Just a reminder that today was the 68th anniversary of the death of the Coast Guard’s most famous hero. If he had lived, he would be 90 now, a grand father and probably great grand father. Instead, he and those with him saved 250 Marines. Presumably there are a lot of grand children and great grand children because of their heroism.
Today is the 92nd Anniversary of the sinking of the Cutter TAMPA by the German submarine UB-91 with the loss of all on board. This was reportedly the largest loss to enemy action suffered by US Naval Forces in WWI.
From the TAMPA’s page at the Coast Guard historian’s web site, “The dead included 111 Coast Guardsmen, four U.S. Navy men, a captain of the British Army and ten seamen of the Royal Navy, and five civilian employee dock workers. Admiral William S. Sims, the senior U.S. naval officer on duty in Great Britain, received the following letter from the Lords of the British Admiralty:
“‘Their Lordships desire me to express their deep regret at the loss of the USS TAMPA. Her record since she has been employed in European waters as an ocean escort to convoys has been remarkable. She has acted in capacity of ocean escort to no less than 18 convoys from Gibraltar, comprising 350 vessels, with a loss of only two ships through enemy action. The commanders of the convoys have recognized the ability with which the TAMPA carried out the duties of ocean escort. Appreciation of the good work done by the USS TAMPA may be some consolation to those bereft and Their Lordships would be glad if this could be conveyed to those concerned.'”
The Naval History and Heritage Command is also recognizing the loss of the TAMPA.
Satterlee Hall at the USCG Academy is named in honor of her captain, Charles Satterlee.
This is the third part of a detailed look at the “Annual Review of the United States Coast Guard’s Mission Performance (FY 2009)” from the office of the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security. The report is available in Acrobat PDF format from DHS. (I’ll refer to it as the DHS IG report.)
Here, we are going to look at what I consider the informative and important part of the report, that was buried in Appendices C and D. My earlier commentary, parts 1 and 2 are here and here.
Much of Appendices C and D is lifted from the United States Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2009 Performance Report which is also available as a pdf (couldn’t get a link to work, but it’s on google). (I’ll refer to it as the CG report.) This document does a much better job of explaining the categories and the performance measures than the DHS IG report but only goes back to 2004. It does, however, also include the targets for FY 2010. It would probably be better if the IG had just put a cover sheet on the CG report and forwarded it.
Both reports provide the essential same results but their are some differences, which I will note.
24 measured are applied to the eleven Coast Guard missions. For FY 2009, the Coast Guard met 8 of 11 performance measures for its 6 non-DHS missions, and 6 of 13 performance measures for its 5 homeland security missions.
—THE GOOD NEWS—
“Non-Homeland Security” missions did well. Standards were high and even when targets were not met, we came close.
SAR: Percentage of people in imminent danger saved in the maritime environment. Target 76% Actual 77.3%
(I find the math used in this section hard to follow and somewhat questionable–there was a reported improvement over FY 2008, but deaths went up 20%, while total number in danger changed very little (see CG report p15,16))
Aids to Navigation:
Ice Operations: Number of days critical waterways are closed due to ice. Target 2 avg. and 8 severe. Actual 0. (Note there is no criteria for Polar Operations.) Success in this criteria is strongly influenced by weather.
Living Marine Resources: Percentage of Coast Guard boardings at sea in which no violations are detected when domestic fisheries regulations apply. Target 97% Actual 96.7%, a miss, but close enough to be insignificant.
Marine Safety: (None of these standards were in place until FY2008)
Marine Environmental Protection: (Here too, these standards did not apply until FY2008)
—THE BAD NEWS—
Homeland Security missions did not fare so well. In general, even when targets were met, the targets were low.
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security:
Drug Interdiction (This standard was not applied until FY2009): Removal rate for cocaine from noncommercial vessels in a maritime transit zone. Target 15.7% Actual 15%. (Probably reasonably accurate and probably about as good as we can hope for, but not good enough to truly discourage the smugglers.)
