“Russia and China Sent Large Naval Patrol Near Alaska” –Wall Street Journal

Posted on by
1

The Wall Street Journal reports,

“Eleven Russian and Chinese ships steamed close to the Aleutian Islands, according to U.S. officials. The ships, which never entered U.S. territorial waters and have since left, were shadowed by four U.S. destroyers and P-8 Poseidon aircraft.”

The Russians and Chinese have been doing these joint deployments into the Bering Sea for at least a few years, and normally it has been the Coast Guard that followed them. This time the Navy sent a capable force, in addition to P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft they sent USS John S. McCain (DDG-56), the USS Benfold (DDG-65), the USS John Finn (DDG-113) and the USS Chung-Hoon (DDG-93).

Previous reports: 

Coast Guard Cutter Kimball encounters Russia and People’s Republic of China military naval presence in Bering Sea” –D17, Sept. 2022

“Chinese Warships Sailing Near Alaska’s Aleutian Islands Shadowed By U.S. Coast Guard” –Small Wars Journal, Sept. 2021

Chinese Navy Operating Off Alaska, Sept. 2015

http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/uschair/258202.htm . This map of the Arctic was created by State Department geographers as part of the U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council.

Why are they there?:

Russia is easy to understand. This is very close to their territory and their Pacific Fleet base in Petropavlovsk, but why the Chinese?

Russia is China’s top crude oil source, and much of that oil comes from Russia’s Arctic. In any conflict China’s energy sources are likely to be a target and the Bering Strait is the choke point on the most direct route from the Russian Arctic to Chia.

I would note that China’s excursions into the Bering Sea all seem to be toward the end of summer, which is about as nice as it gets in the Aleutians.

“Ukraine Situation Report: Photos Show Damage To Russian Tanker After Drone Boat Strike” –The Drive

Posted on by
10

The Drive has an excellent report on the sea drone attack on Russian Tanker Sig, including photos of the damage.

Looking at the video above, it is apparent that it starts with the unmanned surface vessel alongside ship or structure which might have been a point of reference. It makes a sharp high-speed turn until about time 0:19, when the target came clearly into view at a relatively short distance. This is a 37 second video, assuming 40 knots the UAS could go 4,000 yards in three minutes or only about 822 yards in the 37 seconds. The last 18 seconds when the UAS is pointed at the target would be a distance of about 400 yards.

The post also notes that Ukraine has declared six Russian Black Sea ports subject to “War-Risk.”

“Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf returns home after 120-day Bering Sea patrol” –Coast Guard News

Posted on by
Reply

Aerial view of Kotzebue, Alaska, U.S. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, photographer not specified or unknown

Below is a US Coast Guard News report. This was a “Bering Sea Patrol” or what we used to call an Alaska Patrol or ALPAT, but it actually went further North than the Bering Sea.

Northwest Arctic Borough Alaska incorporated and unincorporated areas Kotzebue highlighted. From Wikipedia by Rcsprinter123

When we used to do ALPATs, we spent a lot of time around Dutch Harbor and out toward Adak. We might have gone as far North as the Bering Strait but didn’t spend much time there. Going North of the Berring Strait, which is on the Arctic Circle, was very rare, and we made no port calls at Nome (just south of the Strait) or at any location North of the Strait.
–
In this case, Bertholf made a port call at Kotzebue (population about 3,100) which is not really in the Bering Sea, it is in the Chuckchi Sea, North of the Bering. Note Bertholf had to anchor out in the Sound. There was no place for them to moor. You can see virtually all of the town in the photo above. It is above the Arctic Circle. It is a tiny town, but it has become important for the Coast Guard as the location for a seasonally deployed Helicopter detachment. (I have not seen any report of a detachment being deployed to Kotzebue this year.)
–
Despite a lot of talk about the increasing importance of the Arctic, so far, US Navy Pacific Fleet surface ships operating North of the Aleutians, are very rare. They may have operated in the vicinity of Dutch Harbor during an exercise, but I think it is fair to say we are more likely to see Russian and Chinese warships. We did in 2021 and 2022.
Aug. 3, 2023

Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf returns home after 120-day Bering Sea patrol

ALAMEDA, Calif. – The Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf (WMSL 750) and crew returned to homeport, Thursday, to Coast Guard Island after a 120-day Bering Sea patrol in support of United States national security, U.S. fishing fleet safety and prosperity, and the protection of U.S. living marine resources.

