USCG Polar Security Cutter [Image courtesy Halter Marine / Technology Associates, Inc.]

“Bollinger Shipyards announced Thursday that its Pascagoula Mississippi shipyard now exceeds 1,000 employees, touting the milestone as it gears up to make the first heavy icebreaker in the U.S. in more than 50 years – vessels Washington is keen to produce more of as it partners with Canada and Finland in a pact to bolster icebreaker fleets.

“The three countries announced the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, or ICE Pact, in a joint statement during the NATO summit in Washington on Thursday.”

Always good to partner with people who know what they are doing.

The US and Canada are at similar points in their efforts to build new heavy icebreakers. Having worked together on research, the two classes have many similarities. Davie, Canada’s shipyard tasked with building their new icebreakers, went to Finland for additional expertise. 

“Davie is a part of Group Davie, which in November 2023 acquired Finland’s Helsinki Shipyard, the world leader in icebreaker design and construction.”

Bollinger indicates they expect that, in addition to building icebreakers for the US Coast Guard, they will build for export. That would be a huge turn around.

Below is Bollinger’s press release.

You have probably heard of Project 2025, a controversial product of an influential conservative think tank. You can find it here.

I wanted to see what they had to say about the Coast Guard.

We are not going to talk about other parts of the document. I don’t want to get into a political discussion. The Coast Guard enjoys strong bipartisan support in Congress, so these are not necessarily exclusively the views of conservatives. Some of these proposals may be favored by more liberal members of Congress as well.

Even with only these few samples, you will also see that the document is not always definitive or internally consistent, particularly in regard to the Coast Guard’s proper place in the government bureaucracy. This is prompted in large part by a proposal to dismantle the Department of Homeland Security (p. 133), but continuance of DHS is still seen as a possibility and many changes to the Department are proposed.

There are suggestions that the Coast Guard should remain in DHS or be moved to DOD, DOJ, or Treasury.

I would certainly agree that the Coast Guard needs a long-term ship building plan and combining it with the Navy’s 30 year ship building plan would increase the Coast Guard’s visibility. I would also agree that we are not building enough large cutters (but they don’t have to be NSCs or OPCs) and we could use a base in American Samoa.

It suggests scaling back our mission set but offers no specific suggestions of which missions other than perhaps shifting the Arctic mission to the Navy, as if they could do it cheaper. We will probably just continue to try to do all eleven missions to the degree that offers the best return on investment within our budget.

I would like to see more coordination with the Navy in the determination of the characteristics required for Coast Guard assets, so that they are useful in wartime. I also see opportunities for synergies with the Navy Reserve.

I used “control F” to find everywhere the Coast Guard is mentioned and have reproduced each paragraph below.

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) be moved to DOJ and, in time of full-scale
war (i.e., threatening the homeland), to the Department of Defense (DOD).
Alternatively, USCG should be moved to DOD for all purposes. (p.134)

U.S. COAST GUARD (USCG)
Needed Reforms
The U.S. Coast Guard fleet should be sized to the needs of great-power competition, specifically focusing efforts and investment on protecting U.S. waters, all while seeking to find (where feasible) more economical ways to perform USCG missions. The scope of the Coast Guard’s mission needs to be focused on protecting U.S. resources and interests in its home waters, specifically its Exclusive Economic Zone (200 miles from shore). USCG’s budget should address the growing demand for it to address the increasing threat from the Chinese fishing fleet in home waters as well as narcotics and migrant flows in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. Doing this will require reversing years of shortfalls in shipbuilding, maintenance, and upgrades of shore facilities as well as seeking more cost-effective ship and facility designs. In wartime, the USCG supports the Navy, but it has limited capability and capacity to support wartime missions outside home waters.

New Policies
The Coast Guard’s mission set should be scaled down to match congressional budgeting in the long term, with any increased funding going to acquisitions based on an updated Fleet Mix Analysis. The current shipbuilding plan is insufficient based on USCG analysis, and the necessary numbers of planned Offshore Patrol Cutters and National Security Cutters are not supported by congressional budgets. The Coast Guard should be required to submit to Congress a long-range shipbuilding plan modeled on the Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. Ideally this should become part of the Navy plan in a new comprehensive naval long-range shipbuilding plan to ensure better coherency in the services’ requirements.

Outside of home waters, and following the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, the
Coast Guard should prioritize limited resources to the nation’s expansive Pacific
waters to counter growing Chinese influence and encroachment. Expansion of
facilities in American Samoa and basing of cutters there is one clear step in this
direction and should be accelerated; looking to free association states (Palau, the
Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands) for
enhanced and persistent presence, assuming adequate congressional funding, is
another such step.

