Mandatory Electronic Data Exchange for International Shipping Adopted by IMO

BairdMaritime reports,

“Mandatory requirements for the electronic exchange of information on cargo, crew and passengers have been adopted by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), as part of a revised annex to the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic (FAL).

“The IMO has said the change will help make procedures for a ship’s arrival, stay and departure from port easier once the FAL takes effect on January 1, 2018.”

This should of course facilitate commerce, but it is also an important part of the Maritime Domain Awareness System.

Sensor Hosting Autonomous Remote Craft (SHARC)

These little Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) may be one way to enhance our Maritime Domain Awareness. They have already traveled a million nautical miles.

NavyRecognition has the story.

I could see a line of these in the Eastern Pacific, used to detect drug smuggling semi-submersibles.

Perhaps we will also see them used to cue Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessels.(ACTUV) or maritime patrol aircraft to the presence of submarines. It might not be too expensive to provide a line of them covering an entire trans oceanic route.

There will almost certainly be a war time role for launching these or something similar. Maybe a role for our buoy tenders.

Ruminating on Homeports While Playing the Red Cell

Reading the “National Fleet Plan” prompted some thoughts on where we homeport cutters. What started as a look at homeports then morphed into a look at, if there will be enough large cutters (NSCs and OPCs) in the “program of record” to protect our ports from a terrorist attack. That expanded a bit further. Could we also protect our strategic seaports? The Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) system would after all want to make sure merchant ships were not used to sow mines off our coast.

Warning: This is going to be a rambling post, so let me apologize in advance.

Note, I looked at this from the point of view of making an intercept off shore, so rather than look at specific ports, in some cases, I clustered ports that had a common approach, e.g. Portsmouth, Norfolk, and Newport News all share a common approach so I grouped them together in what I will refer to as the  Chesapeake Bay Complex. Other groups were ports around Puget Sound, San Francisco Bay, Galveston Bay, and Sabine Pass. I also disregarded Inland and Great Lakes ports. 

The National Fleet Plan included these particular stated intentions for the future.

– Fiscal Year 2015: Submit revised Strategic Laydown (SLD) request and OCR to homeport 3 X FRCs at Naval Base Guam to include Lessons Learned from maturing CG-7/OPNAV N51 MOA.

– Fiscal Year 2015: Process Organization Change Request to homeport 3 X Medium Endurance Cutters at Naval Station Pensacola.

– Support feasibility studies to identify potential homeport locations for West Coast Offshore Patrol Cutters

There are a lot of obvious advantages in homeporting at a Navy Base, particularly if Navy surface vessels are also based there. There are likely to be training, logistics, and maintenance support available on base and probably a shipyard will be nearby, meaning the cutter will not have to be away from homeport for their availabilities. But perhaps Coast Guard needs a wider dispersal of its assets than the Navy does.

Although I have my doubts about how the larger cutters are currently armed, I approached this from what I believe to be the Coast Guard’s view, that if there is an attack by terrorists using a medium to large ship, the most likely unit to counter it is a large cutter. This is implicit in the term “National Security Cutter” and the designations, WMSL for the NSC and WMSM for the Offshore Patrol Cutters, e.g. Maritime Security, Large and Medium. (Why is there never a small–WMSS or WSEC?)

I also made the somewhat plausible assumption, that an intercept is more likely to be successful if the cutter is based in or near the port that is being protected. An intercept requires at least one cycle of the OODA Loop, e.g., Observe (detect), Orient (evaluated), Decide (on a course of action), and Act. It is going to take some time to determine that an intercept is needed, and more time to communicated the decision. If the cutter is in or near the port to be protected, we are more likely to be able to make a successful  intercept.

The USN homeports surface combatants in only five distinct geographic areas, the Chesapeake Bay (Norfolk and Little Creek, VA); Mayport, FL, San Diego, CA; Puget Sound (Everett and Bremerton, WA); and Pearl Harbor, HI. The Navy is increasingly concentrated geographically. Navy ships generally are in maintenance, in training, deployed far from the US or are in transit. They no longer routinely patrol US waters. This may not be a problem if you can handle a problem with aircraft, but reaction to a vessel that we suspect may be attempting a terrorist attack will almost certainly require investigation, including, most probably, an attempt to board.