While patrolling the Bering Sea, Bertholf’s crew members conducted 15 boardings of commercial fishing vessels, ensuring compliance with federal fisheries laws, and preserving the highly valuable U.S. living marine resources. These boardings also ensure that the U.S. fishing fleet have sufficient safety equipment to survive in the event of an at-sea emergency.

In a demonstration of the strong trusted partnership between Japan and the United States, Bertholf conducted major at-sea and shore side engagements with the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) training ships Kashima and Hatakaze. During the at-sea engagement, Bertholf, Kashima and Hatakaze executed multiple formations, and during a farewell pass, the JMSDF personnel displayed a highly impressive drumline performance on their flight deck.

Afterward, the three ships moored up together in Dutch Harbor, Alaska, and continued to build relationships and shape partnerships. These engagements included reciprocal ship tours, a baseball game, a fun run up local mountain Ballyhoo, and a Dutch Harbor beach bonfire.

The next day, the Japanese and U.S. crews came together with the Unalaska community and officials from the Qawalangin Tribe during the 81st anniversary of the World War II Battle of Dutch Harbor ceremony to commemorate the lives lost, the community impacts, and to recognize the healing and partnership that has been built in the decades that followed. Rear Adm. Konno, JMSDF Training Squadron Commander, Rear Adm. Moore, commander of U.S. Coast Guard Seventeenth District, and Mayor Tutiakoff presided over the ceremony and exchanged official gifts.

Additionally, Bertholf crew guarded the boundary line between the U.S. and Russian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), ensuring that the fish in U.S. waters were protected from illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing from foreign nations.

Later in the patrol, Bertholf and crew anchored in Kotzebue Sound and engaged in several events with the community members of Kotzebue, Alaska, including a color run and a softball game. In addition, Bertholf’s law enforcement operators engaged with local fishermen and fish processors to establish positive relationships and ensure awareness of boater safety regulations and salmon skiff exemptions in the region.

“Our accomplishments during this patrol would not have been possible without the amazing crew that we have aboard,” said Capt. Billy Mees, Bertholf commanding officer. “The entirety of the crew and their families have my utmost respect for the sacrifices they make for their country.”

The Bertholf returned home on the eve of the 15th anniversary of its commissioning date; August 4th, 2008, which also coincides with the Coast Guard’s 233rd birthday. Since then, Bertholf has truly lived up to the storied past of her namesake, Commodore Ellsworth P. Bertholf, the first Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, and its motto, Legends Begin Here.

Enlistment Bonuses and other Incentives: ALCOAST 281/23 – AUG 2023 UPDATE 5 – FY23 WORKFORCE PLANNING TEAM RESULTS – ENLISTED MONETARY INTERVENTIONS

Posted on by
8

Cutter from GI Joe (Hasbro)

I am just passing this along for any who might be interested or know someone who could be. I did do some reformatting to accommodate this platform. Hopefully I did not introduce any errors.

Subject: ALCOAST 281/23 – AUG 2023 UPDATE 5 – FY23 WORKFORCE PLANNING TEAM RESULTS – ENLISTED MONETARY INTERVENTIONS
Reply-To: uscoastguard@service.govdelivery.com

united states coast guard

R 032020Z AUG 23 MID120000346223U
FM COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
TO ALCOAST
BT
UNCLAS
ALCOAST 281/23
SSIC 7220
SUBJ: UPDATE 5 – FY23 WORKFORCE PLANNING TEAM RESULTS – ENLISTED
MONETARY INTERVENTIONS

A. COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC 211940Z OCT 22/ALCOAST 403/22
B. Military Bonus and Incentive Programs, COMDTINST 7220.2A
C. 37 U.S.C. – Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services
D. Performance, Training and Education (PTEM) Manual, COMDTINST 1500.10D
E. Enlistments, Evaluations, and Advancements, COMDTINST M1000.2C
F. Coast Guard Medical Manual, COMDTINST M6000.1F

1. This ALCOAST announces an update to the results of the FY2023 Military Workforce Planning Team (MWPT). Specifically, this ALCOAST authorizes additional Enlistment Bonuses (EB) and Critical Skills Training Bonuses (CSTB) and increases authorized bonus amounts for specified rates.

