I will comment on this, after I have had an opportunity to read it, but wanted to put out the link to the strategy as quickly as possible. Here it is.
Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard Release Maritime Strategy, 17 December 2020
1
“Defense Health Primer: U.S. Coast Guard Health Services” –CRS
New Orleans, September 5, 2005 – A Disaster Medical Assistance Team member (left) assures a rescued man that the trip to the airport will be safe. Thousands of people are airlifted from the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center pickup site to the New Orleans Airport every day. Photo by Win Henderson / FEMA photo.
The Congressional Research Service has another Coast Guard related “primer,” a two page basic explanation, written for congressmen and their staffers, to provide basic understand. This one is on healthcare, “Defense Health Primer: U.S. Coast Guard Health Services.”
It covers mission, organization, budget, USCG healthcare personnel, USPHS support to the USCG, USCG health services, interaction with TriCare, and current challenges including electronic health records, USPHS support, and the disability evaluation system.
Thanks to Bryant’s Maritime Consulting for bringing this to my attention.
Maybe the Largest Self Right Motor Surfboat in the World
Naval News Reports that, “Italian shipbuilder Intermarine launched the longest self-righting and unsinkable boat ever built in Italy.” At 33.6 meters (110′), length overall, this may be the largest self-righting rescue craft in the world.
Our own 52′ Motor lifeboats are becoming unsupportable, as made clear by the recent withdrawal of Victory, now 64 years old, from service. Our 87′ patrol boat are approaching the end of their service life. It may be time to look at what others have done and procure a larger, more powerful, and extremely seaworthy self righting boat capable of replacing both the 87 footer and the 52 foot MLB, at least in ports where a maritime terrorist threat is extremely unlikely.
Specifications here: Scheda nave nuova classe cp 420 Natale De Grazia (slideshare.net) (Thanks to W B Young)
A Google Translation:
Ship board new class cp 420 Natale De Grazia
1. New Naval Unit class CP 420 Technical Sheet CP 420 – Christmas Ship DE GRAZIA…………………………………. (delivery expected December 2020) CP 421 – Ship Roberto ARINGHIERI………………… (delivery expected December 2021) Classification RINA C (✠) Rescue and Maritime Police Self-thinning and Unsinkable – Navigation Unrestricted Length 33.60 m. Width 8.15 m. Draw 1.34 m. Full load displacement ~ 150 tons Max speed 31 knots > 1000 nm. (28 knots) Construction material Aluminum Alloy Propulsion Hydrojet n.2 KONGHSBERG 2 x MTU : 16V2000M96 (2 X 1790 KW / 2 X 2490HP) Electrical generation 2 DDGG Deutz/Koelmo (2 x 85 KW)
2. Boarding capacity 200 people including 50 hospitalized and sitting in the room shipwrecked with adjacent decontamination area and infirmary Crew 10 (logistics accommodations: (2 x 2pl) + (2 x 4pl) T.V. Command (CP) Operating and communication systems no. 2 GPS – no. 2 RADAR (X and S band) – ECDIS – VSAT – VHF/FM – n.2 HF 500/150W RodeSwarts – Warship AIS NAVNET system – Optronic system – Ecosounder Other operating capacities Sea holding 6 – wind F9 Service boat on fly bridge Dedicated area for operations such as Vertrep/Medevac 0.5 ton feeding table crane for shipwreck recovery 75 mc/h high pressure fire monitor Fendering perimeter system: profile “D” (80×40) expanded polyethylene core (closed cell density 33 Kg/mc) coated the polyurea with differentiated thickness with high resistance (to fire 175°C) orange color RAL2004 Capacity : Water Crates 3.6 mc (in addition to the dissalators) Diesel Crates : 55 mc Construction site INTERMARINE spa La Spezia – Shipyard of Messina
31 knots would be remarkably fast for a vessel of this size with the power indicated, faster than either the 87 footers or the 110s with less power than either.
“Here Is What…Missiles Actually Costs” –The Drive
The Drive brings us estimates of the per round price for several types of missiles in the US inventory, “ship launched” here and “air launched” here. The “air launched” list includes a couple of missiles that can also be surface launched, LRASM and Hellfire. I have pulled out info on those systems that could someday up-arm Coast Guard cutters.
These numbers might look quite scary at first glimpse, but if you consider the cost of an operating day, for a ship like the $650M National Security Cutter, (I don’t really know, but a very rough estimate would be on the order of –don’t quote me– $250,000/operational day, see foot of the post for how I got this) it does not look that much out of line. (Reportedly the 57mm Mk110 gun cost $7.2M and the rounds $1200 each. The fire control systems, maintenance, training, and support personnel are additional cost.) By comparison, the Hellfire looks like an absolute bargain. We could probably mount a set of up to eight on an FRC for less than the cost of a 25mm Mk38 mod3.
