InformationDissemination 5th year Celebration/Tactics and Strategy–Consider how the CG might fit

Perhaps my favorite naval blog, Informationdissemination, is celebrating their fifth anniversary. They have invited a number of prominent individuals to write for the blog and the turn0ut has been impressive. Below, I have listed some of the topic and authors.

Most recently they have published a post by the author of perhaps the most influential book on naval tactic of the last 50 year, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Captain USN (Retired), an operations research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. I think its worth a look. (We had an earlier two part discussion of Coast Guard roles “What Might Coast Guard Cutters Do in Wartime, Part 1, Navy Shortfalls” and “…part-2, Coast Guard Roles”.)

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How can the concepts articulated in writing by transformers/innovators get translated to action? Admiral James G. Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander, United States European Command

What is Air-Sea Battle? Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations.

What fundamental skills do today’s midshipmen need to learn in order to lead the Navy three decades from now? Vice Admiral Michael H. Miller, the 61st Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy

US MARSEC Capability Development Programs in West Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects, N.R. Jenzen-Jones &  LT Chad R. Hutchins, USN.

With so few U.S.-Flagged ships and carriers, is America still a maritime power? Stephen Carmel, Sr. Vice President Maritime Services at Maersk Line, Limited.

How would you describe the evolution of social media in the Navy? Rear Adm. Dennis J. Moynihan, U.S. Navy Chief of Information

Is China the real Mahanian maritime power of the 21st century? Robert C. Rubel, Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College.

How long would it take the shipbuilding industry to grow capacity and throughput if the nation faced a naval crisis or conflict? Mike Petters, President and Chief Executive Officer of Huntington Ingalls Industries.

What is the Littoral Combat Ship in your words, and what should LCS be looking to the future? Christopher Cavas, Journalist at Defense News and Navy Times

To what extent is the Navy setting forth a strategic vision that agrees with your understanding of America’s global role? Secretary John Lehman, Special Adviser to Gov. Mitt Romney and Co-Chair of Romney Campaign’s Defense Working Group

and the same question to a representative of the Obama campaign

To what extent is the Navy setting forth a strategic vision that agrees with your understanding of America’s global role? Secretary Richard Danzig, former Secretary of the Navy under President Bill Clinton and an advisor to President Barack Obama’s re-election campaign on national security issues.

Commandant Interviewed–Link to Video

The Commandant was recently interviewed on a video blog, “This Week in Defense News.” You can watch it here.

Not surprisingly the topic is the budget including sequestration, National Security Cutters, icebreakers, and Off Shore Patrol Cutters.

The interview is in three parts and total time is a bit over 20 minutes. Not sure how long this will be available.

Approaching a Merchant Ship May be Hazardous–Sydney vs Kormoran

File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1969-117-48, Hilfskreuzer Kormoran.jpg

Photo: German Auxiliary Cruiser Kormoran

The Mystery:

On 19 November, 1941 the Australian light cruiser Sydney disappeared. Because of wartime radio silence procedures, she wasn’t missed  for several days. Searches began on 24 November and continued though the 29th.

File:HMAS Sydney (AWM 301473).jpg

Photo: HMAS Sydney, 1940

HMAS Sydney was a substantial warship. Commissioned only six years before, she had recently returned to Australia from the Mediterranean where she had been very active. She had shelled the Italian coast, participated in a major fleet action, and taken part in the sinking of an Italian destroyer, a light cruiser, and at least three merchant ships. At 562 feet long, 8,940 tons, armored, and armed with eight 6″ guns in four turrets, she was approximately the size of modern Burke class DDG and about twice the size of a National Security Cutter.

The Adversary:

The searchers found no survivors from the Sydney, but surprisingly found German Navy personnel. Gradually the story came out.