2. These policy interventions are applicable to eligible candidates and enlisted active duty members. The bonus offerings in this ALCOAST are for FY2023, effective immediately. All authorized FY2023 interventions terminate on 30 Sep 2023. The EB and CSTB maximum amounts listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this ALCOAST supersede their respective maximum EB and CSTB amount listed in REF (A).

3. ENLISTMENT BONUS (EB). An EB is authorized for new recruits enlisting in the Coast Guard for the first time. Each EB is mutually exclusive and cannot be combined with any other EB.
a. Guaranteed A School Enlistment Bonus (GA-EB). A GA-EB is authorized for new recruits, for their first career enlistment, that sign an agreement to attend one of the following critical rating Class A-Schools immediately upon graduation from boot camp. Prior service applicants are not authorized a GA-EB. Applicants agree to enlist and satisfactorily complete a minimum of four years of Active Duty Service Commitment (ADSC) and abide by all requirements and eligibility qualifications of REF (B) and Section 331 of REF (C) to earn a GA-EB entitlement.
(1) Operations Specialist (OS). A $40,000 EB is authorized for OS applicants to enlist.
(2) Electricians Mate (EM). A $20,000 EB is authorized for EM applicants to enlist.
(3) Electronics Technician (ET). A $65,000 EB is authorized for ET applicants to enlist.
(4) Gunners Mate (GM). A $20,000 EB is authorized for GM applicants to enlist.
(5) Machinery Technician (MK). A $20,000 EB is authorized for MK applicants to enlist.
(6) Damage Controlman (DC). A $20,000 EB is authorized for DC applicants to enlist.
(7) Culinary Specialist (CS): A $65,000 is authorized for CS applicants without a degree or certificate to enlist.
(8) Culinary Specialist (CS): A $70,000 EB is authorized for CS applicants with a qualifying culinary certificate to enlist as an E-3.
i. A qualifying culinary certificate is defined as a culinary arts certification from an institution accredited by the American Culinary Federation.
ii. The culinary certificate must be verified by the CS RFMC.
iii. CS members who acquire a culinary certificate after completion of CS Class A-School and members in the Regular Coast Guard who acquire or hold a culinary certificate are ineligible.
(9) Culinary Specialist (CS): A $75,000 EB is authorized for CS applicants with a qualifying culinary degree to enlist as an E-3.
i. A qualifying culinary degree is defined as an Associate of Arts (AA) or Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree in culinary arts from an accredited academic or culinary institution.
ii. The culinary degree must be verified by the CS Rating Force Master Chief (RFMC).
iii. CS members who acquire a culinary degree after completion of CS Class A-School and members in the Regular Coast Guard who acquire or hold a culinary
degree are ineligible.

4. CRITICAL SKILLS TRAINING BONUS (CSTB). A CSTB is authorized for current active duty enlisted personnel who agree to attend and complete Class A-Schools below in subparagraphs (b) – (h), or in the BM Rating Apprenticeship Program (RAP), and agree to extend their enlistment upon graduation to meet obligated service IAW
REF (D).
a. General eligibility requirements:
(1) All CSTBs incur a four (4) year Active Duty Service Commitment (ADSC) from date of Class A-School graduation, advancement to pay grade E-4 through the BM RAP, or receipt of designator, whichever is later. Applicable contract extensions must be executed upon graduation of Class A-School, advancement to E-4 through BM-RAP, or receipt of designator to meet the minimum obligated service requirement;
(2) Members must abide by all requirements and eligibility qualifications IAW REF (B).
(3) Members may not receive a CSTB if they have signed a contract (annex) to receive a GA-EB for the same rate;
(4) Members who qualify for a CSTB, but received an EB, will receive the computed difference between the CSTB and EB;
(5) Members must continuously meet all performance and conduct
standards including additional reenlistment criteria as outlined in REF (E). Members who are eligible to extend are eligible to receive a CSTB; and
(6) Members must apply for the bonus by completing and submitting the Bonus Agreement listed in Paragraph 5.a. of this ALCOAST.
b. A $65,000 CSTB is authorized for CS Class A-School.
c. A $20,000 CSTB is authorized for DC Class A-School.
d. A $20,000 CSTB is authorized for MK Class A-School.
e. A $65,000 CSTB is authorized for ET Class A-School.
f. A $20,000 CSTB is authorized for GM Class A-School.
g. A $40,000 CSTB is authorized for OS Class A-School.
h. A $20,000 CSTB is authorized for EM Class A-School.
i. A $40,000 CSTB is authorized for BM RAP. To be eligible, a member must hold a current Boat Crew certification on any platform (except punts, skiffs, and ice rescue boats). Commands of new prospective applicants who meet the requirements must submit an A-school request form selecting BM RAP.

