“South Korea Bolsters Polar Capabilities Moving Ahead With Next-Generation Icebreaker” –gCaptain

South Korea’s research icebreaker Araon, operated by the Korea Polar Research Institute. (Source: Korea Polar Research Institute)

gCaptain reports South Korea is building an icebreaker, “With a displacement of 16,560 tonnes the dual-fuel icebreaker – it can use both low-sulfur diesel and LNG – will be twice as large as the country’s existing icebreaker, Araon.”

But more interesting to me is that South Korea has been instrumental in operationalizing Russia’s Norther Sea Route.

All fifteen Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers for the Yamal LNG project were constructed by DSME (now Hanwha) with additional vessels and vessel elements for Arctic LNG 2 built by both Hanwha and SHI. Ice-capable oil tankers also originate at South Korean shipyards.

The country has also been a key anchor for expanded Arctic shipping with several container ship voyages via Russia’s Northern Sea Route originating or terminating at South Korean hubs, including Busan.

The Northern Sea Route certainly has the potential to facilitate trade between South Korea and Europe. The ships they have been building can traverse the Northern Sea Route without the aid of icebreakers.

Korean Built Ships for the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard –Naval News

Naval News has a new post, “HD HHI Pitches Horizon 3 Frigates, Corvettes and White Hulls to Manila” that includes the video above.

HD HHI has delivered two “frigates” to the Philippine Navy and has contracts for six offshore patrol vessels (OPV) and two corvettes. Hyundai apparently hopes to continue this successful collaboration with proposals to meet Philippines requirements for larger and more capable “Horizon 3” frigates and for Philippine Coast Guard cutters.

200820-N-TT059-2393 PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 20, 2020) Republic of the Philippines Navy ship BRP Jose Rizal (FF 150) participates in a tactical maneuvering drill with U.S. Coast Guard ship USCGC Munro (WMSL 755) and U.S. Navy guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG 70) during exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2020. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Lily Gebauer)

The two Philippine 2,600 ton Jose Rizal class frigates (pictured above) are smaller than the former USCG Hamilton class cutters (3200 tons). The follow-on (3,200 ton) Miguel Malvar class corvettes (or light frigates) will be larger and more capable. The Horizon 3 Frigate will be larger still.

The six Philippine Navy Offshore Patrol Vessels (above) will be 2400 tons full load; 94.4 meters (310′) in length; 14.3 meter (47′) of beam; with a maximum speed of 22knots; and a maximum range of 5,500 nautical miles at 15 knots. It appears they will be armed with a 76mm gun, two 30mm guns, and two Simbad-RC twin-Mistral missile launchers. HHI is proposing cutters based on this design for the Philippine Coast Guard.

Will the Philippine Coast Guard arm its cutters? Currently no Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessels have any weapons larger than .50 caliber machine guns, but the models of possible future Philippine Coast Guard vessels all carried some type of installed weapons system, apparently 30mm, 40mm, or 76mm. Was this because the PCG intends to field larger weapons or just because that is the way South Korean CG cutters are armed? The twin 35mm Gökdeniz close-in weapon system (CIWS) mounted on the new corvettes and that appears on the model of the proposed Horizon 3 frigate would be very appropriate for the Philippine Coast Guard.

There is an interesting statement at the end of the post,

“HD HHI plans to realize its ‘Pacific-Rim Belt Vision’, establishing regional hubs in countries such as the Philippines, Peru, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States (emphasis applied–Chuck) based on its advanced shipbuilding technologies.”

“Stateless Cargo Ship De Yi Detained: South Korea’s Bold Move Against North Korea” –Regtechtimes via MSN

North Korea

MSN reports,

“A cargo ship called De Yi was recently detained by South Korea as it was traveling between Korea and Japan and was berthed close to the port of Yeosu. The ship’s detention is a component of South Korea’s stepped-up unilateral measures against North Korea, which also include sanctioning ships that trade arms with Russia and stepping up monitoring for sanctions violations… The South Korean Coast Guard acted quickly after the vessel’s crew—13 people total—refused to cooperate with orders to stop, including a Chinese captain and crew members from China and Indonesia. For further investigation, the ship was escorted to the port of Busan… Authorities from South Korea and the United States (emphasis applied–Chuck) are closely examining the ship to make sure it is not carrying any illegal goods.”

