“Ukrainian Drone Boats Sink Another Russian Navy Landing Ship” –The War Zone

The War Zone reports,

“Ukraine has claimed the destruction of another warship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Ropucha class landing ship Cesar Kunikov (also written as Tsezar Kunikov) being the latest victim of explosives-laden naval drones off the coast of Crimea. Ukrainian officials claim that the landing ship was sunk in the overnight attack and available imagery shows the vessel capsized.”

I applaud what the Ukrainians are doing, but the Coast Guard needs to anticipate that we might someday be on the receiving end of this sort of attack. What are the Russians doing and could we do better?

So far, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has reportedly lost 24 surface units and a submarine to various forms of attack. But let’s look specifically at landing ships in the Black Sea which the Russians are using to transport supplies and reinforcements to Crimea.

Ropucha-I class landing ship Caesar Kunikov (Russian MoD photo)

Russia has been able to add some small combatants to the Black Sea Fleet using its River systems, but they are unable to add large ships, including landing ships because Turkey has closed access to the Black Sea by warships from the Mediterranean, so Russia cannot expect reinforcements. Apparently anticipating closure of the Dardanelles, the Russian Navy moved six additional landing ships into the Black Sea. Wikipedia reports,

In February 2022, prior to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the landing ships Korolev, Minsk, Kaliningrad, Pyotr Morgunov, Georgy Pobedonosets, and Olenegorsky Gornyak from the Baltic Fleet and Northern fleets departed their bases and passed through the Dardanelles Strait for claimed Military exercise in the Black Sea.

In addition, a Ukrainian ship of this type was added to the Russian Black Sea Fleet when Russia occupied Crimea, but that ship is reportedly inactive. The Russians are apparently having difficulty maintaining these approximately 40 year old ships.

“According to Ukrainian Navy spokesperson Dmytro Pletenchuk, the Black Sea Fleet now has only five Ropucha class ships remaining in service out of a previous total of 13 (additional units were transferred from the Baltic and Northern Fleets ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine).” –This may refer to all types of LSTs, not just Rapucha class. They also lost a Tapir class LST.–Chuck 

Ship Self-Defense: 

Looking at this video, I could not help but think that the Ukrainians would have had a harder time if the Russian ship had enforced darken ship. At the very least the attackers might have had less time to coordinate their attack. The attacks are clearly made at night using electro optics, and a lighted target helps them. All that lighting also degrades the night vision of lookouts that might otherwise recognize that an attack is underway.

The Russian LST was well armed. The Rapucha class ship reported sunk, had two twin 57mm guns with a 200 round per minute rate of fire, so, theoretically, about four times the firepower provided by an NSC or OPC’s 57mm Mk110. You might think these would be effective against unmanned surface vessels, but I have yet to see any evidence in any of the videos of main gun systems being used against such attacks. They always seem to be pointed on the centerline.

It seems that in successful attacks, the target is late in recognizing it is under attack. I have to wonder if their weapons and sensors were manned and ready? Were lookouts posted? Were lookouts equipped with night vision devices?

Russian/Soviet designed 57 mm/75 AK-725 mount.

Force Protection:

Apparently, the attack occurred near the end of its voyage from Novorossiysk to Sevastopol. The ship was close enough to Sevastopol that smoke from wreck was visible on shore.

If you are intending to intercept a ship that may use evasive courses. The most logical place to intercept it would be near the known starting and ending points and in this case the ending point would have been an easier place to stage an ambush. It would also be the easiest place to provide protective units.

In an earlier attack, we saw the attacking USVs engaged by a helicopter. In this case, there seems to have been no overwatch.

Small boat escorts might help, even if all they did was provide eyes and ears away from the light and noise of the target vessel that could recognize the threat.

It would of course be critical that they escorting vessels not be fired upon by the targeted vessel, so recognition signal lights would probably be appropriate.

Pairs of boats ahead and on either side of the escorted vessel could alternately sprint and drift so as to minimize noise.

I would estimate escorting boats would want to patrol about 4,000 yards from the escorted vessel, but this is something that could be tested using watercraft with similar characteristics to the kamikaze USVs.

If armed with machine guns, escorting boats could attempt to engage the threats. If using tracer ammunition, even if unable to destroy the threat, they would be pointing out the threat to the target ship.

In many of these videos, it appears that the first hit which immobilizes the target occurs with USV in a pursuit curve coming up the stern of the vessel. An escorting boat in the wake of target vessel would be in a good position to prevent that first immobilizing hit.

“Vampire weapon system makes Ukraine combat debut” –Defense Blog

Defense Blog reports,

The Ukrainian Navy’s press service recently released footage showcasing the combat effectiveness of their air defense units, marking the confirmed debut of a new Counter-Unmanned Air System (UAS) weapon system developed by L3Harris for Ukraine.

