Tag Archives: nsc

Recapitalization Plan in Eight Slides

Posted on by
1

FierceHomelandSecurity has a slideshow that summarizes the “Recapitalization Plan” in only eight slides.

If you have been following this web site, there won’t be much new here, but I did note a couple of things that might be significant (or maybe not).

In describing the Webber class Fast Response Cutters (FRC), their endurance is now described as seven days instead of the five that was the contract minimum. (Always figured they were probably good for more than that.)

In describing the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) the speed is given as specifically 25 knots, not as a range from 22 to 25. I hope this is true, because it the increase from 22 to 25 makes the ships a lot more useful as potential naval vessels, if we ever need them to go to war.

The slides do seem a bit out of date in calling the helicopters HH-60 and HH65 instead of the current designations, MH–60 and M-H-65.

Ship Type Designations–The Bertholfs are Minesweepers?

Posted on by
53

In the comments section of a previous post we got into a small discussion about type designations. The Coast Guard type designation system is supposed to be a straightforward adaptation of the Navy’s designation system that was initiated in 1920 with the expedient of preceding the standard designation with a “W” to indicate Coast Guard.

Initially the designation system was a relatively simple. Ships were uniquely identified by a two letter designator followed by consecutive hull numbers within the category defined by the designator. The first letter was a general classification and the second letter was to define a sub-category (e.g.–PG for patrol gunboat, WPG was the designation of large patrol cutters before the switch to WHEC). If there were no sub-category, the first letter would be repeated (e.g.–DD for destroyer). Since 1920, the system has gotten a bit more complex with additional modifiers added to basic designations, but generally the system has proven useful and has been adopted in a simplified, single letter form by NATO, and many of the world’s navies have followed their example.

Particularly recently, designations of several types, both Coast Guard and Navy, don’t fit the traditional system. Some of these deviations from the system at least have the advantage of a long history, but the newest designations (WMSL and WMSM) are particularly inappropriate and uninformative.

Why should we care?

The designations are shorthand for capabilities and help our friends and allies understand our ships’ capabilities and limitations. Using non-standard designations can lead to confusion and misunderstandings. Using the system correctly will also help our own personnel understand the logic of the US Navy and NATO designations better. These designations are not only used to identify our own forces, they are also frequently used in intelligence reports and discussions of other Navies’ vessels. I’ll make some suggestions, but first let us examine the system in more detail.

The W prefix:

The “W” prefix for Coast Guard is not the only prefix used this way. Currently MSC ships use a “T” prefix, followed by a dash, before the Navy standard designation. In World War II, ships being built in the US for Britain were given a “B” prefix. “E” has also been used as a prefix to denote experimental. At one time “O” was used as a prefix to indicate old. Notably the Army’s ships, which also generally follow the Navy system, do not use a prefix. NOAA does not use the system, their hull numbers are preceded only by an “R” for research or “S” for survey, and the first digit of their three digit hull number identifies a classification based on size and horsepower.

(Perhaps we should consider using a dash between the W and the remainder of the designation because it would be more understandable to those already familiar with the MSC system,)

Vocabulary for the first letter:

As noted, the first letter denotes a general category. They are listed below. Those used by the Coast Guard and their meaning are in bold:

A Auxiliary
B Battleship (now archaic)
C Cruiser
CV Aircraft Carrier
D Destroyer
F Frigate
IX Unclassified Miscellaneous (They may have avoided using the letter I alone because it might be mistaken for a one.)
L  Landing (amphibious warfare)
M Mine warfare
P Patrol
S Submarine
Y Yard (supporting craft used around a base)

(I suspect, since aircraft carriers were originally part of the scouting force, just as cruisers were, and the two first true fleet carriers (Saratoga and Lexington) were converted battle cruisers, that carriers may have originally been considered just a different sort of cruiser, an aviation cruiser, “V” meaning heavier than air aviation.)

Vocabulary for the NATO designations:

As noted NATO uses a single letter system, similar in most respects to the USN’s first letter.  I don’t think they use the “IX” or “Y” designations. The only other difference is the use of “R” for aircraft carriers and other ships primarily designed to operate aircraft including some we would not consider aircraft carriers.

Second and subsequent letter vocabulary:

As currently used in the US Navy system, several additional letters may follow to modify the initial general category. The list below includes both current and now archaic uses. I have tried to put the most frequent usage of the letter first, but in many cases I was unable to make a meaningful distinction. (A list of all current Navy ships with their designators and hull numbers is here. A little research will identify the ship’s purpose from which the meaning of the designator can be inferred, but I have attempted to include all the meanings below.) Apparently at times letters may be paired to convey meaning, there are some examples below (eg AC for Air Cushion). Those letters used by the Coast Guard and their meanings within the system are in bold:

A  Auxiliary, Assault, Attack, Armored or Heavy (cruiser) (archaic)
AC Air Cushion
B  Big, Boat, Ballistic Missile
C  Coastal, Craft, Command, Crane, Cable
CM Countermeasures
D  Dock, drone
E  Ammunition, escort (archaic)
F  Frigate
G    As applied to a warship–Guided missile (for surface ships–AAW area defense only eg DDG, does not include self defense missile; for submarines–specialized cruise missile carriers (eg SSGN)).
G  As applied to others–it seems a catch-all being applied to icebreakers (AGB), Oceanographic Research ships (TAGS), cargo submarines (AGSS), and many others; gun (archaic)
H  Helicopter, Hunter, Hospital
I  Intelligence (eg AGI) Infantry (archaic), Interceptor (archaic)
K  Cargo, ASW (Killer–archaic)
L  Large, Light (eg FFL), Leader (archaic), Lighthouse (archaic as AGL for light house tender)
M  Medium, Missile (cruise), Monitor (archaic) Midget (archaic), Mechanized (archaic)
MH  Minehunter
MS  Minesweeper (eg DMS, Destroyer Minesweeper)
N  Nuclear
O  Oiler, Ocean
OR Oceanographic Research (eg AGOR)
OS Ocean Surveillance
P  Transport (people?)
R  River(ine), Rubber, RO-RO, Replenishment, Repair, Rescue,  Research, Refrigerated (archaic?) , Radar (archaic), Rocket (archaic)
RC Cable, Repair
RS Submarine, Rescue
S  Sweeper, Support, Strike, Special, Seaplane (archaic)
T  Training, Tug, Target, Tank (eg LST), torpedo (archaic)
U  Utility
V  Heavier than Air Aviation, Vehicle (eg LSV)
W  Wing in ground effect
Z  Lighter than Air Aviation (archaic)