I was actually kind of shocked when I first realized the Navy had no surface combatants in the Atlantic Fleet homeported North of Virginia. We cannot rely on the Navy to do intercepts, with the possible exception of off San Diego and Chesapeake Bay.

The current fleet of approximately 40 NSCs/WHECs/WMECs (it is a moving target) is distributed among 18 homeports in 13 states:

CCGD1:

  • Kittery, ME: 2x270s, 1×210
  • Boston, MA: 3×270

CCGD5:

  • Chesapeake Bay Complex, VA: 6×270 (Portsmouth), 2×210 (Little Creek)
  • Wilmington, NC: 1×210

CCGD7:

  • Charleston, SC: 2xNSC
  • Mayport, FL: 1×210
  • Cape Canaveral, FL: 2×210
  • Key West, FL: 2×270
  • St. Petersburg, FL: 2×210

CCGD8:

  • Pascagoula, MS: 1×210
  • Galveston, TX: 1×210

CCGD11:

  • San Diego, CA: 2xWHEC
  • Alameda, CA: 3xNSC

CCGD13:

  • Warrenton, OR: 2×210
  • Port Angeles, WA: 1×210
  • Seattle, WA: 2xWHEC

CCGD14:

  • Honolulu, HI: 2xWHEC

CCGD17:

  • Kodiak, AK: 1xWHEC, 1×282 WMEC

The Coast Guard fleet is much more geographically distributed than that of the Navy. The Coast Guard’s average of about two ships per homeport is probably not optimal in terms of maintenance. There are good reasons to group at least three ships of the same type together. This almost guarantees that at least one ship will be in port at all times, permitting shore side support to be usefully employed in continuous support of the ships. Three ships in each homeport also almost guarantees that at least one of the ships is fully operational.

There are several  reasons for the choice of homeports.

  1. Proximity to operating areas, e.g. closer to Alaska for ships that do Alaska Patrol, or closer to the Eastern Pacific transit zones for ships primarily assigned drug enforcement.
  2. Proximity to supporting facilities, e.g. shipyards, training facilities, assist teams.
  3. Proximity to potential target ports, if we consider these ships relevant for this mission.
  4. Perhaps cynically, political support may follow homeporting in a Congressional district or state. Maybe ethically we should not consider this, but unless you get political support you can’t do your job.

Terrorist Target List (Playing Red Cell):

Lets look at what ports need to be protected, based on what characteristics make a port a potential target. I looked at it from the terrorists point of view. “How can I hurt the United States and make the biggest impact?”

Since the terrorists targets are more about psychological impact than economic or military significance, attacking certain cities may be more important than the actual damage done. Cities that likely figure large in their psyches are:

  • New York City–symbol of American capitalism
  • Washington, DC–for obvious reasons
  • Los Angeles (Hollywood)–as exporter of American culture
  • San Francisco–as symbol of “alternate lifestyles” that many terrorist groups find abhorrent.

Next, there are symbols of American military power, that terrorist groups would like to show are not invulnerable. Plus, if they could also at least raise the possibility of a spill of radioactive material, so much the better. So nuclear powered ships of any kind are likely targets.

  • Aircraft Carriers are homeported in three ports: Norfolk, VA; San Diego, CA; Bremerton, WA
  • Ballistic Missile Submarines in two: Kings Bay, GA, Bangor, WA
  • SSNs in six: Groton, CT; Norfolk, VA, San Diego, CA; Bremerton, WA; Pearl Harbor; Guam

Attacks on Shipyards that build USN ships might also provide an opportunity to strike at US symbols of power. Notable shipyards are BIW in Bath, Me; Electric Boat in Groton, CT; Newport News in the Chesapeake Bay complex, VA; Austal USA in Mobile, AL; HII in Pascagoula, MS; and NASSCO in San Diego, CA.

