Naval Today reports on the commissioning of four former US Coast Guard Island class cutters into the Greek Navy.
Lots of friendly nations are benefitting from receipt of previously well-maintained US Coast Guard vessels through Foreign Military Sales. Their availability helps our friends in the maintenance of a global rules based maritime environment. Ships that are no longer economical to support in the US, may be maintainable in other countries where labor costs are lower.
This movement of retiring ships should be part of regular Coast Guard planning. We should set a reasonable life, say 30 years for large ships and 25 for smaller, and produce a 30 year ship building plan. Yes, it may change, and it should, but it would establish expectations for future budgets. We should produce a new projection every year.
The Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations has issued “United States Coast Guard Force Posture 2024.” Dated October 2024, it is reportedly the first of its kind and a new edition will be published annually. I have appended the Coast Guard News Release regarding the publication below.
“This posture statement informs all audiences about the U.S. Coast Guard’s operational priorities, initiatives, requirements and future challenges across its missions and geographic regions. It conveys how we are “Advancing Mission Excellence” in accordance with the 2022 Coast Guard Strategy and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Strategic Plan. This posture statement serves as a window into the breadth and depth of the Coast Guard’s commitments and how it is posturing our workforce, capabilities, and assets to deliver operational services that best serve the American people.
It is organized under four major topics rather than by the eleven statutory missions.
Operating Environment (p.3)
Guiding Principles (p.3/4)
Operating Posture (p.4-7)
Geographic Operating Areas (p.7-11)
I love it, but it does lack a clear summary of what we will do differently. I will try to interpret some of that. Below I provide a readers’ digest version with a few comments, looking first at the eleven Coast Guard missions as listed in 6 U.S. Code § 468, at select Geographic Operating Areas, and finally I will speculate on the long term implications. Given the increased use of the Coast Guard as a tool of foreign policy, I also suggest changes to the Area Commanders’ areas of responsibility (AOR) to make them fit more easily into the national command structure.
MISSIONS
Some of the missions are specifically addressed in the “Operating Posture” section, others are not. The Eleven missions are:
Non-homeland security missions:
Marine safety
Search and rescue
Aids to navigation
Living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement)
Marine environmental protection
Ice operations.
Homeland security missions:
Ports, waterways and coastal security
Drug interdiction
Migrant interdiction
Defense readiness
Other law enforcement.
I will just address them in alphabetical order:
Aids to Navigation:
Aids to Navigation is not called out under a separate heading.
“Our comprehensive approach (to the Marine Transportation System (MTS)) encompasses…Maintaining aids to navigation…” (p.4)
The Coast Guard is reinforcing actions to be “brilliant at the basics” that strengthen…aids to navigation.
The Coast Guard is in the early phase of recapitalizing an aging fleet of inland aids to navigation tenders with new Waterways Commerce Cutters, crucial to maritime commerce in our inland river system. These investments are central to maintaining service delivery in an increasingly complex MTS (Maritime Transportation System–Chuck).
Sounds like minimal changes in the near term but expect improving technology may reduce manpower requirements. Elsewhere there is indications buoy tenders may increasingly be used for non-AtoN missions. This suggests that the number of sea-going buoy tenders (WLBs) is unlikely to be significantly reduced, but their character may change–more on this below.
Defense Readiness
We are increasing attention on the Coast Guard’s defense readiness mission given the increasing threat posed by nation-state competitors. Through integration with Department of Defense efforts, refreshing defense-related plans, and preparedness exercises, we are sharpening readiness to support homeland defense requirements and force deployment commitments for major overseas contingencies. We continue to meet our commitments to North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) for National Capital Region and deployable Rotary Wing Air Intercept and we are adjusting the structure of our Port Security Units (PSU) to address Reserve workforce shortages. We are also integrating PSU elements with DoD expeditionary units to increase their deployment readiness.
This is a welcome recognition of an increasingly hostile world and the emergence of non-state actors who, acting independently or as a proxy for hostile states, can impact national security.