5. ADMINISTRATION.
The only approved Bonus Agreements to be used per this ALCOAST are as follows:
a. GA-EB: CG Form 7220A (revised Jun 2022 or later).
b. CSTB: CG Form 7220D (revised Aug 2022 or later), “Critical Skills Training Bonus.”
c. CSTB BM RAP: CG Form 5305G (revised Sep 2022 or later), “Enlistment Bonus: Boatswain Mate Rating Apprenticeship Program.”
d. All authorized forms are located at:
(Copy and Paste URL Below into Browser)

https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/ppc/pd/forms/

e. Members must maintain physical and medical standards for continuous retention IAW REF (F).
f. Members considering appointment to the warrant or officer corps may still enlist, re-enlist, or extend their contract in one of the above mentioned ratings without electing to receive a bonus.
g. The Pay & Personnel Center (PPC) receives a high volume of bonus questions and submissions. Unanswered questions must be routed through the member’s SPO before engaging PPC. Payments may take up to two (2) months from the date a member’s SPO has submitted a trouble ticket to PPC. Refrain from contacting PPC
about a bonus until two (2) months have elapsed from a trouble ticket’s submission date. If it is not known whether a ticket has been submitted, designated yeoman should contact PPC Customer Care for investigation. If no ticket is active, submit a trouble ticket with appropriate bonus documentation.
h. COs and OICs are reminded that all members who agree to obligate service and are within the FY of their end of enlistment, or within the FY of their six (6) and ten (10)
year active duty anniversary date will: (1) be counseled on their SRB eligibility; (2) have the opportunity to read REF (B) in its entirety; and (3) sign the appropriate Administrative Remarks, Form CG-3307, for their record.
i. Eligible members are reminded that they ultimately decide the length of contractual obligation and actual date of reenlistment. A reenlistment requires the member’s signature acknowledging they have read and understood the terms of the contract and have had all questions answered to their satisfaction.
j. Members who previously signed contracts IAW REF (D) are prohibited from canceling their existing contract to sign a new contract to meet the requirements of this ALCOAST.
k. Members who were counseled about their SRB eligibility and signed an Administrative Remarks, Form CG-3307, entry IAW REF (D), but have not signed a reenlistment contract, are eligible to receive a bonus in accordance with this message. Members must still meet the remaining requirements of this ALCOAST and REF (B).
l. For questions, members should contact their unit counselors (typically the Command YN/CMC/SCPO/MCPO) well in advance of their reenlistment or extension date. Additional sources of information include servicing personnel officers, work-life staff, and senior Yeoman. For questions that cannot be answered after exhausting all of the above resources, the designated administrative support representative for that specific unit may contact COMDT (CG-133) at: HQS-PolicyandStandards@uscg.mil.
m. Special Assignment Considerations: Members in critical ratings are encouraged to apply for special assignment opportunities; PSC-EPM will work within each rating to ensure a proper balance is achieved between special assignments and rating needs.

6. Questions regarding this ALCOAST may be directed to Office of Military Personnel Policy (CG-133) at: HQS-PolicyandStandards@uscg.mil.

7. This message will be cancelled on 01 OCT 2023.

8. RADM M. W. Raymond, Assistant Commandant for Military Personnel
(CG-1M), sends.

9. Internet release is authorized.

“Northern Fleet ship seriously damaged in drone attack” –The Barents Observer

Posted on by
7

The Barents Observer provides the most complete report I have seen on a recent attack on a Russian Landing ship (LST). It identifies the ship as the Olenegorsky Gornyak, a Ropucha-class landing ship. It was in serious danger of sinking because a vehicle deck stretches the length of the hull.