Current Coast Guard type designations:

Lets take a look at the Coast Guard’s ship designations. I think this list is exhaustive. The ship types with an asterisk already fit nicely in the system.

WAGB  Icebreaker*
WHEC High Endurance Cutter
WIX      Barque Eagle*
WLB     Buoy Tender, Large
WLBB  USCGC Mackinaw, Domestic Icebreaker
WLI      Buoy Tender, Inland
WLIC   Buoy Tender, Inland Construction
WLM   Buoy Tender, Medium
WLR    Buoy Tender, River
WMEC Medium Endurance Cutter
WMSL  Maritime Security, Large
WMSM Maritime Security, Medium
WPB    Patrol Boat*
WPC    Patrol Coastal or Craft*
WTGB  Icebreaking tug
WYTB  Yard Tug large*
WYTL  Yard Tug Light*

The ones that do not already fit the system are in three groups, The buoy tenders (including Mackinaw), the large patrol ships, and the icebreaking tugs.

What is wrong with WMSL and WMSM?

If you are familiar with the standard Navy system, when you see the designations WMSL and WMSM it tells you these ships are Coast Guard Mine Sweepers, Large and Medium (perhaps once). I presume these designations were chosen as an acronym that would hopefully help sell DHS on the idea of the ships, but these programs already have acronyms (NSC and OPC) and few outside the Coast Guard know what their designators are. When you designate these as “maritime security” assets are you saying others cutters are not? This would be particularly inaccurate, in that the smaller patrol craft are much more likely to be involved in maritime security missions than the larger ships which are more likely to be either cold iron or far from the populations centers if there is a sudden need for maritime security. (And isn’t maritime redundant? We are talking about the ships here.) We could have designated them WNSCs and WOPCs, and it would at least have had the advantage of not using a misleading “M” designator. Of course that would have had us calling them “winces” and “woops.”

It is true the Navy does have some ships that don’t conform to the norms of the designations system. They are:

DSRV  Deep submergence Rescue Vessel
JHSV  Joint High Speed Vessel
LCS    Littoral Combat Ship

The DSRV is very small. Both JHSV (Joint High Speed Vessel) and LCS (Littoral Combat Ship) are recent programs and acronyms for their respective programs, although the JHSV program is no longer joint, at least it does not use a misleading first letter. The LCS is the real outlier here, since LCS suggest Landing Craft, Support or Special. (In fact there was a growth industry among bloggers suggesting what, usually uncomplimentary, words LCS should stand for.)

“P” is the almost universally accepted designator for patrol ships. That is what these ships do. Why not simply designate the NSCs WPL and the OPCs WPM? (Incidentally the Japanese Coast Guard already use the designators PL and PM, but they would call both these ships PLH–Patrol, Large, Helicopter. Their PMs are all under 1,000 tons full load.) It may not be worth doing but the remaining WHECs and WMECs might also use these designations.

Recommendations:

The policy should be that Coast Guard designations will fit within the Navy’s system in so far as possible, and in the rare case where the Coast Guard is acquiring ships that don’t fit the systems, we should seek to amend the system.

The buoy tenders, and icebreaking tugs could have their designations changed to comply simply by inserting an “A” between the “W” and the rest of their current designation, but these ships all have a long history and they are unlikely to work with the Navy or allies so it probably is not worth changes existing designations now, but their replacements probably should get a more standardized designator, either beginning WA (CG auxiliary) or the Coast Guard could use one of the letters not included in the current Navy and NATO first letter vocabulary as the first letter following the W to uniquely identify the general type. “N” is available for aids to “Navigation.” We could use “I” or “IB” for icebreaker or perhaps “Z” might denote “below zero.” “T” is available for tug, but tug designations have always begun “AT.”

In any case, WMSM and WMSL really should be changed.

Coast Guard Capital Investment Plan, 2014-2018

Posted on by
5

Earlier we discussed the House sub-committee hearings on the Coast Guard’s Capital Investment Plan (CIP). The US Naval Institute has published the plan, you can see it here. It is very short, only six pages, and virtually all the useful information is on the last page.

What I found bewildering is that the Coast Guard does not have any unfunded priorities. The report is supposed to include unfunded priorities, after all the long title is “Capital Investment Plan and Unfunded Priority List.”