Another likely target is a cruise ship. The Top Cruise Ship Ports:

  1. Miami, FL
  2. Fort Lauderdale, FL
  3. Port Canaveral, FL
  4. New York, NY
  5. San Juan, PR
  6. Galveston, TX
  7. Tampa, FL
  8. Seattle, WA
  9. Long Beach, CA
  10. New Orleans, LA
  11. Los Angeles, CA
  12. Baltimore, MD
  13. Cape Liberty, NJ
  14. Jacksonville, FL
  15. Charleston, SC

Large container ports might also be seen as a good way to disrupt the economy. Top Container Ports:

  1. Los Angeles, CA
  2. New York, NY/NJ
  3. Long Beach, CA
  4. Savannah, GA
  5. Houston, TX
  6. Oakland, CA
  7. Norfolk, VA
  8. Seattle, WA
  9. Charleston, SC
  10. Tacoma, WA
  11. Miami, FL
  12. Baltimore, MD
  13. Port Everglades, FL
  14. New Orleans, LA
  15. San Juan, PR

More generally, Top US waterports by tonnage:

  1. Port of South Lousiana
  2. Houston, TX
  3. New York, NY and NJ
  4. Beaumont, TX
  5. Long Beach, CA
  6. New Orleans, LA
  7. Corpus Christi, TX
  8. Baton Rouge, LA
  9. Los Angeles, CA
  10. Port of Plaquemines, LA
  11. Lake Charles, LA
  12. Mobile, AL
  13. Texas City, TX
  14. Norfolk Harbor, VA
  15. Huntington – Tristate

Military Targets:

Aside from the military targets listed above MARAD has designated 23 ports for outload of military equipment. These are referred to as “Strategic Seaports”:

  • Port of Port Elizabeth, NJ;
  • Philadelphia, PA;
  • Norfolk, VA
  • Newport News, VA
  • Morehead City, NC;
  • Wilmington, NC;
  • Sunny Point, NC
  • Charleston, SC
  • Savannah, GA
  • Jasonville, FL
  • Gulfport, MS
  • Beaumont, TX
  • Port Author, TX
  • Corpus Christi, TX
  • San Diego, CA;
  • Long Beach, CA;
  • Hueneme, CA
  • Oakland, CA;
  • Concord, CA
  • Tacoma, WA
  • Indian Island, WA
  • Ports of Anchorage, AK
  • Guam

Consolidated Target Port List:

Obviously there is some overlap from list to list. Putting them all together and grouping them by district we get these 30 ports:

CCGD1:

  • Bath, Me–Major Naval shipbuilder
  • Groton, CT–Submarine base
  • Hudson River complex, New York, NY/Elizabeth and Bayonne, NJ–a major cultural target, #3 US Port by tonnage, #2 Container port, #4 Cruise ship port (NYC) and #13 cruise ship port (Cape Liberty, NJ), Strategic Seaport (Elizabeth)

CCGD5:

  • Delaware Bay–Strategic Seaport (Philadelphia)
  • Chesapeake Bay Complex, VA–Base for aircraft carriers and submarines, Major naval shipbuilder, #14 port by tonnage, #7 container port; plus water route to Washington, DC (major cultural target) and Baltimore, MD–#9 port by tonnage, #10 container port, #12 cruise ship port, Strategic Seaport (Norfolk and Newport News)
  • Morehead City, NC–Strategic Seaport
  • Cape Fear River–Strategic Seaport (Sunny Point and Wilmington, NC)

CCGD7:

  • Charleston, SC–#9 container port, #15 cruise ship port, Strategic Seaport
  • Savannah, GA–#4 container port Strategic Seaport
  • Jacksonville complex, FL (including Kings Bay, GA)–SSBNs, Navy Base Mayport, #14 cruise ship port, Strategic Seaport
  • Port Canaveral, FL–#3 Cruise Ship port
  • Port Everglades/Fort Lauderdale, FL–#13 container port, #2 Cruise Ship port
  • Miami, FL–#11 container port, #1 Cruise Ship port
  • San Juan, PR–#5 Cruise Ship port, #15 container port
  • Tampa, FL–#7 Cruise Ship port

