Category Archives: Weapons

“AGAINST THE GROWING ANTI-SHIP MISSILE THREAT, ARE WE TRULY SEMPER PARATUS?”–CIMSEC

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CIMSEC has a new post that is worth the read, “Against the Growing Anti-ship Missile Threat, Are We Truly Semper Paratus?” It is the first of two parts.

Pointing toward the increasing ubiquity of anti-ship missiles, it suggests that we install the SeaRAM system in place of the Phalanx on the Bertholf class National Security Cutters (NSC), and that we also install the system on the Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) and the new icebreakers.

With the Commandant’s proposal,  that the new administration send cutters to the Western Pacific to counter Chinese aggressiveness, better self-defense systems make more sense than ever.

Fitting the system to at least a couple of West Coast NSCs that might be available for WestPAC deployment should be relatively straight forward since the systems have much in common with the Phalanx system it would replace. SeaRAM would have the additional benefit of increasing the ships anti-surface capability as well.

Coast Guard and CG Manned Vessels Lost in World War II

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uss-menges-de-320torpedodamage

Coast Guard manned destroyer escort USS Menges (DE-320) showing the effects of an acoustic homing torpedo hit on the stern.

It is entirely appropriate for Veteran’s Day weekend reading, but this post was prompted by a recent update of the list of “Top Ten Posts.” I found that the 2011 post “What Does It Take to Sink a Ship?” was not only the top post since I started writing, it is also the top post of 2016. That looked at Navy major surface combatant losses in WWII, but I realized I have never surveyed the Coast Guard’s WWII losses.

This began as another shameless attempt to get the Coast Guard to recognize that they need torpedoes to stop medium to large ships, but it grew into a more comprehensive look at CG losses in WII. I did find that six (or seven, Escanaba?) Coast Guard or CG manned vessels were hit by torpedoes and in every case the ship was either sunk (four or five?) or immobilized (two).

I found a couple of good sources. “The Coast Guard at War” is a series of monographs completed shortly after WWII (between 1045 and 1950) and most of the apparently 25 volumes are available in pdf format here, along with a lot of other WWII references. In particular I used The Coast Guard At War: Lost Cutters (Official History Series, Volume VIII, 1947). It lists the loss of 16 Coast Guard vessels and the loss of 12 Coast Guard manned Navy vessels, but two of these (one Navy and one CG) were actually after the war was over. My other source was “U. S. Coast Guard Ship Losses” by Jim Gill, on the US Coast Guard Light Ship Sailors Association International web site. This source identifies 40 losses beginning with the Tahoma in 1914 up to USCGC Mesquite (WLB-305), grounded in 1989. It included three losses not listed in the official history, all by torpedoes:

  • (FS-255), a small Army freighter, 560 tons, torpedoed and sunk by a Japanese submarine while anchored, 11 May 1945, with the loss of four men.
  • USS Menges (DE-320), 1,590 tons, torpedoed while on convoy duty, 4 May, 1944, the ship survived severe damage to her stern, but there were 31 dead.
  • USS Etamin (AK-93), 7,176 tons, which was hit by a hit by an air launched torpedo and damaged badly enough that it was decommissioned and was used subsequently as an unpowered floating warehouse. One dead.

Coast Guard Vessels Lost:

The Coast Guard lost 15 vessels during the course of WWII. Of those, three are believed to be the result of enemy action. Of the remaining 12, eight were a result of adverse weather. 214 Coast Guardsmen were killed in these 15 incidents.

The three ships presumed loss to enemy action included the three largest Coast Guard vessels lost during the war:

CG 85006, 67 tons, was destroyed by an explosion, probably gasoline vapors, 27 Mar.’43, four dead.

CG 58012, 30 tons, was destroyed by fire, 2 May ’43, no fatalities.

CG 83421, 44 tons, was sunk in a collision, 30 June ’43, no fatalities.

