LRASM for Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security

Lockheed Martin supplied Navy Recognition with the first image showing a deck-mounted quadruple Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) launcher. According to our source, this "top side" launcher graphic is a notional concept that could be used on an appropriately sized surface vessel, such as the Arleigh Burke class (DDG 51) or Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes.

Discussion on an earlier post suggesting the Coast Guard might want to fit our new major cutters “for but not with” Long Range Anti-ship Missiles (LRASM) has prompted me to rethink the suggestion and advocate for equipping them with the missile in peacetime.

One of the Coast Guard’s peacetime missions is of course Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS).

“The PWCS mission entails the protection of the U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS) …prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks… Conducting PWCS deters terrorists from using or exploiting the MTS as a means for attacks on U.S. territory, population centers, vessels, critical infrastructure, and key resources.”

I have been concerned that the Coast Guard has not had adequate weapons to deal with a terrorist attack using a medium to large sized merchant ship, and currently I don’t believe there is any other organization capable of answering this threat in the 30 or more port complexes terrorists might find worthwhile targets, in a timely manner. Navy surface forces are too geographically concentrated. The over 200 nautical mile range and the ability to strike selected locations on a target ship suggest LRASM could possibly provide an answer.

If we had LRASM on all National Security Cutters (NSC) and Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC), in perhaps a dozen ports on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts, Honolulu and Kodiak, its over 200 mile range fired from cutters, including possibly those in port, could cover all of these ports (except Guam), and have a weapon on target within about 20 minutes of launch.

To effectively counter the threat, I think we need to get a weapon on target within an hour of positive identification of the threat. This would require improved coordination between units. In addition to providing a datum, course, and speed, presumably an intercepting unit, boat or aircraft, would need to transmit a photograph of the target to be incorporated in the missiles memory and aim points would be chosen some time during mission planning. We would need to coordinate with air traffic control. A command decision to authorize use of the weapon and updates on the target position course and speed would also be needed. Because we might have 40 minutes or less from threat identification to launch, these steps would likely have to proceed in parallel with mission planning progressing prior to authorization.

New units appear to be on the way to developing the kind of common tactical picture we need to facilitate both decision making and targeting. We could start developing the capability with the National Security Cutters based at Alameda (San Francisco Bay) and Charleston, SC, even if the system could not be completed until the last OPCs are delivered in about 2034.

Naval Science and Technology, “Future Force”

Eaglespeak has brought to my attention a quarterly magazine that is available on line, that I had not been previously aware of: Naval Science and Technology, “Future Force”

It has a number of interesting articles, including:

  • Weather satellites
  • Wave Prediction
  • Ice prediction
  • Using unmanned ground vehicles for maritime interdiction boardings, and
  • Detecting Lasers

I have added the magazine to the recommended blog lis for future reference.

 

Loss of the Leopold, 9 March 1944

Leopold_DE-319

On 9 March 1944, one of the 30 destroyer escorts the Coast Guard manned during WWII, USS Leopold (DE-319), was sunk south of Iceland, in the midst of a Gale, by what was then a new, cutting edge weapon, an acoustic homing torpedo.

All of the Leopold’s 13 officers and 158 of her complement of 186 enlisted men were lost.  There were only 28 survivors.

This was the second largest loss of life (171) in a single incident in Coast Guard history, exceeded only by the Explosion of the USS Serpens (AK-97) which killed 196 Coastguardsmen. It is more than the USCGC Tampa (111), the Escanaba (103), or the USCGC Muskeget (116) and many more than D-Day of the Normandy invasion (13).

USS_Joyce_(DE-317)_during_WWII

USS Joyce (DE-317), also Coast Guard manned, was Leopold’s sistership. She rescued 28 survivors from a crew of 199.

LeopoldCO_LCDR_Kenneth_Coy_Phillips

Photo: Leopold’s CO, LCdr Phillips 

Specifications for the Leopold and Joyce. Edsall Class Destroyer Escort

  • Displacement: 1,253 tons standard; 1,590 tons full load
  • Length: 306’ (93.3 m) oa
  • Beam: 36’7” (11.2 m)
  • Draft: 10′ 5′ (3.2 m) full load
  • Machinery: 2-shaft Fairbanks Morse diesels, 6,000 bhp
  • Range:  10,800 nmi at 12 knots
  • Top Speed: 21 knots
  • Complement: 186 
  • Armament: 3 x 3”/50; 2 x 40mm; 8 x 20mm; 3 x 21″ torpedo tubes; 2 x depth charge tracks; 8 x depth charge projectors; 1 x hedge hog.

Twelve of this class were transferred to the Coast Guard 1951 to 1954 for service as Ocean Station Vessels. Ten of those had been Coast Guard manned during WWII. This class had the logistics and training advantage, that they had the same engines as the 311 foot cutters

Rogue Wave Prediction

gCaptain reports that MIT claims to have developed an algorithm that can provide warning of incoming rogue waves two to three minutes before they arrive.