“This report responds to the language set forth in
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012
(Pub. L. 112-213) as per the following:
SEC. 213 CAPITAL INVESTMENT PLAN AND ANNUAL LIST OF PROJECTS……….(b) UNFUNDED PRIORITY DEFINED.—In this section, the term unfunded priority’ means a program or mission requirement that— (1) has not been selected for funding in the applicable proposed budget;(2) is necessary to fulfill a requirement associated with an operational need; and (3) the Commandant would have recommended for inclusion in the applicable proposed budget had additional resources been available or had the requirement emerged before the budget was submitted.”
–
If you look at the “Fleet Mix Study” it is clear that both the Coast Guard and the DHS agree that in order to accomplish its mandated missions, the Coast Guard has a significant shortfall in assets and would still have a shortfall even if the “Program of Record” (POR) were complete today.
–
Looking at the table below which was included in the Fleet Mix Study, that concluded the assets under FMA-4 would be required to complete all mandated missions, we can see that the POR is short one NSC, 32 OPCs, 33 OPCs, 22 C-130s, 31 HC-144s, 62 H-60s, 121 H-65s, 22 land based UAS, and 19 Cutter based UAS.
–
Table ES-8 Alternative Fleet Mix Asset Quantities
—————-–POR       FMA-1       FMA-2        FMA-3        FMA-4
NSC                8             9                 9                 9                  9
OPC              25           32               43                50               57
FRC               58           63               75                80               91
HC-130         22            32               35                44               44
HC-144A       36            37               38                40               65
H-60              42            80               86                99             106
H-65            102          140             159              188             223
UAS-LB          4             19                21                21              22
UAS-CB       42             15                19               19               19
–
Where are these unfunded priorities? It is one thing to say, “This is what we think we need, but we understand we cannot afford it right now.” It is another thing entirely to preemptively surrender and not even tell Congress what you need when they have asked.
–
And, at a subcommittee hearing entitled “Examining Cutter, Aircraft, and Communications Needs,” why was there no mention of the Fleet Mix Study except in passing by the Congress’s own researcher?
–

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation: Examining Cutter, Aircraft, and Communications Needs

Posted on by
10

“The Coast Guard’s FY2014 Five Year (FY2014-FY2018) CIP (Capital Investment Plan–Chuck) includes a total of about $5.1 billion in acquisition funding, which is about $2.5 billion, or about 33%, less than the total of about $7.6 billion that was included in the Coast Guard’s FY2013 Five Year (FY2013-FY2017) CIP. (In the four common years of the two plans—FY2014-FY2017—the reduction in funding from the FY2013 CIP to the FY2014 CIP is about $2.3 billion, or about 37%.) This is one of the largest percentage reductions in funding that I have seen a five-year acquisition account experience from one year to the next in many years.”–Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service

The video above is long (one hour and forty two minutes) but I think it is important, and it might even make you mad. This is a hearing before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. The first hour and ten minutes are fairly routine and I’ll summarize some of it below. It includes the obligatory thank you to the Department Secretary (Secretary Nepolitano has been “particularly supportive”) when in fact the Coast Guard has been cut far more deeply than the rest of DHS. The real meat begins with Ronald O’Rourke’s presentation at 1hr.10min.

(1:10 to 1:15) Mr. O’Rourke’s stance is neutral, as befits a good researcher, preparing a balanced assessment for the law makers, but he succeeds in making some of the best arguments I have heard for increased funding for the Coast. (Unfortunately this seems in marked contrast to the passivity of the Coast Guard leadership. Hopefully this is more apparent than real and there are things going on that we do not see. There is some indication this is true, here and here.) He also takes the Coast Guard to task for not employing multi-year and block buy contracting.

(1:15 to 1:19) Dr. Bucci provides his personnel view, noting that the Coast Guard has not learned to play the Washington bureaucratic game of asking for more than really need. (He also specifically advocates an exemption to the Jones act to allow the Coast Guard to lease foreign built icebreakers.)

(1:19 to 1:24) Dr. Korb advocates a Unified National Security Budget that looks as trade-offs between the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and State. He also advocates including the Commandant in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointing a Civilian Service Secretary to act as an advocate. Later, when questioned, he points out that the Coast Guard’s unofficial motto is “We can do more with less” and if that is what you ask for “that is what you will get.” Among his telling points was that the Navy budget is 16 times that of the Coast Guard even though they have only eight times the people.

(1:24 to 1:42) Testimony of these three witnesses continued in response to the Representatives’ questions.

You can take a short cut and read the text of the prepared statements, but the Congressmen’s questions and reactions are also instructive, and generally supportive of the Coast Guard.

(0:00 to 1:10) Discussion with Vice Admiral Currier, Vice Commandant

Vice Admiral Currier’s prepared statement was completed at 14 minutes. Questions, answers and committee member statements continued to 1 hour and 10 minutes.

(Note, I am not taking the points in chronological order as discussed)

C-27J: The Coast Guard is apparently counting on getting at least 14 of these aircraft, perhaps as many as 21. Eighteen C-144s have been funded so far of a total of 36 in the “Program of Record.” Substituting C-27Js (which do have a higher operating cost) for the remaining 18 could represent a savings of up to $800M in acquisition costs. Calling it a strategic pause, the Coast Guard has zeroed additional C-144 purchases as it waits to find out if it will get these surplus Air Force assets.

Zeroing future C-144 purchases accounted for about a third of the reduction of the CIP compared to last years. As much as I have supported this course of action, and as confident as the subcommittee sounded, this is really not a done deal because the Air National Guard wants to keep the planes and they are very well connected politically. Additionally there are others who also want these aircraft.

Webber Class WPCs: Another major change was the decision to fund only two Fast Response Cutters annually instead of the four or six funded previously. Simply spreading out the buy is a really bad decision. Building six per year cost less per ship. Buying only two per year will require a renegotiation of contract. In addition, inflation in the ship building industry is not only higher that inflation in general, its rate is higher than the interest rate on government borrowing, so it would cost less in the long run to borrow money and build as rapidly as we can, even including the interest paid on the bonds. This consideration applies to the Offshore Patrol Cutter as well as the FRC. I don’t think this is the last word on construction of the FRCs, and we may see more money added to the budget.

Bertholf Class WMSLs: It now appears all eight National security Cutters will be completed, but we can waste time and money if we do not fund long lead time items and this is currently the plan. This was also discussed and generally deplored.

Multiple Crewing: Questions were raised about when the Coast Guard would demonstrate the “Crew Rotation Concept” which has been touted as being able to provide 225-230 days per year from each of the larger cutters. The Vice Commandant responded that the plan would not be implemented until 2017, but until that time the NSCs are expected to average 210 days AFHP.