USCGC Bodega (WYP-342), 588 tons, went aground attempting to assist another vessel, 20 Dec. ’43, no fatalities.

The eight vessels lost to foul weather were:

ls73

LV 73 on the Vineyard Sound station where she served from 1924 through 1944.  On 14 September 1944 she was carried off station during a hurricane and sank with the loss of all hands.

It might be assumed that the non-combat casualties were not war related, but that might not be the case. The urgency of the missions, the diversion of more capable ships to escort duty, the influx of inexperienced personnel placed in responsible positions, and the use of vessels pressed into service for which they may have been ill-suited, were all a result of the war, and it led to crews being placed in more danger than would have been the case in peacetime.

Coast Guard Manned Navy Vessels Lost:

Of the eleven Coast Guard manned US Navy ships lost during WWII, seven were lost to enemy action, the others were:

  • LST 203, 2,366 tons, was stranded after an intentional beaching, 1 Oct. ’43, no fatalities.
  • LST-69, 2,366 tons, destroyed in the West Loch disaster, 21 May ’44, no fatalities.
  • USS Serpens (AK-97), 14,250 tons, destroyed as a result of an apparent internal explosion of its cargo, 29 Jan. ’45, 196 CG fatalities. (Largest single loss of CG personnel)
  • USS Sheepscot (AOG-24), 2,270 tons, driven ashore by adverse weather, 6 June ’45, no fatalities.

serpens_ak-97

USS Serpens (AK-97)  US Navy photo #NH 89186, from the collections of the US Naval Historical Center, courtesy William H Davis, 1997

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USS Sheepscot (AOG-24) underway, August 1944, US Navy photo

Those lost to enemy action were:

USCGCMuskeget(WAG-48)

Photo: USCGC Muskeget, seen here before conversion to a weather ship. http://www.navsource.org/archives/09/49/49048.htm

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“LST discharges supplies. . .”; no date (November, 1943?); Photo No. 3237; photographer unknown. The Coast Guard-manned LST-69 disembarks equipment during the Tarawa invasion.

Leopold_DE-319

USS Leopold (DE-319) being launched. 

File:Lci-convoy.jpg

Normandy Invasion, June 1944 A convoy of Landing Craft Infantry (Large) sails across the English Channel toward the Normandy Invasion beaches on “D-Day”, 6 June 1944. Each of these landing craft is towing a barrage balloon for protection against low-flying German aircraft. Photograph from the U.S. Coast Guard Collection in the U.S. National Archives. Photo #: 26-G-2333

lci93_omaha_1_300

“SHE FELT THE NAZIS’ WRATH:” A U.S. Coast Guard infantry landing craft still flies its flag, though knocked out of the invasion, ripped and wounded on the beaches of France. Moving in for a landing, the LCI ran afoul of an underwater obstruction, which tore a gaping hole in her bow. Then as its cargo of troops piled ashore, Nazi shells battered her out of further action.”; no date; Photo No. 2395; photographer unknown.

Conclusion:

It may be surprising that it appears the Coast Guard lost two and half to three times as many men in Coast Guard manned Navy vessels, as in Coast Guard vessels.

According to the Coast Guard history web site,

Two hundred and fourteen thousand two hundred and thirty-nine persons served in the Coast Guard during World War II.  That number included 12,846 women.  The Coast Guard lost a total of 1,917 persons during the war with 574 losing their life in action, “died of wounds” received in action, or perishing as a “Prisoner of War.”

These incidents account over 40% of all lives lost and a majority of lives lost as a result of enemy action.

