Arctic Guardian 2017

This is all I have, from the German Navy Blog, “Marine Forum,”

6 September, ICELAND (multinational), Search & rescue exercise „Arctic Guardian 2017“ kicked off … first exercise of its kind under the auspices of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF), with all eight Arctic nations (Denmark, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, USA) participating … scenario sees cruise ship with hundreds of passengers gone missing in the Danish Strait between Iceland and Greenland.

Surely, we will hear more.

Battle of the Paracel Islands, 16 January 1974

Chart of Paracel Islands. Image prepared by CIA

There has been much concern about China’s aggressive claims to nearly all of the South China Sea and how the rest of the world, particularly the Philippines, Vietnam, and the US will respond. The “Nine Dash Line” is an artifact of the mid-20th century, but claims on the islands go back to the 19th century.

In 1974 China and Vietnam came to blows over ownership of Paracel Islands, which are roughly equidistant from the Vietnamese coast and China’s Hainan Island.

The battle between the Navy’s of South Vietnam and the PRC is little known in the West, but it is apparently very important to the Chinese since the Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has fought few battles in its relatively short history, and this is one they won, against what they portray as long odds.

I have long had an interest in the battle because two of the South Vietnamese vessels were former Coast Guard Cutters of the same class as my first ship out of the Academy, USCGC McCulloch (WHEC-386). I was transferred off shortly before she transited to join Coast Guard Squadron Three as part of Operation Market Time. With the end of the Ocean Station program and “Vietnamization,” seven of the class, as well as 26 WPBs, that were in country, were transferred to the Navy of South Vietnam. When Saigon fell, six of the seven former WHECs made it to the Philippines, later being inducted into the Philippine Navy. Surprisingly, another of the four Vietnamese ships in the battle had also served in the USCG.

I used three sources for this post,

Many of the photos come from a Chinese source.

There was a lengthy standoff, but after the Chinese opened fire on a landing party reportedly under a flag of truce, killing three and wounding more, the Vietnamese Navy was given permission to open hostilities.

How the battle actually progressed is not really clear. There are apparently no track charts. The mechanics of the battle are missing so I will make some, hopefully informed, speculation about how it was actually fought.

Participants in the Battle of the Paracels

The Participants: 

There is conflicting information regarding the secondary weapons on the Vietnamese vessels and the types of vessels used by the Chinese, but the list below is what I interpret to be a reasonably accurate order of battle for the incident.

Vietnam

Two former Barnegat class small seaplane tenders,

  • RVNS Trần Bình Trọng (HQ-05), the former USCGC Castle Rock (WAVP-383 later WHEC-383) and
  • RVNS Lý Thường Kiệt (HQ-16), the former USCGC Chincoteague (WAVP-375 later WHEC-375) (The Vietnamese blog reports that this was the former USS/USCGC Bering Strait (AVP-34, WAVP-382/WHEC-382 but this is unlikely as she served as HQ-2)

By the time these two “311s” were transferred to Vietnam, most of their WWII armament, and all their ASW systems had been removed. As cutters they were armed with a single Mark 12 5″/38 caliber (127-mm) gun (55 pound projectile), four M2 Browning .50-caliber (12.7-millimeter) general-purpose machine guns, and perhaps two 81-mm mortars. The Vietnamese apparently added some weapons. A twin Bofors 40mm/56 gun mount is clearly visible on HQ-16 on the O-1 deck between the bridge and the 5″ mount. None of the pictures of HQ-05 I was able to find show a similar mount. Some sources say these vessels mounted four Bofors 40mm anti-aircraft gun mounts and four Mk. 4 single 20mm/70 Oerlikon anti-aircraft gun mounts, but I think this may have been their battery later while in Philippine service. These ships had a full load displacement of 2,800 tons, a length of 311 feet (95 meters), and a speed of 18 knots.