CCGD8:

  • Mobile, AL–major naval shipbuilder, #12 port by tonnage
  • Pascagoula, MS–major naval shipbuilder
  • Gulfport, MS–Strategic Seaport
  • Mississippi River Complex, LA–#14 container port,#10 Cruise Ship port (NOLA), #1 port by tonnage (South Louisiana), #6 port by tonnage (NOLA), #8 port by tonnage (Baton Rouge), #10 port by tonnage (Port of Plaquemines)
  • Lake Charles, LA–#11 port by tonnage
  • Sabine Pass complex (Beaumont/Port Author/Orange, TX)–#4 port by tonnage (Beaumont), Strategic Seaport (both Beaumont and Port Author)
  • Houston/Galveston/Texas City, TX–#2 port by tonnage (Houston),  #13 port by tonnage (Texas City), #5 container port (Houston), #6 Cruise ship port (Galveston)
  • Corpus Christi, TX–#7 port by tonnage, Strategic Seaport

CCGD11:

  • San Diego–Base for aircraft carriers and submarines, major naval shipbuilder (NASSCO), Strategic Seaport
  • Los Angeles/Long Beach/Port Hueneme, CA–A major cultural target, #5 port by tonnage (Long Beach), #9 port by tonnage (Los Angeles), #1 container port (Los Angeles), #3 container port (Long Beach), #9 cruise Ship port (Long Beach), #11 cruise ship port (Los Angeles), Strategic Seaport (Long Beach and Port Hueneme)
  • San Francisco Bay complex–A major cultural target, #6 container port (Oakland), Strategic Seaport (Oakland and Concord)

CCGD13:

  • Puget Sound Complex, Seattle/Tacoma, WA–Base for aircraft carriers (Bremerton), SSBNs (Bangor), and submarines, major naval bases, #8 container port (Seattle), #10 container port (Tacoma), #8 Cruise ship port (Seattle), Strategic Seaport (Indian Island and Tacoma, WA)

CCGD14:

  • Honolulu/Pearl Harbor–Major Naval base, including submarines
  • Apra, Guam–Submarine Base, Strategic Seaport

CCGD17:

  • Anchorage, AK–Strategic Seaport

Homeport:

If we complete the “Program of Record” we will have 33 major cutters, 8 Bertholf class and 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters. The Bertolf class are already planned to go to Charleston, Alameda (San Francisco Bay), and Honolulu, HI, three ports on the target list. The 25 OPCs might best be distributed among eight or nine ports (7 ports with three ships and either one with four or two with two each). That would only cover at most 12 ports.

Looking at it another way, if we assumed that these 33 ships were all successfully using the “crew rotation concept” and were available 225 days a year, that would give us 20.3 ships available on an average day. Certainly, not all of these are going to be available because some will be in Alaska and some will be in the Eastern Pacific. Hopefully the Western Pacific will also be patrolled and some will be in training.

Observations:

The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) will be based in San Diego and Mayport. Since the new cutters will share systems with the LCS, there will be a strong case for homeporting at least some of the OPCs in San Diego and Mayport.

Even though the Gulf of Mexico ports may appear somewhat protected by the relatively narrow entrances, the proximity of Mexican waters also means that it may be only a relatively short run from Mexican waters to a US port. That cuts the reaction time available to detect an anomaly, decide there is a need for an intercept, and sortie a cutter to intercept it. (We could say the same thing about San Diego and LA/Long Beach.)

Looking at the distribution of ports and the current distribution of cutters, it looks like CGD8 (Gulf of Mexico) needs more than the two 210s currently assigned. The proposal to put three MECs in Panama City looks like a good idea even if Panama City itself doesn’t look like a likely target because of the proximity of Mobile, Pascagoula, Gulfport and the Mississippi Delta. Undoubtedly there are support facilities in the area. Still it is on the Eastern extreme of the District and not centrally located relative to these ports. Mobile or Gulfport are more centrally located.

