Category Archives: OPC

National Fleet Plan

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A friend of the blog, Leesea, recently pointed me to the recent update of the “National Fleet Plan,” which, despite its name, does not really talk about the entire US Fleet. It is really about the Coast Guard, and how it and the Navy will cooperate to “identify additional opportunities for increased commonality and interoperability.”

You can find it in the form of a pdf here.

I have reproduced the table of contents below. Mostly, it is what you would expect and/or hope would be included. There are potential areas of cooperation, current situation, where they hope to progress, and identification of responsible offices.

It really did not get interesting to me until it started talking about the Offshore Patrol Cutter (page 22-24 particularly).

There was one particular section that I thought might be of interest, the “Strategic Laydown” (page 54), which concerns sharing facilities, including ship homeports, with the Navy.

Plan of Action and Milestones
– Fiscal Year 2015: Process Organizational Change Request (OCR) for Coast Guard System Acquisition Integration Laboratory (CGSAIL) relocation to Navy Combat Systems Engineering Development Site (CSEDS).

– Fiscal Year 2015: Submit revised Strategic Laydown (SLD) request and OCR to homeport 3 X FRCs at Naval Base Guam to include Lessons Learned from maturing CG-7/OPNAV N51 MOA.

– Fiscal Year 2015: Process Organization Change Request to homeport 3 X Medium Endurance Cutters at Naval Station Pensacola.

– Continue to develop solutions to permanently station aviation assets at Naval Base Ventura County.

– Support feasibility studies to identify potential homeport locations for West Coast Offshore Patrol Cutters

I am planning on two follow-up posts, one about what they had to say about the OPC and one about the implications of homeporting Coast Guard ships at Navy Bases.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Page No.

1.  Preamble …………………………………………………. 9
2.  Purpose ………………………………………………….. 9
3.  National Fleet Plan Overview ……………………………….. 9
4.  Plan Progression and Oversight……………………………………………………… 10
5.  National Fleet Plan…………………………………………..………………………… 10
5.1.  Current and Evolving Operations……………………………10
5.2.  Integrated Logistics………………………………………….……………..……….. 12
5.3.  Training……………………………………………………………..………………… 15
5.4.  Maritime Security Cooperation…………………….……………………..………… 21
5.5.  Command, Control, Communications (C3) Systems……………….….………… 22
5.6.  Sensors………………………………………………………………………………… 25
5.7.  Weapon Systems…………………………………………………….……….……… 26
5.8.  Engineering Systems……………………………………………………….………… 28
5.9.  Platforms………………………………………………………………….…………… 29
5.10. Intelligence and Information Integration …………………. 34
6.  Programmatic Collaboration…………………………………………………………… 36
7.  Integrated Plan of Action and Milestones…………………………………..…….….. 36
8.  Navy-Coast Guard Memoranda of Understanding/Memoranda of Agreement…… 44
9.  Legal Authorities ……………………………………………….………………… 48
Chartered Commonality Working Groups:  Mission/Plan of Action and Milestones
Appendix A.  Permanent Joint Working Group…………………………………………… 50
Appendix B.  Small Boat Commonality Integrated Process Team …….. 51
Appendix C.  Naval Logistics Integration………………………………………………..… 52
Appendix D.  SSBN Transit Protection Systems…………………………………………. 53
Appendix E.  Strategic Laydown Working Group………………………………………… 54
Appendix F.  Arctic Working Group ……………………………….55
Appendix G.  Maritime Security Cooperation Council ………………… 56
Glossary……………………………………………………………………………………… 57

Navy Chooses Longbow Hellfire

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Lockheed Martin animation of Hellfire employment from an LCS

The US Naval Institute Proceedings is reporting that Navy has committed to selection of the Longbow Hellfire as an interim missile to arm the Littoral Combat Ships.

“For the LCS deployment, a single Longbow Hellfire launcher with a 24-missile capacity will be integrated with the LCS SSMM, which will be part of one of three weapon stations. Navy officials point out that Longbow Hellfire integration for the LCS SSMM will require only software modifications; no changes to the missile hardware or to the Army launcher or gas-containment system will be needed.

“In selecting the Longbow Hellfire, the Navy also will be able to draw from an available inventory of thousands of missiles already stockpiled for the Army, avoiding the need to spend money on new production.

“Navy officials emphasize that the Longbow Hellfire meets the requirement of the LCS Capabilities Description Document for a standoff-engagement capability for fast inshore attack craft.  An “increment 3” of the SSMM, while still going through modifications, now is expected to be ready to deploy aboard LCSs with the Longbow Hellfire in 2017.”

As we have discussed before, this weapon system seems like a good one for arming cutters against the possibility of an attack by highly maneuverable, high speed craft. In quantity the missiles might also be effective against larger targets.

It is likely the Coast Guard could add this capability at relatively low cost, if they made a case for it. As noted there are already large stocks of the missile. It seems likely that these weapons will be replaced on the LCSs before all the Offshore Patrol Cutters are complete. There are likely to be large numbers of Hellfire considered semi-obsolescent as they are replaced by the JAGM.

Poland looking for OPCs

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ProposedPolishCorvette

Rolls Royce proposal

Poland is planning some ships that have many similarities to the Offshore Patrol Cutters. We have talked about these a little already, in the context of an unconventional hull form offered by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) that promises better fuel economy. Our friend at Thinkdefence talks about another proposal from Rolls Royce. He also provided a link to a more detailed description of the program.

The intention is apparently to produce three “Miecznik” corvettes and three “Czapla” patrol ships (with mine countermeasures) with the two classes sharing a common platform. ThinkDefence reports the key features of Rolls Royce’s corvette version as follows:

“It is 99.7 metres long and displaces just over 2,400 tonnes. Accommodation for 60 crew and an additional 30 personnel is included and the ship is said to have a 28 day endurance. With a CODLOD propulsion system its design top speed is 25 knots. Weapons and sensors include a 76mm Oto Melara gun, twin MSI 30mm automatic cannons, two quad NSM missile launchers, MU90 torpedo launchers and four Sylver A35 cells for quad packed VL-MICA anti-aircraft missiles; Smart-S 3D radar, Thales optronic systems and Kingclip sonar.”

Substituting some equivalent US systems, I think that would represent a good approximation of how a war ready OPC might be equipped.

Apparently they intend to order one ship a year beginning with the corvettes in 2017. That starts them on nearly the same schedule as the OPCs. Which will be finished first? Unfortunately the Poles will probably see their first ship before we see the first OPC.

Rolls Royce CDV 4

 

MEKO Energy Saving Hull

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At MSPO 2015, the International Defence Industry Exhibition in Poland which took place in Kielce from the 1 to 4 September 2015, German naval vessels designer ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) unveiled a new variant of the MEKO A-100 PL with a unique
The new MEKO A-100 design unveiled at MSPO 2015. The variant shown here is the Mine Counter Measures (MCM) one.

NavyRecognition is reporting that the German ship builder ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), is offering a new hull form for its OPC- sized MEKO A-100 to meet Poland’s projected requirement for six Offshore Patrol Vessels. It is claimed that the new design will allow the ship to go 1.5 knots faster with no increase in installed power.

Two major differences are apparent,

  1. The raked stem and bulbous bow are replaced by a vertical stem which appears to provide a longer water line length.
  2. The fin stabilizers are missing.

Increasing waterline length does have the effect of decreasing wave making resistance which is predominant at higher speeds. Conversely increased length tends to result in  increased wetted area which would make ships less efficient as slower speeds by increasing skin friction. Deleting the fin stabilizers would have the benefit of reducing wetted surfaces. There may also be some less obvious changes, not apparent in the artist’s rending.

The original post has a nice side by side comparison of the conventional corvette and TKMS’s proposal to meet Poland’s Mine Countermeasures OPV requirement.

“Commandant Sees Bright Future for Coast Guard Acquisition Programs”

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National Defense Magazine reports that the Commandant, while addressing the National Press Club on August 5, made some remarkably positive statements about his expectations for the coming budget year.

“One day after the Coast Guard’s 225th birthday, its commandant predicted that the service would be receiving a big present this year: the largest acquisition budget in its history.”

There were few details, but the Commandant did refer to the prospects for Coast Guard Icebreakers.

“’This is generating a lot of interest and I’m very optimistic that on my watch we will see — no fooling — forward progress as we look at building a national fleet of icebreakers,’ he said.”

We will have to wait to find out what this really means.  Will the OPCs be funded; will the program be accelerated? Will we ever see Multi-Year funding of the Webber Class WPCs? Will we see the four aircraft shortfall in the planned fixed wing fleet addressed (and the additional recently identified shortfall in fixed wing flight hours)? Will we see new Inland tenders and new domestic icebreakers? Will we see the obsolete shore facilities upgraded?

Certainly we will not see all the problems fixed in 2016.

Funding for an icebreaker alone could result in the largest budget ever, but I’ve seen no indication we are far enough along in the procurement process to warrant full funding in FY2016. We have authorization for the Navy to build Icebreakers for the Coast Guard. But that would not increase AC&I budget.

The FY2016 AC&I budget request was only $1,017.3M. In 2012 the AC&I budget was $1,463,968,000. I am not sure that FY2012 was the largest ever AC&I budget, but it does mean if the 2016 budget is going to be “the biggest” Congress will need to add at least $446.7M. I suppose several projects could be aggregated to come up to this amount, but there I another possibility.

Could this mean the Coast Guard will get a ninth Bertholf class? It makes a certain amount of sense. The FY2016 budget request funds not a single major cutter. The Fleet mix study has documented the need for a ninth Bertholf. We have a hot, increasingly efficient shipbuilding process, and the shipbuilder, HII, is certainly not without influence in Congress. A third NSC in Hawaii could significantly boost our presence in the Western Pacific and would make the long promised Crew Rotation Concept more nearly possible (not to say I think it could work).

Waesche Carat 2012

Just adding a Bertholf class to the FY2016 AC&I request would bump it to close to $1.7B, still short of the $2+B/year the CG needs. Will we see genuine long term movement to adequate funding for the Coast Guard?

Australia to Build OPVs

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Australia has been talking about getting new ships for sometime, but recently they announced a policy of “continuous shipbuilding” in an effort to maintain a domestic  warship building capability.

While submarines and frigates have gotten most of the press, and will get most of the money, they also intend to build Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) to replace their Armidale class patrol craft, which have proven not quite up to the demanding missions they have been assigned. (They will also be building patrol boats to be distributed to Pacific island nations.)

“The construction of offshore patrol vessels to replace the Armidale class has also been moved forward to 2018.”

2018 puts them two years ahead of the Frigates, so this may be a lead in for the more sophisticated project. I suspect they will be strongly influenced in the selection of their OPV by New Zealand’s experience. due to the frequent contact and cooperation between the Australian and New Zealand Navies.

The New Zealand OPVs, HMNZS Otago and Wellington, appear to be progenitors of Eastern’s OPC proposal, so there is a good chance the Australians will be building something like the OPC. The CG should make its selection of the final OPC design about a year before Australia has to make their OPV design selection, so perhaps they could benefit from the Coast Guard’s selection process.

ASuW Hellfire Test Success–Operational Late 2017

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Navyrecognition reports that a successful test of modified Hellfire missiles for use in the Surface to Surface Missile Module (SSMM) planned for the Littoral Combat Ship has paved the way for operational deployment of the system in late 2017.

We have talked about these missiles before. They seem to be an ideal way to deal with the threat of small, fast, highly maneuverable boats that might be employed by terrorists, and absent more effective weapons, may provide some capability against even large vessels. Unlike gun systems, they promise high first round accuracy and lethality, with very little chance of a round going astray and hitting something unintended.

The projected SSMM would provide storage and launch facilities for up to 24 rounds. 24 rounds would weigh only about 2500 pounds. The launcher and support systems is unlikely to weigh more than that, suggesting and all up weight of about 5000 pounds, far less than either the 76mm Mk75 gun or the 57mm Mk110 (two and a half tons compared to eight or nine tons). Both of these guns are commonly used on missile and patrol boats smaller than the Webber class WPCs. Also unlike a gun system, the SSMM is unlikely to require any significant deck reinforcement.  It would almost certainly fit on all large cutters and perhaps the WPCs and WPBs as well. (It should be included on Offshore Patrol Cutters from day 1.) If the 24 round system is too large to be comfortably carried by smaller cutters, it is likely a smaller, say four round, system could be quickly and economically developed for Coast Guard use and perhaps for the Navy’s MkVI patrol boat as well.

If we take the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission seriously we really should be looking seriously at acquiring these systems, not just for the new ships as they are built, but also for the existing fleet with the idea that the systems would be transferred to the newer ships as the older ones are replaced.

The Navy should be willing to pay for these systems under existing inter-service agreements.

As noted before, if we need to stop a terrorist attack, we are far more likely to have a WPC or WPB on scene than a larger cutter. For this reason, arming some the Webber class in each homeport should be the first priority. Unfortunately the Webber Class are not geographically wide-spread, so we should look at mounting systems on existing MECs and WPBs to insure all potential targets have some protection until the entire fleet is armed.

I would say there are places where they might be mounted on Coast Guard stations ashore, to act as gate keepers for the ports against clandestine attacks, but coast defense is still an Army mission. Perhaps this is something we should be talking about too. If not Coast Guard manned defenses (which is probably the proper solution), then perhaps placement of unused SSMMs with their associated Navy crews on Coast Guard facilities or small detachments of army troops with their weapons to perform this function.

Document Alert–Coast Guard Cutter Procurement

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USNI news service has posted a copy of the Congressional Research Services latest take on the Coast Guard Vessel recapitalization program, “Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress.”  As usual their “Specialist in Naval Affairs,” Ronald O’Rourke, has done an excellent job and by simply stating the facts has made a strong case for recapitalization.

There are some criticisms implicit in the recitation of events thus far. I think it is apparent that the Crew Rotation Concept is proving an embarrassment, in that while we have now had three operational “National Security Cutters” for some time, there has been no attempt to validate the concept, and no attempt to repudiate this relic of the Deepwater program. The concept is a non-starter we have discussed several times. Ships are not cars in a motorpool. You cannot swap entire crews and expect good results. Time to piss or get off the pot. This bad news is not going to get better with age.

Limited progress on UAVs was also discussed.

Authorization Bill Has Some Surprises

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Federal Times is reporting the contents of the Coast Guards latest authorization bill, and there are some surprises.

The item I was particularly pleased to see, was a apparent interest in something I feel should be more closely watched, cutter days available.

Part of that requirement would be to implement a standard for tracking the number of days Coast Guard cutters are in operation at sea, and include days in which cutters are undergoing maintenance or repair.

That should be revealing. In considering what should be expected, I would suggest we look back a few years, say take a five year average from 1998 to 2002 as a baseline.

There are lots of other proposed changes, not the least is that it is to cover two years. I suggest you check it out.

CG making progress in reducing acquisition risks for OPCs–DHS IG

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IMG_4134

Photo: Eastern’s proposed Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) concept. One of three shipyards contending for the contract

FierceHomelandSecurity is reporting,

“An internal audit says that the Coast Guard is making progress in reducing acquisition risks of more than two dozen offshore patrol cutters, but it’s still too early to tell whether the service has fully implemented two risk mitigation recommendations that were previously made by the inspector general.

“One recommendation directs the Coast Guard to make sure it’s achieved a level of “design maturity” in its engineering plans, meaning that the designs are fully developed prior to construction.

“The other instructs the service to ensure that “low-rate initial production” – that is producing enough quantities of cutters to test, evaluate and approve before full production – are supported by an operational assessment. This assessment evaluates proposed cutter designs against operational requirements and identifies risks.

The Commandant has said they have looked so closely at the designs that they questioned the number of water fountains (scuttlebutts for the sailors). That sounds like design maturity, but then the purpose was to save money, not to ensure operational competence. I would hope we have done that as well. We are certainly taking long enough to make sure the designs are mature.

I would take issue with the statement, “Under a two-phase strategy, the service plans to acquire 25 OPCs to replace an equal number of medium endurance cutters.” These 25 ships are intended to replace 32 WMECs, four of which have already been decommissioned, 13 270s, 16 210s, the Alex Haley, Acushnet, and Storis. In 2000 we had 44 large cruising cutters; if the program of record is fully implemented we will have only 33. The misguided “Crew Rotation Concept” which, even if it works, will not give us the same number of ship days away from home port as 44 ships, even if we have to pay for 44 crews, is biting us. (Note, it appears to me this statement was made by FierceHomelandSecurity rather than as part of the IG report.)

The DHS IG report referred to, regarding the OPCs, is this document, “Verification Review of U. S. Coast Guard’s Acquisition of the Sentinel Class Fast Response Cutter (OIG-12-68),” that can be accessed through the FierceHomelandSecurity post.

The alarming aspect of this, is the insistence on “low rate production” until the design is tested. It seems we have been planning low rate production all along, with only one ship per year to be funded for the first three years, and no more than two per year after that, meaning with production of 25 ships, we will not see the last ship delivered until 2035. That sounds pretty low rate to me.

If we fund as expected (one per year for three years, then two per year), there will be a shift to funding two ships per year before the first ship has completed testing. Is two ships per year a high rate which the IG might oppose? Is there any possibility that after testing we might be able to build OPCs at a rate higher than two per year (as we really should)?

I have still heard no suggestion that the Coast Guard will take advantage of the multi-year/block buy procurement that Congress has authorized for the OPC, nor have they requested authority for Multi-Year procurement of the Webber class WPCs which certainly qualify as a mature and tested program.

There was a time when the Coast Guard took delivery of 28 ships in nine years.  It really looks like the we are going to need similar surge in the future to prevent a collapse of our capabilities.