Undocumented Migrant Interdiction:
Defense Readiness: These three measures are to be replaced next year.
Other Law Enforcement (Foreign Fisheries Enforcement):
—OTHER MEASURES—
Some of the things we did not see measured, that we might want to get a handle on:
—OTHER THOUGHTS—
We really need to consider Domain Awareness for vessels under 300 tons too. Even sailboats can bring in some nasty weapons.
The Department needs to see that their future is in disaster preparedness from whatever cause. Hopefully the terror threat will fade. They need to see, that the “non-DHS missions” complementary DHS missions. When we have a disaster, we need to do SAR and restore Aids to Navigation. Icebreaking may be necessary to get access to a disaster or to prevent one, and environmental disasters are still disasters.
The Coast Guard needs to embrace the DHS missions and recognize that the greater capability, that we really do need to do these missions, also means greater capability to do traditional missions. That Long Rang Identification and Tracking (LRIT) will help SAR is just one example. More boats, more aircraft, more command, control, communications, information, and reconnaissance systems translate to doing all our missions better. To get those assets, we need to make our case, and it can only be made on the basis of DHS missions.
Congress needs to recognize that we are an Armed Service. They don’t expect to see a product out of the Air Force every year. It’s buying insurance. Most of the time, there is no product. Counter terrorism missions are dealing with statistically unlikely, but high impact events. Congress and DHS have a hard time dealing with a multi-purpose organization. From year to year they don’t know what we will be doing because we don’t know either. Mariel Boatlift, Katrina, Haiti, Deepwater Horizon, what’s next? We don’t know!
When it comes time to decide the Coast Guard budget, I would suggest Congress take a different approach. Consider return on investment. If you like the return you are getting from the Coast Guard now, invest more. Don’t say, “Agency ‘X’ isn’t working, we need to put more money into that.” “The Coast Guard, is doing a good job with their current budget so we don’t need to give them any more.” I don’t quote scripture very often. I’m not religious, but there is some wisdom there. Check out the story of the “good and faithful servant” Mathew 25:14-30.
In a move to isolate the British on the Falklands (Malvinas), the Argentines are requiring vessels bound to or from the Falklands through their EEZ to obtain prior approval. Recently a Spanish vessel was denied the right of innocent passage from the waters off the Falklands to Uruguay, because they had not formally requested permission a week ahead as required by Argentina’s “decree 256.” Argentine restrictions are hurting businesses in both Uruguay and Chile (as well as Argentina).
As noted earlier, this is not the first incidence of a coastal state requiring notice of transit. The Canadians want vessels to ask permission to transit the North West Passage. The Chinese are claiming sovereignty over virtually all of the South China Sea, talking as if it were territorial sea. The Coast Guard initiated the Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) and it is only useful if it covers ships transiting the EEZ as well as those going to US ports.
Perhaps it is inevitable that when a state assumes the authority to demand notification of passage though the EEZ, it will also occasionally exercise the “right” to deny passage, but this is the first time I have heard of it happening.
(In a related move, as a sign of solidarity with Argentina, Uruguay rescinded permission for a Montevideo port visit by a Royal Navy Destroyer en route to the Falklands only hours before its scheduled arrival.)
Back in July we had an interesting discussion about Arctic Patrol Cutters in the comments section of a note about Canadian icebreaker and Arctic Patrol vessel procurement. Bill Smith advocated the “X-Bow,” and I know I had some difficulty visualizing how it would react in a seaway. Of course if you want to visualize it, it’s already on Youtube. Reportedly this is a clip showing an X-bow equipped vessel going 13 knots, overtaking and passing a similar type of vessel equipped with a conventional bow going 8 knots in what appear to be moderately heavy seas.
The Coast Guard Compass recently identified the latest “Guardian of the Week” as ME2 Nick Antis (MSST Los Angeles/Long Beach) who was recognized as honor graduate upon his completion of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) 10 week National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program at Lackland Air Force Base, in San Antonio, Texas, which trains dog and handler teams to detect explosives. This marks the introduction of this capability into the service. Also graduating from the course were ME1 William Porter (MSST Galveston) and ME3 Jason Agar (MSST New York).
