18 thoughts on “A Reevaluation, Ruminating on Homeports While Playing the Red Cell, Part 2”

1. @Chuck: I think your assumptions, analysis, and conclusions are well-founded. One thing that worries me, and if I’m reading between the lines correctly, it appears to worry you too. There has been an ever-creeping slow decline in the number of assets. Let’s be blunt. This reduction is to save money, and the counter-point (excuse?) is that the newer assets are more capable, but at some point “quantity has a quality of its own.”

   Looking at operations from the bottom upwards, I think every coastal Sector should have their own pair of WPBCs (short for “87’ Replacement”). I would include Sector San Juan, plus for D17, 2 in SE Alaska, 2 in Homer, and 2 somewhere around Unalaska. That’s 54 boats. Then, I’d add an additional WPBC for each of the 31 critical ports you’ve identified. That raises the total to 85. I could even see home-porting 1 or two on Lake Michigan and/or Superior and maybe 1 in Detroit for the other Great Lakes. That gets us to 88.

   My point behind this is that, as you’ve eluded to, the Webbers are not always waiting around on standby protecting a small coastal/port area. They are frequently patrolling and often that is out quite far from a reasonable response time back to a port. With all the bipartisan support, now is the golden hour to get some assets in a realistic quantity to do the job. Of course, those assets also need the capability to do the job, but that we’ve discussed on other threads here at your blog.

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   • Actually I think the planned force will be better than the force it is replacing, but of course it should be. But I also want to be realistic about its relationship to what is needed. Unfortunately the Coast Guard has not been good about identifying and reporting what it really needs. We did our last Fleet Mix study over a decade ago. Even then it really did not look at alternative platforms, e. g. cutter X, just the platforms we were already planning to build. We just cling to the “program of record” like it came down from God.

     We also do not seem to recognize the need to be able to forcibly stop merchant ships regardless of size, which is fundamental to Coast Guard missions.

     We also do not seem to be considering our mission in a near peer conflict which seems to be a very real possibility lately.

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     • My issue with the concept of: “these platforms are more capable; therefore we don’t need as many,” is that there are some inescapable truths, such as Murphy’s Law. There are going to be engineering casualties. Hulls are going to get damaged. Electronics/Wiring/Power systems are going to go down. Screws are going to get damaged or even lost… I adhere to the concept of “One is none; two is one; and three is better.” Thus, why I advocate 2 in every Sector and an extra at the high-risk/busy ports. No matter how “capable” the Cutter is, it doesn’t equal a fishing trawler when it’s tied up for repairs…

       Maybe the first, imperative criteria for the new WPBC is “reasonable cost; reasonable capability.” Make it affordable enough to buy 90 of them. To this end, AND to make them less desireable to pull away from the Sectors and put on other missions, build to the tasking, so expensive “extras” don’t drive up costs and make them “deployable.” These Cutters, along with Response Boats and MLBs (both of which lack the endurance of this Cutter) are the Sector’s primary assets, and, dare I say(?) Always Ready… The CG shouldn’t get sparkles in their eyes for fancy things, nor stare at the floor and be reluctant to ask for more when it comes to the WPBC program.

       The trouble with the Webber-class is they are too capable. They have now supplanted some WMEC missions, and this means that sometimes they are not “Patrol Boats,” rather “mini-ships,” deployed far from homeport for longish periods of time. Ultimately this is a good enhancement of interdiction capability, but it also results in there simply being no way to factor in the Webbers as covering a certain percentage of ports/Sectors in order to reduce the WPBC purchase.

     • With three ships in a port, the way Webber class are being based, we should be able to keep one underway, one in maintenance, and one in work-up/stand-by.

       If you have two you can only have one in maintenance and one stand-by/or responding, which is what I think the WPB replacement basing should be.

       The concentration of Webber class in D7 in only three ports with 6 or 7 in each, clearly shows they are more than “response cutters.” But that does not mean they don’t do missions for the Sectors as well. I just don’t see any reports of that happening.

       To me there is an irreducible minimum capability the WPBs and the Webber class should have. We are not there.

     • Where the concern is almost exclusively SAR for recreational boaters and/or fishing vessels. WPBs could be replaced by larger, longer ranged but relatively fast MLB. The British have several classes larger than the 47 footers that are at least as fast.

     • It would be interesting to know, say a percentage, of how the 154’s time is used: Cyclical maintenance, Major repairs, Work-up/Stand-by, Transit, Sector Operations/Patrol, and “deployed” (which would mostly be interdiction/WMEC-like missions). Even with having an accurate break-down, though, it would not guarantee a certain equivalent of WPBCs which could be foregone and still cover the mission.