South Korea Seizes Chinese Fishing Vessels –Newsweek

A picture taken on November 16, 2011 from a South Korean helicopter shows Chinese fishermen wielding sticks to stop an attack by South Korean coastguard commandoes armed with clubs aboard rubber boats during a crackdown on alleged illegal fishing in South Korean waters in the Yellow Sea off the southwestern coast county of Buan. South Korea’s coastguard mobilized 12 ships, four helicopters and commandoes for a special three-day crackdown on illegal fishing by Chinese boats this week. REPUBLIC OF KOREA OUT AFP PHOTO / DONG-A ILBO (Photo credit should read DONG-A ILBO/AFP/Getty Images)

Newsweek reports,

“South Korea’s Coast Guard seized five Chinese vessels for allegedly fishing illegally in the country’s waters late last month, confiscating boats and deporting several crew members…The joint patrol’s 30 participating vessels and three aircraft waters were operating in the vicinity of Jeju Island from March 25-31, Korea JoongAng Daily reported.

“The country’s coast guard said that, on average, 300 Chinese vessels fish illegally in the country’s exclusive waters each day, with that figure dropping to an estimated 140 during periods of intensified crackdowns.”

As you can see from the photo above and below. This is not a new problem.

A picture taken on November 16, 2011 from a South Korean helicopter shows Chinese boats banded together with ropes, chased by a coastguard helicopter and rubber boats pacted with commandoes, after alleged illegal fishing in South Korean waters in the Yellow Sea.
Credit: Dong-A-Ilbo

In many cases these encounters have become violent. The South Koreans have not been afraid to seized Chinese fishing vessels, but on the other hand they have not been successful in stopping large scale illegal fishing.

“Top Ten Navies by Aggregate Displacement, 1 January 2024” –Analysis and diagram by Phoenix_jz

Two years ago, I did a post with a similar title from the same source. Somehow, I missed the 2023 edition. As I said in the earlier post, I don’t know , but the data appears to be credible, and it looks like readers are checking his figures. 

It is very difficult to read the tonnages at the bottom of the graph unless you are using a computer and click on the graph to see it in a larger size. 

The creator’s notes and some additional comments are below. 


Hello all!

Well, 2024 is upon us, and as such so is the third edition of my top ten navy list. For those unfamiliar, here are links to 2022 and 2023, with a general explainer of the whole concept in the 2022 version.

The long and short of it is that this graph reflects a personal tracker I keep of almost every large and moderately sized navy, and calculates the aggregate displacement of these navies. It’s not a perfect way to display the size of navies – far from it in fact – but it is at least more representative than counting numbers of hulls alone, in my opinion.

To break down what each of these categories mean;

  • Surface Warships is an aggregate of all above-water warships and major aviation and amphibious assault platforms. This category includes CVNs, CVs, CVLs, LHDs, LHAs, LPDs, CGs, DDGs, FFGs, corvettes, OPVs, CPVs, lighter patrol craft, and MCM vessels.
  • Submarines is what it says on the tin – SSBNs, SSGNs, SSNs, SSKs, and for select nations where applicable (and where information is available), special purpose submarines. Please note dedicated training submarines are counted separately.
  • AORs includes all major fleet replenishment vessels (coastal vessels do not count, however).
  • Other Auxiliaries is a very wide net that essentially captures everything else. Special mission ships, support vessels, minor amphibious assault vessels (LSDs, LSTs, LCAC’s, LCM’s, LCU’s), training vessels, tugs, coastal support vessels, hydrography ships – all essential parts of navies, but generally often paid less attention to as they’re not as flashy as the warships proper.

