A Conversation With General John Kelly

Posted on September 12, 2019 by Chuck Hill

Marine Corps Gen. John F. Kelly, commander of U.S. Southern Command, discusses the latest developments in his command’s efforts to stem the flow of drugs from South and Central America while briefing reporters at the Pentagon, March 13, 2014.

As part of The U.S. Coast Guard Academy 2019–2020 Leadership Lecture Series, General and former administration Chief of Staff John F. Kelly addressed an audience of future officers at the Academy with former Commandant Admiral Thad Allen moderating. You can watch it here, but skip ahead. It does not really start until time 31:30. The actual discussion is about an hour.

Is Our Fleet Recapitalization on Course? Do We Need to Change the Destination?

Posted on September 8, 2019 by Chuck Hill

The Coast Guard started its recapitalization voyage almost three decades ago with the “Deepwater” Project. After false starts and course corrections, it seemed we finally got on course, but for too long we have relied on dead reckoning. It has been a long time since we have taken a fix to see if we are still on course. Meanwhile the world has changed. The fleet designed many years ago may not really be the fleet we want in the future.

To make our procurement case before Congress and the Department, we need a rigorous analysis of our requirements.

The Congressional Research Service issued an updated version of its “Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress” on August 7. As always one of the questions was what is the proper number and mix off assets, specifically, “the planned procurement quantities for NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs.”

The Coast Guard’s Program of Record (POR, 8 NSCs, 25 OPCs, and 58 FRCs, 91 total) has not changes since 2004. In that period the Navy has updated their requirements eight times.

As in previous reports, the Congressional Research Service author refers to the Fleet Mix Study. The Fleet Mix Study, which was apparently begun in 2007, seemed to indicate that while the Program of Record Fleet would be an improvement over the legacy fleet, it would not provide sufficient assets to meet all statutory requirements.

The last analysis of requirements, the “refined objective mix” of 2011, apparently based on a review of the initial study results, which were deemed unrealistically demanding, showed that the POR would provide only 61% of the vessels required to fulfill the Coast Guard’s statutory missions (9 NSCs, 49 OPCs, and 91 FRCs, 149 total).

But it has been a long time since the one and only “Fleet Mix Study” was done, and many of its assumptions were incorrect. The initial fleet mix analysis was to have been followed by follow-on FMA phases that would assess capabilities needed for coastal and inland missions as well as emerging missions, such as Arctic operations and those of the Deployable Operations Group (DOG). These were apparently never completed, but we did at least get the High Latitude Study that documented a need for three heavy and three medium icebreakers.

We need a new Fleet Mix Study, and according to the CRS report, we have been directed by Congress to do a new analysis.

Asset Acquisition Report.—The Commandant is directed to provide to the Committee, not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, a report that examines the number and type of Coast Guard assets required to meet the Service’s current and foreseeable needs in accordance with its statutory missions. The report shall include, but not be limited to, an assessment of the required number and types of cutters and aircraft for current and planned asset acquisitions. The report shall also specifically address regional mission requirements in the Western Hemisphere, including the Polar regions; support provided to Combatant Commanders; and trends in illicit activity and illegal migration. (Pages 39-40)

Additionally the Congress has repeatedly directed development of a 20 year ship building plan. So far we have failed to deliver while the Navy provides a 30 year plan every year.

How was the Fleet Mix Study Wrong:

“The OPC and NSC will operate 230 days away from homeport (DAFHP). No specific crewing method is assumed (i.e., crew rotation concept [CRC]).

They may not have explicitly assumed the Crew Rotation Concept, but 230 days away from homeport certainly reflects an underlying assumption that the NSCs and OPCs would be operated at a higher tempo than could be sustained with only one crew per ship.

“Additional acquisition/next generation platforms have the same capabilities and cost as the FMA Baseline Fleet mix cutters and aircraft.”

These new, larger, more sophisticated assets cost more to maintain than the vessels they replace. According to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard, “our new ships costs almost twice as much to maintain as our old ships, but our money to maintain them has been relatively flat.” The OPCs and the FRCs require more people to man them than the ships they replace, adding to their operating cost. It appears the Coast Guard is going to need a substantial growth in its budget just to operate its assets in the Program of Record (POR).

What did not happen:

The Crew Rotation Concept was rejected as a “cost saving” measure, cutting the theoretical availability of NSC and OPC mission days.

The plan included 36 HC-144s, but when 14 C-27s became available, the HC-144 program was truncated so now we have only 32 Medium Range Search Aircraft instead of 36.

Shipboard Unmanned Air Systems (UAS), of lesser capability, in the form of ScanEagle, are only now being deployed on NSCs.