       The trouble, in large part, as I see it, is the Areas being able to reach down and pluck the asset from Sector. This probably happens most of the time with warning, but it still deducts the asset. Also, with the way the 154s are deployed, not all sectors have them (which is of course why the 87s and future WPBC exist…). Out of the 31 critical ports, 21 have no Webbers stationed at them.

       There are other Sectors with no 154s at all. If they do not get the WPBC, they will have nothing but RB-M or -L to respond to a threat. I agree a couple sectors are very SAR heavy, but I can’t think of a single sector which doesn’t have some kind of LE need, even if it is merely fisheries enforcement which requires more than a response boat.

       The elephant in the room, though, as you said, is the CG still not recognizing a capability shortfall. Perhaps HQ has put all their eggs in the MDA basket, presuming a call to Northcom will get USAF or USN assets to physically engage the threat? If so, that’s a BIG assumption, and leaves our country in danger. (As you’ve talked about before, USN and USAF don’t have operational assets just sitting around waiting for a call either…) The CG, as a military branch and a significant member of DHS, really should be taking the lead on use of force, not hoping another branch or .50-cals and 25mms will take care of any/all threats out there… I would have hoped the CG would be better than most agencies who make changes only after a spectacular failure. “If it is predictable, it is preventable.”

     • Bill,

       The only information I have along that line is that the Webber class are expected to be used 2500 hours a year. That equates to at least 105 days a year. That is considerably more than the 110 foot island class which were, I believe, expected to operate 1500 hours per year. But with short days on departure and return, which will happen frequently, at 2500 hours per year it means we can expect three vessels to provide essentially one underway continuously. In addition of the three, one could be on call to respond to unplanned sector or district demands.

       We do expect at least four additional critical ports to be covered by Webber class WPCs as more are competed. We could have four more ports covered by redistributing 7th District WPCs. That would get us up to 18, leaving 13 unguarded. That is where the minimum 26 number for WPCs comes from.

       I think we have to recognize that an armed response to terrorist attack has to be a priority mission that is considered in the allocation of resources, that is trained for, and tested periodically.

       That is not to say WPBs could not be used for SAR cases if they remained reasonably close to the port they are assigned to protect, say 40-50 miles depending on speed. These WPB replacements don’t have to have any more range than the existing 87 footers (900 nautical miles or 1700 km), but I would hope they are faster. That would not only allow a faster response to terrorist attack, it would also allow greater flexibility in there employment as SAR assets without compromising their readiness to respond to an attack.

     • Agreed. I doubt the District 7 154s would be redistributed, though. It appears the clustering is with the certain intent to employ them throughout the Carribbean and Southern Gulf of Mexico, thus, I would look at 32 as the minimum number, based on your criteria of 2 per port. I’d rather see three, due to the volume of traffic in and around these ports. It might take more than one to search, identify, and locate a threat, or there might be a Murphy’s Law casualty during the mission, requiring a back-up. That would make a minimum of 48. Considering the Sectors which have an over-abundance of Webbers, like San Juan, Miami, and Key West, and considering they are on the list of high-volume ports, I’d come down from my earlier-proposed number of 88 to around 79-80, as ideal… Seems that was the program size of the 87s originally, wasn’t it? Was the intent behind purchasing more 154s than the 110s they replaced to reduce the number of 87’-replacements? If so, I can only believe that has been negatively impacted by the clustering and tasking of many 154s on what has traditionally been WMEC missions. That would leave the situation back at a one-for-one replacement of the 87s…

     • @Bill, originally 74 Marine Protector class.

       Supposedly there was no intent to replace Marine Protector Class with Webber class. It was supposed to be 90 cutters (12 WHECs, 29 WMECs, and 49 Island class WPBs) replaced by 91 new ones (8 NSCs, 25 OPCs, and 58 FRCs). No mention of 87 footers.

       If it was a priority, if we encountered a situation where there were no operational WPBs or WPCs in or near a critical port the logical response would be to have one of the patrolling WPCs move to a position near the port entrance. I don’t think we could justify three WPBs per port just to maintain a ready response.

       The 87 foot WPBs were widely distributed, with many being single vessels in very small ports. In at least some of those cases replacement by ready RB,Ms and Webber class patrolling offshore for more distant SAR makes sense.

2. We’ve been hitting the 87’-replacement question hard, but this thread also has a lot to do with larger Cutter home-porting. In your post about the Forbes article, you noted:

   “So at the end of 1991, the year the last 270 was delivered, we had 47 WHECs and WMECs (12 x 378s, 13 x 270s, 16 x 210s and 6 WWII vintage ships). By the time the first NSC came out, we were down to 41 (12 x 378s, 1 x283, 13 x 270s, 14 x 210s and 1 WWII vintage ship). We are currently at 37 (8 x NSCs, 1 x 378s, 1 x283, 13 x 270s, 14 x 210s) and working toward 36 (11 NSCs and 25 OPCs). I suspect we will the the number drop below that before the OPC program is complete.”