Offshore Patrol Cutters:  VAdm Currier said the CG expects to select to three preliminary designs for further development by the end of this FY, and that the final selection will be made a year later, by the end of FY2014.

Unmanned Air Systems: The uncertain future of the Coast Guard’s Unmanned Air Siystem (UAS) programs, and its dependence on the US Navy’s development, was discussed, with Representative Garamendi pointing out this represented a major hole in the Coast Guard’s plan to maintain Maritime Domain Awarenes (MDA).

Response Boat Medium: A Representative questioned why the Coast Guard had stopped the Response Boat, Medium program at 170 RBMs rather than building the 180 approved by Congress, without submitting a justification report for the smaller program as required by Congress.

Port Security: Representative Janice Hahn, California, expressed discomfort with the current container inspection rate of only 2 to 3%. She also suggested the possibility of diverting from some customs money to port security.

The Arctic: A pleasant surprise was that VAdm Currier expressed confident that the Coast Guard can already demonstrate good Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the Arctic. Don Young, Alaska, asked several questions about icebreaker. He opined that the Coast Guard should lease an “American built” icebreaker, never mind the fact that no heavy icebreakers have been built in the US since the Polar Sea. We could of course lease a ship someone would call an icebreaker, but that sort of misses the point. VAdm. Currier did say the Polar Sea could be returned to operation after about three years work at a cost of $100M and have a seven to ten year additional useful life.

Missions: The question, what missions the Coast Guard will not do, given reduced funding. The only answer was that we will have to make some tough choices and the CG and the Department will do a portfolio analysis, date of completion unknown.

Tone: Generally the Committee was supportive. The irony of spending $5B for an East Coast Missile Defense system while shorting the Coast Guard assets that are necessary to prevent a much more probable method of introducing weapons of mass destruction was not lost on the Committee. They also saw the foolishness adding $46B to  beef-up patrols along the Mexican Border and simultaneously undercutting the Coast Guard. They also discussed the double standard by which they could write a $2.6B blank check to purchase unspecified aircraft for Afghanistan, while demanding detailed justification for all Coast Guard purchases. They seemed to recognize that if “National Security” were considered in a holistic fashion, the Coast Guard would do a lot better, but that the committee structure in Congress prevented this kind of evaluation of trade-offs.

Sexual assault: The Vice Commandant addressed this in his prepared remarks and it was also discussed in the subsequent question and answer period.

Things the Coast Guard might do differently:

There was a clear message from the three civilian witnesses that the Coast Guard has not learned to “play the game,” that the Coast Guard has been excessively modest in pointing out its needs, and that because of this reticence important missions are being short changed.

We have repeatedly told our elected representatives about our successes, but that leaves the impression everything is alright. Everything is not alright. We need to keep reminding them what is not getting done and the possible consequences of inaction. Every time a Congressionally mandated task is not done to the fullest extent, it should be reported, and they should be made to understand that the reason it was not done is lack of resources. We need to put the onus on Congress and the Executive.

When asked what mission the CG will not do, Adm Currier “we can adjust.” Given an opportunity to address why the aging fleet’s patrol hours now down 8-12%, Admiral Currier said, Currier, “We are OK for OPC/MEC” (Frankly I don’t think that is true. The Coast Guard’s own studies point out a need not only for newer replacements but also more ships) and “The gap is in the Offshore and the NSC is key.” The construction of the eight NSCs seems assured, it was time to point out how the fleet will continue to age and deteriorate. We can expect even more breakdowns and higher maintenance costs for the legacy fleet. In the nine years 1964 to 1972, 28 new ships entered service with the Coast Guard (3.11 ships per year). Only three have been replaced and we are building at a rate of less than one a year, and we don’t expect to deliver more than one replacement per year until at least 2023 and then never more than two a year. Things are going to get much worse before they get better.

We have done an absolutely terrible job of conveying an sense of urgency in replacing our over-aged patrol ships. I have on my desk the August issues of the Navy League’s magazine “SeaPower” and the US Naval Institute’s Magazine “Proceedings.” Both magazines carry happy glowing reports of the Coast Guard’s successes. There is hardly a word about the growing problems with our major cutters. There is hardly a mention of the OPC and certainly no article designed to explain the urgency of its funding and why the naval and maritime community should be excited about it.

The Coast Guard needs to publish a 30 year ship building plan. When I first saw that the Navy was doing this, I thought it was ridiculous, but think about what it does for you. It lays out intentions far into the future and prepares the decision makers to deal with uneven funding requirements. It also highlights the bow wave effect of deferring acquisitions.

If the Coast Guard can get seven to ten years out of the Polar Sea for $100M then compared to 30 years from a new $800M to $1B icebreaker then the costs are not out of line. Perhaps we should not reject the idea. By the time the new icebreaker is ready, the remaining life in Polar Star will be used up (if it actually lasts that long) and we will still have only one heavy icebreaker. Putting an second heavy icebreaker into the fleet, as soon as possible, is the best way to create a presumption that there will be a second new icebreaker to follow the one currently planned. These ships break, we really need more than one.

Perhaps it is also time to make another examination of the legacy of Deepwater that is still with the Coast Guard. Are there alternatives to the long range aircraft/UAVs and the ship types that have been perpetuated long after the program failed?

The Coast Guard has belittled its role in national defense and in doing so has also minimized the future utility of its assets in this role. Fear is a stronger motivator than altruism. We need to recognize that the nation is motivated more by fear than by the desire to do good or maintain its infrastructure. This is the reason the Defense Department is well funded.  The national defense role of the Coast Guard, both against terrorism in peacetime and as a naval auxiliary that can bring needed additional numbers to the fight in wartime needs much more emphasis. It is obvious, listening to the subcommittee, that the counter-terrorism role was what they had in the forefront of their minds.