The German sailors were from the Kormoran. Kormoran had been built as a merchant ship. She was large for the period at 8,736 tons and 515 feet long, but would be dwarfed by most modern merchant ships. She had been converted to a clandestine commerce raider. She was armed with six 5.9″ (150mm) guns dating from the first world war (only four of which could bear on a side), five 20mm machineguns, and two 37 mm anti-tank guns.  In addition she was armed with six torpedo tubes, four in pairs on either side and two underwater tubes. She carried scout planes and a large number of mines. She could also alter her appearance to resemble several different allied or neutral merchant ships.

Kormoran had been away from Germany for more than eleven months and had sunk ten merchant ships and captured an eleventh. Kormoran was disguised as a Dutch freighter when Sydney stumbled upon her.

The Fatal Error:

Sydney made the mistake of approaching Kormoran too closely. After sighting a vessel that was not expected to be in the area, and exchanges of signals, Sydney continued to close until they were within 1500 yard, off the Kormoran’s starboard beam. When it became clear that she would not be able to fool the Australian cruiser, Kormoran broke her battle ensign and both ships opened fire almost simultaneously. Sydney’s eight round salvo was high. Kormoran launched two torpedoes. Her first salvo did inconsequential damage, but her second destroyed Sydney’s firecontrol tower, while her 20 and 37 mm guns kept the crews away from Sydney’s open secondary mounts. Sydney’s two forward 6″ turrets were destroyed before they were able to fire their second salvo. Kormoran then turned her attention to the engineroom for three salvos. Sydney’s two aft turrets began firing independently in local control.

As the Kormoran fired her eighth and ninth salvo, one of the two torpedoes she had fired hit the Sydney forward, causing the bow to break downward. This forced her to veer left and pass behind the Kormoran. These events had taken only minutes. Since the torpedo would have covered the 1500 yards between them in little over a minute and 6″ guns fire at up to ten rounds per minute, it may have taken less than two minutes to severely maul an experienced first line warship.

The Second Phase:

The ships now separated. Sydney limped away south, while Kormoran held her course and speed. Sydney’s forward turrets were shattered, and her after turrets jammed. She had fires in the engineering spaces and around the seaplane catapult. About fifteen minutes after the engagement had begun, she belatedly launched torpedoes at the stern of the Kormoran.

Kormoran turned to port to unmask her batteries with the intention of destroying Sydney. The unguided torpedoes missed at the now extended range, the shot made totally impossible by Kormoran’s turn. At this point Kormoran’s engines failed and she went dead in the water. Still she continued firing the four 5.9″ guns that would bear at near their maximum rate, reportedly expending up to 450 of the 100 pound shells while Sydney moved slowly away. The last rounds were expended as the range opened to 6,000 meters (6,600 yards). This would have taken at least eleven minutes, and at that still relatively short range, against a slow moving target, at least one in ten shells should have hit.

Damage Control Fails:

Both ships lost their attempts to control damage and both sank during the night. Of Kormoran’s crew of 399, 317 survived. Many of those that were lost, died when a rubber raft suddenly sank. Why there were no survivors from Sydney’s crew of 645, is a question that has prompted controversy and accusations of war crimes. When the wrecks were discovered in 2008, Sydney’s bow had broken off, but it appeared the main body of the ship had sunk upright. Investigation of the wreck also appeared to confirm German accounts of the engagement.

Lessons Learned:

Sydney was lost, but she did succeed in destroying the raider because, although several vital systems were destroyed early on, she had sufficient redundancy to continue to inflict damage that proved fatal.

The delay in launching torpedoes was difficult to understand. She should have been able to fire the four port tubes when the action commenced. The four starboard tubes should have been able to bear as the Sydney passed astern of Kormoran. They may not have been fully readied and Kormoran’s suppressive fire on the secondary mounts may have also killed the crews of the near-by torpedo tubes or otherwise disabled them.

Coast Guard ships may find themselves placed in a situation not unlike the Sydney’s while providing “ports, waterways, and coastal security” or enforcing a blockade. The CO will have to decide where to place the ship. After years of fisheries and law enforcement boardings, it is natural for Coast Guard ships to make a close approach. It has real advantages, allowing better view of the vessel of interest and their activities and shortening the time in transit for boarding parties, but in a situation where the ship might prove hostile, it may be hazardous.