I think this type of threat may be something the Coast Guard may want to seriously consider since the Coast Guard is the likely agency to defend against it.

A few comments on the conduct of the attack. It was a night attack. It would be interesting to know if the moon was down when the attack was made. It appears there was a lot of light coming from the bridge of the target ship that may have adversely effected night vision. The UAS appears to have used a slow approach, which would have been less likely to attract attention than a high-speed approach, which would have left a phosphorous wake. The target vessel appears to have been unaware of the approach. I see no defensive fire from the target vessel. The target vessel appears to be stopped or moving very slowly because, when the USV steadies up, there is little or no bearing drift.

“GAO: Polar Security Cutter Design Won’t Complete Until 2024, Delivery of First Hull Estimated in 2028” –USNI

Posted on by
7

Photo of a model of Halter Marine’s Polar Security Cutter seen at Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exhibition have surfaced. Photo credit Chris Cavas.

The US Naval Institute news service reports,

According to the estimate from GAO, which cites Coast Guard and Navy officials, as well as shipbuilders – the final design for the 23,0000-ton ice breaker won’t be complete until next March. Construction is scheduled to start shortly after the design is approved. Coast Guard commandant Adm. Linda Fagan told Congress last month that the delivery of the first hull is expected in 2028.

This goes back to the fact that while the Polar Security Cutter was supposed to have been based on a proven design of a successful icebreaker, in fact the selected shipyard used a design that never got past the preliminary design stage.

But really, the problem goes back much further than that.

Polar Star was commissioned in 1976. A new class of ships typically takes ten years from concept to commissioning. 30 years is a generally expected lifespan for military ships. That suggests the program to replace the Polar class should have begun in 1996. Not even close. A replacement program was not initiated until 2012. By then the High Latitude Study had identified the need for three heavy and three medium icebreakers in 2010. Launching the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program in 2012 should have given us an icebreaker in 2022. In 2016 a Polar Icebreaker Operational Requirements Document was issued. Arguably the High Latitude Study should have simultaneously launched both a heavy and a medium icebreaker procurement program.

13 years after the High Latitude Study identified the need, we have seen no movement in an effort to procure medium icebreakers.

In the movie “King Richard,” about Richard Dove Williams Jr., father of tennis players Venus Williams and Serena Williams, he is quoted as saying, “If you fail to plan, you plan to fail.”

This was not a problem with Congress.

We have failed to plan.

The only fleet mix plan we have ever done is now 12 years old. In the interim, much has changed.

There is not now, nor has there ever been, a 30 year ship building plan or any kind of comprehensive long range plan comparable to the Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans which the Navy revises every few years.

The first National Security Cutter was ordered in 2001 but was not commissioned until 2008. The first four were commissioned at essentially two year intervals, but even after that, it has taken nine years to complete next six. Looks like the eleventh ship will not be finished until 2025. When the first Hamilton Class WHEC was decommissioned, it was 44 years old. When the last one was decommissioned, it was almost 50 years old.

The Coast Guard currently has 27 WMECs, every single one of them is over 30 years old. 14 of them are over 50 years old. The average age is about 46.4 years. That is the fruit of poor planning.

We did not plan to run ships for 50 to 60 years, but we also have had no plan that defined when they would be decommissioned, that would have informed when replacements had to be completed.

Planning for the Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) began with the Deepwater Program. Concepts were revised in light of the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001. The acquisition process for the OPC began at least as early as 2010. At that time, we thought all would be delivered by 2027 (and here). The first ship was supposed to have been delivered in calendar year 2019. Now we plan on continuing to build them until 2038 meaning this acquisition program is supposed to run 28 years. 28 years building the same ship without looking at mission and technology changes?

We should decide right now that once we get some experience with the first OPCs, we will start looking at the next class of cutters. It might replace the OPC in future year budgets, or it might be built along with additional OPCs. We might even decide the OPC is exactly what we need to continue building, but we need to reevaluate. Cutter design should evolve. There should be improvements. There should be new capabilities.

