China’s Warship Construction. More Surface Warships Launched in 2019 than the USN has Commissioned in Five Years

Chinese warships launched in 2019.

Earlier I noted that the Chinese seemed to be building an incredible number of warships. Found this chart of surface warships launched in 2019. I have been unable to find the original source, the style appears to be from http://www.military-today.com/, but in any case, it appears to be correct.

16 Type 056 corvettes, 8 Type 052D destroyers, two type 055 destroyer/cruisers, a Type 071 LPD, and a Type 075 LHD. 28 surface warships total. It is possible some of the Type 056s are intended for export or for the China Coast Guard.

By way of comparison, over the last five years, 2015 through 2019, as nearly as I can tell, the US Navy commissioned 15 Littoral Combat Ships, five Burke class destroyers, two Zumwalt class destroyers, two LPDs, no big deck amphibs (LHD or LHA),  and one aircraft carrier. That is 25 surface warships total. The conclusion is a bit startling.

The Chinese launched more surface warships in 2019, than the US Navy commissioned in the last five years. 

The 19th and 20th Type 052D destroyers are launched in Dalian on May 10 (Image: 香港 文匯 網)

The LCS program is coming to an end, but there are still 16 to be commissioned. Generally the program has funded four per year, The FFG(X) program is expected to replace the LCS program in the Navy budget with one FFG funded in the first year followed by two frigates in each year to a total of 20. Combined with the LCS this should give the Navy 55 “small surface combatants.” The Chinese have about 50 frigates but this number is likely to decline as older ships are decommissioned, as their current frigate program, the Type 054A, is nearing completion.

The USN’s Zumwalt class destroyer program will end with three ships when the Lyndon B. Johnson is commissioned in the near future.

The Burke class DDG program was expected to continue building twelve ships over the next five years, but there has been a recent report that DOD would like to cut five ships to make room in the budget for development of more unmanned systems. Also suggested is that Ticonderoga class cruisers be retired early and that the first four LCS be decommissioned.

It is comforting to assume that Chinese systems and their training are inferior. We had similar assumptions about the Japanese before WWII. It is extremely dangerous to assume your own superiority. Plus while the US Forces spread all over the world, the Chinese are concentrated in their own theater of interest.

What Has Happened to Coast Guard Online History?

USCGC Spencer (WPG-36) in 1942 or 1943. Spencer sank U-175 with assistance of USCGC Duane, on April 17, 1943.

Several months ago the Coast Guard moved their on line presence to new servers. When they did this, a great deal of the Coast Guard history that had been available on line disappeared. Apparently there was no plan to migrate the once extensive files to the new system.

I had planned to talk about this when it happened, but other priorities kept pushing it into the future until it seemed to late, but recently I reopened a post I had included in the heritage page, “The Battle for Convoy 166, 25 February 1943” and I was struck by how much had been lost.

“For more information on the Coast Guard’s battles against the U-boats, there are a series of extensively captioned photos of 327s here, an accounting of “U.S. Coast Guard Combat Victories of World War II” which also lists significant losses is here, and a twenty page pdf on the Battle of the North Atlantic is here.”

None of the referenced resources appear to be available on line anymore. It is just one example. Go to the Coast Historian’s page and try to look something up.

If you go to the Coast Guard Historian’s link for cutters, their are four pages of listings. The first page is a listing of ten: Aaron V. Brown, 1861, AB Class, 1913-1938, Absecon, 1949 (WHEC-374), Acacia, 1927 (WAGL-200), Active, 1816, Massachusetts, 1791, Point Class Cutter (82′), USCGC 95003 (ex-Aberdeen), USCGC Bayberry (WLI-65400), USCGC Point Harris (WPB-82376). The remaining three pages are devoted to LCIs of WWII. That is it. Why only these particular ships and not some of the more famous cutters? It has been this way for months.

It should be an embarrassment that the Navy’s Naval History and Heritage web site has more Coast Guard history than the Coast Guard Historians web page.

I have not purged my Heritage page of links that have been broken because, presumably these documents still exist somewhere in the Coast Guards files. Hopefully some day they will reemerge.

HMS Clyde, a Short but Remarkable Career

HMS Clyde (P257) has been decommissioned and is expected to be sold to the Brazilian Navy. By Coast Guard standards, she is almost new, not yet 13 years old. She is being replaced by a new ship of the more capable River Batch II class that evolved from HMS Clyde and three earlier River class Offshore Patrol Vessel.

As an OPV, Clyde’s design is largely unremarkable (specifications below), but her twelve year deployment on distant station, with reportedly only a single yard period, in spite of having a crew of only 40 on a ship slightly larger than a 270 foot WMEC, is quite unusual.

HMS Clyde was commissioned in 30 Jan. 2007 and decommissioned 20 Dec. 2019. In Brazil where she will join three newer, but similar type ships, also built in Britain.

Specifications:

  • Displacement: 2000 tons
  • Length: 81.5 m (267 ft 5 in)
  • Beam: 13.5 m (44 ft 3 in)
  • Propulsion: twin diesel, 11,280 HP total
  • Speed: 21 knots
  • Endurance: 21 days
  • Range: 5,500 nmi (10,200 km)
  • Flight Deck for helicopters up to and including Merlin
  • Armament: 30mm auto cannon, 2 miniguns

What Frustrates Me? –an Apparent Lack of Transparent Long Term Planning

A reader recently asked me, “What frustrates you, Chuck? … what is the one or two key areas that you think the USCG needs?  A new ship design, up-arming, or missiles?”
My answer, actually it is the apparent failure to plan.