   You spoke in our discussion above about having a “minimum number” of WPBs. Do you have a “minimum number” of Large Cutters? After spelling out quite well in this post about home-port assignments, what do you see as the appropriate numbers? Build the 12th NSC? Add more NSCs or increase the OPC buy? I found it very interesting in the Forbes article that the author discussed the CG becoming more geo-political as well as implying a need to take a stronger view of the Homeland Security mission…

   I’d like to hope the 3 medium icebreakers will be more Arctic Patrol Cutters, so take that into consideration too – I could see Alex Haley (and the unreplaced Acushnet & Storis) being accounted for in those Medium Icebreakers. So, assuming the Arctic Patrol Cutter becomes a reality, that will replace 3 of the “former 47,” making the gap 8 large cutters. Does the WMEC-like missions of the FRCs make up for that difference?

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   • Bill, wish I could answer that, but really we need much more information than I have.

     This goes back to the Coast Guard not doing long term planning. Or if they do it they don’t make it public.

     No update of the Fleet mix study.
     No 30 year ship building/refurbishment/retirement plan.

     Navy does this sort of thing every year. We need to do it at least every 4 years. Before the new Commandant takes command, the outgoing Commandant needs to give him his best estimate of what we will need in the future.

     The Fleet mix study was done well over a decade ago and it is quoted in every Congressional Research Service Cutter procurement report (https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42567), even though one of its basic assumptions, that the large cutters would use the “Crew Rotation, Concept” has been thrown out (fortunately). That study indicated that to meet all of our statutory obligations we needed 157 vessels (9 NSC, 57 OPCs, and 91 FRCs). To address gaps in mission areas that would still be at “very high risk” using the “Program of Record” would require a total of 104 vessels (9 NSCs, 32 OPCs, and 63 FRCs (plus 6 more to go to Bahrain for PATFORSWA)).

     Eliminating the Crew Rotation Concept means that fewer cutter would be available (in theory) so we might need more assets. On the other hand, I think FRCs are doing some of the missions they expected OPCs to do and a WPB replacement would probably do some of the missions the “Fast Response Cutters” were expected to do.

     I think we can be relatively sure we need more large ships than provided in the program of record. The OPC program needs to be accelerated and perhaps extended or perhaps augmented by a Cutter X program.

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     • Thanks for the link. I read it a long time ago, but the updates were helpful, and some of the original data, I had forgot.

       As far as the NSC goes, I found it interesting that the “ideal” number of 9 NSCs *with* the crew rotation concept (230 Cutter days) would result in 2070 Cutter days. With 11 NSCs *without* the crew rotation concept, they are getting 185 Cutter days, thus totaling 2035 Cutter days. This makes me feel better about not getting the twelfth NSC. On the other hand, the note that Indo-Pacific Command was turned down a Cutter due to insufficient Cutter availability makes me think your point of changing demands/mission profiles would mean that twelfth NSC would be a useful addition, particularly in PacArea.

       I also see what Alan means about keeping the FRC program going. The objective number of 91 FRCs is FAR from where the program of record puts the CG, and since this year or next appears to be the end of funding requests by the CG, it appears the President and/or Congress are going to need to make a decision about continuing the production without CG direct request… I also wonder, because of the complete absence of discussing the 87’ or its replacement, if that 91 objective number meant to represent replacing the 110s AND 87s with just FRCs? If we add your “minimum number” of 26 87’-replacements to the POR 58 FRCs, we get 84, which is mighty close to 91… The complete lack of discussion of the 87’ replacement makes one wonder…

       The last thing I found interesting was the dichotomy between the PSC and OPC programs. They are the CG’s two most important programs, yet, due to limits in funding, the decision at HQs is to gut the OPC funding, resulting in acquisition at a snail’s pace, in order to fund the PSC… All with the background of the WMECs growing to 50-60 years old before getting replaced! Doesn’t *sound* like a very high priority, does it…?? The Icebreakers and WMECs both coming to a critical point simultaneously is an anomaly (albeit predictable, but that was the malfeasance of prior HQs) which can only be addressed two ways: Congress bumping funding for a couple years, or sharp cut in operations for a decade or two.

     • The first OPCs are going to the Pacific can do just about anything a NSC can do. But on the other hand the delay in completion of the OPC is another reason to continue with the NSCs. Plus the cost difference is not as great as it was supposed to be. And we need a third NSC in Hawaii to complete the set.