The Coast Guard enjoys bipartisan Congressional support. We need to educate the administration, the Congress, and the GAO about our needs, but first we need to decide what they are, because we don’t really know.

We can start by identifying when ships will be decommissioned. The prospect of loss can be a strong incentive for funding their replacements.

We need a new Fleet mix analysis, one that actually looks at our missions, geographic distances and a range of possible solutions.

We also need a long term plan for our major capital resources, particularly the ships and aircraft.

 

 

“Orizzonte Sistemi Navali Signs Contract For New Italian Navy OPVs” –Naval News

Posted on by
5

Drawing of the OPV by Fincantieri

Naval News reports,

As part of the Italian Navy OPV (Offshore Patrol Vessel) acquisition programme Orizzonte Sistemi Navali (OSN), the joint venture between Fincantieri and Leonardo… has signed a contract with the Italian Secretariat General of Defence and National Armaments Directorate for the construction of three next generation patrol vessels, with the options for a further three units and infrastructural upgrades required for the naval bases in Augusta, Cagliari and Messina, where the vessels will be based.

Fincantieri is the parent company of the Marinette based shipyard that has been building Freedom class LCS and will be building the US Navy’s new frigates. That shipyard also built USCGC Mackinaw, the 16 Juniper class WLBs, and the 14 Keeper class WLMs.

I am a little surprised by this. It had been reported that the six ships of the Sirio class and Cassiopea class would be replaced by 3,000 ton units of the European Patrol Corvette (EPC) program. This “PPX” program would be the third Italian Navy “patrol” vessel class being built concurrently along with the EPC and the Thaon di Revel class (also known as PPA for ‘Pattugliatore Polivalente d’Altura – Multipurpose Offshore Patrol Vessel’).

The description looks like a pretty typical modern, medium size OPV with an approximate length of 312′ (95 meters), a displacement of 2,300 tons and accommodations for 97. It appears the probable armament is a 76mm gun and a pair of 20 to 30mm mounts (probably the new Lionfish 30mm). That is a size the US Coast Guard might consider for operating in Atlantic Area, if we wanted to increase the total number of larger patrol cutters above the 36 currently planned.

No information was provided about the speed or range. Italian Navy ships tend to have relatively short range because they are designed to operate in the Mediterranean. I would guess range will be about 4,000 miles at about 14 knots. Speed will probably be about 24 knots.

“As Arctic ice melts, NATO plots northern defense tactics” –Video

Posted on by
3

Wanted to pass along the video above, if for no other reason, for the scenes of the Danish Patrol Frigate HDMS Triton operating in the ice. Notice her ground tackle (equipment used to anchor the ship) is not exposed on the foc’sle, where it would be quickly encrusted with ice. It is well below the main deck.

Triton’s routine peacetime missions and those of her Thetis class sister ships are much the same as US Coast Guard cutters. They do SAR, fisheries, marine environmental protection, and support scientific research. They are ice strengthened and can reportedly operate in 31 inches (80 cm) of ice. They use the STANFLEX modular weapon system, with one slot forward and two slots aft, allowing rapid addition or change out of weapon systems. They have a hull mounted sonar, torpedo tubes, and can support a MH-60R ASW helicopter. They are 3,500 tons full load and 112.3 m (368 ft 5 in) in length with a speed of 22 knots and a range of 8,700 nautical miles at 15 knots and a 60 day endurance. My Combat Fleets of the world reported that they had seven crews to operate the four ships. Perhaps surprisingly, they have only a single shaft, but it is probably well out of the way of ice. The ships of the class are all over 30 years old and the Danes have probably started thinking about replacement.

The Royal Danish Navy (RDN) Thetis-class patrol ship HDMS Triton is pictured operating a Seahawk helicopter during Canada’s Operation ‘Nanook’ exercise in the Arctic in 2022. One element of RDN Arctic capability development is to improve tactical datalinks between the Seahawks and their host frigates and patrol ships. (Canadian Armed Forces)

“Upgun Cutters to Meet Today’s Naval Threats” –USNI

Posted on by
13

PACIFIC OCEAN (July 30, 2022) U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Humberto Alba, a naval aircrewman tactical-helicopter, attached to Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 37, deployed on U.S. Coast Guard Legend-class cutter USCGC Midgett (WMSL 757), looks down at a USCGC crewmember after taking off during flight operations during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2022. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Taylor Bacon)

This essay from the July 2023 issue of Proceedings, is featured on the US Naval Institute Proceedings web site. It won Second Prize in the Midshipmen & Cadets Essay Contest—Sponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute.