Keep in mind, that if the Navy sees a need to arm Coast Guard cutters, the Navy pays for the systems. (I do believe the Navy does not really understand or appreciate our counter terrorism needs, maybe the Coast Guard does not either.)
We had some earlier estimates of the cost to arm cutters here, here, and here.
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) – $1,795,000 (average for the entire projected Fiscal Year 2021 purchase, which includes ESSM Block I and Block II versions).
Mk49 “SeaRAM launcher for Rolling Airframe Missiles.
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) – $905,330 – This unit price is an average across the full projected Fiscal Year 2021 order, which includes multiple RAM variants, including the Block II and IIA.
Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM) Block V – $1,537,645 (base land-attack variant). Conversion kits to transform Block V missiles in Block Va Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) anti-ship missiles approximately $889,681.
The U.S. Navy littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS-10) launches a Naval Strike Missile (NSM) during exercise “Pacific Griffin” on 2 October 2019. The NSM is a long-range, precision strike weapon that is designed to find and destroy enemy ships. Pacific Griffin is a biennial exercise conducted in the waters near Guam aimed at enhancing combined proficiency at sea while strengthening relationships between the U.S. and Republic of Singapore navies. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kenneth Rodriguez Santiago
Naval Strike Missile (NSM) – $2,194,000 (Navy only requested funds to purchase 15 of these missiles in the 2021 Fiscal Year budget).
ARABIAN GULF (Sept. 16, 2018) A MK-60 Griffin surface-to-surface missile is launched from coastal patrol ship USS Thunderbolt (PC 12). Ships attached to U.S. 5th Fleet’s Task Force 55 are conducting missile and naval gun exercises against high speed maneuvering targets to advance their ability to defend minesweepers and other coastal patrol ships. U.S. 5th Fleet and coalition assets are participating in numerous exercises as part of the greater Theater Counter Mine and Maritime Security Exercise to ensure maritime stability and security in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, connecting the Mediterranean and the Pacific through the western Indian Ocean and three strategic choke points. (Photo by MC2 Kevin Steinberg)
Griffin – None included in current budgets, but 2019 Fiscal Year unit cost $127,333.
ATLANTIC OCEAN—A Longbow Hellfire Missile is fired from Littoral Combat Ship USS Detroit (LCS 7) on Feb. 28 2017 as part of a structural test firing of the Surface to Surface Missile Module (SSMM). The test marked the first vertical missile launched from an LCS and the first launch of a missile from the SSMM from an LCS. (Photo by U.S. Navy)
Hellfire (AGM-114): A number of different costs were reported. This is apparently due to the large number of different versions of the missile. The average price for the Navy was reported as $45,409, for the Air Force $70,000, and for the Army $213,143.
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM)
LRASM (Long Range Anti-Ship Missile): AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) for the Air Force – $3.960 million, for the Navy – $3.518 million
How I got a very approximate cost for an operational day for a National Security Cutter.
Annual Coast Guard budget approximately $12M, divide by 40,000 (approximate number of uniformed active duty Coasties, about $300,000 each), multiply by 150 (approximate number of crew members ($45M/year), divide by 180 operating day/year=$250,000/day. (Back in the 1980s I figured a 378 cost forty or fifty thousand per op day. Forget what it was exactly but the higher cost of today’s NSC sounds about right.)
“WINNER ANNOUNCEMENT – 2020 HOPLEY YEATON CUTTER EXCELLENCE AND SUPERIOR CUTTERMAN AWARDS” –ALCOAST
Coast Guard’s 270-foot medium endurance cutter Bear underway in Africa. (Ensign Connor Brown, U.S. Coast Guard)
Commandant Notice below announces this year’s Hopley Yeaton Cutter Excellence and Superior Cutter Awards. The stories show the resilience and adaptability of our cutter crews.
R 150718 DEC 20 |
“Boost Coast Guard Fleet For Pacific Partnerships” –Breaking Defense
The crew of USCGC Joseph Gerczak (WPC 1126) prepare to moor at the port of Pago Pago, American Samoa, Aug. 3, 2019. They will conduct a joint fisheries patrol with NOAA Fisheries and American Samoa Marine Police members. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Chief Petty Officer Sara Muir/Released)
Breaking Defense has an oped from Bollinger President and CEO Ben Bordelon, who also serves as chairman of the Shipbuilders Council of America. We all know, he has a financial interest in additional cutter construction, but that does not mean he is not right. After decades of neglect, the Coast Guard can use some influential support, and the mission is important. With permission from Bollinger, I am publishing it in full below.
Boost Coast Guard Fleet For Pacific Partnerships
By: Ben Bordelon
For decades, China has deployed its fishing fleet – the largest in the world – as a maritime militia, systematically asserting and expanding Beijing’s influence throughout the Indo-Pacific.