USS Forster (DER-334), the Vietnamese HQ-4

RVNS Trần Dư (HQ-04), the former USS Forster (DE-334) (WDE-434 while in Coast Guard service, 1951-1954). An Edsall class destroyer escort converted to a radar picket, armed with two rapid fire 3″/50 single mounts, two 20mm guns, and five .50 cal. machine guns. She had a full load displacement of 1,850 tons, a length of 306 feet (93.3 meters), and a speed of 20 knots, marginally faster than the 311s. This was perhaps the most capable of the Vietnamese combatants. It’s two 3″50s were in Mk34 mounts fore and aft, each with a rate of fire of 50 rounds per minute, two guns and the higher rate of fire, more than making up for their lighter (13 pounds) projectile. It also had the best fire control system, a Mk63.

HQ-10, an Admirable class minesweeper converted to a patrol vessel

RVNS Nhựt Tảo (HQ-10), the former USS Serene (AM-300) an Admirable class steel hulled minesweeper converted to a patrol craft, armed with a 3″/50 and two twin 40mm Bofors guns and six 20mm. She had a full load displacement of 853 tons, a length of 184.5 feet (56.3 m) and a nominal speed of 15 knots, but had had a casualty to one of her two main diesels engines before the battle, and was enroute to have it repaired when diverted to the scene of the battle. She was probably capable of only about 11 knots. This was by far the weakest of the Vietnamese ships. Her single 3″/50 was manually loaded and had no radar fire control.

China

T-396

Two Type 010 minesweepers, hull numbers 389 and 396, a variant of the Soviet T-43 steel hull minesweeper but used as patrol vessels. If I interpret the Chinese illustration above correctly, it appears that they were armed differently. #396 armed with a twin 37mm/67 guns, two twin 25mm guns and two twin 14.5mm/93 machineguns. #389 armed with an 85mm/52 dual purpose mount (20 pound projectile), a twin 37mm gun, and two twin 25mm guns. They had a full load displacement of 600 tons, were 197 feet (60 meters) in length, with a speed of 14 knots.

Two Project 122bis (NATO codename Kronshtadt class) submarine chasers hull numbers 271 and 274 armed with an 85mm gun, twin 37mm/67 guns, and three twin 14.5mm/93 machineguns. They also had ASW rocket launchers that might have been usable against surface ships at close range. About the size of the Webber class WPCs, they were 338 tons full load, 52.24 m (171.4 ft) loa, with a speed reported anywhere from 18 knots to 24.

Two armored (presumably meaning armed) trawlers (presumably hull numbers 402 and 407). These did not participate in the battle.

Type 037, Hainan class subchaser #281

Type 037 Hainan class sub-chaser, two twin 57mm on the main deck fore and aft, two twin 25mm on the O-1 deck fore and aft. RBU1200s on the foc’sle.

Two additional small surface combatants 281 and 282 Type 037 Hainan Class sub-chasers, arrived too late to participate in the fight, but their impending arrival possibly influencing the decision to leave the field of battle. These 430 ton craft were 58.77 m (192 ft 10 in) long with a speed of over 30 knots. They were armed with four (2×2) 57mm guns and four (2×2) 25mm guns, four 5 tube RBU-1200 launchers.

 

Chinese depiction of the fighting. I think there may have been some artistic license taken.

Chinese vessel damaged after the battle. Presumably T-389, which was intentionally grounded to prevent it sinking. Reportedly it was refloated.

HQ16 after the battle. Note the twin 40mm on the O-1 deck forward of the bridge.

QUESTIONS:

Why didn’t the Vietnamese use their range advantage?

It would appear that the Vietnamese had a range advantage with their two larger 5″ guns, but it was not possible to remain entirely outside the range of the Chinese guns. While the two 5″ had a nominal range of 18,200 yards (16,640 m), the Chinese 85mm guns had a range of 17,000 yards (15,565 m). Those ranges are not realistic, in addition to the fact it is almost impossible to achieve hits at max range against moving targets, we also have to consider the fire control system. I don’t have information on the Chinese firecontrol, but the Mk52 fire control on the two former Coast Guard cutters is very familiar and it has significant weaknesses as an anti-ship system.

