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), and perhaps recycle existing Oto Melara 76mm Mk 75s instead.
If the Navy is going the stop supporting the Mk 75, we probably have no choice, but the 76mm is one of the most widely used weapons in the world. New developments including guided munitions and high velocity discarding sabot rounds are keeping it competitive.
STRALES system Oto Melara Munition Gives Naval Guns Low-Tech, ‘Nonlethal’ Precision
The two systems are very similar in weight and range, with the 76mm having a slight edge in range. The 57mm has a higher rate of fire, but this is balanced by the greater weight of the 76mm projectile.
It may not save the CG a lot in acquisition because, if it is like past programs, the Navy is buying the gun, but the Country has to pay for it, and the CG might benefit in having to retrain fewer people to maintain the weapons.
I think the choice of which is best boils down to what you think the critical threat we need to address is. If it is airplanes and cruise missiles or huge swarms of Iranian speedboats, the 57 mm might be better, but if you think you might have to sink a ship or hit targets ashore, then the 76 is probably better. Frankly I think the latter is more likely. For that reason I would actually prefer we mounted a 5″ Mk 45, but I don’t think that is going to happen.
NSC, Have we been lucky or good?
Navy Times has reported the Navy has had serious quality problems with their ships built by Northrop Grumman’s Gulf Coast Yards.
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/01/navy_ships_problems_012110w/
“Navy engineers are tackling a raft of problems discovered aboard warships built at the Gulf Coast yards of defense giant Northrop Grumman — including faulty welds, lube-oil problems and a defective engine — in the latest installment of the ongoing saga between the Navy and its largest shipbuilder.
“Inspectors are rechecking every pipe weld aboard every ship built in the last several years at Avondale, La., or Pascagoula, Miss., including destroyers and small- and big-deck amphibs, after discovering so many problems that all pipe welders and Navy inspectors at both yards had to be decertified and then recertified to work on ships.”
Have we been luckier with the National Security Cutters? Is Coast Guard supervision better than that given Navy projects? Or is this a problem that we will see surface in the future?
Multiple crewing of National Security Cutters
Considering the multi-crew concept for the National Security Cutters, I have my doubts. Here is a brief explanation from the official USCG acquisitions web site:
http://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/NSC/crewing.asp
“Initially, the Coast Guard will employ four crews for three NSCs at a single homeport, rotating the cutters among the crews to limit crew PERSTEMPO to 185 days while maintaining each cutter’s operational tempo (OPTEMPO) at 230 days. The three-cutter, four-crew prototype will be evaluated in 2009 through an operational testing-and-evaluation process. Policy and procedures for CRC are based on the lessons learned by the Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy, as well as consideration of the recommendations made by auditors from the Government Accountability Office.”
First assuming the projections are correct, we are replacing 12 ships which would provide 2,220 operating days with eight ships that will provide at best 1,840 so we are already two ships short.
Then you will also note that the presumption is that the ships will be operated in groups of three from the same home port, but there are only eight ships planned, meaning there will be a rump group of two somewhere. Will they be operated by three crews or by a single crew per ship?
What we hope to save here is acquisition cost, because the operating costs per op day cannot be lowered by this strategy and will actually be higher. I don’t know the projected life cycle costs for the National Security cutters, but in general, I’ve heard that the acquisition costs for similar systems is about 15% of the life cycle cost. Fuel and personnel costs are the real driver. Fuel costs should be the same per op day. Personnel costs will actually be higher, since each crew under the multi-crewing concept will only provide 172.5 op days instead of 185, so personnel costs will be 7.25% higher.
In addition, because the ship will only be in port 135 days a year instead of 180, there will be fewer opportunities for the crew to make repairs. These repairs, normally done by the crew, will have to be done by contractors at additional costs.
I would also note that the acquisition costs we hope to save actually decline as we add more ships. Four additional units are likely to cost far less on the average than the first 8. There is also the long term value of having four additional ships in hand if the country should need them in the future.
Frankly I don’t think we will see any significant savings from this manning approach and it may actually cost us in the long run.
If a truly convincing argument can be made for the concept, I would like to see it. And if the argument involves lower overhead because we get more “mission” op days compared to RefTra day, remember the reason we go, is to train the crews, not the ships, so every crew will needs to go.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 