Another place we might want to put assets is Naval Station Ingleside, next to Corpus Christi. Ingleside is currently the home of all the Navy’s US based Mine-Warfare ships. The port was originally intended to support a carrier battlegroup, but with the reduced size of the navy and with Littoral Combat ships (which will be based in San Diego and Mayport) assuming the Mine Warfare role and replacing the Minesweepers and Minehunters, Ingleside is certain to have unused capacity. It would give the Coast Guard a base in the Western half of the Gulf of Mexico.

There are obvious advantages to basing in San Diego. It is not just a Naval Base, it is one of two US ports where Littoral Combat Ships will be based and LCS share systems with the new cutters. Training, Logistical, and technical support should be excellent. Still of all the US ports, San Diego is the least likely to need additional Coast Guard help in defending the port. We might do better to base ships in LA/Long Beach which is still close enough to enjoy some benefit from the proximity to San Diego.

We could probably say something similar about the Chesapeake Bay Complex. A Coast Guard boarding party delivered by a WPB or riding a Destroyer  is probably all the help they will need in defending the port.

Notably, missing from my target ports list are Boston MA; Key West, FL; the Columbia River/Portland, OR, and Kodiak, AK, suggesting, at least from this limited point of view, these may not be the best choices of homeport. These four ports are currently homeport to nine large cutters. Boston surprised me. There are several potential targets of historical significance in Boston that might attract attention, including the USS Constitution.

The Problem:

Only if we stopped doing anything else, could we, perhaps, provide enough large cutters to provide a reasonable assurance of being able to intercept a medium to large ship suspected to having terrorist intentions, on our top 20 ports. Even if we did this, there would still be other targets that would not be protected.

All along, I have been saying our cutter are not adequately armed to have a high probability of being able to stop such a vessel. I think this shows that, in fact, there is a good chance we might not have a major cutter capable of making such an intercept in the first place.

If my arguments are not convincing, it is not necessary to accept my conclusions, test the hypothesis. Form a red cell to conduct a series of random paper exercises against the Maritime Domain Awareness system. For each exercise, have the red cell pick a target and lay out a ship’s track. Note when the track might be detected and the probability of detection, if missed on the first opportunity, when would it have been detected? add how long to evaluate? how long to make a decision? how long to communicate? Note where our potential intercepting vessels are, and how long it would take to assign them the task and how long would it take to intercept. We don’t actually need to move any assets, but after several repetitions, we should have an idea how good our current system actually is.

The WPB/WPC Alternative:

We could solve this problem and obviate the need to even consider maritime security in the basing of large cutters, if we gave the job of intercepting potential terrorist vessel to the WPCs and WPBs and armed them properly for the task.

All the potential target ports have WPBs and/or WPCs either in the port or nearby, and in many cases they have three or more.

The necessary weapons are neither large nor expensive–a couple of light weight torpedoes to stop larger vessels and some Hellfire or Griffin class small anti-surface missiles to deal with small, fast, highly maneuverable threats. There are currently no US made dedicated anti-surface torpedoes, but they would not be hard to make. Meanwhile, it might be possible to use Mk46 or Mk54 torpedoes by selecting the right minimum and maximum search depths, if the right options are available. The smaller cutters might actually have advantages in speed, maneuverability, and shallow draft.

The Aviation Alternative:

There is perhaps an assumption that there are plenty of forces in the US to deal with this problem, so why do we need to beef up the Coast Guard.  But utilizing those forces will require changes to the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Army and the way they work.

Conceivably we could send a Coast Guard helicopter, supported by a DOD aircraft, off shore to tell a suspicious vessel to heave to until we can send a vessel, most probably a WPC or WPB, to board and inspect  the vessel. If they refuse to stop, even after using the airborne use of force package to fire across the bow, or if they proved hostile to the boarding party, it could be attacked by DOD aircraft.