Interesting trends in data that I thought I would share for various navies, and thoughts and observations otherwise;

The USN is, unsurprisingly, still top dog by a huge margin. In spite a net decommissioning of five ships this year, the USN has grown overall by about 32,000 tons – four ‘cruisers’, two SSNs, four LCS, and five patrol craft decommissioned against the introduction of three destroyers, an SSN, five LCS, and a replenishment ship. It is worth noting that 2023 is the first year since 2010 that the USN has commissioned three destroyers in a year, though a repeat performance in the next couple years is unlikely – these ships were launched in 2020 and 2021, and only one destroyer per year was launched in 2022 and 2023.

No one will be surprised to hear that the PLAN has grown for the nth consecutive year, adding the final Type 055 batch I and the remaining Type 054A Batch V, for almost 50,000 tons of new surface combatants. Much of the remaining increase in displacement for this year (which totaled nearly 90,000 tons) reflected a steady pace of modernization in mine warfare, landing forces, and logistical support/other auxiliaries. As with last year, the number of minor patrol craft continue to plummet as the PLAN continues to divest many of its obsolescent brown-water combatants, or relegates them to training duties.

Moving on to ongoing construction, progress on the new destroyer batches continues at pace. At least two Type 055 Batch II appear to be under construction, and the overall number of Type 052D Batch IV appears to be at least ten. The first ship actually launched at the very end of 2022 (at Jiangnan), and two further have been launched by the same yard as well as three at Dalian. Two more remain under construction at each yard. The first of these ships to be launched appears to be on trials and will likely commission this coming year. The Type 054A program of the navy appears to have finally wrapped up (construction of the hull for the China Coast Guard continues), and the Type 054B program has continued at pace if not scale – two ships were launched this year, but modules of further units have been scarce. Rounding things out for major surface vessels, a new Type 075 LHD was launched this past December. Conspicuously absent has been sightings of any modules for new carriers. Considering Fujian (Type 003) began construction at some point from 2015 to 2017, one has to wonder if we will see China launch another carrier before the end of the decade.

Perhaps most consequential of all, however, has been the completion of new production facilities at Bohai and a resumption of Type 093 SSN launches. The first of the new Type 093B launched in 2022, and has been followed up by two more launches this year (possibly up to three). A sustained pace of two submarines a year, or even just three submarines every two years, would quickly add up could see anywhere from nine to eleven new SSNs launched by the end of 2027, and in service by early 2030s. Only time will tell what the actual drumbeat of production will be.

Russia’s VMF woes in the Black Sea have continued unabated, except less at sea and largely fueled by the Franco-British SCALP cruise missile. The most dramatic loss by far was the destruction of the Project 636.3 ‘Improved’ Kilo Rostov-on-Don in drydock at Sevastopol, but similar attacks claimed the destruction or constructive loss of a Karakurt-class corvette (under construction, not in service) and two Ropucha-class LSTs. The infamous TB-2 made a brief return to destroy a Serna-class LCU, and two other LCU’s may have finally become the first victims of Kamikaze USVs this past November, for a total of 11,407 tonnes lost.

In regards to the more regular cycle of commissioning and decommissioning, one frigate, one MCM vessel, and three corvettes were brought into service, as well as a new SSGN, SSBN, and SSK each. Against this a corvette, SSGN, SSBN, and SSK were decommissioned. Overall, in spite of losses the VMF managed a net gain of 6,324 tonnes of surface warships and submarines. Anyone who checks against my figures from last year will note that the increase in the VMF’s overall tonnage this year is far more substantial, due to the auxiliary category. Though some of this was from new vessels, this was mostly down to a badly needed overhaul and reorganization of that part of my tracker, particularly for the tug fleet. Did you know the Russian navy tug fleet displaces more than either the Argentine or Canadian navies? Now you do! Seriously – it would be the 20th largest navy in the world by itself.