“Rogue waves can measure eight times higher than the surrounding seas and can strike in otherwise calm waters, with virtually no warning … To put the algorithm into practice, he says ships and offshore platforms will have to utilize high-resolution scanning technologies such as LIDAR and radar to measure the surrounding waves.”

Having been on the old Mackinaw on a relatively calm day and suddenly taking a 53 degree role without any warning, I am a believer.

Enlisted Memorial at Cape May

USCGenlistedMemorial.

CoastGuardNews brought to my attention, a planned memorial for the approximately 1500 enlisted Coast Guardsmen who have died on duty since the establishment of the service in 1915.

Unfortunately this was the first I had heard of the project. You can see more information about the design of the memorial here. The home page for the CG Enlisted Memorial Foundation is here.

The Enlisted Memorial Foundation also maintains a data base. The Combat Deaths section was particularly interesting, although it did fail to include the men from the Seneca that were lost in WWI, it did bring to my attention an element of Coast Guard participation in WWII, I was not aware of. Six Coast Guardsmen were lost on the Navy destroyer transports (APD) Colhoun, Little, and Gregory during the early phase of the Guadalcanal campaign. These ships were WWI vintage destroyers that had boilers, weapons, and all their torpedoes removed so that they could serve as high speed transports. Presumably the Coastguardsmen were boat crew for the landing craft the destroyer transports used to land supplies and Marine Raiders.

USS_Gregory_(DD-82)

USS Gregory (APD-3) early 1942, US Navy photo. Four of this class supported the early Guadalcanal campaign. Three were sunk, Colhoun by aircraft, Little and Gregory by Japanese destroyers. 

FY2017 Budget Fact Sheet

There is an FY2017 Budget Fact Sheet here. Notably it does include long lead time items for the OPC and funding for four more Webber class Fast Responce Cutters.

There is also a Coast Guard provided “Appropriation Summary” table comparing “FY2015 revised enacted,” “FY2016 enacted,” and the “FY2017 President’s budget” here. In an earlier post I tracked how the 2016 budget had changed.

Perhaps not surprisingly the AC&I request ($$1.14B) is way down from the FY2016 budget ($1.95B) which funded a ninth National Security Cutter and accelerated the OPC and icebreaker programs, but it is a bit more than the original FY2016 request ($1.02B). The total 2017 budget ($10.32B) appears to be down significantly compared to the 2016 appropriation ($11.1B) but this is attributable primarily to the decline in the AC&I account.

I would hate to see AC&I funding, again drop well below a reasonable sustained funding rate, which is about $2-$2.5B. Would love to see some of the funding for the OPC or Icebreaker moved forward into the FY2017 budget so that a $2B AC&I budget would be seen as the new norm. The Acquisitions Directorate really needs to work to make that an option.

FY2017 Budget Priorities–Commandant

Photos: Eastern’s proposal for the Offshore Patrol Cutter (left), We still have not seen much of Bollenger’s proposal, but I suspect it may look something like the photo on the right, but with  a more conventional mast. 

US Naval Institute News reports on the Commandant’s testimony before the House Appropriations Homeland Security Sub-committee.

“Adm. Paul Zukunft said the service will be looking again at its force-mix analysis, taking into account the money appropriated for a ninth national security cutter for this fiscal year. He said he had “the utmost confidence” the Coast Guard will down-select to one shipbuilder this year for the offshore patrol cutter.

The budget request for Fiscal Year 2017 includes $100 million for long-lead procurement for the offshore patrol cutter program.

I am a little concerned to see the statement below. Note shipbuilder (singular, not plural).

“Zukunft said that the Coast Guard is in “very emotional discussions” with the shipbuilder over the contracts for the last of the fast response cutters. “We need to come to closure on this” in the next few months to clear the way for the construction of the offshore patrol cutters.”

I was under the impression we were to have a competition for construction of the remaining ships. The Coast Guard paid for the design rights so that we could put the remained out for competitive bids. This should have happened a couple of years ago. What happened? And why is this not a multi-year buy?

There is also $150M in the budget for long lead time items for the new Icebreaker. This seems a bit odd, since the builder has not been selected, although I suppose Huntington Ingalls is the foregone conclusion.

————————————————————————–

For more on the previous Force Structure (Fleet Mix) Studies:

 

Distributed Lethality–CIMSEC

harpoon-dvic426

Our friends at CIMSEC have had a week long look at the concept of Distributed Lethality, the Navy Surface Warfare Community’s concept of wide distribution of offensive anti-ship and possibly land attack systems, commonly summarized as, “If it floats, it fights.”

The Coast Guard does not appear to have been included in any of the discussion of this concept, but perhaps it should be.

CIMSEC has collected their recent posts on the subject. There is an intro and background information here, or you can just download the entire collection as a pdf here.