Hobby Drones as Terrorist Weapons

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Since ISIS’s successful weaponization of a commercially available “drone,” as a flying improvised explosive device (IED), there has been a lot of discussion about the possibility of using hobby drones, or the technology associated with them, as a sort of poor man’s guided missile.
War on the Rocks’ “The Democratization of Air Power: the Insurgent and the Drone,” by T.  X. Hammes, Oct. 18, 2016, does a great job of outlining the potential dangers. In particular I can see that his suggestion that they could be used to employ a small explosively formed projectile to attack the wing tanks of parked aircraft could be very effective.
As a beginning drone pilot (I have both an FAA licence for drones and FCC radio amateur radio license to allow use of transmissions of more than 25 milliwatts) I thought perhaps I could put some of this into context, but I found another post, also from “War on the Rocks,” that probably does a better job than I could. “Why the IED Threat Has Barely Started” by Mark Jacobsen.
Still I would like to make some small points:
Capabilities:
When they think of drones, many, perhaps most people, will think of multi-rotors, those strange new aircraft that fly on, usually four, electric motors, but they can have amost any number three or more. They can pack an amazing degree of electronic sophistication into very small and relatively cheap packages. These can include auto pilots with GPS navigation with waypoints. The Phantom 4 is an example of the state of the art. The FAA now considers all radio controlled aircraft as “drones.”
File:DJI Phantom 4 in Flight March 2016.jpg
 Photo: DJI Phantom 4, by Doobybutch
Multi-rotors are all electric powered. Their range is limited and usually they are controlled by 2.4 GHz radios of limited output. Their visual systems that allow real time control are usually 5.8 GHz. These are short range, line of sight and can be blocked by trees and terrain.  In fact all the frequencies that are used to control and provide video for hobby UAVs (910MHz, 1.2-1.3GHz (1200-1300MHz), 2.4 GHz, and 5.8 GHZ in the US) are line of sight systems.
The are not the only potential platforms. Autopilot and navigation systems can also be applied to fixed wing aircraft or surface vessels as well as multi-rotors, and if internal combustion engines are used, they can have very long ranges. At least one fixed wing drone has crossed the Atlantic. On the other hand internal combustion systems are generally noisy and sacrifice the advantage of quiet approach enjoyed by electric systems.
Implications:
Range against moving targets like ships is limited. Fixed targets with a known geographic position can, at least theoretically, be attacked at much longer ranges.
(gCaptain has a series of ship chase videos, including the one above, that illustrate what can be done in terms of piloting a drone out to intercept a ship. The videos are all about ten to twelve minutes long. That is a typical quadcopter endurance. The Phantom 4 now claims an endurance of 28 minutes. This is a round trip and an attack would only require one way. Still the range may be less than the two way range shown because of limits on the reach of the control systems)
Reliably extending real time control beyond a couple of milles may require special transmitting antenna.
Payloads for hobby systems are very small. Most are designed for, at most, a camera like a “Go-Pro” (about 6 oz. while a typical hangrenade is about 14 oz.). Carrying greater weight will generally require a trade-off in reduced range.
Countermeasures:
The DOD is taking the small UAS threat seriously, as evidenced here and here.
For attacking moving targets, the operator requires a controlling signal from the control transmitter and, if the target is beyond the operators ability to observe both the target and the relatively small drone, a video signal from the drone. Neither of these signals is encrypted, though the typical 2.4 GHz control signal is usually frequency agile. Disrupting either signal for an extended period may result in loss of control. Early command guided missiles during were defeated relatively easily using electronic countermeasures. The presence of these signals may serve to alert the possibility of an attack.
Attacking fixed targets at a known position requires only GPS, but this signal can be rendered inaccurate with GPS blocking or spoofing.
A directed electro-magnetic pulse may be able to fry internal circuits that are built with no apparent reason for hardening.
What does it mean to us?:
The threat to parked aircraft is real, but our own aircraft are unlikely to be a target, except perhaps for those working in SOUTHCOM.
The Navy might reasonably worry about one of these taking off from a dhow or near shore in the Straits of Hormuz or Bab-el-Mendab, as a carrier passes through and having a drone attack a plane on deck in hopes of causing a major conflagration. Of course, the drone is more likely just trying to get a video from an unusual angle. We don’t really have to worry about that happening in a US port, because carriers fly off their airwings before returning to homeport.
There is the possibility of a drone attacking the bridge of a ship as it approaches a turn in a narrow channel, and the ship running aground or colliding with a bridge or another ship in the resuting confusion.
The Future:
Battery technology has been advancing very rapidly and likely will continue to do so, giving electric drones greater range.
There is some concern that future development may allow target recognition allowing the drones to pursue a moving target without operator control.
I like the summary from  “Why the IED Threat Has Barely Started”