Drug Interdiction is not called out as a separate topic. The only indication of a change is this statement under the section “Western Hemisphere,”
“We will maximize employment opportunities by conducting a mix of missions such as counter drug and combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing when appropriate.” (p.9)
Ice Operations:
Ice operations is not called out as a separate mission, but it is addressed in the “Polar Regions” section (p.8/9) of the Geographic Operating Areas section.
Arctic and Antarctic Ice operation will get a big boost as we go from 2 polar icebreakers to eight. In the Arctic there will be a continuing need for non-icebreaking large cutters and we can expect increased exploitation of fixed wing aircraft and particularly satellite for communications and information.
Living Marine Resources
“We will increasingly favor shore-based law enforcement teams and our patrol boat fleet, supported by maritime domain awareness sensors, to ensure we best match this mission.”
Webber class WPCs have proven capable of assuming much of the fisheries protection mission. They can go anywhere fishing vessels can go and stand up to any weather they might be fishing in. So FRCs are stepping up to missions WMECs have traditionally done. Not mentioned, but on the other hand, in Alaska and the distant Pacific there is still a role for larger ships.
Marine Environmental Protection:
There was no section devoted to Marine Environmental Protection as a specific mission. MEP was referred to briefly in the Mission execution section (p.5) Arctic (p.8)
But there was this under “Incident Management and Crisis Response” (p.6)
Management of large, complex incidents is a central Coast Guard competency. Employment of this capability enables success for the most consequential crises and events, builds trust, and supports DHS. However, the Coast Guard does not have a large contingency capacity “in garrison” for emergencies. We will continue to strengthen Coast Guard incident management capacity and proficiency to meet increasing demand, including in the Reserve workforce. The Coast Guard continues to respond to stakeholder requests for assistance for incident management while we prioritize incidents with a Coast Guard nexus and prevent overextending Coast Guard resources.
Marine Safety
There is a lot of activity here,
“The Coast Guard is reinforcing actions to be “brilliant at the basics” that strengthen marine inspection, investigation, Vessel Traffic Services, waterways management, and aids to navigation.”
Changes in the environment include autonomous vessels, offshore renewable energy installations, an emerging space launch and recovery industry, and alternative vessel fuels. All of which require determination of standards.
Migrant Interdiction
“The Coast Guard will deploy cutters and aircraft, and adaptive force packages where practical, sufficient to interdict migrant ventures, save lives, and deter maritime migration. We continue to prepare with partners to respond to a mass migration to mitigate a national crisis. We are also integrating new technology to better anticipate, detect, deter, and interdict migrant ventures.
No significant reprioritization here. This is an area where the Webber class WPCs (20 in D7 alone) have supplemented or replaced WMECs. It is an area where shore based Unmanned Air Systems and Unmanned surface vessels like saildrone could provide persistent initial detection and perhaps reduce demand for fixed wing search aircraft.
Other Law Enforcement
Not surprisingly there is no mention of this “mission” because the Coast Guard does it on an ad hoc incidental basis. The Coast Guard’s specific law enforcement missions, drug and migrant interdiction, marine environmental protection, and fisheries are addressed separately. It is a catchall for any illegal activities. So, no change.
Port, Waterways, and Coastal Security
The Coast Guard’s force posture for this mission was configured for the post 9/11 security environment and the Coast Guard is examining approaches to optimize our capabilities to meet emerging threats. For example, the proliferation of drones poses a growing risk to the MTS and we will continue to employ our counter-UxS technology in conjunction with DHS and other partners to prepare for this threat. We are also taking steps to ensure that our deployable specialized forces are configured for their role as threats and operational needs evolve.
Recognizing and preparing to counter the UxS threat is significant. I’ve already made several suggestions. I hope if we get a hard kill system, it will also improve effectiveness against other potential threats.
This was included under Defense Readiness,
“…we are adjusting the structure of our Port Security Units (PSU) to address Reserve workforce shortages. We are also integrating PSU elements with DoD expeditionary units to increase their deployment readiness.”