A more extensive treatment of the battle on which this post is based is here. The section “Why Burnett approached so close” is particularly relevant.

Sydney had approached closely enough that Kormoran was able to selectively target vital systems. Kormoran would have known the location of all of Sydney’s weapons, while the Kormoran’s were far less obvious. Exploiting surprise, Kormoran used her inferior weapons to quickly shift the odds in her favor.

In a similar situation, close in, it might be possible to place a cutter at a severe firepower disadvantage with only a couple of shots destroying the more potent weapons. Extending the range quickly makes this unlikely.

A hostile vessel’s extemporized armament might include machine guns and anti-tank guided missiles, but there are also thousands of surplus anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns in circulation, manufactured during the cold war, ranging in size up to 130 mm (5.1″) that could be mounted on a ship and would prove effective in an anti-surface mode at short range.

What all these systems have in common is their accuracy drops off rapidly with increasing range. It may not be practical to stay beyond their maximum range, but it is probably possible to keep enough distance, to make it highly unlikely critical systems can be destroyed before the cutter can react.

Offshore Patrol Cutter Update, June 2012

Several documents have emerged recently that provide more information on the proposed Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), also known as the Maritime Security (Cutter), Medium (WMSM). This builds on information previously published (here, herehere, here and here).

The Request for Proposal included a projected build schedule for the first 11 ships.

  • FY 2016 Detail Design
  • FY 2017 OPC#1 Construction begins
  • FY 2018 OPC#2
  • FY 2019 OPC#3
  • FY 2020 OPC#4 and #5
  • FY 2021 OPC #6 and #7
  • FY 2022 OPC #8 and #9
  • FY 2023 OPC #10 and #11

There is a notation that the average cost of units 4-9 shall be $276M in FY2016 dollars. (Looks like there might be potential for a multi-year contract here.)

One of the big surprises to me (found in the Fleet Mix Study) was that the OPCs are expected to essentially take over all Alaska Patrols.

The draft Request for Proposal (RFP) also includes a requirement to equip all of them “to operate in areas of broken plate, pancake, and sea ice ranging from 10 to 30 inches thick.” Along with this, came a requirement to be able to operate an ice capable small boat as well. OPCs are also to have automated topside de-icers.

These characteristics combined with the Commandant’s affirmation that the ships should be capable of boat and helicopter operations in state five seas mean these ships will be very much more capable than the WMECs they are nominally replacing, and at least to some degree, that they are taking over duties previously assigned to 378s.

Towing ability to 10,000 tons is required, same as the 378s.

The ships are expected to be able to do Fueling at Sea (FAS), Replenishment at Sea (RAS), Vertical (Helicopter) Replenishment or VERTREP, and to refuel smaller vessels (apparently reflecting an expectation of sustained operations with WPCs or WPBs at locations remote from their bases).

Minimum ranges was specified as 7,500 nautical miles. (This is a reduction from 8,500 miles). Typical operations as outlined in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) were 14 days between refueling, 21 days between replenishment, and 45-60 day patrols. It also stated there would typically be a four to six week inport “Charlie” (stand-down/maintenance) period after each patrol; a six to seven week dockside availability every two to three years; and a seven to eight week drydocking every four to five years. “In addition, the cutter will undergo 3-4 weeks of training and evaluation every 10-24 months.”

An expectation that the ships might operate with Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) was apparently a recent addition. This helps establish a floor for the ships’ maximum speed, since all the units typically operating in an Expeditionary Strike Group (LHAs, LHDs, LPD, LSDs) have speeds of 20 to 24 knots. When the current generation of LSDs is replaced in the not too distant future, all will do 22+ knots. Of the three ships that typically make up an ESG, the largest (LHAs or LHDs) all do at least 24 knots and frequently act as small aircraft carriers. If the OPCs are to be fast enough to stay with these ships and hopefully maneuver around them, then 25 knots appears to be a minimum rather than a nice to have.