Mk52GFCS

Mk52 Gun Fire Control Director with Mk15 Gyro Sight and Mk26 radar

The Mk52 is a relative-rate fire control systems have been designed to engage air contacts at short or medium ranges. The gun target line is established by a crewman using handle bars, pointing the director at the target. Consequently it is responsive to fast moving targets, but lacks the precision required to fully exploit the maximum range of the 5″/38s. On destroyers and larger vessels, it was used only as a secondary fire control system for 5″ guns.

More about the range advantage later.

Why did the Vietnamese loose when they seemed to have the advantage?

The Vietnamese forces were at least equal in terms of their medium gun systems. They may have had a disadvantage in heavy machine guns, but that should have been offset by their much greater displacement. Four Vietnamese ships had a total full load displacement of 8,303 tons  while the four Chinese ships that engaged them had a total full load displacement of 1,876 tons. It might be noted that all four the Vietnamese ships combined, were less well armed than a single Fletcher class destroyer as they were equipped at the end of WWII (five 5″/38s, fourteen 40mm, twelve 20mm, and five torpedo tubes).

Looking at the diagram above, you can see that the Vietnamese forces were split with two ships North of a reef labeled “Antelope” or “Bai da Ngam” and two ships South. If correct, this puts the two groups nine to ten miles apart, too far apart for mutual support, allowing the Chinese to deal with the groups consecutively. It may have been a conscious decision; it may have been that the Northern group opened fire first (which apparently they did at 10:24 AM), but for what ever reason, it appears they may have concentrated first on the Northern group which was the weaker of the two, with one former cutter (HQ-16) and the former minesweeper (HQ-10) slowed by an engine casualty. These two ships were the most heavily damaged in the fighting. The minesweeper was sunk and HQ-16 limped away listing with heavy damage.

The HQ-16 was reportedly hit by fire from the HQ-5, suggesting HQ-5 must have been far enough away that they could mistake their sister ship for a Chinese vessel. Since the battle only lasted 40 minutes it is unlike the Southern group ever closed sufficiently to support the Northern group. With the sinking of HQ-10 and the withdrawal of HQ-16 of the Northern group, the Southern group apparently decided they were outgunned and withdrew after exchanging.

What was the reported guided missile?

” Nhựt Tảo took a direct hit from a ship-to-ship missile (China claims the weapon used was an RPG) on her bridge and went dead in the water.”

There are several references to guided missiles on the Chinese ships, and reports that the RVNS Nhựt Tảo (HQ-10), the former USS Serene (AM-300), was hit by a missile in spite of the fact that none of the Chinese ships were equipped with anti-ship guided missiles. I think it is possible the Chinese may have used their RBU-1200 anti-submarine rockets as an anti-ship weapon.

RBU-1200 rocket launchers, mounted on the bow of a small ASW vessel. The gun mount is a twin 25mm.

The RBU-1200 is an ASW rocket launcher with a range of 1200 meters (1310 yards). Projectile diameter is 250mm (9.8″) with a weight of 154 pounds (70 kg). The warhead weight was 75 pounds (34 kg). The typical launcher consisted of five tubes and most installations included multiple launchers, usually four, for a total salvo of up to 20 rockets. The rockets explode at a programmed depth or on contact. I believe I have seen that these weapons are sometimes used for shore bombardment, so presumably they would explode if they hit a ship.

The Chinese were reported to have said they had hit the ship with an RPG, a rocket propelled grenade. Rocket propelled projectiles like the RBU-1200 are some times referred to a grenades, so this may have been the type of “Rocket Propelled Grenade” they referred to.

“The smaller Chinese warships managed to maneuver into the blind spots of the main cannons on the Vietnamese warships.”