“We cannot afford to be complacent and should not infer too much from the relative absence of flying IED attacks thus far. Yes, small drones have proliferated rapidly, but the technology is still in its toddler years, and today’s widely available consumer drones are not ideal weapons. It is the next generation of drone technology that has me worried, and it will be here soon.”

China Acknowledges Building Cutter to be Upgraded to Frigate in Crisis

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The National Interest reports that the Chinese have openly acknowledged that their newest Coast Guard cutter is being built with provision for upgrading to frigate status should a need arise.

Moreover they were apparently influenced by the example of the USCG during WWII.

In the same issue of this magazine, published by the major Chinese shipbuilding conglomerate China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), builder of the Type 818, there is not coincidentally a very detailed article about U.S. Coast Guard cutters in combat during the Second World War. That article explains that both USCGC Campbell and also USCGC Spencer were able to sink German U-boats (U-606 and U-175 respectively) during the pivotal Battle of the Atlantic. Most of the article examines the operations of 10 American USCG cutters that were 76.2 meters in length and built between 1928 and 1932. These ships were transferred to the hard pressed Royal Navy (RN) during 1941-42 and achieved an enviable war record in RN service, sinking both U-522 and U-954 – the latter with Germany Navy Commander Karl Donitz’s son aboard. The analysis notes that, according to UK naval records, the American cutters were viewed so favorably as to be rated as “surpassing each kind of comparable British designed frigate.” These ships are labeled as an “ideal anti-submarine escort ship” [理想的反潜护航舰] and the implications for the CCG going forward are obvious.

They actually sold the cutters a bit short. The 327s actually sank at least three and probably four U-boats and the ten 76.2 meter cutters, the 250 foot Lake Class, sank three submarines (two U-boats and an Italian). Six subs sunk by 17 ships may not sound particularly impressive, but in fact by comparison, it was spectacular.

The new Type 818 cutters are based on the Type 054 frigates. Its not too much of a stretch to expect them to be upgunned with the same weapons found on the “parent craft,” but if the time ever comes, there may be better systems available for upgrading the cutters or they might be given different capabilities to support emerging missions. That can be an advantage of having ships with unused upgadability.

The Type 054 are only slightly smaller than the Bertholf class, displacement 4,053 tons full load, length 134.1 m (440 ft), beam 16 m (52 ft), 30,400 HP, 27 knots, compared to the Bertholf’s 4,500 tons, 127.4 m (418 ft), 16.46 m (54 ft), 49,875 HP, and 28 knots. They actually appear to be the same size as the Offshore Patrol Cutters, but their design leans more toward higher speed. Their range is not as great as the OPC at about 8,000 miles compared to the OPCs’ 10,200, but it is a greater range than USN frigates enjoyed.

The Chinese have learned a lesson from USCG experience in World War II. I wonder if it is a lesson we may have forgotten.

Thanks to Luke for bringing this to my attention. 

White Hulls Must Prepare for Gray Zone Challenges–USNI

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The US Naval Institute’s 2016 Coast Guard Essay Contest winner, “White Hulls Must Prepare for Gray Zone Challenges,” by LCdr.Craig Allen, Jr., USCG is worth the read.

Much of the focus is on the PATFORSWA and LCdr Allen seems to know where of he speaks.