As a final note on the VMF – it is worth remembering that ships commissioned in the Russian navy are not always actually in service, as ships can often languish in near-terminal refits or simply be left inactive without a formal decommissioning. Almost half the remaining Projekt 877 Kilo’s, for example, appear to be inactive at this point (5 of 10).

(In comments the author noted the following, “Russian naval losses during the war have totalled 13 vessels for 29,870 tonnes. Quite a bit – but also only about 1.4% of their current overall tonnage.” –Chuck)

The British Royal Navy observes a second year of marginal reduction in overall tonnage (-2,640t, or -0.3%), losing another Type 23 frigate as well as the last Echo-class survey ship. Against this the RFA brought into service the first MROSS, ProteusProteus represents a considerable increase in subsurface capability, though the loss of a frigate with no replacement ship to replace it for another thee to four years is painful, especially given how many of the remaining eleven ships are deep in LIFEX/Post-LIFEX refits. With that said, their new frigate programs are moving on steadily. Steel was cut on two new frigates this year – the future HMS Birmingham (4th Type 26) and HMS Active (2nd Type 31), bringing the total construction volume to five frigates building and one fitting out.

The JMSDF continues to grow, albeit at a more moderate pace this year (+6,530t, or +0.9%), inducting a new Mogami-class frigate and Taigei-class attack submarine, while shifting another Oyashio-class from the active fleet to a training role. Two more FFM were launched this year, though surprisingly they have not started construction on the next pair. This past November, it was announced that the Mogami-class FFM would be curtailed at 12 units (of 22 planned), and followed on by an evolution of the design known as FMF-AAW. The FMF-AAW will feature greater air and surface warfare capabilities. Twelve such ships are planned.

The Indian Navy’s growth in 2023 was far less dramatic than in 2022, but still noteworthy (+9,200t, or +1.5%), as adding a new conventional attack submarine and destroyer to the fleet has finally pushed them over the 600,000-tonne line.

The Marine Nationale grew by almost 9,000 tonnes (2.1%) this year, largely down to the retirement and replacement of a patrol ship, nuclear attack submarine, and tugs with an equal number of replacements. Though it is worth noting that the new attack submarine is not fully operational yet – that will happen in 2024 – so technically the MN’s attack submarine fleet is really four boats at this point in time.

The saga of eight and ninth place swapping around continues, as the ROKN has managed to move back to the position of eighth largest navy in the world. In 2023 they added a net 15,374t (+4.3%), commissioning four Daegu-class frigates, a second KSS-III class attack submarine, an MCM vessel and a pair of LCACs, against the decommissioning of two corvettes and five PKM’s.

In contrast, the Marina Militare continues to feel the bite from the two FREMM sold to Egypt, as well as delays in brining the LHD Trieste into service – intended for 2023 but again pushed back, now to the spring of 2024. The first PPA ‘Light+’, Raimondo Montecuccoli, was brought into service in 2023 – an OPV on paper, but light frigate in practice. Against this one of the elderly Maestrale-class frigates, Zeffiro, was retired, as was one of the fleet’s AORs (Vesuvio) and a water tanker (Bormida), resulting in a real drop of 7,073 tonnes (-1.9%). The drop seen versus the chart versus last year is more dramatic (totals 16,632 tonnes), which reflects both cleaning up data on old auxiliary platforms for which information is scarce, and correcting some minor sheet errors, which totaled 9,559 tonnes.

The outlook should be looking up in the future – as previously mentioned, the LHD Trieste should enter service this year, as should the fourth and fifth PPA. The first of two replacement FREMM (GPe) was launched in late 2023 and a second will follow this spring, with both being slated to enter service in 2025 alongside the sixth PPA and second Vulcano-class replenishment ship – barring any delays.

Finally, the Indonesian Navy saw another year of growth, adding a net 9,930 tonnes (+3.1%), with another hospital ship commissioned, a new survey ship, corvette, and two new MCM vessels and FACs each, as well as several patrol boats. The TNIAL continues a steady program of domestic construction of patrol craft, and construction is ongoing on two Iver Huitfelt derivative frigates, with the keel of the first vessel laid down this past August. They have also cut steel on a new hydrography ship, which will launch in Indonesia and complete fitting out in Germany.