If they had attempted this, a counter might have been something like the “Thach Weave” which naval aviators in World War II when engaging faster more maneuverable Zero fighter aircraft. Wingmen alternately passing under the stern of the other aircraft to clear his “six.”

I suspect this only happened in the case of the HQ-10 and only after its one operating engine was disabled. When the crew manning its aft mounted 40mm guns were killed, which happened twice, it became essentially defenseless. This does lead to another observation.

The crews of automatic weapons on the Chinese ships were better protected than those on the Vietnamese ships. 

Chinese (Soviet) 25mm

Looking at the installation of the 37, 25, and 14.5mm guns on the Chinese ships, it is apparent that their crews were better protected than those manning the 40, 20, and 12.7mm (.50 cal.) guns on the Vietnamese ships. If the Vietnamese guns were protected at all, it was only by shields protecting the crew from the direction the guns were pointed. Additionally the 3″/50s on HQ-10 and HQ-4 had no ballistic protection for the crews. By contrast the Chinese had wrap around protection that at least some extent protected their crews from effects of explosions that might occur to the side or in some cases behind the crew. The 85mm guns were shielded by what appears to be a complete enclosure, similar to those on the 5″/38s. The lack of protection endangers not only the gun crew, but also the ship they are trying to protect. I am still concerned about the lack of protection for Coast Guard gun crews manning .50 caliber machine guns and early model crew served 25mm Mk38s.

Chinese (Soviet) 37mm twin

Soviet era 14.5mm twin heavy machine gun. The Chinese also made a twin 14.5mm that looked much like the 25mm above, with the guns stacked vertically.

The Butcher’s Bill:

According to Wikipedia:

The South Vietnamese reported that the warship HQ-10 was sunk and the HQ-16 heavily damaged, while the HQ-5 and HQ-4 were both slightly damaged. 53 Vietnamese soldiers, including Captain Ngụy Văn Thà of HQ-10, were killed, and 16 were injured. On January 20, 1974, the Dutch tanker, Kopionella, found and rescued 23 survivors of the sunken HQ-10. On January 29, 1974, Vietnamese fishermen found 15 Vietnamese soldiers near Mũi Yến (Qui Nhơn) who had fought on Quang Hòa island and escaped in lifeboats.

After their successful amphibious assault on January 20, the Chinese held 48 prisoners, including an American advisor. They were later released in Hong Kong through the Red Cross.

The Chinese claimed that even though its ships had all been hit numerous times, none of them had been sunk. Warships #271 and #396 suffered speed-reducing damage to their engines, but both returned to port safely and were repaired. Warship #274 was damaged more extensively and had to stop at Yongxing Island for emergency repairs. It returned to Hainan under its own power the next day. Warship #389 was damaged the most by an engine room explosion. Its captain managed to run his ship aground and put out the fire with the help of the minesweepers. It was then towed back to base. China confirmed a total of 18 deaths among its forces.

The Vietnamese claimed greater damage to the Chinese forces including a sinking. Could the Chinese be lying? I doubt it, but it is certainly possible. We cannot assume either side would never attempt to shape the narrative for their own purposes. In any case it makes little difference in the long run.

 When it ended:
After the battle, the Chinese doubled down on their commitment, bringing in additional reinforcements.
The Vietnamese made no further effort to reclaim the islands and left their remaining small garrisons to be captured by larger Chinese landing parties.
How it might have been done differently:
It appears the Vietnamese made two preliminary mistakes.
  • Splitting their forces and
  • Including HQ-10 in their force.

The error of splitting the force should be obvious. The HQ-10 was too weak to add much to the offensive capability of the force, and its reduced speed made her a liability. The Chinese were able to easily overtake and overwhelm her.

What should have been done with the other three ships (two 311s and the DER)? Operating as a unit, the Vietnamese would have had an advantage in medium range weapons (2×5″ plus 2×3″ rapid fire mounts vs 3x85mm) while at shorter range, the Chinese’ eight 37mm, eight 25mm, and sixteen 14.5mm might have tipped the balance the other way.