The Sub-Committee:

—Republicans

Duncan Hunter, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska
Howard Coble, North Carolina
Frank A. LoBiondo, New Jersey
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania
Steve Southerland, II, Florida, Vice Chair
Tom Rice, South Carolina
Trey Radel, Florida
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Bill Shuster, Pennsylvania, (ex officio)

—Democrats

John Garamendi, California, Ranking Member
Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland
Corrine Brown, Florida
Rick Larsen, Washington
Timothy H. Bishop, New York
Janice Hahn, California
Lois Frankel, Florida
Nick J. Rahall, II, West Virginia, (ex officio)

GAO-12-918, “COAST GUARD, Portfolio Management Approach Needed to Improve Major Acquisition Outcomes”

Posted on by
16

September 26, Fiercehomelandsecurity posted a story (“GAO: Not eliminating two National Security Cutters will cause ‘difficult choices'”) on a recent GAO report, “COAST GUARD, Portfolio Management Approach Needed to Improve Major Acquisition Outcomes” (download the report, GAO-12-918 (.pdf)). While the post focused on the apparent recommendation not to seek to build units seven and eight of the National Security Cutters, there was much more to the report.

Basically the GAO is saying that the Coast Guard is not using a systematic approach to its acquisitions, that much of the information that its budget is based on is out of date, and that the Coast Guard is allowing the Congressional Budget Process to determine its priorities.

I’m going to quote the report liberally:

What GAO Found

“The planned cost and schedule of the Coast Guard’s portfolio of major acquisitions is unknown because of outdated acquisition program baselines and uncertainty surrounding affordability. The Coast Guard’s approved baselines, which reflect cost and schedule estimates, indicate the estimated total acquisition cost of Coast Guard major acquisitions could be as much as $35.3 billion—an increase of approximately 41 percent over the original baselines. However, the approved baselines for 10 of 16 programs do not reflect current cost and schedule plans because programs have breached the cost or schedule estimates in those baselines, changed in scope, or do not expect to receive funding to execute baselines as planned. Furthermore, a continued mismatch between resources needed to support all approved baselines and expected funding levels has required the Coast Guard to make decisions about which programs to fund and which programs not to fund as part of its annual budget process. Both DHS and the Coast Guard have acknowledged this resource challenge, but efforts to address this challenge have not yet resulted in a clear strategy for moving forward.

“The Coast Guard has taken steps through its requirements process—a process that takes mission needs and converts them to specific capabilities—to address affordability, but additional efforts are required. For example, in an effort to consider affordability, the Coast Guard made some capability trade-offs when developing requirements for its largest acquisition, the Offshore Patrol Cutter. But whether the cutter ultimately will be affordable depends on some key assumptions in the cost estimate that are subject to change. At the fleet level, the Coast Guard completed two efforts to reassess what mix of assets it requires to meet mission needs, but neither effort used realistic fiscal constraints or considered reducing the number of assets being pursued. The mix of assets the Coast Guard is acquiring is based upon needs identified in 2005, but the Coast Guard may not be on a path to meet these needs and it has not re-examined the portfolio in light of affordability.

“The Coast Guard has established an acquisition governance framework that includes the following cross-directorate teams: the Executive Oversight Council, the Systems Integration Team, and Resource Councils. The Executive Oversight Council—composed of admirals and senior executives—is well-positioned to delegate tasks to the other teams or obtain information as needed to assist in managing acquisitions. This Council has been active in meeting to discuss individual acquisitions; however, it has not met to discuss the portfolio as a whole. Coast Guard officials told us it manages portfolio affordability through the budget process. GAO’s best practices work has found that successful commercial companies assess product investments collectively from an enterprise level, rather than as independent and unrelated initiatives. The Coast Guard’s current approach of relying on the annual budget process to manage portfolio affordability involves immediate trade-offs but does not provide the best environment to make decisions to develop a balanced long-term portfolio.

——————————————————————–

“Outdated acquisition program baselines and uncertainty surrounding the affordability of the Coast Guard’s acquisition portfolio continue to limit visibility into the current cost and schedule of the Coast Guard’s major acquisitions. Even though the Coast Guard has revised 15 out of 16 baselines in its major acquisition portfolio at least once, 10 of those 15 baselines do not reflect the current cost or schedule of the programs. According to the acquisition program baselines that are approved as of July 2012 and total program cost for programs with no planned funding beyond fiscal year 2014, the Coast Guard is managing a portfolio of major acquisitions that could cost as much as $35.3 billion—or 41 percent more than the original estimate of $25.1 billion—but the majority of these baselines do not reflect the current status of these programs. DHS and the Coast Guard have acknowledged that affordability of the Coast Guard’s portfolio is a challenge, but the mismatch between resources needed to support all approved baselines and anticipated funding levels continues to affect Coast Guard acquisitions. Some of this mismatch could be alleviated by the Coast Guard’s current five-year budget plan which does not include the final two National Security Cutters; however, Coast Guard officials have stated that, regardless of this plan, it continues to support completing the program of record. A decision to pursue the final two National Security Cutters in the near-term budget years could have significant portfolio-wide implications.

In other words, the Coast Guard hopes to buy a really nice dinner table, but can only afford three of the four legs. GAO is telling us we really should be looking a nice little Formica topped breakfast table.

I can see why they would say this, but on the other hand, I can see that the Coast Guard may view it differently. The GAO assumes that the Coast Guard’s AC&I budget will remain essentially the same with minor fluctuations. From the Coast Guard perspective that is a prescription for disaster. It really needs to increase to approximately $2B/year. There is also likely, a fear that if they ask procurement that would fit within the budget, that would be trimmed even more by the the Department and the Administration, and the service would be even worse off.