To me Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security is a subset of Defense Readiness once you understand that Defense Readiness is a full time, 24/7 job that does not wait until war is declared or the Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy Department. Attacks like 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, will likely come as a surprise, there may be no time to mobilize before an attack, and our Maritime Transportation System is a likely target.
Search and Rescue:
“Search and Rescue is an enduring, no-fail mission that is deeply ingrained in the Coast Guard’s identity. As it remains a top priority, technical advances now allow us to perform the mission more effectively and with fewer resources.“
SAR success standards are not being lowered, but technology is increasingly taking the search out of search and rescue. Individual units have greater capability so fewer dedicated units may be required. Expect fewer personnel to be assigned to less demanding SAR missions that are also covered by local government first responders.
GEOGRAPHIC OPERATING AREAS
The Operational Posture goes on to discuss specific operating areas. Some of this has been addressed in the mission summaries above, so I will say no more about the Arctic, Western Hemisphere, Middle East and Europe, Caribbean, and Atlantic basin that are discussed individually in the Operational Posture, but I will talk about the Indo-Pacific, Eastern Pacific, and Antarctica.
Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific is a top regional priority given its geostrategic importance, criticality to global trade, and the threat contesting a free, open, and rules-based maritime commons.
Yes, we are paying more attention to the Pacific, the Indian Ocean not so much. We expect to have six Webber class WPCs in Guam. Harriet Lane (WMEC-903) has been moved from Atlantic Area to Hawaii and it looks like a second WMEC may also be moved. Two OPCs each are expected to go to Long Beach and Kodiak. Assuming Alex Healy stays in Kodiak and the last Pacific Area 210 is decommissioned or transferred to Atlantic Area, that will give Pacific Area 13 large patrol cutters–still fewer than the 16 that were in PacArea in 2000 and only 39.4% of the 33 large cutter total I think we have now and will have for the foreseeable future.
Given the great distances involved, the fact that 84% of the US EEZ is in Pacific Area, and because we have an obligation to the Compact of Free Associated States–Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau–that together have additional EEZ equal to about 50% of the entire US EEZ, it makes no sense for 60% of the large cutters to be in Atlantic Area. More than half of all large patrol cutters should be in Pacific Area.
Eastern Pacific:
“…with declining major cutter and maritime patrol aircraft availability, we will increasingly employ fast response cutters, ocean-going buoy tenders, and adaptive force packages supported by expeditionary logistics.” I am not surprised; this is something that was begun when Admiral Fagan was Pacific Area Commander.
“…we remain committed to supporting the Mexican Navy as they expand their Captain of the Port authorities through increased information sharing, joint training and exercises, and capacity building engagements. This expanded partnership will enhance maritime governance in the Western Hemisphere and contribute to the fight against illicit trafficking of fentanyl and precursor chemicals through Mexican ports into the U.S.”
US navy fleets areas of responsibility. Source Wikipedia.
The only mitigating rationale I see for not transferring most of the large cutters to Pacific Area is that the Eastern Pacific drug transit zone is actually closer to Atlantic Area ports than to Pacific Area ports. This is why all of South America is under 4th Fleet, which is an Atlantic Fleet command. Probably an argument should be made for realigning the Coast Guard Area geographic descriptions to match those of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. A change of name to Eastern and Western Area might be appropriate and in fact a more accurate description.
Atlantic area includes not only the Atlantic coast but also the great lakes, inland areas, the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, and parts of the Arctic and Southern Oceans. Pacific Area also includes inland areas, the Indian Ocean (part of which is under Atlantic Fleet), and parts of the Arctic and Southern Oceans.
A realignment along Fleet dividing lines would also mean the dividing lines would more closely correspond to COCOM areas of responsibility and limit the number of cases where COCOMs would need to deal with both Coast Guard Areas to NORTHCOM. Currently there is also overlap in SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM, and CENTCOM. All three of those COCOMs would only need to deal with the Eastern (Atlantic) Area. That seems to be what is happening with AFRICOM and CENTCOM now anyway. PATFORSWA WPCs, Atlantic Area assets, operate routinely in the Indian Ocean, part of the PACAREA AOR.