The Vietnamese would have had a speed advantage over at least two of the four Chinese vessels.

Rather than rushing to close the range, the Vietnamese should have tried to maintain a range to target within its effective range, less than 10,000 yard–optimally about 7,000 yards, but outside the effective range of the Chinese 37mm and smaller weapons–less than 5,000 yards. Optimally the Chinese would have wanted to be inside 2,000 yards.

For the Chinese to attempt to run would be suicidal, because Vietnamese could maintain a range, at least on the two slowest warships and the two trawlers, most favorable for them.

Assuming the Chinese attempted to close the range, the Vietnamese probably would not want to simply turn directly away, at least not for any length of time, because they would then only have one 3″/50 that could bear, while the Chinese could bring all three of their 85mm to bear. They could, however, by turning slightly away from the Chinese, going 18 knots, and keeping their enemy at about 120 or 240 degrees relative, slow their approach and allow virtually unlimited time to attrite the Chinese. The resulting track would approximate a circle with the Vietnamese on the outside and the Chinese on a shorter radius circle inside.

Hindsight is 20/20 and I benefitted from both better information about the opposing forces and much more time to think about it than the men who were actually there, so perhaps it would be unfair to be critical.

“Effective Border Security: Addressing the Causes and Root Problems South of Mexico,” Video

If you did not see the U.S. Naval Institute presentation, Effective Border Security:
Addressing the Causes and Root Problems South of Mexico,”
when it aired live on Tuesday, 29 August, you can still watch it. The US Naval Institute News Service has both commentary and a video of the discussion here.

The discussion featured ADM Kurt W. Tidd, USN, Commander, U.S. Southern Command and The Hon. Earl Anthony Wayne, Career Ambassador (Ret.)
former Ambassador of the United States to Mexico (2011-2015) and Public Policy Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The conversation was moderated by ADM Thad W. Allen, USCG (Ret.) former Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard (2006-2010).

It is an hour and 20 minutes. I will mention a couple of things that caught my attention.

The transnational criminal organizations are evolving. Adm. Tidd indicated that illegal gold mining, which is wrecking the environment in several Latin American countries is yielding an estimated $3.5B in profits compared to $2B (wholesale) from the sale of cocaine, and once taken outside the country is no longer “illegal.”

Heroin, primarily from Mexico, and synthetic opioids primarily from China but entering the US from Mexico are becoming more of a problem than Cocaine.

The US has finally acknowledged that we are part of the problem, that $19B to $29B profit in drug sales in the US, buys a lot of influence and arms.

SOUTHCOM is attempting to build capacity in Latin American militaries and sees developing these four principles within those services as essential.

  • Respect for human rights.
  • Need for professional NCOs
  • Talent from all parts of society including women
  • Jointness not only among the military but also law enforcement and diplomatic

Adm. Tidd both complemented the Coast Guard and noted the absence of the Navy when he said, “My Navy all has white hulls and orange stripes.”

Question at 58:15 about how we might interdict the established target of 40%. Adm. Tidd talked around the question, suggested we could get help from our allies but he also said there were not enough ships in the USN and USCG to interdict our way out of the problem, which may be true, but if we really do have good information of 80% of the traffic as has been reported repeatedly, then there are enough ships to achieve a 40% interdiction rate.  It is simply not a priority. Earlier in the presentation, Admiral Tidd acknowledged that in an earlier assignment he had allocated Navy resources and had decided against assigning them to SOUTHCOM.

Opinion on the border wall 1h01m

1h07 capabilities of our allies

Positive aspects of NAFTA 1h11

Marine Protector class WPB replacement? Its Time!

33 meter Damen designed patrol boat

Bairdmaritime brings us news of a new patrol boat being built for a private security company that is protecting Nigeria’s offshore oil industry. Looks like a possible replacement for the 87 foot Marine Protector class WPBs. Yes it is bigger, but all our vessels have gotten bigger. It is also faster, but the crew is no larger, although more accommodations are provided.