Unfortunately it seems the other armed forces do not readily embark on missions that have not been approved, exercised, and briefed well in advance. So far, I have seen no evidence we have been doing exercises that would make this alternative feasible. DOD units in the US are here to rest, train and reequip. Nothing could be more alien to most of them than to attack a merchant vessel of the US coast. We saw this lack of preparedness on 9/11 when two F-16s launched with the intention of ramming one of the hijacked aircraft because they had no weapons. Now there are aircraft prepared for Air-to-Air, but I suspect anti-ship preparedness is much as it was pre-9/11.

The Navy Alternative:

This is really a Navy mission that we have somehow accepted responsibility for, allowing the Navy to base their ships in the most efficient manner, while they show the flag everywhere in the world except in our own waters.

If we cannot do this job, we need to make the Department, the Administration, and the Navy understand that we cannot be held responsible for a task we have not been properly equipped to perform and that while the Coast Guard will assist, this is really not our job, its the Navy’s.

I don’t really think we want to do that. It is giving up. It is repudiating the idea that the Coast Guard is a real armed force, with real military missions.

Conclusion:

We really need to start acting like we believe these threats are credible. We need to be brutally honest in appraising the Coast Guard’s current weaknesses, and we need a sense of urgency in addressing those weaknesses.

Giving the Maritime Security job to the WPCs and WPBs and equipping them accordingly is fastest, cheapest route to a credible capability. Otherwise there is a good chance some poor JG, his crew, and his boat, armed with only a couple of .50 cal. may be the only thing standing between a much larger and possibly better armed terrorist controlled ship and its target.

 

 

Lighter Than Air Maritime Domain Awareness with Chinese Characteristics

Popular Science reports the Chinese have begun testing a largely solar powered airship capable of carrying heavy loads to high altitude (20,000 meters/65,600 feet) and remaining aloft for up to six months.

The airship is expected to have a role similar to that envisioned for the US Army’s JLENS currently being tested with apparently limited success in the Washington DC area, but it would cover a much larger area than the JLENS aerostats.

From its high altitude it can theoretically maintain radar and visual surveillance over a hundred thousand square miles.

The prototype seen in the accompanying video looks much less impressive, but remember that the gas will expand many times, filling out the envelop.

“Sailing into the Future with the United States Coast Guard”–NavalHistory.org

Interesting piece from the US Naval Institute’s Naval History Blog.

In honor of the United States Coast Guard, which turned 225 years old this week, the Naval History Blog offers a selection from a speech delivered by A. Denis Clift, Vice President for Planning and Operations at the United States Naval Institute.

It primarily deals with the Coast Guard’s growing role in the National Intelligence organization and is a bit old, dating from 2000, but it fills in some history I was not aware of, and seems to demonstrate a lot of continuity in mission requirements. It even delves into Coast Guard Intelligence operations during Prohibition.

Thanks to Lee for bring this to my attention.

Kites for Energy Savings and Maritime Domain Awareness

gCaptain is reporting that, since 2012, the Irish Naval Service has been experimenting with using kite sails to give their ships a fuel saving boost and to hoist aloft surveillance equipment up to 300 meters (1000 feet) into the air.  They now consider the technology mature enough to be commercialized.

Putting sensors at 1000 feet gives a horizon distance of 38.7 miles compared with 8.7 miles for a more typical height of 50 feet.

The Irish Naval Service, their missions, and their ships look more like the US Coast Guard than the US Navy. This technology might have applications for the Coast Guard. Perhaps it is worth a look by the Research and Development Center.

It looks like the Navy may be working on something that looks similar, TALONS, but is only intended to hoist sensors, not improve fuel economy.

Document Alert–National Military Strategy, 2015

The US has issued a new National Military Strategy. You can see it in pdf form here, or you can see it on the Naval Institute News Service here.

Its not really very long. There are only 18 pages of text. Even so, I will provide a “Readers’ Digest” version, or perhaps more properly, a powerpoint version, in that it is in outline form, and offer only limited Coast Guard related comment.