No Coast Guard land based UAS has been deployed.

The networking that was envisioned has proven problematic.

What has Changed:

The original “Deep Water” program was developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union but before “9/11.” It was modified to at least theoretically address the terrorist threat, and the result was the 2004 Program of Record we still live with. At that time the US had no near peer naval competitors. The US Navy was unchallenged at sea, so there was no need for the Coast Guard to shoulder any significant war time role.

The Navy has all but abandoned any attempts to assist in drug interdiction.

The Coast Guard has begun to assume significant roles in the Western Pacific in the US EEZ and in support of the Federated States of Micronesia.

The Coast Guard is also supporting efforts by COCOMs in Africa and Asia to build additional coast guard like capabilities.

The replacement assets, particularly for the WMECs, are coming on line too slowly, and we are likely to see a drop in capability as these already difficult to maintain assets continue to age over the next 15 years current plans require to replace them.

Congress has departed from the Program of Record and funded eleven National Security Cutters instead of eight.

The Webber class seem to be exceeding our expectations and have proven more capable that I believe was originally envisioned.

Ship Debt:

The Fleet Mix Analysis was not linked to time of fulfillment except to say that it was looking at requirements for the year 2025. A reasonable service life for naval vessels is typically 30 years. Our youngest 210 is now 50 years old and the oldest 55. Two of the 210 were already passed off to Sri Lanka and Colombia. The youngest 270 is 29 years old and the oldest, 36 years old. We really should have started the OPC program 24 years ago. The plan to build the OPC provides the first coming on line in 2021, one in 2022, one in 2023, and two per year with the last to be delivered in 2034. That is 25 ships to replace 29 that were in the legacy fleet, one of which, Acushnet, was decommissioned in 2011. The remaining overaged ships are already having difficulty meeting their scheduled commitments. This situation will only get worse over the next decade. We really need to introduce the time element into our analysis. Some things just cannot wait.

The Bottom Line:

We need a new fleet mix study.
It needs to include the WPB replacement.
It needs to consider more than just the ship types as we are currently building as they are currently configured. We need to ask if equipment changes could make them more effective and reduce the total platform requirement. Specifically I think better armed WPCs and WPBs could eliminate a need for additional OPCs to fulfill the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security role.
The objective the Coast Guard has set for itself in Drug interdiction is I believe about 10%. That really serves no purpose, but to impose something less than an income tax penalty on drug shippers. It needs to be much higher.
The mix should also consider an alternative to meet the apparent need for more medium sized cutters using a notional alternative about half the size of the OPC, such as Cutter X.
We need to consider the Coast Guard’s role in the national fleet and what capabilities need to be incorporated to fulfill those roles in a potential conflict with China or in worst case, a combination of China and Russia.

Conclusion:

Each commandant should prepare a new fleet mix to provide a best estimate of the Coast Guard’s future needs for his successor. Since a typical term is four years, the Commandant could take two years to frame a new fleet mix study. This would still allow about a year for completion and a year for evaluation and refinement of the results before passing it along to his successor.

In the period since the development of the program of record in 2004 we have had five Commandants, but only one, not completely comprehensive, look at our resource requirements. It is well past time for another.

This Is a Bit Funny, but There Are Lessons Here

Posted on September 8, 2019 by Chuck Hill

We have gotten more security conscious since 9/11. I was frankly surprised at the level of security when I entered a Coast Guard base recently. It hasn’t always been that way. Still no doubt, we have lessons to learn, and its always better to learn from the mistakes of others, than to wait until lessons are learned in a more up close and personal way.

The Air Force Times reports on an incident that happily ended with no casualties other than a shot up Volvo and a shredded teddy bear.

Finding a balance between the essentially unlimited levels of increasing security (is there ever enough?) and a realistic assessment of the threat and cost benefit is difficult.

Incidentally, that Coast Guard Base I visited seemed to be well protected from threats arriving by motor vehicle on the one access road, but water side access was wide open.

What Really Happened to the Serpens?

Posted on September 5, 2019 by Chuck Hill

Jan. 29, 2020 will be the 75th anniversary of the largest loss of life in Coast Guard history, the explosion of USS Serpens (AK-97). We have already discussed this incident, but now there is a effort to look again at the cause of this loss.

Foxtrotalpha reports there may be reason to believe that the ship was torpedoed rather than having been destroyed by an ammunition loading accident.