Is it too early to start looking at a replacement class? Actually we may already be a year or two late starting the process.  

Our 73 Marine Protector class 87 foot WPBs were commissioned over an eleven year period from 1998 to 2009. If we want to replace them when they reach 25 years old, the first new cutters should be commissioned in 2023. If it were possible, it could fit well into our shipbuilding program since it appears likely the last of the programmed 58 Webber class will be funded in FY2020 and the first of the new class could be funded in FY2021.

Additionally we probably would want to start with an initial low rate production until the bugs have been worked out, and we get DHS approval to enter full-rate production. At that point, we should enter into a Multi-year Procurement. We don’t want to get into a situation where we have to rush a crash program to replace overage vessels.

Unfortunately it looks like we are once again “behind the power curve.” It takes us ten years to procure a large ship. Maybe we can move a little faster on these smaller vessels, but if you look at the way we are doing ship contracts,

  • there will be a year for market research/requests for information
  • a year of competition to select three preliminary designs
  • a year to refine and select from among the preliminary designs
  • a year to complete the winner’s detail design
  • at least two years construction before the first ship is commissioned.

That is six years, meaning we needed to start the contracting process in 2018, but there is nothing in the FY2018 budget that would move us toward a WPB procurement.

Even before the procurement process begins, we really need to look at what characteristics the new WPBs should have. I think the documentation is still called ROC and POE, for Required Operational Characteristics and Projected Operating Environment.

Surely we would want a better ship’s boat (the same 26 foot over the horizon boat used on the Webber class) and probably more speed and greater range.

Is it going to be just a SAR and LE asset, or will we consider Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) and our newly remembered Defense Readiness missions?

If so, I would suggest that they provide at least one Mk38 mod3 mount with provision for mounting a second Mk38 mod3, a guided weapon (which might be on the Mk38 mount) to deal with small, fast, highly maneuverable threats, and weight and space for a pair of tubes for light weight torpedoes to deal with the largest terrorist threats and . We might also consider a pilot house armored against small arms, like that on the Nigerian boats.

We ought to be able to get all that in a boat less than half the displacement of a Webber class, eg, about the same size as the Island class 110s.

 

 

H-60 Replacement Tilt-rotor Prototype

Bell’s V-280 prototype

The Aviationist brings us pictures of the first prototype for the V-280, one of two contenders for the Army’s “Future Vertical Lift” program to replace the H-60 and other helicopters. We have discussed this program previously as a potential replacement for Coast Guard MH-60s, here (2015) and here (2013).

The competing Sikorsky-Boeing-made SB-1 Defiant coaxial helicopter is expected to fly in 2018.

The V-280’s characteristics reportedly include:

  • Speed: 280 KTAS cruise speed
  • Combat range: 500-800nm
  • Strategically Self-Deployable – 2100nm Range
  • Achieves 6k/95 (hover out of ground effect at full load, at 6,000 feet/95 degrees F)
  • Non-rotating, fixed engines
  • Triple redundant fly-by-wire flight control system
  • Conventional, retractable landing gear
  • Two 6′ wide large side doors for ease of ingress/egress
  • Suitable down wash
  • Significantly smaller logistical footprint compared to other aircraft

 

Looking at “Land Based, Long Range/ultra-long endurance UAS”

Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) flies on a simulated Navy aerial reconnaissance flight near the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) off the coast of southern California on Dec. 5, 1995. The Predator provides near, real-time infrared and color video to intelligence analysts and controllers on the ground and the ship. This is the Predator’s first maritime mission with a carrier battle group. The UAV was launched from San Nicholas Island off the coast of southern California. DoD photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Jeffrey S. Viano, U.S. Navy.