The video captured the moment when a Russian kamikaze drone, identified as the Shahed-136, was successfully shot down by an Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) laser-guided rocket launched from the Vampire weapon system.

If you have been following my blog, you know I like this system and have been advocating for Coast Guard use of the APKWS since at least 2017.

  • It is probably less maintenance intensive than a .50 caliber machine gun.
  • It has a very small footprint and light weight.
  • Because it is a precision weapon, it minimizes the probability of collateral damage.
  • It is a proven counter Unmanned Air System.
  • It can employ a variety of warheads for different purposes including air burst with the M429 proximity fuse. It has even been tested successfully against cruise missiles.
  • It is effective against small, fast, highly maneuverable surface threats.
  • It has an effective range greater than that of our M38 gun mounts and a similar effective range to that of the 57mm and 76m guns.
  • While I would not count on its ability to stop medium to large ships, it can inflict damage at effective ranges beyond that of most weapons a terrorist organization might equip a vessel with.  It is likely to be a lot more effective against small ships than the Mk38.
  • And it is cheap. 

Without much additional effort, it could make Coast Guard assets much more capable in the Ports, Waterways & Coastal Security and Defense Readiness missions.

“Research and Development Center projects continue to enhance Coast Guard mission success” –CG-9

The Coast Guard Research and Development Center workforce is based in New London, Connecticut. U.S. Coast Guard photo.

Below is a news release from the Acquisitions Directorate (CG-9). If you follow the links there is a huge amount of information.

There is a lot of ongoing work, including cooperation with 4th Fleet in their efforts to operationalize unmanned systems. I had hoped the Coast Guard was doing that, and it’s gratifying to see they in fact are.

The projects listed are wide ranging and may potentially impact every mission area.

Perhaps the biggest surprise was that they are working on detect and avoid systems for small UAS. It appears they are looking at beyond visual line of sight UAS that could be used by the Fast Response Cutters and other vessels that do not have a flight deck. Apparently, they are also looking at using Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) to fire warning shots, presumably to stop drug runners. Would that mean they would also use USVs for disabling fire?

They are also looking at counter UAS alternatives, at ways to operate more effectively in polar regions, maritime domain awareness, and a lot more. It’s very impressive, especially when you consider how little the Coast Guard spends on R&D.


In fiscal year 2023, the Coast Guard Research and Development Center in New London, Connecticut, supported a research portfolio of 54 projects, covering the full scope of the Coast Guard’s missions. This video highlights a few of those projects, including beyond visual line of sight unmanned aircraft system detect and avoid technology, cutter-based unmanned systems integration with the Ship Control and Navigation Training System, International Maritime Organization polar code validation through advanced simulation modeling, and laser corrosion removal.

View video here.

Related: FY24 RDT&E Project Portfolio

For more information: Research and Development Center page and Research, Development, Test & Evaluation and Innovation Program page

 

The Navy is Looking for Counter Drone Systems

Interim Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (IM-SHORAD). The sensors and remote weapon system used here looks like it might be a contender.

The Navy is looking for mature counter Unmanned Air Systems (c-UAS) that can be rapidly deployed. They have issued a Request For Information (FRI). Responses are due today, so we are talking near term if it happens. 

Looks like it might be something the Coast Guard could use,

Marine Air Defense Remote Weapon Station. Use of this Remote Weapons Station would require an interface with cueing sensors.

Below is SECTION 3: [Requirements Overview]


PEO IWS 11.0 is looking for respondents to submit feasibility and capability information on innovative, mature solutions to counter Group 3-5 UAS from surface ships.  System requirements include:

  1. Mature systems that are in production and can be deployed in 1-6 months (preferred), or 6-12 months at the latest.
  2. Demonstrated performance against Groups 3 to 5 UAS, with demonstrated capability against other classes of UAS’s being of interest.
  3. Minimal integration requirements with Naval combat systems; with independent, self-contained capability highly desirable.

If the system is capable against Group 5 UAS (the largest UASs, over 1320 pounds (600 kg) and with no limit on their maximum speed) it’s likely the system will also have a capability against at least subsonic cruise missiles and manned aircraft and perhaps against winged smart bombs. After all, a Naval Strike missile fits the definition of a Group 4 UAS. Surface launched Harpoon or Tomahawk would be Group 5 UAS.

The War Zone has a fairly long post about this including discussion of alternatives. They seem to think these systems are destined for DDGs, but I think the need to equip other types, that do not have robust AAW capabilities, may be more urgent. If a C-UAS has an anti-surface capability, I could see such a system replacing Mk38 mounts. Alternately a 30mm Mk38 Mod4 mount that also mounts AAW missiles (like Stinger) might meet the requirement.