The Secretary of the Navy should convene a naval board to review and reset
requirements for Coast Guard wartime mission support. To inform and validate
these updated requirements, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Coast Guard
Commandant should execute dedicated annual joint wartime drills focused on
USCG’s wartime missions in the Pacific (the money for these activities should be
allocated from DOD). An interagency maritime coordination office focused on
developing and overseeing comprehensive efforts to advance the nation’s maritime interests and increase its military and commercial competitiveness should be established.

Given the USCG’s history of underfunded missions, if the Coast Guard is to continue to maintain the Arctic mission, money to do so adequately will be required over and above current funding levels. Consideration should be given to shifting the Arctic mission to the Navy. Either way, the Arctic mission should be closely coordinated with our Canadian, Danish, and other allies.

Personnel
USCG is facing recruitment challenges similar to those faced by the military
services. The Administration should stop the messaging on wokeness and diversity
and focus instead on attracting the best talent for USCG. Simultaneously, consistent with the Department of Defense, USCG should also make a serious effort to re-vet any promotions and hiring that occurred on the Biden Administration’s watch while also re-onboarding any USCG personnel who were dismissed from service for refusing to take the COVID-19 “vaccine,” with time in service credited to such returnees. These two steps could be foundational for any improvements in the recruiting process. (p.155-157)

Both the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy are vital tools to ensure an unmonopolized Arctic. It is imperative that the Navy and Coast Guard continue to
expand their fleets, including planned icebreaker acquisitions, to assure Arctic
access for the United States and other friendly actors. The remote and harsh conditions of the Arctic also make unmanned system investment and use particularly
appealing for providing additional situational awareness, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance. The Coast Guard should also consider upgrading facilities,
such as its Barrow station, to reinforce its Arctic capabilities and demonstrate a
greater commitment to the region. (p.190)

MARAD would be better served by being transferred from DOT to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). MARAD is the only DOT modal administration
that does not regulate the industry that it represents: The maritime industry is
regulated by the U.S. Coast Guard (ships and personnel) and by the Federal Maritime Commission (cargo rates and competitive practices). (p. 637)

MARAD, including its subordinate Service Academy (the U.S. Merchant Marine
Academy) should be transferred to the Department of Defense (if the Coast Guard
is located there because DHS has been eliminated) or to the Department of Home
land Security. In this way, the two agencies charged with oversight and regulation
of the Maritime sector—MARAD and the United States Coast Guard—would be
aligned under the same department where operational efficiencies could be realized more easily. (p. 638)

Finally, DHS as a department is experienced in administering and budgeting for
the operation of an existing federal service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy,
which is similar to the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in size. There would be
increased efficiencies and better alignment of the missions of these two institutions
if they were under one single department that has equity in the industries served
by these academies. (p. 638)

Transfer NOS (National Ocean Service–Chuck) Survey Functions to the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Geological Survey. Survey operations have historically accounted for almost half the NOS budget. These functions could be transferred to the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Geological Survey to increase efficiency. NOS’ expansion of the National Marine Sanctuaries System should also be reviewed, as discussed below. (p. 676)

U.S. Coast Guard and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Congress should examine whether to return the Treasury’s former in-house law enforcement capabilities via the return of the United States Coast Guard and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Bringing these agencies back from the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, respectively, would allow Treasury, in the case of U.S. Coast Guard, to increase border security via a vigilance with respect to economic crimes (for example, drug smuggling and tax evasion). (p. 709/710)

Japan CGC Oki (PL-1) prior to transfer to the Malaysian Coast Guard

Army Recognition’s Navy News reports,

“According to information published by Kompas on July 8, 2024, the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) has received a new patrol vessel from the Japanese government.”

I am a bit confused by this report. It says Indonesia “has received a new patrol vessel.” Then it says,

Construction will take place in Japan, and upon completion, the ship will be officially handed over to Bakamla by the Japanese government through JICA and Japan Marine Science Inc. (JMS).

Acompanying the article is a photo of the former Japan CG cutter Oki (above, previous name Nojima, the only ship of its class) which was transferred to the Malaysia Coast Guard in 2017. (One of three JCG vessels transferred to the Malaysia CG.) Their caption even includes the Malaysia Coast Guard name for the vessel, KM Arau, without any explanation.

They report these specifics about the vessel,

The vessel, with a capacity for 70 crew members, measures 85.6 meters in length and can reach speeds of up to 22 knots.

The length does not correspond to any Japan Coast Guard vessel I have been able to identify.

A December 20, 2023, from the Asia Pacific Defense Journal, “Indonesia to receive large patrol vessel from Japan as part of aid” reported Japan would build a new ship for the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA), but that is more than six-month-old news.

Could it be than Japan has already handed over an existing Japan Coast Guard vessel and is also building a new one, or is this just the result of not proofreading an AI written story?

In any case, that Japan is helping not only the Philippines but also Indonesia and Malaysia (as well as Vietnam and others) is significant.

That the Coast Guard has had a workforce shortage is well known. Steps have been taken to improve recruitment and retention, but I have not yet heard how successful the efforts have been.

In 2023 the Army, Navy, and Air Force also had workforce shortages. Their shortages were proportionately smaller, but the problems were similar, lower propensity to serve, fewer qualified young people and a recently implemented health records system, except that unlike the Coast Guard everyone knows the Army, Navy, and Air Force exist and are employment options.

Navy Times reports the Army, Air Force, and Marines are on track to meet or exceed their recruiting goals, the Navy expects to fall short, but is doing much better than in 2023 despite an increase of 5,000 in their recruitment goal.

“We are seeing significant increases year over year as you saw,” Allchin said. “Right now, we’re projecting a miss of around 4,200 for our active enlisted mission of about 40,600.”

 MHS Genesis, the military’s new electronic health record has apparently complicated recruitment.

“Before the health system rollout, Goodyear said, getting 100 new Marine Corps contracts took 154 applicants; now it takes 181 applicants.

“The number of medical waivers being submitted for applicants has more than doubled, creating processing delays.

“The average time in military entry processing for recruits has increased from 10 days to 35 days…With an average of 120 days in the delayed entry program compared with 162 days before MHS Genesis, the boot camp dropout rate has increased, he said, from 11% to 12%.

“…in the Air Force…service officials estimate between 3,000 would-be recruits and 4,000 would-be recruits in 2023 simply walked away from service amid long medical processing wait times.

…“Often, extended delays require these individuals to pursue a different career path based on the financial realities of life.”

CAM RANH INTERNATIONAL PORT, Vietnam (July 8, 2024) – Hospital Corpsman 2nd Class Renato Paredes from San Diego, mans the rails as U.S. 7th Fleet flagship USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19) moors Cam Ranh, Vietnam, July 8, 2024. As the 7th Fleet flagship, Blue Ridge is the oldest operational ship in the Navy and routinely operates with allies and partners in preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific. USCGC Waesche is moored in background left. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Adam Craft) 

The “USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker: July 8, 2024” notes,

U.S. 7th Fleet command ship USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) and the Coast Guard cutter USCGC Waesche (WMSL-751) pulled into the Vietnamese port of Cam Ranh Bay on Monday, according to the Navy.

“During the port visit, Blue Ridge and Waesche leadership will meet with the Vietnam People’s Navy, Vietnam Coast Guard, and Khanh Hoa leadership. Events during the visit include subject matter expert exchanges and community relations activities,” reads the statement.

“The Project 23550 Ice-class patrol ship “Ivan Papanin”, built for the Russian Navy at “Admiralty Shipyards”, went to sea for factory sea trials.
https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/21229221

We have a couple of reports that the first of four Russian Project 23550 ice class patrol vessels is conducting sea trials. Two are expected to go to the Russian Navy and two to the Russian Coast Guard.

• From The War Zone, “Russia’s New Combat Icebreaker Starts Sea Trials”
• Frome Army Recognition’s Naval News, “Russian Navy’s new Ivan Papanin Project 23550 combat icebreaker begins sea trials with Kalibr missiles”

We have talked about this class many times going back to 2016, most recently in a post, “Arctic Patrol Cutter, State of the Art–Revisited.”

Perhaps too much is made of the fact that these ships can carry two containers that might contain cruise missiles. The real story is that just about anything that can carry containers can also carry a variety of containerized weapon systems, offensive or defensive. The US has fired Tomahawk and Standard missiles from their Mk70 containerized launchers.  Even Iran has fired ballistic missiles from shipboard containers.

Russia already has a host of cruise missile launchers in the Arctic, aircraft, submarines, surface ships, and ground launchers. Should these ships receive containerized cruise missiles, they will only marginally improve Russian offensive capability.

Alternately, two containers on the stern might be used to house a towed array and torpedoes to give the ships an ASW capability.

These are probably excellent Arctic Patrol Vessel, but they are not impressive as warships, their defensive capabilities are lacking, having no AAW or anti-surface capability beyond a single medium caliber gun.

“The Project 23550 Ice-class patrol ship “Ivan Papanin”, built for the Russian Navy at “Admiralty Shipyards”, went to sea for factory sea trials. https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/21229221

Any reporting you may see to the contrary, these are not the first “combat icebreakers” in the Russian Navy or Coast Guard. They are just the latest in a long string including eight Ivan Susanin class, three American built Wind class, and the Puga laid down in 1938 but not completed until 1957. Even the icebreaker Krassin, completed in 1917, and now a museum ship, was armed with four 76mm during WWII.

The Russians may take advantage of these ships to more widely distribute their cruise missiles, but that is secondary to their primary purpose as patrol vessels.