Costs are greatly dependent on order quantity and time of funding. Is the estimated price of a system to be based on the build rate we need, or the build rate we think we will see? If we choose wrong, the baseline will be wrong and will not reflect reality.

Congress and GAO do recognize inflation rates, but they don’t seem to have recognized that inflation is higher in the shipbuilding industry than in the economy as a whole, so as ship construction is pushed to the right, the projects will get more expensive, even on an inflation adjusted basis.

“DHS stated that future breaches in Coast Guard programs would almost be inevitable as funding resources diminish. (p.17)

“Due to these capability shortfalls, the Coast Guard is at risk of purchasing a fleet that will not be able to close all of the gaps identified following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks or fully conduct operations in a presence-based manner. While the 2005 Mission Need Statement presented a business case for the Coast Guard’s future investments, the Coast Guard has not re-examined the value of these assets in light of the difficult affordability decisions likely to come. By continuing to pursue some capabilities and not others without reevaluating the portfolio as a whole, the Coast Guard is increasing the risk that it may not accomplish the goals envisioned in 2005 and cannot ensure it is maximizing the value of the assets it is buying.”

While unmanned systems, and comprehensive maritime domain awareness may have allowed the CG to do with fewer ships, in the absence of these systems we need more ships and manned aircraft.

“Coast Guard program officials also added that the cost estimate for the Offshore Patrol Cutter is optimistic in that it assumes that the cutter will be built in accordance with the current acquisition strategy and planned schedule. They noted that any delays, design issues, or contract oversight problems—all of which were experienced during the purchase of the National Security Cutter—could increase the eventual price of the Offshore Patrol Cutter.”

——————————————————————–

While the (Coast Guard’s) Executive Oversight Council has had opportunities to discuss affordability of the entire portfolio and make informed trade-off decisions, Coast Guard officials told us that all of these decisions are handled through the annual budget process, which also takes into account budgeting for operating expenses. However, the Coast Guard’s current approach of relying on the budget process to manage the affordability of its portfolio has proven ineffective. The preparation of the annual budget request involves immediate trade-offs, but does not provide the best environment to make decisions to develop a balanced, long-term portfolio. As we have previously reported, given that the Coast Guard is managing more programs than its budget can support, and it does not review its portfolio outside of the annual budget process, the Coast Guard has relied on budget decisions each year to drive the acquisitions process. As a result, program managers react to the budget request each year as opposed to having a reliable funding profile consistent with their approved baselines by which to execute their programs. One of the responsibilities in the Executive Oversight Council’s charter is to synchronize projects with planning, programming, budgeting, and execution milestones to align them for successful completion of key milestones, but Coast Guard officials acknowledged that this alignment has not yet occurred.

“Opportunities Exist to Address Affordability through the Requirements Process”

Perhaps there are opportunities to look at alternatives to the platforms in the existing program of record.

The program of record replaces the existing fleet with more sophisticated more capable platforms, but these platforms are also relatively expensive, and cannot be procured in the numbers needed, within the existing budget. But should the budget be fixed at this level?

Essentially the size of Coast Guard’s cutter fleet actually shrank as we went from a 3 mile territorial sea, to a 12 mile territorial sea, to a 200 Exclusive Economic Zone; as we went from doing “courtesy” boardings where we did a little research and swapped dirty magazines with foreign F/V crews, to enforcing fisheries regulations and hunting for drugs of the West Coast of South America. The job has grown immensely but the fleet never did.

The DHS Cutter Study, Trade-offs, and the Case for “Cutter X”

Posted on by
67

I have had an opportunity to look a bit more closely at the Department of Homeland Security Cutter Fleet Study, “Options for the Future USCG Cutter Fleet Performance Trade-Offs with Fixed Acquisition Cost,” by Alarik Fritz • Raymond Gelhaus • Kent Nordstromr (.pdf).

The Study

I highly recommend at least the synopsis, which is the first thirteen pages. I think the study is an honest attempt to determine the best mix for the Coast Guard fleet; it is quite well done. Basically it holds cost constant and looks at possible alternatives to build the most effective fleet possible. It builds on work done for the earlier Coast Guard Fleet mix studies, but unlike the CG studies, it looks at alternatives to the program of record. It looks at where the missions are being performed and considers the effects of weather on mission performance in four regions, the Northeast, Southeast, West, and Alaska.

The study considers:

  • trading National Security Cutters (NSC) for more Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) (Approx. two OPCs per NSC)
  • trading OPC as currently described for OPCs that have reduced capabilities but retain the seakeeping and endurance of the OPCs (This was postulated but not explored in depth. It did not appear to make much difference.)
  • trading OPCs for a modernized version of the 270 (approx. four mod-270s for three OPCs)
  • trading OPCs for an equal number of LCS (This was seen as a non viable choice because of the higher cost and lower seakeeping and endurance of the LCS)

The problems (and these were recognized by the study) are:

  • Further delays in beginning building ships severely impacts near term capability
  • A major Cutter fleet of only NSCs and mod-270s does not meet the needs for heavy weather capability where it does exist.
  • Because the Mod-270s have as large a crew as the OPCs, a larger number of ships would add to the operating cost of the fleet.

What comes through loud and clear, from this study is that

  • We need ships with the capability to do boat and helicopter ops in State Five Seas particularly in the Northeast and Alaska.
  • In the Southeast and West, where the primary missions are Drug Enforcement and Migrant Interdiction, we are a long way from a point of diminishing returns, that is, mission performance is most directly linked to the number of cutters, increasing in in almost direct proportion to the number available.
  • The cutters ability to launch boats and helicopters in State Five conditions are much less important in the West and Southeast where most of the cutters are normally deployed.