3. More reason to consider Charleston important. Will be the deepest port on the East Coast. https://www.marinelink.com/news/charleston-deepest-harbor-us-east-coast-481983

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4. Nice article here on the work our engineers do. Also an indication we will soon have nine WMECs in Portsmouth, VA. Presumably all 270s.
   https://www.stripes.com/news/coast-guard/coast-guard-cutter-northland-is-back-home-but-the-work-doesn-t-stop-for-the-crew-1.653636#.X8QEr5LE91w.gmail

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5. USCGC Finback changing homeport from Cape May, NJ to Portland, ME. Webber class FRCs now homeported in Cape May.

   News Release
   U.S. Coast Guard 1st District Northeast

   Coast Guard Cutter Finback shifts homeport to Portland, Maine

   Editors’ Note: Click on images to download high resolution version.

   PORTLAND, Maine – The Coast Guard Cutter Finback (WPB 87314) officially arrived at its new homeport in Portland, Maine, Wednesday.

   Mooring alongside the Coast Guard Cutter Sitkinak (WPB 1329), the Finback is a coastal patrol boat with a crew of 11 men and women whose area of operations ranges from Sandy Hook, New Jersey to the Maine/Canadian Border.

   “We are excited to see the Coast Guard Cutter Finback relocate to Portland,” said Capt. Amy Florentino, commander, Sector Northern New England. “As a service with a big mission and limited resources, we are constantly seeking ways to be more efficient and effective. Portland is central location for the cutter to suppler both law enforcement and search and rescue operations. The change of homeport will also allow our team to provide better mission support for cutter maintenance and personnel needs. While the cutter’s homeport is changing, its mission and service to the public aren’t. As one of the only two patrol boats in our fleet, Finback and the crew will continue to operate throughout Sector New England’s area of responsibility.

   The crew will significantly increase the Coast Guard’s operational presence and maximize logistical support in Portland, and will continue to aid in maritime law enforcement, ports & waterways, coastal security, marine environmental protection, and commercial vessel safety mission-sets.

   Bollinger Shipyards Inc. of Lockport, Louisiana built USCGC Finback in December 1999. This vessel employs the latest in technology. A fully integrated electronics suite coordinates RADAR, satellite navigation, gyrocompass, autopilot, and computer generated charts to form a compact, but user-friendly command-and-control system for all ship’s missions. A unique stern launch/recovery system is vastly superior in safety, speed, and manning requirements. Even during inclement weather, the small boat can be launched and recovered with a minimal crew on deck. It also allows for safe deployment in a much larger sea state than previous systems. The engine room incorporates electronic control and monitoring system with video readouts that can be monitored from the engine room or the bridge. For the first time, the crew onboard can be a combination of male and female resulting from the multiple state-rooms throughout the cutter.

   The Finback is one of the most advanced coastal patrol boats in the world and will help the Coast Guard remain the world’s premier maritime organization for many years to come.

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6. D5 News Release
   USCGC Steelhead (WPB 87324) moves from Port Aransas, TX to Fort Macon, NC

   This puts her in a port that already has two Webber class FRCs, Richard Snyder, and Nathan Bruckenthal

   FORT MACON, N.C. — The Coast Guard Cutter Steelhead (WPB 87324) officially arrived at its new homeport in Fort Macon, Aug. 6, 2021.

   The Steelhead is a coastal patrol boat with a crew of 11 men and women whose area of operations ranges from the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay near Cape Charles and Cape Henry, Va., to the South Carolina border.

   Steelhead joins Coast Guard Cutters Maple, Bayberry, Smilax, Richard Snyder, and the Nathan Bruckenthal in Fort Macon.

   “We are pleased to announce the Coast Guard Cutter Steelhead has relocated to Fort Macon, North Carolina,” said Capt. Matt Baer, commanding officer of Coast Guard Sector North Carolina. “As a multi-mission, maritime service with vast responsibilities and limited resources, we are constantly seeking ways to be more efficient and effective. Cutter Steelhead will conduct both law enforcement and search and rescue operations spanning the entire North Carolina coastline, providing an outstanding addition to the Coast Guard’s layered response strategy of shore-based boats, aircraft, and cutters. The change of homeport will ensure critical mission support functions for cutter maintenance and personnel needs are met, while improving offshore response capabilities from the Outer Banks throughout the Crystal Coast and across southeastern North Carolina. The crew and families of the cutter Steelhead are excited to join the long-standing heritage of lifesavers who call the Coast Guard community of Cartaret County their home.”

   The 87-foot coastal patrol boat is a capable multi-mission platform designed for search and rescue, law enforcement, and fisheries patrols, as well as drug interdiction and illegal alien interdiction duties up to 200 miles off shore.

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7. Pingback: Three 270s Change Homeport from Boston to Portsmouth | Chuck Hill's CG Blog

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