Japan, China, and Taiwan are in a dispute over islands that convey ownership of potentially oil and gas rich offshore areas. The Japanese Coast Guard finds itself in the middle of the dispute. In the latest move it looks as if the Chinese may be moving drilling equipment into the disputed area. This is on the heals of apparently more aggressive fisheries enforcement by the Japanese Coast Guard that resulted in two Japanese cutters being rammed and a Chinese vessel seized with its captain still being held for prosecution. Some additional background here.
Reportedly the Navy has found “significant structural damage” in several of their Cyclone Class patrol boats. This includes the five boats operating with CG 110ft WPBs that protect Iraqi oil terminals. Sounds as if the WPBs may have to take up the slack. In addition the Coast Guard operates three boats of this class which will also require inspection and likely repairs.
The Acquisition Directorate is reporting “The Coast Guard awarded a $166.1 million contract option to Bollinger Shipyards of Lockport, La., on September 14 to begin production of four Sentinel-class Fast Response Cutters (FRCs). ”
This is the third contract and means that eight vessels have been contracted for. Options have already been negotiated to bring the total to 34. Ultimately we plan to have 58.
I have high hopes for these vessels. They are much more capable than the ships they replace. In some respects they may be able to fill in for the ship-day deficits we will see in HEC/MEC days. At the same time, it has to be recognized that they will cost more to run than the 110s, just as the 110s cost more to run than the 95s.
This is a continuation of a look at a report the Department of Homeland Security presented to Congress regarding Coast Guard mission performance begun in part one.
The report divides the Coast Guard’s 11 missions into Department of Homeland Security Missions and Non-Homeland Security missions as follows (percent of hours associated with each mission is in parenthesis):
Homeland security missions include:
Non-Homeland Security Missions include:
The first thing you may notice is that the “Homeland Security Missions” were Coast Guard missions long before the creation of DHS.
This distinction is artificial. DHS seems fixated on terrorism. Once the DHS is reconciled to the fact that they are the department responsible for disaster prevention, response, and mitigation regardless of whether that disaster is natural, accidental, or a terrorist attack, then they will see that the remaining Coast Guard missions are also to some extent DHS missions. (Notably the previous year when GAO testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, “Drug Interdiction” and “Other Law Enforcement” were listed as non-homeland security missions.)
Marine Safety and AtoN help prevent accidental disasters. Living Marine Resources and MEP help prevent environmental disasters. Any SAR case is at least a small scale disaster for those involved. SAR can be a major part of disaster mitigation as in the case of Katrina or Haiti. The SAR organization is the frequently the basis for post disaster communications. Even Ice Operations can mitigate the possibility of flooding by preventing the accumulation of water behind Ice dams that may release catastrophically–all good DHS missions.
As noted in part 1, the report seems to miss a signifiant part of the Coast Guard’s operation, but for now lets look at what it does show. We will look at Measures of effectiveness later.
General:
The report actually covers the entire period from 2001 to the present and compares current operations with a baseline established on the basis of eight quarters prior to 9/11. One important item is that although total resource hours declined since 2005, hours are still up considerably compared to pre-9/11 levels, up from a little less than 500,000 hours to 717,992 hours, so a decline in percentage doesn’t necessarily reflect a decline in activity.
Homeland Security Resource Hours:
Hours increased significantly as might be expected, 115%, from a baseline of a bit less than 200,000 to 400,742.
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security: By far the greatest percentage of hours (181,264 hours/25.25%) was taken by ports, waterways and coastal security missions. Resource utilization is up ten fold from the baseline after peaking in 2003/4/5.
So maybe we ought to add another 25.25% to MEP, another 25.25% to SAR, and another 25.25% to Drug interdiction. Still do we patrol enough? The vessel and aircraft related measures of effectiveness targets are being exceeded. But the targets are abominably low, considering we are dealing with events with potentially catastrophic consequences.