What comes next in terms of major platforms for the TNIAL is somewhat up in the air. As with the year prior, there has been no progress made on the procurement of six FREMM from Italy, despite a contract being signed two and a half years ago (June 2021). In spite of this, they have expressed interest in procuring two PPA to bolster their patrol fleet. In the interest of expediting procurement, they are looking at two ‘Light+’ configuration vessels currently fitting out at Muggiano – Marcantonio Colonna (due for delivery to the MMI in the latter half of 2024) and Ruggiero di Lauria (due for delivery to the MMI in mid-2025). According to the General Manager of Fincantieri’s Naval Vessels Division, Dario Deste, a contract for the two vessels could be signed in the first half of 2024.

(In answer to a question the author added this in the comments–Chuck)

No.11 to 20 are as follows for 1 January 2024;

  • 11: Turkey – 297,298t
  • 12: Taiwan – 268,958t
  • 13 Egypt – 232,046t
  • 14: Spain- 229,373t
  • 15: Germany – 226,655t
  • 16: Australia – 224,074t (decided to add the National Support Squadron, which added about 30kt)
  • 17: Greece – 189,184t
  • 18: Brazil – 162,29t
  • 19: Chile – 161,404t
  • 20: Argentina – 138,620t
(A reader, , added this–Chuck)

Listed by ranking for this year:

Nation Change from 2023 (tonnes) 2023 Ranking Change from 2022 (tonnes) 2022 Ranking
United States +55,658 1st +250,308 1st
China +93,567 2nd +99,299 2nd
Russia + 211,333 3rd +166,682 3rd
United Kingdom -2,640 4th -5,815 4th
Japan +6,530 5th +23,790 5th
India +9,200 6th +62,349 6th
France +8,925 7th +12,145 7th
South Korea +15,374 9th +7,153 8th
Italy -16,632 8th -3,452 9th
Indonesia -70 10th +17,709 10th

Probably not surprising given all these nations are competing more or less with each other, but the rankings have basically remained the same except for Italy and South Korea trading places in 2023, then reverting to their 2022 places again this year. Nobody previous top 10 navy has left the club either.

However, do note that not all of the year-to-year tonnage differences are due to actual changes in fleet size/composition. As Phoenix mentioned in his post, the Russians in particular got a huge tonnage jump this year because he changed the way he counts auxiliaries, and given the discrepancy between his reported +32k figure for the USN and the numbers, there’s probably some math correction involved there too.

 

“USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker: Aug. 21, 2023”

USCGC Munro (WMSL-755) escorts USNS Fisher (T-AKR-301) in the East China Sea on Aug. 12, 2023. US Navy Photo

Looking at the latest US Naval Institute “Fleet and Marine Tracker,” I am a bit surprised to see there are still 3 Navy ships operating under 4th Fleet, presumably doing drug interdiction. This is an uptick.

Again, they report on atypical Coast Guard operations:

  • Legend-class National Security Cutter USCGC Munro (WMSL-755) departed South Korea last week and is in the Korea Strait. (As I mentioned earlier, there is a possibility, cutters may encounter the new North Korean corvettes.)
  • Coast Guard Cutter USCGC Healy (WAGB-20) continues its work in the Beaufort Sea. Healy is on a five-month deployment in partnership with ONR and the National Science Foundation.
  • Coast Guard Cutter USCGC Forward (WMEC-911) is currently supporting Operation Nanook. Operation Nanook is an annual Canadian-led exercise that fosters international cooperation and shared responsibility in the Arctic and the northern Atlantic Regions. The cutter recently made a port call in Nuuk, Greenland.

You can use Control F “USCGC” if you want to quickly find the Coast Guard cutters mentioned in the USNI posts.

PATFORSWA is mentioned again.

