This is my commentary on the Fleet Mix Studies and GAO’s response to them. Part 1, which outlined the results of the studies and GAO’s reaction is here.
Other, previous, related posts include:
Offshore and Aviation Fleet Mix Study Published
Fleet Mix Where Are the Trade-offs
General Comments applicable to the evaluation process
While the best way to consider acquisitions is to consider lifecycle costs, these don’t seem to have been considered by any of the players involved. The NSCs have crews substantially smaller than the 378s they replaced. Presumably they also have lower maintenance and fuel costs as well. If lifecycle costs were considered there would have been less likelihood the NSCs would have been deferred or cancelled, as they seem to have been.
On the other hand the FRCs and OPCs are likely to cost more than the vessels they replace, except that some of the first OPCs are likely to actually replace 378s, which are probably much more costly to operate.
Also the value of these vessels as national security assets is not considered. Trade-offs of construction of cutters vs Navy ships was not considered.
How the Coast Guard has handled the process:
The Coast Guard may have made all the right decisions regarding type and number of assets, but they have not done a good job of explaining why the decisions are the right one, and they do not seem to have succeeded in building a consensus in favor of the program in the Department, Congress and the Administration. These people like to think they are part of the decision making process and, like it or not, they are. They have to be brought along the decision chain, so that they understand the rationale for the ultimate choices. The Fleet mix studies were an opportunity to do that, that was not fully exploited.
Some of the weaknesses I see in the Coast Guard’s studies were that
- There were no ice-capable ships, so the budgetary effect of this requirement was not dealt with.
- There is no consideration of trade-off between types.
- There are no alternative types considered.
- There was no exploration of the consequences of building less than the “Program of Record.”
- The time dimension is largely ignored, in that there was little reference to the catastrophic effect of stretching out the replacement program.
It is unfortunate that the Coast Guard took so long to deliver their Fleet Mix Study to Congress. It was certainly not perfect, but Congress asked for it, and it should have been seen as part of a continuing process to build support. Feedback could have been incorporated and there would be an improved product by now. It is still not too late to use follow on studies in an iterative process to help convince decision makers outside the Coast Guard. Continue reading →
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 