U.S. ENDURING NATIONAL INTERESTS

  • The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners.
  •  A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.
  • Respect for universal values at home and around the world.
  • A rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS 

  • The survival of the Nation.
  • The prevention of catastrophic attack against U.S. territory.
  • The security of the global economic system.
  • The security, confidence, and reliability of our allies.
  • The protection of American citizens abroad.
  • The preservation and extension of universal values.

NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES 

  • Deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries.
  • Disrupt, degrade, and defeat violent extremist organizations.
  • Strengthen our global network of allies and partners.

PRIORITIES

  1. Maintain a secure and effective nuclear deterrent 
  2. Provide for military defense of the homeland 
  3. Defeat an adversary 
  4. Provide a global, stabilizing presence 
  5. Combat terrorism 
  6. Counter weapons of mass destruction 
  7. Deny an adversary’s objectives 
  8. Respond to crisis and conduct limited contingency operations 
  9. Conduct military engagement and security cooperation 
  10. Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations 
  11. Provide support to civil authorities 
  12. Conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response

There is nothing here that adds to the Coast Guard’s “to do list.” There is no specific mention of the Coast Guard or any other service for that matter. They do talk about working with DHS partners, and a couple of times they mention Coast Guardsmen along with an enumeration of all other types of US military personnel.

There is a recognition of the “Violent Extremist Organization” either acting alone or with support of a Nation State in a form of “Hybrid Warfare.”

DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND

There may be more emphasis on “defense of the homeland,” but we are a long way from providing the kind of commitment to this, that we saw in the late 1950s and early 60s when we had Nike missile launchers around every US city and hundreds of interceptors on strip alert around the country. At that time there were also Naval Sea Frontiers that were ready to respond to naval threats.

DOD has recently begun to talk about defense against cruise missiles, but really, it is easier to get a weapon of mass destruction into the country by boat than by missile or aircraft.

I would like to particularly highlight the explanation that accompanies the #2 priority, after #1–maintaining a nuclear deterrent,  because it certainly involves the Coast Guard,

Provide for Military Defense of the Homeland.  Emerging state and non-state capabilities pose varied and direct threats to our homeland.  Thus we are striving to interdict attack preparations abroad, defend against limited ballistic missile attacks, and protect cyber systems and physical infrastructure.  Key homeland defense capabilities include resilient space-based and terrestrial indications and warning systems; an integrated intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination architecture; a Ground-Based Interceptor force; a Cyber Mission Force; and, ready ground, air and naval forces, (emphasis applied–Chuck).  We also are leveraging domestic and regional partnerships to improve information sharing and unity of effort.  These capabilities will better defend us against both high technology threats and terrorist dangers.

Make no mistake, for countering any covert maritime surface threat to the US, the Coast Guard is the “ready naval force,” that is ready to investigate possible hostile contacts. Even if the US had aircraft armed and ready to engage surface vessels, which I doubt, I don’t think anyone is going to send aircraft to sink a ship based on a suspicion, however well founded, that the ship has some nefarious intent. Someone is going to have stop the vessel and attempt a boarding.  Navy Bases are few and far between. The only Navy surface combatant on the Atlantic coast based North of the Norfolk complex is the USS Constitution. The only surface ships based on the East Coast are around Norfolk and Jacksonville. On the West Coast they are either in Everett or San Diego. There are none based in Alaska and none on the Gulf Coast. Unless they are holding a Navy Day, celebration the majority of US ports are hundreds of miles from the nearest Navy surface combatant.

The Coast Guard’s position ought to be that we see a problem here, and the Coast Guard is the solution (and here I am not talking about the larger cutters, because they are either going to be deployed or in some sort of stand down if they are in port). The vessels that are going to do the stopping and boarding are most likely to be WPCs or WPBs, but currently they are not really armed to handle anything much more threatening than an angry outboard.

In addition to better weapons, we certainly need to continue to exploit the DOD’s intelligence organization and the Navy’s Maritime Domain Awareness hopefully including JLENS if they become more than prototypes.

REACTION. Of course the Chinese had a comment, as did Russia, “Clearly Anit-Russsian.”