The fleet routinely operates in areas where there is little to no enforcement and willfully engages in aggressive, predatory practices to intimidate lawful local fishermen, undermine maritime governance, and destabilizing the global blue economy.
China is not alone in these actions. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing occurs under a number of flags. The practice is so pervasive, in fact, that one in five fish caught around the world – between 11 million and 26 million metric tons of fish – is done illegally, robbing legal fishermen of tens of billions of dollars every year. But IUU is first and foremost a maritime and national security threat. The erosion of global norms and standards by the Chinese is a direct affront to global stability and threatens the ability of sovereign nations to manage and defend their resources. (One of the most easily understood examples for Americans would be the predations that occur in Bahamian waters by fishermen from the Dominican Republic and other countries.)
The Coast Guard is uniquely positioned for this and similar missions, not just in the Pacific, but across the globe. The Coast Guard occupies the sweet spot on the diplomatic spectrum between the State Department on one end and the Department of Defense on the other. The distinctive white hulls and red racing stripe of the Coast Guard are able to move through international waters and Exclusive Economic Zones without being viewed as overly aggressive or provocative, making them a prime candidate for cooperative policing and security. They can deescalate and mitigate, without their simple presence escalating the situation. They symbolize safety, maritime order and the protection of economic and environmental resources.
Across Asia, as China continues to grow economically and militarily, we’ve seen countries shy away from traditional joint naval operations in the region for fear of drawing Beijing’s ire – or worse armed conflict. White hulls, however, have been embraced as a much better alternative with an intrinsic freedom for positive cooperation that cannot be confused or conflated with aggression.
IUU fishing has replaced piracy as the leading global maritime threat and often is connected with other illegal activities, including human trafficking, forced labor and narcotics trafficking. Last year, U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area Commander Vice Admiral Linda Fagan stated that Washington intends to engage in “law enforcement and capacity-building in the fisheries enforcement realm.” Earlier this month, the Coast Guard made good on its commitment and released its first IUU Fishing Strategic Outlook, which outlines its efforts to combat IUU fishing over the next decade.
The Coast Guard identifies enhanced enforcement operations and expanded multilateral cooperation as the keys to countering IUU. To successfully conduct this mission, the Coast Guard will be relying heavily on its growing fleet of small and medium high-endurance vessels.
Earlier this year, the first of three 154’ Sentinel Class Fast Response Cutters were sent to Santa Rita, Guam where they will be stationed in support of Operation Aiga in an effort to strengthen island nations in Oceania, including through fishery patrols and enforcement. Commandant of the Coast Guard Adm. Karl Schultz has acknowledged the importance of this homeporting, saying, “by placing an ocean-going Coast Guard buoy tender and FRCs, we will promote ‘rules-based order,’ build capacity and affirm the United States’ positive and enduring role in the region.” Schultz has also said that “you’re going to see more of those vessels in those parts of the world.” This is in line with and affirms the emphasis the United States set in its 2018 National Defense Strategy on countering U.S. strategic competitors and adversaries.
The Coast Guard has the opportunity to establish itself as the preferred partner in the region. Already it has successfully embarked on a number of joint initiatives, such as its Theater Security Cooperation effort and Shiprider program, that combine efforts with partner nations to build cooperation and goodwill with defense and security capacity building, while simultaneously meeting development goals and furthering the strategic objectives of the United States and its allies. In a dynamic global arena, the Coast Guard continues to successfully demonstrate that white hull diplomacy should be looked to more and more as a complementary arrow in the whole-of-government quiver.
Should the Coast Guard’s mission continue to expand, the maritime defense industrial base stands ready to construct and deliver the high-quality and high-endurance vessels necessary to carry out and perform the mission at hand. This community is dedicated and available to modernize, maintain and expand the U.S. fleet.
Patrolling the vast reaches of the Pacific, as well as patrolling its home waters, may require a larger fleet as the expanded presence of white hulls around the globe helps further the regional partnerships and alliances necessary to curb the creeping influence of America’s strategic competitors and adversaries and reaffirm its leadership and commitment to rules-based order and maritime governance around the world.
“Explosive-Laden Boat Strikes Oil Tanker In Saudi Arabian Port” –The Drive
The Drive reports a gasoline tanker moored in the Saudi port of Jeddah has been attacked by a remote controlled motor boat packed with explosives. Presumably this attack was done by Yemeni Houthi Rebels. Jeddah is about 707 km or about 382 nautical miles from the Yemeni border, about half way up the Red Sea, on the Eastern side.
The resulting fire was extinguished and there were no personnel casualties.
“Cooling procedures and inerting of cargo space have been initiated to avoid reignition of fire,” it continued. “Ship stability is being assessed before proceeding with any further operations.”