The link in the Healy entry, “U.S., Canadian Icebreakers Conduct Operation, Rendezvous en Route to Arctic Ocean” is interesting, plus there is more in the USNI post including an “adorable” polar bear photo.

“‘Strategic’ Cruise Missile Tested From North Korea’s New Corvette” (Corvette with Nuclear Capable Cruise Missile?) –The Drive

The Drive reports.

“North Korea’s state-run media has released new photos of the country’s most modern surface combatant, known in the West as the Amnok class corvette, which is also the largest operated by the Korean People’s Navy. Of particular interest is that the warship is armed with cruise missiles, which can likely be fitted with nuclear warheads, adding yet another platform to North Korea’s diverse and growing strategic arsenal.”

Cutters doing UN sanctions enforcement in the East China Sea might run into one of these.

This coast guard cutter sized vessel, one of four being built, which is reportedly 77 meters (253′) in length, is interesting for its combination of possible nuclear capability with old tech.

Aside from the cruise missiles, which may not have been accurate, this corvette includes four heavy gatling style machine guns (two 30mm and two 14.5mm) which would be very dangerous at short range. For mid-range, the mid 20th century 100mm gun looks rather crude, but it does throw a 34.4 lbs. (15.6 kg) projectile up to 24,323 yards (22,241 m). That is almost seven times heavier and about 6,000 yards further than the 57mm.

The portholes look out of place and may mean the ship is not fully airconditioned.

“China Coast Guard’s New ‘Monster’ Ship Completes Maiden Patrol in South China Sea” –The Diplomat

Photo credit: China Defense Blog

The Diplomat reports the maiden patrol of China Coast Guard’s second monster 12,000 ton cutter.

The patrol was only 19 days, but no telling how quickly they will come out again.

When you want to play bumper boats, size really does matter and the Chinese have raised the stakes considerably. Meanwhile the Japan Coast Guard (and here) and South Korean Coast Guard also have some very large cutters.

Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States

U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Munro and Japan Coast Guard Patrol Vessel Large Aso, transit together in formation during a maritime engagement in the East China Sea Aug. 25, 2021. U.S. Coast Guard members aboard the Munro deployed to the Western Pacific Ocean to strengthen alliances and partnerships and improve maritime governance and security in the region. (Photo courtesy of Japan Coast Guard)

The Whitehouse has issued a new Indo-Pacific Strategy, and it specifically mentions the US Coast Guard.

The document calls out China for its aggressive behavior,

This intensifying American focus is due in part to the fact that the Indo-Pacific faces mounting challenges, particularly from the PRC. The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power. The PRC’s coercion and aggression spans the globe, but it is most acute in the Indo-Pacific. From the economic coercion of Australia to the conflict along the Line of Actual Control with India to the growing pressure on Taiwan and bullying of neighbors in the East and South China Seas, our allies and partners in the region bear much of the cost of the PRC’s harmful behavior. In the process, the PRC is also undermining human rights and international law, including freedom of navigation, as well as other principles that have brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific.

It recognizes the value and values of our allies and partners,

For centuries, the United States and much of the world have viewed Asia too narrowly—as an arena of geopolitical competition. Today, Indo-Pacific nations are helping to define the very nature of the international order, and U.S. allies and partners around the world have a stake in its outcomes. Our approach, therefore, draws from and aligns with those of our closest friends. Like Japan, we believe that a successful Indo-Pacific vision must advance freedom and openness and offer “autonomy and options.” We support a strong India as a partner in this positive regional vision. Like Australia, we seek to maintain stability and reject coercive exercises of power. Like the ROK, we aim to promote regional security through capacity-building. Like ASEAN, we see Southeast Asia as central to the regional architecture. Like New Zealand and the United Kingdom, we seek to build resilience in the regional rules-based order. Like France, we recognize the strategic value of an increasing regional role for the European Union (EU). Much like the approach the EU has announced in its Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, American strategy will be principled, long-term, and anchored in democratic resilience.