Martlet Light Multirole Missile launchers mounted on MSI 30mm gun mount that will be used in US Navy service as the 30mm Mk38 Mod4.

Mine Countermeasures Ships and MSC ships are currently essentially unarmed. They might be recipients.

“Minimal integration requirements with Naval combat systems; with independent, self-contained capability highly desirable” would certainly mean it should not be too difficult to add to a cutter.

“A Houthi missile got so close to a US destroyer the warship had to turn to a last resort gun system to shoot it down: report” –Business insider

A Phalanx Close-In Weapons system on the US destroyer Gravely downed an incoming Houthi cruise missile on Tuesday. This image shows the CIWS during a live-fire practice by a guided-missile cruiser in November 2023. MC2 Malachi Lakey/US Navy

Business Insider reports,

“A Houthi anti-ship cruise missile fired into the Red Sea came within a mile of a US Navy destroyer (USS Gravely. DDG-107) on Tuesday, close enough that the American warship had to turn to its Close-In Weapon System (Phalanx)— a last line of defense.”

Nice to know it worked but bet the pucker factor was high. Gravely is not one of those Burke class destroyers that traded one of its Phalanx for SeaRAM.

“USCG Leans In Towards First Polar Security Cutter” –Naval News

Photo of a model of Halter Marine’s Polar Security Cutter seen at Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exhibition have surfaced. Photo credit Chris Cavas.

Naval News reports on Coast Guard remarks about the Polar Security Cutter program at the Surface Navy Association annual symposium.

There is some good news. The Commandant says she is, “100% confident in the design…” The keel has not been laid, but “Welding work is commencing on three build units purchased for the first ship.” (That phraseology does sound a little strange to me.)

She goes on to say,

“I’m focused on fielding the Polar Security Cutters …. [and] getting that first one well into construction, with some predictability around when that ship will come to full operating capacity. We’re working hard with the yard, with the navy, and with the program office to bring some better certainty and clarity around that,” said Adm Fagan.

Which clearly means we do not yet have the predictability, certainty, and clarity the Commandant wants.

Explaining why this is not just an Icebreaker, Rear Admiral Chad Jacoby – USCG Assistant Commandant for Acquisition/Chief Acquisition Officer – told the symposium,

“The distinction there is the Polar Security Cutter is going to do way more than break ice. It will have National Security Cutter-level capabilities, sensors, and equipment on a hull that can go anywhere in the world in any season,” Rear Adm Jacoby continued. “So, we’re not just breaking ice, we’re not just having presence: we’re going to be able to execute almost all USCG missions up in the Arctic, down in the Antarctic, anywhere in the world.”

I look forward to learning what that actually means. It certainly isn’t in terms of installed armament. I don’t see an air-search radar on either the model presented (pictured above) or the illustrations I have seen.

Photo of a model of Halter Marine’s Polar Security Cutter seen at Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exhibition have surfaced. Photo credit Chris Cavas.

There do appear to be AN/SLQ-32 antennas on top of the bridge on the model (in gray). Could there also be a SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facility) like there is on the National Security Cutter? There are also areas where containerized systems could be installed.

To me the most encouraging thing that has happened with regard to this class is that Bollinger took over the project when they purchased the shipyard that is building them. I wish them every success.

“The all-rounder – the 30mm Automated Small Calibre Gun in focus” –Navy Lookout

The new Mark 38 Mod 4 30mm naval gun system on display on MSI Defence stand at Sea Air Space 2022.  Photo: NavalNews

This is a three-year-old article, but Navy Lookout, a non-government news site focused on Royal Navy news and analysis, reports how the UK’s Royal Navy came to choose the MSI DS-30M MkII gun mount with the 30mm Bushmaster II Mk 44 chain gun that has also been chosen by the US Navy, under the designation Mk38 Mod4.

“SNA 2024: Adaptable Deck Launcher, MK 70 Missile Launcher, PAC-3 Missile and SPY-6 Radar” –Video

The video above is from Naval News via Youtube.

Just wanted to point out that, should a need arise to equip the NSCs, OPCs, or even icebreakers for combat, there are two options in the video above:

As to alternatives, on the NSCs, we know they were designed to be able to accept twelve MK56 VLS and could probably accept eight Mk41 VLS in their normal deck penetrating configuration. Using quad packed ESSMs this could allow them to carry up to 32 ESSMs or alternately perhaps 16 ESSMs and four vertical launch ASROC. (Since the latest versions of the ESSM are fire and forget weapons that no longer require an “illuminator,” it now requires less supporting electronics and can engage more than one target at a time.) 