“Lieutenant Commander Allen is a cutterman assigned to the Office of Defense Operations at Coast Guard Headquarters. He previously commanded the Sentinel-class cutter USCGC William Flores (WPC-1103) and the USCGC Baranof (WPB-1318), an Island-class cutter forward deployed to Manama, Bahrain. He also served as the executive officer of the USCGC Tornado (WPC-14), a Cyclone-class patrol craft. Commander Allen is a 2014 graduate of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College.”

But as he points out. These “Gray Zones” are not limited to SW Asia. We see them in South East Asia, East Africa, West Africa, and even in Central and South America.

While the post concentrates on crew preparation, I think its appropriate to point out an observation by Vice Adm. Joseph Mulloy, deputy chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources, that attacks like those on the USS Mason, where a non-state actor employed cruise missiles are likely to become more common.

Maybe adding a CIWS (preferably the SeaRAM) to the OPC might not be a bad idea.

What Might a Wartime OPC Weapons Fit Look Like?

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opc-eastern

Four years ago I wrote a post suggesting that the Offshore Patrol Cutter might be designed from the start for a wartime weapons fit, but then fit them out with only those systems required for their peacetime missions, which might have included only its helicopter, UAS, and 25 mm Mk38 Mod2 gun(s).

I started with the assumption that the OPC should be able to mount a weight of weapons at least equal to those mounted on the 255 foot Owasco class cutters as built during World War II (140-150 tons). This figure did not include ammunition other than depth charges, consequently, nearly all the weight was above the main deck. This now appears very conservative in that the Eastern OPC design is about twice the size of the Owasco Class. (For another data point, when built, the USS Fletcher, first of a class of 175 destroyers with a design displacement of 2,700 tons, had 161.8 tons of armaments and 190.8 tons of ammunition.)

In the earlier post, a possible wartime outfit that I believed might be used for designing the ship (and the weights I used) included:

Total 124.4 tons

Since we now have a notional design for the cutter and my own views have changed somewhat, I thought it might be worthwhile to revisit how this class might be armed in wartime. The design may have ruled out some of the systems above, but the surprisingly large size suggest it should be fairly adaptable.

In fact it looks like the OPC could be turned into a credible warship adding only deck mounted systems that require only minimal deck penetration for cabling and the like.

What’s already there?:

Based on earlier information, as built, the design will includes provision for

For a total of 28.55 tons

Anti-Ship Cruise Missile:

 LRASM_TSL_Concept_Lockheed_Martin
LRASM topside launcher concept. The size and weight are comparable to launchers for Harpoon. Photo: Lockheed Martin.
Currently there are three potential anti-ship cruise missiles that might be used, Harpoon, LRASM, and Naval Strike Missile. Harpoon weighs 1,523 lb (691 kg) with a 488 pounds (221 kg) a warhead. Naval Strike missile is smaller, longer ranged, and more intelligence with a weight of 900 lbs (410 kg) with a 276 (125 kg) warhead. LRASM is the newest and supposedly the most “intelligent.”
As I posted earlier, I think the Coast Guard could use a couple of LRASM on each of their NSCs and OPCs even in peacetime as a means of addressing the threat of a terrorist attack using a medium or large ship. It is the missile’s range (about twice the others) and purported ability to target specific parts of a specific target rather than its larger warhead, that made the LRASM the system of choice for this role.
Reportedly the LRASM deck mount is comparable in size and weight to the Mk141, which is the standard quad deck launcher for Harpoon. The only source I could find, indicated that the weight of a quad Mk141 with missiles is 27,126 lbs or 13.6 tons, or 27.2 tons for an eight missile battery. Still I can’t believe the LRSM will not weigh a bit more than Harpoon, seeing its warhead is twice as large. I will assume a quad deck mount weighs about 15 tons, or 30 tons for an eight missile outfit. In any case, if other types of missiles were used, they would weigh less.
These might be positioned either on the fantail or on the platforms aft of the 57mm and below the bridge, one deck above the foc’sle where it appears they plan to mount .50 caliber machineguns possibly in Mk49 ROSAM.