Unified Combatant Commander’s Areas of Responsibility.
As Pacific Area assumes more responsibility in the Western Pacific and potentially the Indian Ocean passing off responsibility for all Coast Guard operations in 4th Fleet’s Area of Operations to Atlantic Area might make sense.
Antarctic:
The U.S. priority for Antarctica remains maintaining “a continent reserved for peace and science in accordance with the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.”
No real change expected other than more and better icebreakers, but not everyone thinks like the US.
We should have the agility to react to a change from the present “continent reserved for peace and science.” We really have no reason for confidence that Antarctica will not become a zone of Conflict. Fortunately, actions to increase capabilities in the Arctic may also serve us well in Antarctica.
Implications for the Future
Cutter Design:
Patrol Cutters: Moving from “Patrol and Interdict” to “Target and Interdict” suggests that cruise speed endurance may become less important, and that higher max speed and an economical loiter speed may become more important. Greater emphasis on Defense Readiness would also suggest the desirability of greater speed. This suggest that we may want to build fewer than the currently planned 25 OPCs and shift investment to a new design based on a different set of priorities that we can build in greater number; ships with greater speed and increased modularity to accommodate an uncertain future.
Buoy Tenders: Improved aids to navigation may mean tenders will spend less time on routine AtoN maintenance. Still, they will need to be geographically distributed to respond to critical outages. It seems these ships will become more multi-mission by design. They should continue to be able to operate in ice. Their increased use for non-AtoN missions suggest that they may need overflow berthing and more fuel and stores capacity when supporting WPC deployments and to make them more effective in law enforcement roles–more speed, a flight deck and hangar for UAS and a deck gun such as the Mk38 Mod4.
Deployable Teams
Sounds like we will be getting more deployable Law Enforcement Detachments given the proliferation of capacity building objectives. Increased specialization and a desire for continuity in this area may someday result in a new rating.
Thanks to Paul for bringing the video to my attention.
Oct. 25, 2024
Coast Guard unveils first Operational Posture Statement
By Zach Shapiro, MyCG Writer
The Coast Guard just released its first Operational Posture Statement, which outlines the service’s operational priorities, including its plans to adapt to personnel and resource challenges. Vice Adm. Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations (DCO), unveiled the document Friday during an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
Think of the new annual Operational Posture Statement as a tactical annual document that supports the long-term Coast Guard Strategy by providing more specificity.
To improve operational efficiency and effectiveness, for example, the Coast Guard will increasingly use intelligence and data to shift its approach from “patrol and interdict” to “target and interdict.”
And to improve readiness, the Coast Guard will focus on three key elements: the workforce, capabilities, and assets. The Operational Posture recognizes the need to meet increasing demand while addressing workforce and resource shortages. The service will also continue to recapitalize cutters, boats, aircraft, and infrastructure.
The Operational Posture “is our effort to communicate with our stakeholders and be transparent with the American people on how we will confront all of these challenges, this increasing mission demand, and provide the kind of services that Americans deserve,” Gautier said.
Six guiding principles underpin the Operational Posture Statement:
Balance current operations with future readiness
Strengthen maritime governance
Counter strategic competitors while fulfilling our primary responsibility to secure and defend the homeland
Adjust force structure and posture to maximize operational effectiveness while maintaining a high level of support for our people, platforms, and infrastructure
Employ resources holistically to meet growing demands
Leverage intelligence, information, and improved maritime domain awareness to shift from a “patrol and interdict” to “target and interdict” model
These priorities reflect the increasing national and global demands for Coast Guard services. As 90 percent of global trade moves by sea, maritime security is the bedrock of national security and economic prosperity. In the face of rising global maritime tensions, the Coast Guard has a unique and critical role as a law enforcement entity and military agency.
Amidst this evolving environment, Gautier emphasized, the Coast Guard remains committed to its Search and Rescue (SAR) mission. That mission is “a sacred trust with the American people and a no-fail mission. It is our primary lifesaving mission. It defines us as a humanitarian service,” he said.
