The Israeli navy moved to stop a convoy of 6 ships attempting to break their naval blockade of Gaza. Looks like there are at least 10 dead. Someday, the Coast Guard might be doing the same sort of thing. Put yourself in the Israeli Navy’s position. Was there a better way this might have been handled?
A bit more information here.
Now this is what we really need, a death ray for our cutters.
“The LaWS is essentially a laser upgrade to the MK 15 Close In Weapon System (CIWS), a.k.a. the Phalanx gun, a radar-guided autocannon that is already installed on Navy surface combatants. According to NAVSEA, the system tested fired a laser through a beam director installed on a tracking mount, which in turn was controlled by a Mk 15 CIWS. That’s the basically same system that controls the Phalanx.”
Read the whole story at the link here. We do already have the CIWS on our WHECs and National Security Cutters and expect to have them on the Offshore Patrol Cutters.
It’s not April First is it?
A short video of one of several UAVs the Navy is looking at operating from the Stelleto. There is a short commercial before it starts.
Screen shot from the video:
When the new Bernard C. Webber class Fast Response Cutters are commissioned, I hope we will use the traditional designation for this type, “WPC” rather than “WFRC.” The “PC” type designation is widely recognized. Using “WFRC” would have people outside the CG (and probably more than one inside) scratching their heads.
There is a long history of WPCs in the Coast Guard. Currently we have the three WPCs of the Cyclone Class that were originally built for the Navy, that are virtually the same displacement as the Webber class. More importantly, before that, we had the 33 units of the 125 ft Active class, and the 17 units of the 165 ft Thetis Class like the Icarus and Triton, that were also the same size as the Webber Class.
PCs are typically a bit larger than PBs, making them clearly distinct from the 87 ft WPBs and the 110s WPBs that will remain in the fleet until replaced.
It may seem trivial, but this is about both a historical link to successful cutters of the past and the integrity of a designation system that goes back almost 100 years.
Another significant document has been issued, the “National Security Strategy.” This is not just a military strategy. In many respects it seems to reflect the values of “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century.” There are sections that can be used to justify international cooperation and training, but the most immediately applicable sections are on pages 18-19
“Strengthen Security and Resilience at Home
“At home, the United States is pursuing a strategy capable of meeting the full range of threats and hazards to our communities. These threats and hazards include terrorism, natural disasters, large-scale cyber attacks, and pandemics. As we do everything within our power to prevent these dangers, we also recognize that we will not be able to deter or prevent every single threat. That is why we must also enhance our resilience—the ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption. To keep Americans safe and secure at home, we are working to:
“Enhance Security at Home: Security at home relies on our shared efforts to prevent and deter attacks by identifying and interdicting threats, denying hostile actors the ability to operate within our borders, protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources, and securing cyberspace. That is why we are pursuing initiatives to protect and reduce vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, at our borders, ports, and airports, and to enhance overall air, maritime, transportation, and space and cyber security. Building on this foundation, we recognize that the global systems that carry people, goods, and data around the globe also facilitate the movement of dangerous people, goods, and data. Within these systems of transportation and transaction, there are key nodes—for example, points of origin and transfer, or border crossings—that represent opportunities for exploitation and interdiction. Thus, we are working with partners abroad to confront threats that often begin beyond our borders. And we are developing lines of coordination at home across Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners, as well as individuals and communities.
“Effectively Manage Emergencies: We are building our capability to prepare for disasters to reduce or eliminate long-term effects to people and their property from hazards and to respond to and recover from major incidents. To improve our preparedness, we are integrating domestic all hazards planning at all levels of government and building key capabilities to respond to emergencies. We continue to collaborate with communities to ensure preparedness efforts are integrated at all levels of government with the private and nonprofit sectors. We are investing in operational capabilities and equipment, and improving the reliability and interoperability of communications systems for first responders. We are encouraging domestic regional planning and integrated preparedness programs and will encourage government at all levels to engage in long-term recovery planning. It is critical that we continually test and improve plans using exercises that are realistic in scenario and consequences.