RGM-84 Harpoon SSM was fired from a Mk-141 missile launcher aboard USS Shiloh (CG 67). The Shiloh’s beam is only one foot more than that of the Offshore Patrol Cutter. Looking at the photo, you can see that the launchers take up well under half the width of the fantail.

opcplacemat

Photo: Click to enlarge

 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile:
It appears it may be possible to equip the OPCs with ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile). A new version of the missile, the ESSM block II, will obviate the need for illuminators that have been required for earlier versions. These would allow the cutter to provide limited local area AAW protection for ships that the cutter might be escorting out up to 25 miles. Additionally they can be used against surface targets.
Using the Mk56 VLS a loaded 12 missile module weighs 11.5 tons. Physically it is not very large. 3.66 m (12 ft) x 2.71 m (9 ft) x 4.65 m (15’3″) high. We could locate one or perhaps two of these on top of the superstructure where they apparently intend to store the third boat.  This may seem relative high in the ship, but it is the same position where the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) Class frigates mounted their 76mm gun and the OPC is considerably beamier (54 vis 45 foot).

harpoonmk56

Photo: Click to enlarge. The relatively small foot print of the Mk56 VLS system (pdf) can be seen here on a Danish Absalon-class command and support ship (beam 64 feet, by comparison the Offshore Patrol Cutters’ beam is 54 feet–same as that of the Bertholf class National Security Cutters).  Two sets are visible in the foreground, one set of twelve with missile canisters with red tops in place to the right, on the ship’s centerline, and a second set of twelve without canisters to the left. The Absalon class has three twelve missile sets, with the third set off camera to the right. 

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Photo: 12 earlier Mk48 mod3 VLS for ESSM seen here mounted on the stern of a 450 ton 177 foot Danish StanFlex300 Flyvefisken class patrol boat.  The Mk56 launchers replace the Mk48s with an approximate 20% weight savings. 
SeaRAM: 
searam_lead_img
This could really be any of three systems, Phalanx, SeaRAM (a modified Phalanx with eleven rolling airframe missiles instead of the 20 mm gun) or the 21 round Mk 49 RAM launcher. Loaded, all three are about 8.5 tons or less.
An operations research study done for Australia “Limitations of Guns as a Defence against Manoeuvring Air Weapons,” (pdf) by Christian Wachsberger, Michael Lucas and Alexander Krstic, Weapons Systems Division, Systems Sciences Laboratory, DSTO-TN-0565 has convinced me that gun systems are unlikely to effective in the future, so for the OPC I would choose two SeaRAM. This has also been chosen for the frigate follow on to the Navy’s LCS.
Two LCS systems could provide automated 360 degree protection against the sudden attack of a coordinated anti-ship missile attack. One system could replace the Mk38 mod2 system currently planned for placement on top of the hangar. A second system could be sited on the superstructure forward and below the bridge, behind and above the 57mm. This might require a small extension of the superstructure to provide a platform sufficiently large enough to both support the system and allow access for maintenance.
AN/SQR-20 Multi-Function Array (Thales CAPTAS 4):
 captas-4_vds_fremm_sna_2016_surface_navy_news_2
Photo: NavyRecognition. Reeling system for the CAPTAS-4 Variable Depth Sonar tether aboard a French Navy FREMM Frigate (Aquitaine class).
If there is a submarine threat, we will need a sonar. Additionally passive towed arrays may be used as a targetting system for anti-ship cruise missiles. In peacetime, a towed array might also be to locate semi-submersibles.
The Thales CAPTAS-4 is one of the systems being considered for the LCS and its frigate derivative. The current version weighs 20.6 tons. The US version will probably be lighter since the Navy is looking for a lighter version for the LCS. Additionally there are lighter options made by Thales and others, so what ever might be chosen is going to be this weight or less. It would of course be mounted on the fantail.