Towed Airborne Lift of Naval Systems (TALONS)

DARPA’s Towed Airborne Lift of Naval Systems (TALONS) effort seeks to develop a low-cost, fully automated parafoil system to extend small ships’ long-distance communications and improve their maritime domain awareness. DARPA developed TALONS as part of Tern, a joint program between DARPA and the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Research that seeks to enable forward-deployed small ships to serve as mobile launch and recovery sites for medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial systems.

Navy Recognition reports on two initiatives that are part of the TERN,  “a joint program between DARPA and the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Research that seeks to enable forward-deployed small ships to serve as mobile launch and recovery sites for medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial systems.”

We have talked about TERN before, it is intended to allow the LCS and similar sized ships to have persistent overhead surveillance by Unmanned Air Systems (UAS). The post talks about a launch and recovery system for fixed wing UAS, “SideArm,” but there is also this discussion of a towed system that looks like it might be applicable to units as small as WPBs and give them many of the advantages of a UAS with far less overhead.

DARPA’s TALONS effort seeks to develop a low-cost, fully automated parafoil system to extend small ships’ long-distance communications and improve their maritime domain awareness. Towed behind boats or ships, TALONS could carry ISR and communications payloads of up to 150 pounds between 500 and 1,500 feet in altitude—many times higher than current ships’ masts—and greatly extend the equipment’s range and effectiveness. Following successful ground-based tests, DARPA will conduct at-sea testing this year and potentially transition the technology to the U.S. Navy.

Why is this important? With a mast head height of say 36 feet the horizon distance is only about 7 nautical miles. Go to 500 feet and it is over 26 miles. Go to 1500 feet and it is over 45 miles. Effectively search widths could be multiplied several times over.

It doesn’t take much power to keep a parafoil up. In my neighborhood, there is a good sized man who flies a powered foot launched version out of our local open space. He has the engine and prop on his back, launches into the wind with just a short walk or run. Landings are frequently at walking speeds. That people (admittedly braver than I) are willing to entrust their lives to these things has to say something about their reliability.

(Historical note: During WWII, the Germans used an manned unpowered autogyro, the Focke-Achgelis FA-330, that was towed behind U-boats in an effort to extend their visible horizon.)

Mini-Aegis Possible for Corvette (or Cutter) Sized Ships

NavyRecognition reports on the presentation of the Raytheon’s AN/SPY6(V) Air and Missile Defense Radar at the recently completed SEA-AIR-SPACE trade show.

This is the radar that has been selected to go on the Flight III version of the Burke class DDG. Most of the emphasis has been on larger installations, but the good news for the Coast Guard is that these systems are modular, based on two foot square elements than each constitute a separate radar, so that it can be scaled down as well as up. These fixed arrays would normally be arranged with four arrays positioned to each cover a 90 degree sector. Raytheon claims arrays consisting of nine elements arranged in a 3×3 square (6 ft x 6 ft) provides performance similar to the 12 foot octagonal AN/SPY-1D on existing Burke class DDGs. It appears the intention is that the Flight III ships will have roughly octagonal arrays consisting of 37 elements, 14 foot across. There is also an option for an even larger array of 69 elements in an octagonal 18 foot diameter array.

These radars are reportedly capable of performing virtually every type of radar function including air and surface search and firecontrol. Reportedly the radar will be “qualified” in 2017 and the initial operational capability will be attained in 2023, presumably with the first flight III DDG.

When might we consider using these?

The Bertholf was commissioned in 2008 so the class will start needing mid-life renovations some time after 2023.

The Offshore Patrol Cutter construction program is expected to be stretched out with funding over 15 years and deliveries will probably extend from FY2021 to FY2035. Over so long a period it would not be unreasonable to expect that there will be a “B class” with updated systems. By that time, these systems may be so common it may be reasonable to replace the planned radar suite with these fixed systems.

At the very least, at some point it might be advisable to convert at least one of each class to accept this or a similar system as a prototype for war emergency conversion. This might be something DOD would pay for.