I considered that it might have been an attack carried out by Kaiten, submarine launched manned suicide torpedoes. They were being used at that time to attack shipping in forward bases. Kaiten might have made an attack on a protected harbor easier, but the link in this paragraph provides a listing of operations that seems to preclude that possibility. That in spite of the fact that there were about 20 Kaiten capable Japanese submarines operational at the time of the sinking.

“Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress” CRS

Posted on September 2, 2019 by Chuck Hill

The crew of USCGC Kimball (WMSL 756) arrive in Honolulu for the first time Dec. 22, 2018. Known as the Legend-class, NSCs are designed to be the flagships of the Coast Guard’s fleet, capable of executing the most challenging national security missions, including support to U.S. combatant commanders. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Chief Petty Officer Sara Muir/Released)

The Congressional Research Service issued an updated version of its “Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress” on August 7. I have reproduced the report’s summary below.

Summary

The Coast Guard’s program of record (POR) calls for procuring 8 National Security Cutters (NSCs), 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and 58 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) as replacements for 90 aging Coast Guard high-endurance cutters, medium-endurance cutters, and patrol craft. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2020 budget requests a total of $657 million in procurement funding for the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs.

NSCs are the Coast Guard’s largest and most capable general-purpose cutters; they are intended to replace the Coast Guard’s 12 aged Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters. NSCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $670 million per ship. Although the Coast Guard’s POR calls for procuring a total of 8 NSCs to replace the 12 Hamilton-class cutters, Congress through FY2019 has funded 11 NSCs, including the 10th and 11th in FY2018. Six NSCs have been commissioned into service. The seventh and eighth were delivered to the Coast Guard on September 19, 2018, and April 30, 2019, respectively, and are scheduled to be commissioned into service in August 2019. The ninth through 11th are under construction; the ninth is scheduled for delivery in 2021. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $60 million in procurement funding for the NSC program; this request does not include funding for a 12th NSC.

OPCs are to be smaller, less expensive, and in some respects less capable than NSCs; they are intended to replace the Coast Guard’s 29 aged medium-endurance cutters. Coast Guard officials describe the OPC program as the service’s top acquisition priority. OPCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $421 million per ship. On September 15, 2016, the Coast Guard awarded a contract with options for building up to nine OPCs to Eastern Shipbuilding Group of Panama City, FL. The first OPC was funded in FY2018 and is to be delivered in 2021. The second OPC and long leadtime materials (LLTM) for the third were funded in FY2019. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $457 million in procurement funding for the third OPC, LLTM for the fourth and fifth, and other program costs.

FRCs are considerably smaller and less expensive than OPCs; they are intended to replace the Coast Guard’s 49 aging Island-class patrol boats. FRCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $58 million per boat. A total of 56 have been funded through FY2019, including six in FY2019. Four of the 56 are to be used by the Coast Guard in the Persian Gulf and are not counted against the Coast Guard’s 58-ship POR for the program, which relates to domestic operations. Excluding these four OPCs, a total of 52 FRCs for domestic operations have been funded through FY2019. The 32nd FRC was commissioned into service on May 1, 2019. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $140 million in acquisition funding for the procurement of two more FRCs for domestic operations.

The NSC, OPC, and FRC programs pose several issues for Congress, including the following: 

whether to provide funding in FY2020 for the procurement of a 12th NSC; 
whether to fund the procurement in FY2020 of two FRCs, as requested by the Coast Guard, or some higher number, such as four or six; 
whether to use annual or multiyear contracting for procuring OPCs; 
the annual procurement rate for the OPC program; 
the impact of Hurricane Michael on Eastern Shipbuilding of Panama City, FL, the shipyard that is to build the first nine OPCs; and 
the planned procurement quantities for NSCs, OPCs, and FRCs.

“The United States Ratifies Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement” –DOS

Posted on August 29, 2019 by Chuck Hill

The Arctic, note the US includes the Aleutians and the Bearing Sea as part of the Arctic

Department of State announced ratification of an agreement to prevent unregulated fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (I am assuming this means in the areas outside the Arctic nations’ EEZ). This may mean, at some point, the CG will be conducting fisheries enforcement in the central Arctic Ocean. The State Department announcement is reproduced below. (Thanks to Bryant’s Maritime Consulting Blog for bringing this to my attention.)

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The United States is the fourth party to ratify the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean after Canada, the Russian Federation, and the European Union. The Agreement will enter into force once all ten Signatories ratify.

There are currently no commercial fisheries in the Arctic high seas, with most of the region covered by ice year round. However, with an ever-increasing ice-free area in the summer for an increasingly lengthy portion of the year, parties anticipate that commercial fishing will be possible in the foreseeable future. This Agreement is the first multilateral agreement of its kind to take a legally-binding, precautionary approach to protect an area from commercial fishing before that fishing has even begun.

