Author Archives: Chuck Hill

New Renderings of Proposed OPC

Posted on by
19

OPC Conceptual Rendering (Unfortunately the rendering that originally appeared here is no longer available. This is a later version which appears similar.)

Conceptual Rendering of the OPC

The Acquisition Directorate has given us some more information on the proposed Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), including some new renderings of its appearance and information on how it will use “green” technologies and concepts to reduce environmental impact.

I like the fact that the 57mm is up one deck from the foc’sle, because that will provide some protection from green water coming over the bow and, it will allow the weapon to train on targets at relatively close range over the bow. In fact the design looks very much like the successful Floréal class of light “surveillance frigates” designed for the French Navy in 1989.

Looks like they are planning on mounting a 25 mm Mk 38 mod 2 on top of the hanger instead of a CIWS. For our purposes, that is probably a better choice, provided we have the option of substituting a state of the art CIWS like SeaRAM should we go to war. I’d really like to know what they are anticipating for a fire control system. Radar and electro-optical or electro-optical only?

What surprises me is that there is no stern ramp, in spite of the fact that it looks like there is adequate room. I never liked the arrangement we have for launching the boat at the fantail of the 270s, because of what happens when the ship is pitching, and this does not look like an improvement. However, the fact that she has boats on both sides amidships is an improvement.

I would still like to see some space planned for interchangeable containerized mission modules. Maybe there could be an option to put these on the fantail in lieu of the third boat. Aside from the Littoral Combat Ship modules, these might include class rooms for cadet cruises, holding cells for migrant interdiction, operating rooms for disaster relief, or laboratories for scientific research.

Hopefully the larger flight deck means the ships will be capable of operating all the H-60 variants including the Navy’s MH-60 R and S versions and there will be space available to store their equipment and weapons.

Provided the price is reasonable, these ships should have definite Foreign Military Sales potential. I can see variations of this design with Harpoon launchers either on the fantail or foc’sle.

Related posts (newest to oldest):

Two More Heroes for Two More Cutters

Posted on by
1

The Coast Guard Compass has continued to expand their coverage of the stories of the individuals the first 14 Fast Response Cutters are to be named for, adding two more since our last post on the subject.

Napier was a Life Saving Service Great Lakes station keeper in the late 19th century. William Trump was one of the many Coast Guardsmen involved in the Normandy invasion. You might also like to follow this link (also included in Trump’s story), that gives more detail about the Coast Guard and the Normandy invasion.

If you would like to catch up on stories previously published, they are linked here.

Missile Launch Off SoCal–Who Did It?–No One Knows!

Posted on by
8

The contrail of a missile launch, video recorded by a news organization helicopter, approximately 35  miles off Los Angeles, and no one seems to be able to explain, more than 20 hours later, where it came from or where it landed.

I thought our security lapse at Port Angeles was embarrassing, but this is a lot worse. I have to ask, where was the quarter deck watch? You know the one that is supposed to be protecting our country. Navy times reports the story and InformationDissemination provides commentary.

If you think we are ready to intercept a cruise missile fired from offshore, think again.

Innovations in Piracy?

Posted on by
3

A recent pirate attack may signal changes in the nature of Somali Piracy. The European Union Naval Force reports, during the night, November 6, the Spanish corvette INFANTA CRISTINA, escorting an African Union Military Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) supply ship, the MV Petra I, was attacked by a vessel identified as the MV IZUMI, a ship that had itself been pirated on Oct. 10. (“Since…December 2008, EU NAVFOR has conducted 86 World Food Programme escorts and 71 escorts  for AMISOM.”)

The best analysis I have found is here. This post includes photos of the three ships involved. The things that made this attack different were:

  • The pirates attacked directly from a relatively large cargo vessel that still had hostages on board, rather than from boats.
  • Because the hostages were still aboard the attacking ship, the escorting vessel had to limit its return fire.
  • This is the first attack on an EU escort ship.
  • At least one blog states that these pirates originated from a port controlled by Al Shabaab, a group that appears to be winning the civil war in Somalia and has been associated with Al Qaeda. Other than speculation, if this is true, its the first evidence I have seen that pirates are associated with this group. The blog further suggest that the aim of the operation was to cut off supplies to the African Union Forces that oppose Al Shabaab and that the pirate vessel attempted to ram the Spanish corvette (a relatively small ship, at less than 1,500 tons, smaller than a 270).

If pirates start staging attacks directly from larger ships, it will allow them to attack larger ships with greater freeboard. It may make it possible to conduct attacks in weather that precludes attacks by boats. It will almost certainly require different countermeasures on the part of the merchant ships.

Its possible these events may be being misinterpreted. Its possible the encounter was unintentional, that the choice of a AMISON ship was random, and that the small warship was not recognized in the dark. However, if it is proven an Al Queda associated group is using piracy to further its aims, it will radically change US perception of the importance of Somali piracy, which in economic terms, has been more nuisance than major problem.

“We need icebreakers”–Adm Papp

Posted on by
11

The Commandant has come out and said what we already knew. Navy Times is reporting Admiral Papp stated “We need icebreakers up [in the Arctic], and right now our icebreakers are in a sorry state…They need replacement or very thorough renovation to allow the United States to sustain an active presence and support our sovereignty up there.”