This is just one of many such articles that have been published repeatedly over the years. The logic is clear,

If more heavily armed, Coast Guard cutters could better support the Navy and enhance defense readiness.

At small marginal cost, cutters could make a significant contribution to our nation’s naval strength, but it has not happened in the last 30+ years. Why not?

It seems the Leadership of both the Navy and Coast Guard have other priorities, and there is no sponsor in a position of power to push the program.

The Navy is in trouble. The Navy has been shrinking over most of the last 34 years, from down from 592 Sept. 30, 1989, to 299 as of this week. It began with the collapse of the Soviet Union. I’m sure it seemed like good idea at the time, but the “peace dividend” meant there was not much reason to build new ships. Teams that had developed a long string of successful ship designs ceased to exist. Shipyards closed. As a result, they have had difficulty fielding new classes of ships. Their new generation shipbuilding programs have been plagued with problems, while the Chinese navy has been building ships at a furious pace.

The Coast Guard has had its own troubled recapitalization program, beginning with “Deepwater” and while the NSC and FRC programs seem to have been successful, if long delayed, the Offshore Patrol Cutter and Icebreaker programs are still having significant difficulties. But perhaps more importantly, Coast Guard leadership sees the conventional model of a combat ready Coast Guard as counterproductive to other Coast Guard priorities.

Personally, I feel fears that a more heavily armed Coast Guard would not be welcome in many parts of the world is overblown, but the fear does exist and the conventional model of permanently installed weapon systems operated and maintained by Coastguardsmen would require a diversion of assets unless the budget is increased and more assets are provided. There is a cost to the Coast Guard in terms of training and maintenance time for both units and individuals, even if the Navy pays for the systems.

I think there is an alternative that would address the fears of the Coast Guard leadership and create a powerful sponsor in the Navy. 

The Navy Reserve could be that sponsor. It is a reservoir of trained talent, but where do they go upon mobilization? There are only so many ships. Their crews, while they may have some shortages, are essentially at war time manning levels. There are only so many helicopter landing spots on Navy ships. Many Navy Reservists have no really appropriate place to serve upon full mobilization.

Coast Guard units can provide a place where they can be used effectively. Navy helicopters and their crews can fly from Coast Guard cutters. Modularized versions of towed array sonar systems could be operated and maintained by Navy reservists on large cutters.

Initially at least, these reinforced cutters would be best used in the board reaches of the Pacific, beyond the effective range of enemy land based and air-launched anti-ship missiles, where the primary threat would be submarines, protecting the logistics ships that are essential for prosecuting a war in the Western Pacific.

In 2012, Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, U.S. Navy, advocated,

“We need to move from ‘luxury-car’ platforms—with their built-in capabilities—toward dependable ‘trucks’ that can handle a changing payload selection.”

If the Navy can provide payloads, the Coast Guard can provide some trucks.

“Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines renew commitment to cooperation” –Indo-Pacific Defense Forum

Posted on by
Reply

Coast guard leaders and personnel from member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations participate in the June 2023 ASEAN Coast Guard Forum in Jakarta, Indonesia. IMAGE CREDIT: Indonesian Maritime Security Agency

The Indo-Pacific Defense Forum reports,

“Joint sea and air patrols conducted by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines under the 2017 Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement (TCA) continue to demonstrate success and remain critical to Indo-Pacific maritime security, according to officials and analysts. The three countries agreed in June to build on their cooperative efforts going forward.

“Regular patrols, coordination and intelligence sharing established by the TCA are known as INDOMALPHI. The patrols have successfully countered threats including piracy and terrorism with no reported threat events in the first six months of 2023, according to Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense. This compares to 99 reports of piracy and armed robbery in 2017 in the patrol area.”

This sort of cooperation might lead to my proposed Combined Maritime Security Task Force. They don’t need the US Coast Guard to do it, but US participation might add some much-needed gravitas, if they have to face down the Chinese.