Signed in Greenland on October 3, 2018, there were ten participants in the negotiation of the Agreement: Canada, the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland), the European Union, Iceland, Japan, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America. The Agreement has two principal objectives: the prevention of unregulated fishing in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean and the facilitation of joint scientific research and monitoring.

Recognition for the Coast Guard’s contributions to the Office of Strategic Services during World War II

Posted on August 28, 2019 by Chuck Hill

Just passing this along. Always nice to be appreciated.

U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters
Contact: Headquarters Public Affairs
Office: (202) 372-4630
mediarelations@uscg.mil
Headquarters online newsroom

US Coast Guard event to recognize the service’s contributions to the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, presentation of medal to the Coast Guard

WASHINGTON — Media are invited to attend a ceremony Sept. 12, 2019, in Washington, D.C., when the Office of Strategic Services Society will recognize the U.S. Coast Guard’s contributions to the OSS — the precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency — during World War II.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed a directive in 1941 to stand up the office of the Coordinator of Information, which became the OSS in 1942. The Coast Guard’s support to the OSS on covert, counter-intelligence, espionage and sabotage operations in the maritime environment was a unique instrument for national security policy during World War II domestically and abroad, and it helped lay the foundation for future Coast Guard operations. Because the information was classified for so long, the public is not fully aware of the relationship between the OSS and the Coast Guard, including Coast Guardsmen attached to the OSS in Europe and the China-Burma-India Theatre.

The OSS Society was founded in 1947 by Gen. William Donovan. It honors the historic accomplishments of the OSS during World War II and educates the American public regarding the continuing importance of strategic intelligence and special operations to the preservation of freedom.

Event details:

What: Presentation of medal to the Coast Guard by the Office of Strategic Services Society

Who:

Commandant of the Coast Guard Adm. Karl Schultz
Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard Adm. Charles Ray
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard Jason Vanderhaden
Mr. Charles Pinck, president of the Office of Strategic Services Society

When: Tuesday, Sept. 10, 2019, from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m. Eastern

Where: U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Douglas Munro Building, U.S. Department of Homeland Security St. Elizabeths Campus, Washington, D.C.

Advance registration is required for any media wishing to attend the event — there will be no same-day registration. Please reply to mediarelations@uscg.mil by Sept. 4, 2019, for instructions on registering.

A Modest Proposal for a Containerized Weapon System

Posted on August 27, 2019 by Chuck Hill

Leonardo DRS has been chosen to provide the mission equipment package (rendering pictured) atop a Stryker combat vehicle to serve as the Interim Maneuver-Short-Range Air Defense system for the U.S. Army. (Courtesy of Leonardo DRS)

After the recent report of Russia containerizing anti-air missile systems I got to thinking about containerized systems the Coast Guard might use. There are many systems that might be containerized–sonars, torpedo countermeasures, cruise missiles, drones, 120mm mortars, medical facilities, but there is one combination I found particularly appealing.

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We could tie into the Army’s attempt to develop a new short range air defense system (SHORAD) by mounting a marinized version of the SHORAD turret on a container. The systems are meant to fire on the move, so they should be able to deal with ship’s movement. The container might be armored to some extent to protect it from splinters and small arms. The container could be equipped to provide power (external connection, generator, and battery), air conditioning, air filtration, etc as the supporting vehicle would have in the Army system. It looks like the planned interim SHORAD system will include Stinger, Hellfire, an M230 30mm gun and a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun. If we could mount some additional vertical launch Hellfire in the container, so much the better.

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For the Coast Guard these might be used on icebreakers and buoy tenders when they go into contested areas. They might be mounted on the stern of FRCs in lieu of the over the horizon boat using an adapter over the stern ramp, when additional firepower is required.

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The Army and Marines might also use these containerized systems as prefab base defense systems. As fixed ground defenses, the containers might be buried leaving only the turret above ground level.

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They could also be used on Military Sealift Command and Merchant ships to provide a degree of self defense.

“Russian navy to receive container air defence system” –Navy Recognition

Posted on August 24, 2019 by Chuck Hill

The Pantsir- M presented at Army 2017

NavyRecognition is reporting that the Russians are planning to package air defense systems in standard containers.

Specifically they refer to possible use on the project 20386 corvettes and project 22160 patrol ships. One of the two systems discussed is a missile and gun “Close In Weapon System” (CIWS) but the other system is a much longer ranged system.

This is a significant departure from the container packaged cruise missile systems we have heard about before.