Moving forward, the Coast Guard intends to release a new Operational Posture Statement annually to outline the ways in which the service is adapting to new challenges and missions to best serve the American people.
To read the Operational Posture Statement in full, please click here.
Coast Guard Chief Petty Officer Christian Seay, a chief boatswain’s mate on the Coast Guard Cutter Tampa, looks over to the Coast Guard Cutter Thetis, Key West, Florida. USCG photo by Lisa Ferdinando Sky digitally altered by AI
Perhaps because the Coast Guard has always been underfunded, he sees the Coast Guard’s current situation even more dire than I do (I will be publishing my own assessment soon), but he also adds an important additional view as a member of the Merchant Marine community.
It fails to address some other massive failures, such as the Coast Guard’s stringent training requirements for U.S. Merchant Mariners, the difficulty in advancing from seaman to officer ranks, and its substantial backlog of medical evaluations. These issues collectively contribute to a mariner crisis that has forced the U.S. Navy to sideline seventeen ships.
Officials of the Naval Air Systems Command at Patuxent River Naval Air Station, Md., announced a $32 million order late last month to Boeing Insitu Inc. in Bingen, Wash., for four RQ-21A Blackjacks, 20 ScanEagles, 62 ScanEagle payloads and turrets, as well as support equipment and spare parts.
Could some of these systems be going to the Coast Guard? And, if not, why not? The Coast Guard regularly buys equipment, including aircraft, by adding on to DOD contracts.
The Coast Guard is, I believe, still contracting for vendor operated Scan Eagles. It’s about time they were integrated into the service and operated by enlisted Coast Guardsmen.
I suggested the Coast Guard should take a look at this system in 2011. Probably not because of my suggestion, but the Coast Guard started testing the systems at least as early as 2014. Scan Eagle was flown from USCGC Bertholf and made its “first bust” in 2014, nine years ago. The decision to put Scan Eagle on the National Security Cutters was made in 2020. Presumably Scan Eagle or something similar will be on the Offshore Patrol Cutters as well. The Coast Guard still needs long range shore based UAS, and I think there is a good case for small shore based UAS at the group level.
Point being, we are passed the initial research stage. We know there will be UAS operated by the Coast Guard for the foreseeable future. The number of unmanned systems in the Coast Guard should grow rapidly.
Scan Eagle was developed to be operated by commercial fishermen from Tuna boats. It’s not rocket science. It should be obvious the Coast Guard needs to own the equipment and develop in house unmanned system expertise.
Buy the equipment. Make unmanned operation and maintenance a rating or a special qualification and career path. At least follow the Navy/Marine Corps lead.
Five white 311-foot cutters of Coast Guard Squadron Three, assigned to support Operation MARKET TIME tied up alongside Navy repair ship USS Jason (AR-8) at Naval Station Subic Bay in the Philippines, 4 August 1967. From inboard to outboard: USCGC Half Moon (WHEC-378); USCGC Yakutat (WHEC-380); USCGC Gresham (WHEC-387); USCGC Barataria (WHEC-381) and USCGC Bering Strait (WHEC-382) U.S. Coast Guard Historian’s Office. Photo by CDR Richard Morse, USCG, Commanding Officer USCGC Barataria (WHEC-381)
First that he Coast Guard has no similar long-term plans, and second,
Coast Guard assets are not considered in as part of the “Battle Force.”
A good part of the reason our ships soldier on long after they should have been replaced may be because we have not been informing the executive branch and congress about our long-term needs.
I can imagine an adverse reaction to my suggestion that cutters should be part of the “Battle Force”, but you need to understand what the Navy includes in that category. These are not all high-powered warships. Currently the US Navy “Battle Force” is 299 ships. Of those, 59 are USNS ships that are almost completely unarmed, have civilian crews, and no electronic countermeasures. They include oilers, logistics ships, expeditionary fast transports, towing salvage and rescue ships, and ocean surveillance ships. In addition, it includes some commissioned ships that are not really warships, like command ships and expeditionary base ships. The relatively small future Landing Ship Medium is expected to be included as well.