It calls for action in five areas:

  1. ADVANCE A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC
  2. BUILD CONNECTIONS WITHIN AND BEYOND THE REGION
  3. DRIVE REGIONAL PROSPERITY
  4. BOLSTER INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY
  5. BUILD REGIONAL RESILIENCE TO TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

There is mention of the Coast Guard is in the section “BOLSTER INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY” on page 13.

We will also innovate to meet civilian security challenges, expanding U.S. Coast Guard presence, training, and advising to bolster our partners’ capabilities. We will cooperate to address and prevent terrorism and violent extremism, including by identifying and monitoring foreign fighters traveling to the region, formulating options to mitigate online radicalization, and encouraging counterterrorism cooperation within the Indo-Pacific. And we will strengthen collective regional capabilities to prepare for and respond to environmental and natural disasters; natural, accidental, or deliberate biological threats; and the trafficking of weapons, drugs, and people. We will improve cybersecurity in the region, including the ability of our partners to protect against, recover from, and respond to cybersecurity incidents.

Coast Guard roles presumably extend beyond interdiction and fisheries to include assistance with intelligence, port security, and maritime industry cybersecurity.

The strategy refers to ten lines of effort that are to be pursued in the next 12 to 24 months. The first is “Drive New Resources to the Indo-Pacific” (p.15),

Building shared capacity requires the United States to make new regional investments. We will open new embassies and consulates, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, and increase our strength in existing ones, intensifying our climate, health, security, and development work. We will expand U.S. Coast Guard presence and cooperation in Southeast and South Asia and the Pacific Islands, with a focus on advising, training, deployment, and capacity-building. We will refocus security assistance on the Indo-Pacific, including to build maritime capacity and maritime-domain awareness.

Sounds like this may include Coast Guard attachés attached to diplomatic staffs and possibly some new basing.

There is a second line of effort that will undoubtably involve the Coast Guard, “Partner to Build Resilience in the Pacific Islands” (p.17),

The United States will work with partners to establish a multilateral strategic grouping that supports Pacific Island countries as they build their capacity and resilience as secure, independent actors. Together, we will build climate resilience through the Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility; coordinate to meet the Pacific’s infrastructure gaps, especially on information and communications technology; facilitate transportation; and cooperate to improve maritime security to safeguard fisheries, build maritime-domain awareness, and improve training and advising. We will also prioritize finalization of the Compact of Free Association agreements with the Freely Associated States.

A Maritime Executive post, New U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Singles Out China’s “Coercion”, notes,

In the security arena, the new strategy reiterates that the United States has maintained “a strong and consistent defence presence necessary to support regional peace, security, stability, and prosperity”, pointing to the South China Sea and the East China Sea as a priority. However, it is interesting that while the document underscores the importance of freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific, not a single paragraph mentions the US Freedom of Navigation Operations Program (FONOPS) carried out by the US Navy, which has stirred controversy. Conversely, the strategy emphasises the importance of the Coast Guard to lead maritime security cooperation in the region, in “advising, training, deployment, and capacity-building … including to build maritime capacity and maritime-domain awareness”. Indeed, in 2021, the US Coast Guard announced a joint maritime training centre with the Indonesian Coast Guard in Batam.

The emphasis on coast guard cooperation can be seen as a positive gesture since it will be less provocative and sensitive compared to a military presence in the region. And more importantly, coast guard operations in Southeast Asia are very much required to tackle maritime security threats such as illegal fishing.

Thanks to Paul for bringing this to my attention. 

“Smugglers Fake Ship Identities to Evade North Korea Sanctions” –MarineLink

This photo provided by Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force shows an apparent ship-to-ship transfer involving a North Korean tanker in the East China Sea.

MarineLink reports on a study that found that,

“Smugglers suspected of evading sanctions on North Korea have turned to schemes to create fraudulent identities for sanctioned ships…the group’s case studies of two ships allegedly involved in evading North Korea sanctions show how the IMO registration process can be hijacked to issue a registered identity to a non-existent vessel, which in turn can be used to disguise the identity of other ships, the report said.”