The Pantsir-M CIWS (photo above) would also be effective against surface targets, at close range. In addition to the two 30mm gatling guns, the missiles may also have an anti-surface capability.

In time of war, we might see these, or something similar, on naval auxiliaries or even merchant ships as well as the naval vessels mentioned above. Encountering them on a terrorist controlled vessel is far less likely, but not impossible.

The other way to look at this is, could we do something similar, to make it easy for our icebreakers or perhaps other ships, to go from armed, to unarmed, and back again relatively easily?

Coast Guard patrols North Pacific in support of international fisheries

Posted on August 24, 2019 by Chuck Hill

Below is a news release in full. USCGC Mellon is in the North Pacific, but this is not a typical ALPAT (Alaska Patrol). In addition to working with US authorities, she is working with, “five Pacific Rim countries and three regional fisheries management organizations (RFMO).” This is, I presume, the Coast Guard helping nations of the Western Pacific deal with those who would steal their livelihood and deplete their environment.

News Release

U.S. Coast Guard 17th District Alaska
Contact: 17th District Public Affairs
Office: (907) 463-2065
After Hours: (907) 209-6509
17th District online newsroom

Coast Guard patrols North Pacific in support of international fisheries

Editor’s Note: Click on images to download high resolution version.

JUNEAU, Alaska — The crew of Coast Guard Cutter Mellon (WHEC 717) continues their North Pacific patrol in support of Operation North Pacific Guard (NPG) 2019, protecting living marine resources, enforcing international fisheries agreements and conducting global security missions.

Since June, Mellon’s crew has conducted 40 boardings and issued 61 violations. Twenty-five were serious violations because of their potential to severely impact fisheries and/or blatant disregard for conservation and management measures. Their most frequent violations were improper vessel marking (9), illegal shark finning (4), and improper use of or intentional tampering with the vessel monitoring system (2).

“These fisheries patrols are vital to demonstrating the U.S.’s commitment to our regional partnerships while strengthening regional maritime governance and promoting sustainability of living marine resources,” said Capt. Jonathan Musman, commanding officer of cutter Mellon. “I’m extremely proud of the work we’ve done this patrol, and it’s a direct result of the hard work of this crew as well as the continued support of our international partners. Together, we’ve put in a lot of hours and a lot of work, and we’ve seen impressive results because of it.”

Mellon’s deployment is in support of U.S. goals for the conservation and management of high seas fisheries resources to eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activity from the North Pacific. NPG 2019 showcases a multi-mission effort between the Coast Guard, NOAA, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, five Pacific Rim countries and three regional fisheries management organizations (RFMO). Unlike previous years’ operations, Mellon has conducted high seas boardings and inspections on the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC) fishing vessels, while continuing to conduct Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) boardings.

“We’ve seen a 344 percent increase in boardings and 867 percent increase in violations compared to last year’s operation,” said Lt. Cdr. Kristen Caldwell, living marine resource program manager, Pacific Area. “This increase highlights the significance of employing differing authorities all aimed at mitigation of IUU fishing, capitalizing on a highly capable resource to maximize time on scene and the targeting of IUU vessels.”

NPG 2019 was designed to conduct law enforcement operations in support of RFMO in the North Pacific Ocean. Through the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF) and North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission’s (NPAFC) enforcement coordination process, each partner nation contributes to this at-sea enforcement effort by providing surface patrols and/or air surveillance.

This operation is in direct support of the National Security Strategy as it aligns with the tenant of “achieving better outcomes in multilateral forums,” as well as by addressing the risks to sovereignty of developing nations by China identified in the Indo-Pacific Region. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) also has identified China as a “strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea.” A goal of the NDS is to “support U.S. interagency approaches and work by, with, and through our allies and partners to secure U.S. interests and counteract this coercion.”

Due to the increasing threat, complexity and diversity of tactics in IUU fishing, it is critical to ensure oversight and enforcement in regions in which the United States has jurisdiction and authority to mitigate the rapidly developing influence of specified fleets known to engage in IUU fishing. Efforts to increase the ability of the United States to check the threat of IUU fishing in the Pacific Ocean have been continuous, with the recent success of the adoption of high-seas boarding inspections (HSBI) for the Northern Pacific Fisheries Commission and continued efforts in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission’s (NPFAC) Convention Areas.

During NPG 2019, Mellon embarked two Canadian shipriders from the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans as well as two aircrews from Coast Guard Air Station North Bend.

Mellon, a 378-foot high endurance cutter with a crew of 150, is homeported in Seattle and routinely deploys in support of counter-drug and alien migrant interdiction, living marine resources and search and rescue missions.