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently released its latest report: AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, by Jan van Tol with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich and Jim Thomas.
It explores the possible progression of a major armed conflict between China and the US and its allies as a worst case scenario (short of nuclear weapons) of how to deal with the developing threat of Anti-Access and Area Denial weapons like conventionally armed Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) along with air and surface launched cruise missiles, mines, and submarines.
At almost 150 pages it is a bit of a slog, but interesting. It is a bit like WWII in the Pacific with modern weapons. The Chinese make a devastating surprise attack, then establishes a bastion in hopes of convincing the US and their allies that it is just too hard to reverse their aggression. The allies then have to begin disassembling and rolling back the bastion’s defences. This begins as each side makes a concerted attempt to blind the other’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems including space based systems.
The Coast Guard is not specifically mentioned, but if you look at the section on enforcing a distant blockade on China, page 76-78, it is a classic Maritime interdiction Operation (MIO) not unlike drug interdiction. They note, “However, many of the platforms most suited for this kind of operation, such as Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), patrol craft and small frigates, do not carry ordnance sufficiently heavy to stop larger ships determined not to halt and be boarded. Those Navy ships that do would be likely to have higher priority taskings, and thus would not generally be available to support MIO operations. However, Air Force bombers with their large payloads and long endurance could provide “on-call” maritime strike. These bombers could be assigned to support MIO operations and conduct strikes on PLA vessels or cargo ships as needed.”
This looks like make work for bombers that couldn’t survive China’s integrated air defense system to me. As we discussed in the post on the Korean sinking, There are cheaper and simpler ways of stopping recalcitrant merchant ships, but of course support of Maritime Patrol Aircraft for this type mission is almost always useful.
The Naval Operations Concept 2010 has finally been released. This document is intended to implement the Maritime Strategy, 2007. After only a quick skim, it is apparent that the Coast Guard was well represented in writing the document. If anything the number of references to the Coast Guard are surprisingly high, considering the relative size of the service. The document calls out a number of requirements for Coast Guard forces, both currently filled and anticipated.
In view of the frequent question of whether the Coast Guard is a “Naval Service,” it was gratifying to see this straight forward statement on page 7, “The Naval Service is comprised of the active and reserve components and the civilian personnel of the United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps and the United States Coast Guard.”
A nice tribute to Admiral Allen over at the “Information Dissemination” web site. The author goes so far as to refer to him as “the most influential Admiral of the early 21st century in the United States.”
The US Naval Institute Blog has a story about a deadly accident that occurred at Pearl Harbor on this date in 1944 while the fleet was preparing for the invasion of Saipan. In one of the pictures you will see a 180-foot WLB helping to deal with the aftermath. There is more information about the disaster here.
Coast Guard-manned LST 69 was one of the six LST vessels sunk; CG-manned LST 205 was heavily damaged and missed the invasion.
This and the Port Chicago disaster two months later led to stronger Coast Guard oversight of explosive loading.
Here is a little article (unfortunately this link is now broken) about an ordinary Coastie’s experience in WWII that, in addition to having a cute dog story, includes reference to a little remembered program that resulted in the Coast Guard manning 75 Tacoma Class Patrol frigates (PFs), beginning in October 1943. These ships were adaptations of the British “River” Class, a design similar in purpose to Destroyer Escorts, but built to merchant standards by the Maritime Commission.
The ships were 2238 tons full load, 304 feet in length, with a 36’6′ beam and 12’8″ draft. They were steam powered and used triple expansion reciprocating engines for 5,500 HP and a speed of 20 knots. They had a range of 9500 nmi at 12 knots. The ships were typically armed with three 3″/50s, two twin 40mms, nine 20mms, a “hedgehog” multiple ASW mortar, depth charges, and eight depth charge projectors (K-Guns).
Twenty-three of the class were converted to serve as weather ships with the aft 3″/50 replaced by a balloon shelter and the crew reduced from 190 to 176. They replaced Coast Guard manned merchant ships that had been providing the service previously.
The battle, with subsequent rescue, referred to in the article, was the Battle off Samar, an inspiring story, worth a look if you are not familiar with it.