I know of no information publicly available that suggests planned upgrades for the OPCs, although I did speculate, “What Might a Wartime OPC Weapons Fit Look Like?”

The Mk70 would probably just be a temporary install on the flight deck to meet the requirements of a planned operation, but there is little doubt we could put at least four strike length four tube launchers, on NSCs, OPCs, or icebreakers.

For the OPC, the Adaptable Deck Launcher is a possible more permanent installation and would probably be mounted on the Focs’le. Weight and space requirements might mean a trade-off would be required. Loss of the 57mm in exchange for even four Mk41 tubes might be worthwhile, but we might also consider replacing the gun with eight deck penetrating Mk41 cells. If Strike length cells proved impossible, tactical length cells could still provide weapons with anti-air, anti-surface, and ASW capabilities we do not have with the 57mm.

Potential Mk41 VLS weapons load outs for tactical and strike length launchers.

 

“Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Hits U.S.-Owned Container Ship In Gulf Of Aden” –The Drive

MV Gibraltar Eagle YouTube screencap

The Drive reports,

” A Marshall Islands-flagged, U.S. owned and operated container ship was struck by a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile on Monday, U.S. Central Command said.

“There were no injuries or significant damage to the vessel, the M/V Gibraltar Eagle, which is continuing its journey. The vessel is a 200-meter long Ultramax container ship, according to its U.S. owner, Eagle Bulk Shipping.”

The Drive also offers an overview of the Houthi anti-ship capabilities, “The Anti-Ship Missile Arsenal Houthis Are Firing Into The Red Sea.”

I believe this is the first time in history, a ship, underway, has been hit by a ballistic missile.

“No Injuries or significant damage”:

At about 200 meters in length, M/V Gibraltar Eagle, is not particularly large. I would say that it is medium sized.

This is one of those rare times like, the Tanker War, when we get to see how modern ships, at least merchant ships survive modern weapons.

So far, I don’t think any of these Houthi attacks has resulted in a mobility kill, much less a sinking.

Modern merchant ships are extremely resilient. A lot of their bulk is made up of non-critical space.

This has implication for the Coast Guard’s own Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission. Explosions below the waterline, torpedoes and mines, remain the most effective way to forcibly stop a medium to large ship.

K-LOGIR, Korean Low cOst Guided Imaging Rocket and Launcher

K-LOGIR launcher fitted on a Textron CUSV USV at Sea Air Space 2021. The system was showcased by Raytheon and LIG Nex1.

Naval News recently did a post highlighting a 4th Fleet live fire test combining a Korean developed fire and forget guided rocket system with the Common Uncrewed Surface Vessel (CUSV) cued to a target by a Radiosonde UAS for a fully uncrewed kill chain.

The “Poniard” Korean-Low cOst Guided Imaging Rocket (K-LOGIR) is closely related to the APKWS, both being based on the 70mm Hydra unguided rocket. Unlike the semi-active laser homing APKWS, the K-LOGIR is a fire-and-forget system allowing multiple simultaneous engagements.

Most of the reports I have read on this exercise are unclear if six missiles hit a single target or if six missiles hit six different targets, but this Defense Mirror report, “Textron’s Unmanned Boat Uses South Korean Weapon to Engage Multiple Targets.” makes it clear that multiple targets were engaged in a single salvo.

I don’t fully understand how they designate different targets for the missiles in the salvo, but it may be that they are sending them to different waypoints before they initiate their search.

The ability to engage several targets simultaneously makes this system attractive for countering surface swarm tactics like those that might be encountered by PATFORSWA, but for the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission, the APKWS’ semi-active laser homing might be a better solution, in that we are unlikely to have to engage numerous targets in a single salvo and we may want to target particular parts of an adversary’s vessel or perhaps engage low-level air targets such as UAS, helicopters, or general aviation aircraft. Presumably, APKS could be fired from the same launcher.

Textron USV fitted with LIG Next1’s Poniard guided rocket. Textron photo.

Take a look at the launcher above and below. Here it is mounted on an unmanned 39-foot boat. In the photo above you can see that it traverses and elevates. It appears to hold up to six rockets. It might be an appropriate way to arm Coast Guard patrol boats and larger cutters with APKWS, but “Vampire” might be even simpler.

K-LOGIR launcher fitted on a Textron CUSV USV at Sea Air Space 2021. The system was showcased by Raytheon and LIG Nex1.

I would really like to see 4th Fleet make more effort to publicize their experimentation efforts. I’m surprised I was not able to find a YouTube video that documented this test and I have seen no mention of it on the 4th Fleet website.

I am also curious to know if the Navy’s 39′ CUSV could be operated from the stern ramp of a National Security Cutter. Interoperability?