If we have a naval conflict with a major power (e.g., China) the Navy is going to need the Coast Guard’s help. Cutters will help enforce blockades, round up hostile merchant shipping and fishing vessels, rescue crews from sunken ships, play host to unmanned systems, provide harbor defense and force protection, and probably ultimately be equipped as second line warships.
Cutters count, so they should be counted.
Vessels I would include in the count would include at least all the Icebreakers, National Security Cutters, Offshore Patrol Cutters, and Medium Endurance Cutters and possibly ocean-going buoy tenders and Webber class WPCs.
Eagle Eye UAS, part of the “Deep Water” Coast Guard recapitalization plan.
National Defense has a post that traces the Coast Guard’s two-decade effort to put unmanned aircraft on cutters.
But here is where I confess that this article is not really about the Eagle Eye. Sorry to say that it was all a bit of misdirection, because this article is really about one of the nation’s greatest but chronically underfunded assets: the United States Coast Guard.
National Defense since the Eagle Eye’s cancellation has written dozens of articles about the service’s effort to deploy UAVs. Over and over again, the only reason cited for the Coast Guard being the “have-not” of the services when it comes to drones was funding.
It is a good article, but I think the conclusion of the article is wrong. To paraphrase Jimmy Buffett (“wasting away in Margaritaville”) it’s our own damn fault.
Too long we seemed to glory in doing more with less. Too many years we went without bothering to submit an unfunded priorities list. We really haven’t changed our program of record since the rethink prompted by 9/11 more than two decades ago. We fired the Deepwater program contractors in 2012, but we are still working on their program. There have been changes around the edges, more NSCs, more FRCs, but those changes were not the result of a Coast Guard masterplan. They were ad hoc and frequently driven by Congressional interests.
Despite repeated Congressional calls for a new Fleet Mix Study, there is none.
Despite repeated Congressional calls for a 20- or 30-year ship building plan, there is none.
We still have not reached the number of medium range fixed wing search aircraft that were in the Program of Record and apparently have not plan to do so.
We have failed to field any shore based maritime search UAS system, a capability that was included in the Deep Water program, while Japan, Thailand, India, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the UK have already done so. This in spite of the fact that we have been piddling around with CBP’s MQ-9 program for well over a decade.
Regional Maritime Domain Awareness programs are being implemented all over the world, but if we have such a program with Mexico and Canada no one seems to know about it.
Planning for the medium Icebreakers could have proceeded in parallel with planning for the heavy icebreakers. We know we need them, but I have seen no indication that we have started looking seriously at the possibilities.
We have not talked about the possibly devastating effects the delays in the OPC program are going to have, that would justify increasing the pace of construction to more than two per year.
We still have not adequately addressed the water borne terrorist threat to our ports. Since we never have its easy to continue to ignore.
Despite demands for reports from field units, for whatever reason, the “puzzle palace” is not making public the kind of analytics required to justify significant departures from what we did last year, so we keep stumbling along from one budget to the next.
US Coast Guard cutter Munro transits the Taiwan Strait with US Navy destroyer USS Kidd in August. US Navy
A recent discussion with frequent contributor Peter Ong, lead to Peter pointing to “The National Fleet Plan.”
It was an important publication for the Coast Guard and its interface with the Navy. It portended the FRCs in Guam and WMECs in Pensacola. Among other things, it listed equipment to be included in cutter classes, much of it supplied by the Navy (p.24). I did a post on it.
Trouble is, while much of the information is probably still accurate, it was published in August 2015. Maybe it is time for new edition.
File:Major russian gas pipelines to europe.png Created: 15 November 2009 Prepared by Samuel Bailey (sam.bailus@gmail.com)
Naval News reports on the Nordic response to the apparent sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline. Coast guards are involved.
This raises the question of who protects undersea infrastructure? I don’t think there has been a lot of interest in or discussion of this question in the US. Certainly the USCG has a role.
Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton leads the way for cutters Robert Goldman and Charles Moulthrope as they depart Puerto Rico April 1. National security cutter Hamilton is escorting the two fast response cutters (FRCs) across the Atlantic to Rota, Spain. From there, the FRCs will continue to their homeport of Manama, Bahrain. U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Sydney Phoenix.
Next Navy comments on why despite great support in Congress, the Coast Guard is still not getting full funding.
There are other reasons, but it is hard for our friends to advocate for full funding when essentially, we don’t know what full funding is.
The current “Program of Record” dates from 2004. The last Fleet Mix Analysis, which essentially only served to show, “Yes, we really do need the Program of Record and a lot more,” was done in 2011.
Much has changed.
We are using the Webber class WPCs in ways not imagined in 2011.
We still don’t have the land based UAS that were included in the Program of Record.
Improved sensors and platforms, including unmanned air, surface, and subsurface are now available.
The Coast Guard’s aviation fleet, both fixed wing and rotary are not what was envisioned in the Program of Record.
The Navy’s own Maritime Domain Awareness capabilities have changed. Presumably they will share with the Coast Guard.
Illegal Unregulated Unreported fishing has emerged as a national security threat.
The Chinese have been using their Coast Guard to intimidate our friends and allies.
Combatant Commanders are constantly seeking Coast Guard assistance in Capacity Building in their AORs.
In spite of these substantial changes, we have not changed our Program of Record in 17 years.
By contrast the US Navy publishes a new Fleet Plan almost annually.
Congress has repeatedly directed the Coast Guard to complete a new Fleet Mix Analysis, but they have yet to see anything beyond the one ten year old study. I don’t know who is to blame for this. Is it the Coast Guard, the Department, or the Administration(s)?
I think they are going to have to demand the Coast Guard present a regular report bypassing the Department.
There is no way we should go more than four years between rigorous analysis of our needs. It is essential for risk analysis by all concerned parties, the Coast Guard, the Department, the Administration, and the Congress.
Proceeding without analysis is just whistling in the dark.
The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf (left) moves in formation with Philippine coast guard vessels Batangas (center) and Kalanggaman during an exercise on May 14. U.S. Coast Guard/Chief Petty Officer John Masson
The Hill argues for increased Coast Guard presence in the Pacific including greater interaction with the nations of the Western Pacific.
After explaining why China is a greater threat than Germany, Japan, or the Soviet Union ever were, the author, Seth Cropsey, explains:
“The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is uniquely situated to act as a bridge between U.S. combat forces and their allied counterparts precisely because of its dual political-legal role. Its engagement in answering grey zone challenges is also a helpful encouragement to the maritime services’ cooperation that allows each service to perfect its unique skills.”
He argues for the 12th NSC.
“As it stands, the Coast Guard’s long-range cutters have been cut from ten in the Pacific to only six (actually we still have six NSCs and two WHECs–Chuck). If Congress does not fund the 12th National Security Cutter, it will undermine the Coast Guard’s mission in the Western Pacific and weaken U.S. security.”
Most importantly, as we have done several times here, he calls for a reevaluation of the services needs and recurrent long term planning.
Even more broadly, U.S. policymakers – within the Coast Guard, the Armed Forces, and the Pentagon – must consider the Coast Guard’s strategic role. The USCG has not produced a fleet plan, termed the “Fleet Mix Analysis,” since 2004. Even in 2008 and 2012, when it revisited the document, it concluded that its fleet could only meet three-fifths of its missions. In 2004, Chinese fighter aircraft seldom conducted night operations, North Korea had not yet tested a nuclear weapon, and the U.S. had toppled Iraq’s Saddam Hussein just a year before; Hamas was a small but noted Palestinian terrorist organization, while al-Qaeda in Iraq was still consolidating power.
After 16 years, any service’s missions and equipment must change as it adapts to new threats; the same is true for the Coast Guard. A robust force review is in order, potentially modeled off the Navy’s 30-year plan which will generate a new fleet capable of meeting the demands of great-power competition, especially in the Asia-Pacific.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 