Mk38 mod2/3 and Mk49 ROSAM: 

I will assume that the two Mk49 RO

SAM will be retained and the Mk38 mod2 (or mod3) will be relocated and a second Mk38 (1.15 tons) will be added.

Summary: 

The resulting additions would be:

  • Multi-Function Array (CAPTAS-4) (20.6 tons)
  • MH-60 (11.75 tons)
  • 8 x LRASM (30 tons)
  • 24 x ESSM (23 tons)
  • 2 x SeaRAM (22 missiles) (17 tons)
  • 57mm Mk110 gun w/1000 rounds (15.4 tons)
  • 2 x Mk38 mod2/3 (2.3 tons)
  • 2 x .50 cal. in Mk49 ROSAM (0.25 tons)

This totals 120.3 tons or 91.75 tons more than the planned outfit as built.

We don’t really know if the ship can take this much weight. Assuming it displaces 4,000 tons, which seems likely, this is about a 2.3% increase in displacement and much of the weight is relatively high.

Is it feasible?

There are things that can be done to counterbalance the effects of this additional weight. Some fuel tanks might have to be left permanently full or be converted to ballast tanks. Given the extreme range of the cutter, even half of the design range would be more range than most Navy combatants.

We know the ship is supposed to have some weight moment reservation for additional weapons but we don’t know how much. There is also the requirement that the ship be able to take on, feed and shelter 500 migrants on the foc’sle or flight deck. Those 500 people alone would amount to almost 40 tons of additional top weight.

There are alternatives that could provide a simlar outfit while moving the weight lower. A more extreme change would be to replace both the Mk56 VLS (23 tons) and the 57mm Mk110 (15.4 tons) with Mk41 VLS (33.6 tons) in place of the 57mm. We would loose the gun, but this would provide the additional capability of launching Anti-Submarine Rockets (ASROC) as well. That might be a good trade, but it would require more radical reconstruction.

In short, adding less weight in weapons than carried by the 255 foot Owasco Class cutters of WWII, the Offshore Patrol Cutter could be turned into an effect surface combatant comparable to many frigates. The same sort of alterations could also be appied to the National Security Cutters.

What Does It Take to Sink a Ship–the ex-USS Rentz Sink-Ex

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Earlier I explored “What Does It take to Sink a Ship?” as a measure of what it takes to be absolutely sure you can stop one. Then the Japanese Tsunami gave us fishing vessel Ryou-Un Maru, a small vessel USCGC Anacapa attempted to sink with their 25mm gun. Anacapa ultimately resorted to coming along side and using a fire hose to fill the vessel with water, but it took over five hours.

Now the Navy provides us with information about another Sink-Ex. The former USS Rentz (FFG-46), a 4,200 ton, 453 foot long frigate, was the target. In spite of being hit by 22 missiles, she took five hours to sink. The last hit or hits were by Hellfire, and may not have been necessary, but not all the missiles were that small. The caption below appears to indicate at least two Harpoons were used.

harpoonlaunchrentzsinkex

Photo: US Navy. Guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65), foreground, and USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) fire Harpoons missiles as part of a sink exercise (SINKEX) during Valiant Shield 2016.

Reports also indicate that at least one JSOW C-1, an over 1000 pound guided gliding munition with both Infra-Red and Link-16 guidance, was used.

The caption on the photo below seems to indicate multiple AGM-65F were used. These are infra-red homing, Air to Surface Missiles, weighing over 600 pounds with a 300 pound warhead.

U.S. Navy sailors with Patrol Squadron 46 load a P-3 Orion aircraft with AGM-65F MAVERICKS Air to Surface Missiles prior to a sinking exercise (SINKEX) Sept. 13, 2016, at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, during Valiant Shield 2016. SINKEX provided service members the opportunity to gain proficiency in tactics, targeting, and live firing against a surface target at sea. Valiant Shield is a biennial, U.S. -only field-training exercise with a focus on integration of joint training among U.S. forces. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Justin Fisher)

U.S. Navy sailors with Patrol Squadron 46 load a P-3 Orion aircraft with AGM-65F MAVERICKs, prior to a sinking exercise (SINKEX) Sept. 13, 2016, at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, during Valiant Shield 2016.

When the video at the head of this post begins, it appears that the ship has already taken at least three major hits. I suspect these were two Harpoons and possibly the JSOW C-1. I suspect the four hits seen in the video were Mavericks launched from the P-8 that made the video.

The video below shows a Hellfire hitting what appears to be an already sinking hulk. It appears to me, the effects are clearly less than those seen in the video at the top of the post.

I would love to have a clearer idea of the sequence and effects of the individual hits, but one thing is clear. It took a lot of ordnance to put even this relatively small ship down. The Coast Guard’s 25 mm and 57 mm guns, with their five ounce and six pound projectiles, will not cut it.

American Made Patrol Boats for Qatar

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NavyRecognition reports, “The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Qatar for Mk-V Fast Patrol Boats, equipment, training, and support. The estimated cost is $124.02 million.”

Based on the number of .50 calibers ordered, it appears that this will include four boats.

Looking back, in 2009 DefenseIndustryDaily reported the sale of ten of these craft to the Kuwaiti Navy under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program for $61.6M. Saudi Arabia is also interested in these boats and is reportedly planning to buy 30 at an estimated $1.2B.

These are apparently an extended version of the US Navy Mk5 Speicial Operations Craft. The company web site has more information on both versions.

I don’t recognize the 27 mm reportedly included in the Qatar deal as a weapon in US service, but the Germans (Mauser, now Rheinmetall) do make a 27mm and this is the gun used on the Kuwati boats, and it appears to be gun used on the boats for Qatar.

MLG27 onboard Elbe Class Tender Rhein at the en:Kiel Week 2007. Photo by Rebell18190

MLG27 onboard Elbe Class Tender Rhein at the en:Kiel Week 2007. Photo by Rebell18190

The size of the boat seen on the stern ramp in the video is not clear.

These 90 foot boats is clearly optimized more for speed than our 87 footers. They also have a shorter range and with water jets, are probably less manuverable at the slow speeds often required for SAR.

How Much Would it Cost to Add ESSM to NSC?

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The US Naval Institute reports the Chilean Navy is planning to upgrade three of their British Built Frigates, with Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) replacing their existing Sea Wolf weapon systems. Since ESSM was planned as a possible upgrade for the National Security Cutter, I thought the information might be of interest.

The US is providing the equipment under a Foreign Military Sales contract valued at $140.1M that will include three sets of Tactical Length Mk41 VLS (vertical launch systems), 33 Evolved Seasparrow Missiles (ESSMs) Six Evolved Seasparrow Telemetry Missiles, “Ten (10) MK25 Quad Pack Canisters; Five (5) ESSM Shipping Containers; Five (5) MK-73 Continuous Wave Illumination Transmitters, One (1) Inertial Missile Initializer Power Supply (IMIPS); spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, technical assistance, installation and integration oversight support, logistics, program management, packaging and transportation.”

These figures include only the additional equipment. They do not include the yard work necessary to prepare the ship for installation and the installation of the equipment. Still I think this constitutes most of the cost of the upgrade of the three ships.

I would note that it is not clear how many VLS cells will be installed on each ship, but they are always installed in groups of eight. If we assumed eight cells on each ship, then each ship could theoretically support 32 missiles since they can be “quad packed,” that is four missiles can be placed in each cell. Chile is buying only 33 “war-shot” missiles and ten quad pack canisters. That is barely more than enough to fully arm one ship with eight cells, so it appears there will be some cells either left empty or filled with other types of weapons, which might include ASROC which also fit the tactical length Mk41 VLS.