An Alternative

In simplistic terms, while we need some highly capable hulls, we also need even more hulls on patrol, but the additional hulls don’t need to be particularly sophisticated. This leads me to the conclusion to the we really need another option, another class of ship, I’ll call it “Cutter X.” Think of this new class as taking the crew and equipment of a Webber class Fast Response Cutter (FRC) and putting them in a larger hull with more endurance and seakeeping, while accepting lower top speed than the FRC. We can take advantage of the training and corporate experience with the FRCs, if we add similarly equipped larger cutters.

I am going to talk about one possible fleet mix including this additional class. It is not necessarily the optimum mix, I’ll leave that for further analysis, but I think it may illustrate the advantage of including this additional class. For this proposed new mix I believe we can hold acquisition and operating costs constant, ie the same as the program of record. The proposal would trade 24 units in the program of record (2 NSCs, 4 OPCs, and 18 FRCs) for 22 units of this additional class (depending on cost we might get more) and could allow us to:

I’ll compare this possible fleet mix to the Coast Guard Fleet as it existed in 2000/2001 and the fleet in the Program of Record (POR). on the basis of cutter days available and crewing requirements using both conventional and augmented crewing.

Before we do that, what would “Cutter X” look like? The design that I think comes closest to what I have in mind is the French built L’Adroit (also here and here). It is four times as large as the FRC at 1,450 tons but even with far less horsepower than the FRC (7,500 vs 11,600) it still does 21 knots. With the FRCs engines it would likely do about 24. It might be thought of as a modernized 210, in that unlike the 270 it has no medium caliber gun, fire control system, or ESM.

(There are other similar ships that could be used as examples, see the addendum at the end of the post.)

As we have noted earlier, increased size doesn’t necessarily add much to the cost of a ships. Adding only volume, storage, and larger fuel and ballast tanks, I think these ships can be produced for no more than three times the price of the FRCs, perhaps less than twice as much. I don’t have prices for other examples, but for one, BAEs “Port of Spain” class, the original price for  was only $80M each, less than twice the cost of a FRC and that figure included continued maintenance and training for the crew.

Basically my assumption is that the tradeoffs would work something like this:

1 NSC = 2 OPCs = 4 Cutter Xs = 12 FRCs

This equates to approx. prices of: $700M/NSC, $350/OPC, $175M/Cutter X, and $60M/FRC.

Lets compare the Fleets

As a baseline, take a look at the CG fleet as reported in the 2000/2001 Combat Fleets of the World (I happen to have a copy). It included:

  • 12 Hamilton class 378s
  • 13 Bear class 270s
  • 16 Reliance class 210s
  • Alex Haley
  • Acushnet
  • Storis
  • 49 Island class 110s

or 93 vessels including 44 “cruising cutters” to use the old generic term.

The Program of Record if completed will include:

  • 8 NSC
  • 25 OPC
  • 58 FRC

or 91 vessels including 33 cruising cutters.

The proposed alternative mix would include:

  • 6 NSC
  • 21 OPC
  • 22 Cutter X
  • 40 FRC

or 89 vessels including 49 cruising cutters.

Cutter Days AFHP and Crew Requirements:

For the analysis below I have used the following as the personnel allowances for the new classes:

  • NSC 113
  • OPC   90 (still to be firmed up)
  • FRC    24 (includes two extra junior officers assigned to gain experience)

The personnel allowance for new class could be as little as 30 but is likely going to be more, if only as an opportunity to provide more at sea experience. Using the assumed personnel allowances and the trade-off identified earlier, the proposed mix would require no more personnel than the program of record unless the personnel allowance for “Cutter X”  is more than 46. At most the personnel allowance should not be more than that of the 210s. My figures may be out of date, but at least at one point that was a crew of 62. I’ll use this as the upper limit.

The 2000/2001 fleet theoretically could have provided 8,140 cruising cutter days away from homeport (AFHP) (44 cruising cutters x 185 days) and would have required a total personnel allowance of 5,509.

Without augmentation, the program of record would theoretically provide 6,105 cruising cutter days AFHP (33 cruising cutters x 185 days) and require a total personnel allowance of 4,526.

With Augmentation (increasing their personnel allowance by a third and running the cruising cutters 230 days/year) the program of record would theoretically provide 7,590 cruising cutter days and require a total personnel allowance of 5259.

Without augmentation, the proposed mix would theoretically provide 9,065 cruising cutter days AFHP (49 cruising cutters x 185 days) and require a total personnel allowance of between 4,188 (assuming a crew of only 30 for Cutter X) and 4,892 (assuming a crew of 62 for Cutter X).

With Augmentation (increasing their personnel allowance by a third and running the cruising cutters 230 days/year) the proposed mix would theoretically provide 11270  cruising cutter days AFHP (49 cruising cutters x 230 days) and require a total personnel allowance of between 5264 (assuming a crew of only 30 for Cutter X) and 6203 (assuming a crew of 62 for Cutter X).

What about the loss of FRCs? The proposal would trim 18 FRC from the POR. They are projected to operate up to 2500 hours per day. If we assumed that all 2500 hours were devoted to offshore cruising for the 18 additional units, that would add 1875 days AFHP to the POR for a total of 7,980 days AFHP for the un-augmented fleet and 9,465 days AFHP for the augmented POR. (disregarding the 40 additional FRC that are included in both proposals).

In summary Cutter Days Available:

  • ————————————————–Un-Augmented———Augmented by 1/3
  • 2000/20001 (cruising cutters only)                     8,140                            N/A
  • POR (cruising cutters only)                                 6,105                          7,590
  • POR (w/1,875 additional FRC day AFHP)           7,980                          9,465
  • Proposed Mix w/Cutter X (cruising cutters only) 9,065                        11,270

It looks like this alternative provides an improvement of at least 13% over the program of record, possibly as much as 48.5% depending on how you view the FRCs as a patrol asset. It appears that the un-augmented version may be superior to the augmented version of the program of record while using far fewer people.