The crew is not to exceed 100, but additional birthing must also be available for a 5 person AvDet and a 5-11 person “Signals Intelligence Support Element,” “and possibly others.”

There was reference to ballistic protection, that I had not seen before.

“The WMSM will provide increased protection for (sic.) small caliber weapons and shrapnel fragmentation around the bridge, CIC, and magazine spaces.”

The ships are to be built the American Bureau of Shipping Naval Ship Rules, but will not have explosive or underwater shock hardening.

Again we do not have access to the draft specifications, but we can deduce some details of the proposed equipment from the Allowance Equipage List included in the Draft RFP. All the systems below are referenced. (In a few cases there may be duplicate listing if different nomenclature is used for the same system.) The outfit, in most respects, repeats or even improves on that of the National Security Cutter:

Communications:

  • Military SAT com
  • Tactical Data Link System
  • IFF
  • SBU (presumably “Sensitive but Unclassified”) Network
  • SIPRNET (Classified Network)
  • NIPRNET (Unclassified Network)
  • Entertainment System

Sensors:

  • TSR-3D RARAD System, a multimode surface and air surveillance and target acquisition radar
  • Electro-Optic/Infrared Sensor system
  • RADIAC

Armament:

  • Mk 48 mod 1 Gun Weapon System (pdf), which includes the Mk 110 57mm gun, AN/SPQ-9B  Surface search and Fire Control Radar, Electro-Optical sensor system Mk 20 mod 0, the Mk 160 GCS Mod 12, and Mk 12 Gun Computer System
  • Mk 15 mod 21-25 CIWS (Phalanx)
  • Mk 38 mod 2 25 mm
  • Gun Weapon System (.50 cal.) SSAM
  • Four crew served .50 mounts including Mk 16 and Mk 93 mod 0 or mod 4 mounts
  • Mk 46 optical sight

Electronic Warfare:

  • Mk 53 Decoy launcher
  • AN/SLQ-32 (v)2

Navigation:

  • Encrypted GPS
  • Electronic Chart Display and Information System

Intelligence:

  • Ships Signals Exploitation Space (A change from SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility))
  • Special Purpose Intel System

Aviation:

  • Hangar for helicopter up to and including Navy and Coast Guard H-60s
  • Facilities for the support of unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
  • TACAN
  • Visual Landing Aids

Keeping the Polar Sea?

The plan had been to scrap the Polar Sea (WAGB-11), but it looks like the plan may have changed. The Seattle Times is reporting that the Ship has been spared, at least for now.

“The decision was announced Friday by Sens. Maria Cantwell of Washington and Mark Begich and Lisa Murkowski of Alaska.”

“Cantwell, Begich and Murkowski say the Polar Sea’s hull is in sound condition and rebuilding the ship would be cheaper than building a new icebreaker.”

File:USCGCPolarSea.jpg

US Coast Guard Photo

Coast Guard Releases Draft Request for Proposal for the OPC

Today the Coast Guard released a draft “request for proposal” (RFP) for the construction of the Offshore Patrol Cutters.

They also indicate they expect to meet with industry the week of July 9, request feedback by July 16, and that they will issue the RFP in September.

There is an awful lot of material here to absorb, but one thing I did notice immediately was the apparent intention to make all the OPC ice strengthened. “The discussion of operating environments was expanded to include Arctic climates. An ability to operate in areas of broken plate, pancake, and sea ice ranging from 10 to 30 inches thick was added. However, the summary states that the WMSM will not conduct ice breaking as a mission (page iii).”

There will be more I’m sure.

GAO Responds to Fleet Mix Studies, Part 1, The Report

In my post, Irresponsibly Rebuilding the Fleet-a Look at the Future, I talked about why it was essential that the Coast Guard build at least two Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) a year, when it finally starts building them in 2016. My concern is that there is still no wide spread support for funding the Coast Guard’s “Program of Record” which includes 25 OPCs in addition to eight National Security Cutters and 58 Fast Response Cutters.

Conceptual Rendering of the OPC

The Coast Guard has recently gone public with similar concerns.

Studies are playing an important part in the effort to build consensus on what the Coast Guard’s fleet of Cutters should look like in the future and how to get there. May 28 of this year, we looked at the Executive Summary of the Offshore and Aviation Fleet Mix Study completed in 2009, but only recently made public. The Coast Guard completed a second phase of its Fleet Mix Study which looked at the effects of two funding levels on the procurement process in May 2011 and the Department of Homeland Security completed a “Cutter Study” in August 2011.

May 31, 2012 GAO released a report to Congressional Committees titled “Observations on the Coast Guard’s and the Department of Homeland Security’s Fleet Studies” [PDF] along with briefing slides provided on April 20, 2012. I’m going to quote GAO’s report and slides extensively.

GAO saw there objectives as to:

  • “(1) What are the key results of the Coast Guard’s Fleet Mix Studies and DHS’s Cutter Study with respect to recapitalization and operations?
  • “(2) How useful are these studies to DHS, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Coast Guard for informing recapitalization decisions?” Continue reading

Irresponsibly Rebuilding the Fleet–a Look at the Future

I have seen several references to how the FY2013 budget is “Responsibly rebuilding the fleet,” as if we might otherwise have gone off willy-nilly building ships we don’t really need because we haven’t done prior proper planning. In fact we have been in analysis–paralysis for two decades, since we finished the last 270 in 1990, without building replacements for ten WWII vintage ships that continued to serve.

In the last 22 years the Coast Guard has taken delivery of 21 ships (one WAGB, three WMSL, one WLBB, and 16 WLBs), less than one ship a year, while we should have averaged at least two ships a year (and should do so for the foreseeable future to maintain the current fleet and replace ships at what is generally recognized as the economical end of their useful lives at 30 years).

It gets worse. Over the last eight years, since 2004 the Coast Guard has take delivery of only four ships (one WLBB and three WMSL). We are now in a situation where it may be four years between delivery of NSC#3 and #4 (funded in 2006 and 2010 respectively).

Let’s take look a what will happen if more money is not allocated to the AC&I budget.

The Problem:

By the end of 2020 the Coast Guard can expect to loose the services of at least half the existing fleet of large patrol vessels, 20 ships (six 378s and 14 WMEC 210s). During that time, if there are no changes to current budget, we can expect no more than four new ships to be added (three “National Security Cutters” (NSC) already funded and one “Offshore Patrol Cutter” (OPC)).  This will give the Coast Guard a fleet of 24 large patrol cutters (6 NSC, 3 WHECs, an OPC, the Alex Haley, and 13 WMEC 270s), down from 40 ship in the current fleet, and far less than the 33 ships in the “Program of Record.” Even this is probably overly optimistic in that it assumes all existing ships will be decommissioned only after 50 years of service, with three 378s still in service in 2020. Continue reading

D-Day Normandy Remembered

The Coast Guard Compass has an excellent post on one Coast Guardsman’s perspective as he experienced the landings on the beaches of Normandy in 1944. The Coast Guard historian has a very comprehensive index of information and stories related to the invasion available on the historian’s website.

Coast Guard participation in the invasion included three Coast Guard manned attack transports, two more that were partially CG manned, eleven Landing Ship Tanks (LST), 24 Landing Craft Infantry, Large (LCI(L)), and 60 wooden hulled 83 foot patrol boats. In addition the Coast Guard manned numerous smaller landing craft.

File:Lci-convoy.jpg

Normandy Invasion, June 1944 A convoy of Landing Craft Infantry (Large) sails across the English Channel toward the Normandy Invasion beaches on “D-Day”, 6 June 1944. Each of these landing craft is towing a barrage balloon for protection against low-flying German aircraft. Photograph from the U.S. Coast Guard Collection in the U.S. National Archives. Photo #: 26-G-2333