The Coast Guard has issued a “Request For Information” (RFI) about Land Based, Long Range/ultra-long endurance UAS (unmanned aerial system). You can see it here. The CG-9 commentary about it is here. The Coast Guard is being pushed in this direction by the Congress, specifically by the House sub-committee that has oversight of the Coast Guard.

Note this seems to be directed specifically at drug interdiction rather than Maritime Domain Awareness of approaches to the US coast.

There is specific reference to the UAS operating beyond line of sight, so it will require both some degree of autonomy and satellite communications.

AMALGAMATED NAVIGATION RULES–Navigation Center

USS John S. McCain

The US Coast Guard’s Navigation Center has published amalgamated navigation rules, providing a side by side listing of rules of the nautical road for both inland and international waters. You can see them here.

Below are the introductory paragraphs which provide some additional information on content.

Below is an amalgamation of the International and Inland Navigation Rules, their Annexes, and associated federal rules and regulations. All efforts are made to ensure this amalgamation is accurate and current; nonetheless, the U.S. Coast Guard makes no claims or guarantees of such and expressly disclaims liability for errors or omissions. Readers are encouraged to bring any errors, omissions or suggestion to our attention using our Contact Us form (select “Navigation Rules of the Road” from the pull-down menu). Official versions of the Navigation Rules can be found at: the International Navigational Rules Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-75, 91 Stat. 308, 33 U.S.C. 1-8) or the Inland Navigation Rules Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-591, 94 Stat. 3415, 33 CFR 83).

Text unique to either Rules is shown in a dual columned table or in bracketed text: where the International text is  square bracketed ] and Inland Rules text is < angle bracketed and italicized ›.  Implementing and Interpretation Rules are shown in a bordered box aft of the Rule they implement/interpret Editorial comments provided by the USCG Office of Navigation System (CG-NAV) are shown in {braces}. Instances of “…with/of this paragraph/subparagraph/Section/Subpart/Part ( ) of this Rule…” have been redacted to refer to the enumerated Rule(s), e.g. International Rule 18(e) states “…with the Rules of this Part” and the same Inland Rule states “…with the Rules of this Subpart (Rules 4-19) (§§83.04 through 83.19)”, but, below it is stated as “…with Rules 4-19.

Hypertext permits the reader to jump to specific sections.

Thanks to Bryant’s Maritime Blog for bringing this to my attention. 

Weapons Effectiveness Testing–25 vs 30mm

This is old. It goes back to 1992, but if they knew the results here, it raises a question, why are we still equipping the Mk38s with 25mm guns instead of 30mm (or 35mm or 40mm) guns which also fit the same mount? The results are discussed beginning at time 8:00. The 30mm does nine times the damage to the hull and five times the damage inside the hull.

At the very least we need to make sure we have available rounds that do not detonate on impact. The 25mm rounds, exploding on impact, failed to even penetrate the 1/4 inch aluminum hull of the Mk3 target boat.

Thanks to Luke for bringing this to my attention. 

Effective Border Security: Addressing the Causes and Root Problems South of Mexico–Discussion

Passing along an announcement of an event coming up Tuesday, 29 August. Below is the announcement edited slightly. 

Livestream will be available here on 29 August at 1900.

As part of

The U.S. Coast Guard Academy 2017- 2018 Leadership Lecture Series

The U.S. Naval Institute presents

Effective Border Security:
Addressing the Causes and Root Problems South of Mexico

Featuring

ADM Kurt W. Tidd, USN
Commander, U.S. Southern Command

and

The Hon. Earl Anthony Wayne, Career Ambassador (Ret.)
former Ambassador of the United States to Mexico (2011-2015) and
Public Policy Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

in a conversation moderated by ADM Thad W. Allen, USCG (Ret.)
former Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard (2006-2010) 

29 August 2017, 1900-2000 Eastern

U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Leamy Hall

Space is limited, please contact conferences@usni.org if you have questions or are interested in attending in person.

This event is made possible with support from The William M. Wood Foundation.