Drug Interdiction: Hours are down 34% from the pre-9/11 baseline from a little over 120,000 down to 80,564. Here we are getting substantial help from DOD but that doesn’t show up in the hours, and the efforts of our LEDETS, like those of the small boats, are also not reflected by the resource hour measure.
Undocumented Migrant Interdiction: Up more than 150% to 76,100 hours. Reportedly we are achieving record high interdiction rates.
Defense Readiness: Hours are up considerably, to 56,128 hours or 7.82% but the baseline was ridiculously low at what looks like less than 7,000 hours or less than 300 unit days. The results have been poor with little improvement expected until the National Security Cutters and Fast Response Cutters replace the 378s and 110s.
Other Law Enforcement: (6,686 hours 0.93%) The number of hours has bounced around quite a bit by percentage (now 19.2% below the baseline). The entire effort is less than 280 unit days, but the service is exceeding its performance goal by a wide margin.
Non-homeland security
Non-Homeland Security hours (317,250 hours or 44.18%) dropped below the baseline in 2002/2003/2004 but are currently slightly above the baseline.
Search and Rescue: SAR Hours are down more than a quarter, from over 80,000 to 58,607 hours or 8.16%. Even so, we are meeting our performance objectives. SAR hours are demand driven. In 2005, hours were still below baseline, but bumped up 14.8% from 2004 as a result of Katrina. Hopefully we will be able to do more rescuing and less searching as a result of innovations like Rescue 21. The depressed economy may have a role here too. If we were a SAR only organization we would have to fly or get underway just to train and maintain proficiency. As it is, much of the proficiency training is done working on other missions, so perhaps we should credit a few more percentage points to the hours we spend on SAR.
Marine Safety (52,579 hours 7.2%): The Coast Guard did not even report commitment of resource hours to Marine Safety before 2005. I’m still not sure what we are doing with this much cutter and aircraft time that effects the number of commercial mariner and commercials passenger deaths or injuries (two of the three measures of effectiveness) Most of these hours must go to Recreational Boating Safety (the third measure of effectiveness). This may be another way to count patrol hours.
Aids to Navigation: AtoN hours show a drop from the baseline of about 10% to 1000,904 hours, but it is still 14.05% of the current total. Improved reliability of aids appears to have made this possible without a drop in service.
Ice Ops (8,033 hours/1.12%): This category is primarily a reflection of ice conditions on the Great Lakes and navigable waterways that can fluctuate substantially year to year. It says very little about our Arctic capabilities, long in decline.
Living Marine Resources (94,178 hours/13.12%): Hours declined after 9/11 but now slightly exceed pre-9/11 baseline.
Marine Environmental Protection (MEP) (2,949 hours/0.41%): Like Marine Safety, MEP recorded no resource hours committed before 2005. Hours are down over 40% since 2005, but in FY2009 we exceeded our goals for prevention of chemicals and oil discharges per units shipped. There were no performance measures specifically related to safety of or pollution from offshore wells. I suspect most MEP work is not done by the cutters and aircraft included in this report, but that we will see a big increase in MEP hours when figures come out for FY2010. In the minds of most people, fisheries enforcement, both “Living Marine Resources” (domestic fisheries) and “Other Law Enforcement” (foreign fisheries) is a form of “Marine Environmental Protection.” Perhaps we need to group them with regulation of the chemical and petroleum industries and pollution clean-up under an expanded Marine Environmental Protection Program, so that there will be a better appreciation of what the service does.
Conclusion:
Traditional Coast Guard missions continue within the Department of Homeland Security. They have not been neglected.
For the Coast Guard to have gone from less than 500,000 resource hours to consistently over 700,000 hours, a more than 40% increase, when there has been no substantial increase in assets and as the average age of the assets increased has got to be a strain.
Coming in Part 3: Performance Measures and Where the Problems are.
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