Let’s be clear, a “very thorough renovation” may be needed, but it is not enough. The two Polar Class breakers are already 34 and 36 years old. Hopefully we will get them running again, but they will need to replaced within any prudent planning horizon. It seems to take us ten years to get a new ship built, so if we start on their replacements now, they will be about 46 years old when they are replaced. We need to start with the assumption that we will build new icebreakers, then we can make intelligent decisions about how much to invest in the Polar Class.  The replacement ships may not need to be as large or as powerful, but even a ship of comparable capabilities should be possible that is cheaper to man, run, and maintain. The question is not do we need new icebreakers, it is how quickly? Expecting these ships to soldier on without a planned replacement is unrealistic.

More Enlisted Heroes/FRC Namesakes

Posted on by
16

Earlier we noted that the Coast Guard Compass is posting a series of short histories highlighting the namesakes of the first fourteen Fast Response Cutters. We provided links to the first four in two previous postings:

Two more were linked in comments on a previous post:

Since then, they have posted three more:

For more information on the Cutter COMANCHE and her efforts to rescue the survivors of the Transport DORCHESTER which resulted in the death of Charles Walter David, Jr. go here.

“Navy at a Tipping Point,” What Does It Mean to the Coast Guard?

Posted on by
10

The Navy is shrinking and will have to make some hard choices. How will this effect the Coast Guard?

March 1, 2010 the Center for Naval Analysis published a now widely read and quoted treatise, discussing how the Navy can best reorder its priorities to deal with the new realities of a shrinking fleet and the rise of new potential competitors, particularly China, ” The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?” It is available as a pdf and can be downloaded here.

It accepts that the Navy will shrink to approximately 230 ship from its current level of approximately 285 and outlines five alternative futures.

  • 2 Hub–continuously maintaining forward deployed Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean (IO) at the expense of engagement (nation building/maritime policing) and forcible entry (amphib) capability.
  • 1+ Hub–maintaining a forward deployed CSG in the Western Pacific and a tailored task group based on amphibs in the IO
  • Shaping–emphasizing maritime policing, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HS/DR), and engagement with friendly navies/coast guards at the expense of combat capability (trying to create a more peaceful world but compromising warfighting ability)
  • Surge–Emphasizing strong combat capability but with much reduced forward deployment/engagement
  • Shrinking Status Quo–trying to continue doing all the same things with less

In the sparest terms their impact on the fleet are outlined below (ref. p 43):

  • 2 Hub–fewer amphibs and low end assets, more Aegis and SSNs
  • 1+ Hub–fewer CSG, more low end assets
  • Shaping–fewer CSG, Aegis, and SSNs, more amphibs and low end
  • Surge–fewer amphibs, low-end, and logistics, more Aegis and SSNs
  • Shrinking Status Quo–less of everything

Relative to their emphasis on the high end to low end spectrum the resulting fleet looks like this:

High End–2 Hub, Surge, Shrinking Status Quo, 1+ Hub, Shaping–Low End

Observations:

The study doesn’t explicitly address some missions.

  • ASW protection for merchant shipping (and the attendant need for frigates), once a core mission of the Navy, wasn’t considered at all.
  • ASW operations against SSBNs wasn’t explicitly addressed
  • Nor were changes to our nuclear deterrents (SSBNs)
  • Possible future requirements to impose a blockade, if considered at all, were only addressed in nebulous terms of establishing “Sea Control” and the large number of low end units required was not addressed.

The USN doesn’t seem to regard coastal defense of the US as a mission that it needs to concern itself with. (I suppose that’s why we have a Coast Guard.) It is mentioned in the study only as a “wild card” that might constrain future options (page 22).

The Coast Guard performs many of the missions that Navies do in most countries. This has relieved the Navy of the requirement to maintain large numbers of low end assets. Unlike most countries, the US essentially has two Navies–the High End Navy and the low end Coast Guard. Since the USN has abdicated the low end tasks, expecting the Navy to mentor low end Navies around the world may be unrealistic anyway.

What I think will happen:

The Navy will make every effort to keep their high end assets–Carriers, Aegis equipped Guided Missile Cruisers and Destroyers and Submarines–exemplified in the  “2 Hub”  option, perhaps with deployments pulled back from the Asian mainland in recognition of the dangers of a Chinese first strike.

Amphibs and low end forces will be cut back further. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will be truncated far short of the originally planned 55 units.

Navy support for drug enforcement will be reduced, as will “engagement” in terms of interaction with small navies and coast guards. The Coast Guard will be asked to fill in, in the engagement role.

In wartime, the need for small vessels to do inspections for contraband, either as a quarantine or blockade or off the shores of friendly countries, as we did in Vietnam in Operation Market Time, or to protect offshore assets, as we are doing now off Iraq, will fall increasingly on the Coast Guard.

What I think we should do:

That the Coast Guard has a defense role needs to be more widely recognized, planned for, equipped, and appropriately funded, meaning a marginally larger force.

While I personally doubt its effectiveness, it can be argued that reduced Navy commitments in support of drug enforcement will need to be replaced by less expensive Coast Guard assets.

The Coast Guard can do engagement missions cheaper and possibly better, but they need to be properly funded, because they do effect our force structure. The same may be true of counter piracy.

To make it happen, we really need the Navy to strongly support the Coast Guard, and if they choose the high end option, they have an incentive to do so, as a way of explaining why they can reasonably walk away from some of the things they have done in the past and “let the Coast Guard do it.”