Rant to Follow

Maybe there is a plan, but if there is, it has not been shared with the Congress or the public. Consequently there has been no opportunity to build support for the plan.

Despite direction from Congress to provide a 25 year shipbuilding plan, none has been provided. Is the hold up in the Coast Guard or the Department? Who knows.

Our shipbuilding “Program of Record” (POR) was last baselined in 2005, as part of the defuncted “Deepwater” program. It was based not on need, but on expected funding.

An examination of need was made, in the form of an “Offshore and Aviation Fleet Mix Study.” A report was completed in 2009. It was reevaluated in 2011, resulting in lower requirements that still indicated that we needed assets far in excess of the program of record. Results were not made public until 2012.
There has been no reexamination of our needs since then, in spite of the fact that the Fleet Mix Study was based on an assumption of the use of the “Crew Rotation Concept” on the National Security Cutter and Offshore Patrol Cutter. It also anticipated deployment of shore based Unmanned Air Systems (UAS), large vertical take off ship based UAS, and networking that would provide a common tactical picture. So far, no land based UAS, only a much smaller less capable ship based UAS, and no real common tactical picture. The only pleasant surprise has been the utility of the Webber class cutters.
I have a half assed Operations Research background. It pains me to see that we are apparently not using the planning tools that are available.
When we present a well considered and fact based plan, the Congress has been responsive. They have supported the program of record, and are funding icebreakers in response to the High Latitude Study.
  • We sorely need an updated Offshore and Aviation Fleet Mix Plan.
  • From this and consideration of other needs we need to develop a 30 year Shipbuilding and Aviation Procurement Plan.
  • We need to update these planning tools on a regular basis. We can expect that they will get better with each iteration.
Normally the leadership changes every four years. It is reasonable that we have a planning cycle that follows this pattern. We can give the new Commandant and his staff a year to work with his predecessor’s planning products before initiating a new cycle. A year in he should initiate a new Fleet Mix Plan. Using it and other inputs, a new 30 year Shipbuilding and Aviation Procurement Plan should be completed well before the new Commandant is selected. 
Only tangentially related, but a budget document we seldom see, is the Coast Guard’s unfunded priority list. Almost three years ago, I did one of my own. Not much has changed.
Thanks to Peter for kicking off this line of thought. 

“Metal Shark set for full-rate production of Navy’s next-gen patrol boats” –MarineLog

MarineLog reports that the Metal Shark Defiant 40 foot patrol boat, selected by the Navy to replace its Force Protection patrol boats is nearing completion of its Operational Test and Evaluation phase and is now ready for full rate production (one every four weeks).

Earlier we discussed this boat and compared it to the RB-M. Significant features are a remotely operated weapons system and ballistic protection for the crew.

“Davie to become Canada’s third National Shipbuilding Strategy strategic partner” –Marine Log

To no one’s surprise MarineLog reports that Davie Shipbuilding, Lauzon, Quebec, Canada’s largest shipyard, has been selected as the third shipyard partner in Canada’s “National Shipbuilding Strategy” and will build six icebreakers for the Canadian Coast Guard.

“Coast Guard releases draft request for proposal for industry studies, announces Offshore Patrol Cutter Industry Day” –CG-9

I am passing this along, but have to say that, since this came out Dec. 20, 2019, it seems a bit confusing. The significant news is that the Request for Proposal is expected to be issued by the end of the year.

D

The Coast Guard released a draft request for proposal (RFP) for industry studies Dec. 4 to support offshore patrol cutter (OPC) follow-on production. Responses to the draft industry studies RFP will be used to inform development of a final RFP, which is scheduled for release before the end of calendar year 2019.

Today’s action complements the release of the Coast Guard’s draft statement of work (SOW) for OPC industry studies. The draft RFP and SOW are available at the following here.

The Coast Guard also announced that the service will host an OPC Industry Day on Dec. 11, 2019, at 9:00 a.m. EST at the Coast Guard Yard in Baltimore, Maryland.

The industry day announcement can be found at the following here.

An RSVP is required to attend. Attendees must RSVP no later than 12:00 p.m. Monday, Dec. 9, 2019. Please see the industry day announcement for detailed RSVP instructions and location information.

The Coast Guard’s overall goal for the OPC Industry Day is to refresh awareness and understanding of industry capabilities and provide an opportunity for potential offerors to gain insight into OPC industry studies and other follow-on acquisition activities. The industry studies draft RFP will be a focal point of the industry day event; attendees are strongly encouraged to review the contents of the draft RFP and come prepared to discuss it with Coast Guard officials.

Addendum: The Coast Guard updated the Industry Day announcement Dec. 13, 2019, based on discussions with interested vendors.

Addendum: The Coast Guard released a revised draft RFP Dec. 20, 2019, in support of the OPC follow-on production, based on discussions with interested vendors.

For more information: Offshore Patrol Cutter program page

“Set ThreatCon Delta. Active Shooter Reported in Building 12!” –USNI

A petty officer pulls another to safety during a 2015 active shooter exercise at the Coast Guard Training Center in Cape May, N.J. Photo: U.S. Coast Guard (Lauren Simmons)

The Dec. 2019 edition of the US Naval Institute Proceedings has an article expressing concern about the Coast Guard’s readiness to deal with active-shooter/hostile-event response (ASHER)? The article is available on line and is written by Commander Thomas J. Hughes, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), currently head of the Exercise Support Division of Coast Guard Force Readiness Command as a career Federal employee.

It is thought provoking. How much time, money, training, and priority is appropriate in the face of competing demands?