I have to wonder, did they detect the in coming threat? Did they attempt to engage?
I would also note this is another example of how hard it it to seriously damage a large ship, particularly a tanker.
More on Houthi naval activities here, here, here, and here.
Topographic map in English of the Red Sea, UTM projection (WGS84 datum). Author: Eric Gaba – Wikimedia Commons user: Sting
Safer Seas Digest, 2019. Lessons Learned from Marine Accident Investigations
USS John S. McCain
The National Transportation Safety Board has published the results of their marine accident investigations completed in 2019. Included are USS McCain’s collision and the Duck Boat sinking.
Its long. You might want to start by skipping to page 86 for the lessons learned.
Thanks to Lee for bringing this to my attention.
Christmas Tree Ship
In addition to the news story above, there is a background article here from the magazine Sea History.
Thanks to Lee for bringing this to may attention.
“US Coast Guard won’t ‘close the door’ on hunting submarines again in the future” –Business Insider
US Coast Guard crew of cutter Spencer watched as a depth charge exploded near U-175, North Atlantic, 500 nautical miles WSW of Ireland, 17 Apr 1943. Photo by Jack January
Business Insider reports on the Commandant’s response to a question posed at a Navy League event. It was hardly a ringing commitment, but the Commandant did say,
“If there was a requirement that was at the joint Coast Guard-Navy-[Department of Defense] level that said, ‘Hey, there’s an urgent need to bring that capability back in Coast Guard,’ I’m not saying we couldn’t revisit that,”
“I’m not so sure I see an immediate return to that mission space here, but again, I don’t close the door on anything since we live in an increasingly complicated world … and requirements change,” Schultz added
We have had an almost 30 year period when the Coast Guard’s Defense Readiness mission has been limited to low level requirements that had little impact on the majority of Coast Guard members. It happened because of the virtual disappearance of any significant naval threat after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but there has always been the possibility that a more active role might reemerge in the future.
If we have no defense readiness mission, there is no reason the Coast Guard should be military. There would be no reason for our ships to have sophisticated fire control systems, electronic warfare systems, or Phalanx CIWS. There would be no reason for defensive systems, because if we were irrelevant in a military conflict, why would an enemy bother wasting ammunition on us.
Many countries have no coast guard or their coast guards are limited to coastal SAR. In many nations their regular navies and air forces, that do have war time missions, also do fisheries protection, drug enforcement, migrant interdiction, coastal security, and SAR.
If our large cutters do not have a wartime defense readiness mission, it is illogical for us to build ships that are 80 to 90% of a frigate or corvette, with 80 to 90% of the crew of those types, when more numerous, much less capable ships could do the non-defense related missions much more economically.
Schultz and other officials have also said new Coast Guard ships will be able to adapt for future missions.
“We’re putting in what we call space, weight, and power to be able to plug and play for all kinds of mission support,” Shannon Jenkins, senior Arctic advisor at the Coast Guard’s Office of Arctic Policy, said at an event in August when asked about arming icebreakers. “It certainly will have the capacity and the abilities to add in whatever we need to execute our national missions, not just Coast Guard missions.”
( I think you mean Coast Guard non-defense related missions, because defense is a Coast Guard mission?)
If conditions are favorable and no conflict appears likely for a long period, then it may make sense to adopt a policy of “fitted for but not with” or a more open weight, space and power reservation approach, but at some point we are going to need leadership in the mold of Admiral Wasche to recognize the need for the Coast Guard to again step up and fill its military role.
Adding an ASW capability will take time. It has become more complex than it was in WWII and we no longer have a lot of ship building and repair facilities capable of quickly upgrading our ships. How good are we at predicting the future?
Even in WWII we began the war terribly unprepared. Cutters were assigned to escort convoys that had neither sonar nor radar. Some ships that got sonars had no trained operators. Although more U-boats were sunk by aircraft than by ships, our air assets failed to sink any submarines (although one sinking was credited, it turned out not to have been the case).
The Navy may be hesitant to ask that the Coast Guard start preparing for possible armed conflict. There are many in the US Navy who might see asking the Coast Guard to shoulder some of the responsibility for naval defense as a diversion of attention from the Navy’s needs. But the Navy has several communities that compete for dollars. If the Coast Guard can provide some surface escorts it may mean more Navy money available for submarines or aircraft, so we may also have support from within the Navy. We really need to talk about the Coast Guard’s role in a major conflict when our non-defense related missions will have a lower priority.
The international environment is starting to take on an ominous resemblance to the late 1930s. The US needs to deter aggressive action. The Coast Guard can play a part in providing a credible naval deterrent, but only if it is seen as capable in the near term. We really need to start thinking about this before the need becomes urgent.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 