Is it doable? What is the timing? How would it mess with other programs?

Cutter X production could ramp up as FRC construction trails off. If we are unable to increase the FY2013 from the current two units, that will put the program at 20 units funded. With no NSCs planned for FY 2014 and 2015, hopefully there will be funding for six in FY2014. Out-years, beginning in FY2015 will require a new contract to complete the additional 14 units proposed. Assuming six units a year, in FY 2015 and 2016, the last two would be funded in FY2017.

If the CG starts soon they could fund the prototype unit of Cutter X in FY2017. L’ Adroit was completed in approximately 13 months, so it is at least theoretically possible the first unit could be delivered well before the first OPC (expected FY2020). Replacing the FRC in the budget, two units a year could be funded in parallel with OPC construction.

Addendum: Other Patrol Vessels similar in concept:

File:HMS-Clyde Fox-Bay.jpg

HMS Clyde, 267x45x12, 8,250 HP 21 knots, crew 42 + accommodations for 20 more, endurance 7,800 nmi @ 12 knots, 1x30mm, Flight deck for up to Merlin (16 ton helicopter)

HMS Tyne (P281) Offshore Patrol Vessel at sea

British River class OPV (UK) (and here), 261x45x12, 1,677 fl, 5,532 HP 20 knots, crew 30 + accommodations for 20 more, 1x20mm, no flight deck or hangar

File:T&T Port of Spain-1-tonal.jpg

BAE’s Port of Spain class  (Brazil and Thailand) (more here), 264x44x12, 1700 tons,  9,700 HP 25 knots, crew 34+5 trainees, endurance , 1x30mm, 2x25mm, Helo deck, but no hangar (Thai version HTMS Krabi has a 76mm Oto Melara and 2x30mm)

File:Vega P404.jpg

Italian Ship Vega, Cassiopia Class, Nov. 2001, by Antoio Munoz Criado

Cassiopea class (Italy), 262x39x12, 1,475 tons fl, 8,800 HP 21 knots, crew 60,  endurance 35 days, 3300 nmi @ 17 knots (probably 5,000 at 12 or 13 knots) 76mm gun and FCS helo deck and hangar.

Program Updates from a GAO Report

Posted on by
12

September 26, Fiercehomelandsecurity posted a story (“GAO: Not eliminating two National Security Cutters will cause ‘difficult choices'”) on a recent GAO report, “COAST GUARD, Portfolio Management Approach Needed to Improve Major Acquisition Outcomes” (download the report, GAO-12-918 (.pdf)).

I’m going to look at other aspects of the report later, but there were a number of items addressed in the report that readers may not be aware of. This is not an exhaustive list, the report contains even more, but I thought these most interesting. We may have touched on some of  these changes already, but here goes.

General:

“DHS stated that future breaches in Coast Guard programs would almost be inevitable as funding resources diminish.” (p.17)

Maritime Domain Awareness/C4ISR:

Nationwide Automatic Identification System–Indefinitely deferring plan for continuous nationwide coverage. (p14)

Common Operating picture:

“The Coast Guard planned to buy an integrated C4ISR system for each asset to enable greater awareness. As we reported in July 2011, the Coast Guard has spent over $600 million purchasing a C4ISR system that is difficult to maintain and does not yet achieve the system-of systems capability and the Coast Guard’s helicopters are no longer going to be a part of this system” (p.26)

–Neither the OPC or the FRC are expected to be able to exchange near real time “battle data” (tactical data link?) with DOD assets. (p.25)

–Why don’t we use LINK 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals on all these platforms?

Fast Response Cutter:

“…the Coast Guard has attributed the more than $1 billion rise in the Fast Response Cutter’s cost to a reflection of actual contract cost from the September 2008 contract award and costs for shore facilities and initial spare parts not included in the original baseline.”

Aviation:

Coast Guard’s Aviation Logistics Center told us they recently identified that the end of service life for the HH-60s and HH-65s could be reached as early as the 2022 time frame—not the 2027 time frame as originally planned. Officials added that this will require the Coast Guard to either buy new HH-60s and HH-65s or conduct a service life extension—previous service life extensions have been funded with acquisition dollars.(p16)

H-65 program: dropping both a helicopter handling, traversing, and securing system and a surface search radar. (p.13)

H-60 Program: deferring indefinitely upgrades to include a surface search radar and C4ISR due to budget constraints. (p.13)

A revise baseline program for C-130s has been forwarded DHS that recommends 11 H models and 11 J models (p.40) (I think this is an increase in the expected number of “J” models.)

Sanity Prevails:

The Coast Guard has dropped its plans to deliver boarding parties on potentially hostile ships by helicopter (p.27)

A Small Bit of Surprisingly Good News:

The National Security Cutter can do 32 knots (“speed is based on the results of an operational assessment” p. 32), making it almost certainly the fastest major cutter ever.

DHS Cutter Fleet Study

Posted on by
13

FierceHomlandSecuroty brought to my attention a Study by DHS (.pdf) they obtained under the Freedom of information act.

A cursory scan of the study suggest that (at 392 pages), it is a rich source of data and probably of continuing interest, so I have added it to the blog’s references page. I’ll try to give a more in depth review later. I have also added an earlier report–GAO briefing slides for Congressional Committees, April 20, 2012, “Observations on the Coast Guard’s and the Department of Homeland Security’s Fleet Studies”[PDF]

The study helps explain the apparent cancellation of NSCs #7 and 8, in that the DHS study finds very little difference in mission performance between NSCs and OPC, to justify the NSCs apparently much higher price, but it also leaves room for a revision of this decision because, they expect not building NSCs would reduce the fleet’s capabilities at least into the 2030s. The study recognized there remain many unknowns and at least to some extent recognizes the urgency of replacing the cutter fleet, so, at least to my reading, it identifies no definitive single best course of action.

Related: