We mentioned this earlier, but there is now a trailer and gCaptain has a release date, 29 Jan., 2016.
There is also an earlier telling of the story here.
Undoubtably, USCGC Webber will have to get a copy of this on Blu-Ray.
The US has issued a new National Military Strategy. You can see it in pdf form here, or you can see it on the Naval Institute News Service here.
Its not really very long. There are only 18 pages of text. Even so, I will provide a “Readers’ Digest” version, or perhaps more properly, a powerpoint version, in that it is in outline form, and offer only limited Coast Guard related comment.
U.S. ENDURING NATIONAL INTERESTS
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES
PRIORITIES
There is nothing here that adds to the Coast Guard’s “to do list.” There is no specific mention of the Coast Guard or any other service for that matter. They do talk about working with DHS partners, and a couple of times they mention Coast Guardsmen along with an enumeration of all other types of US military personnel.
There is a recognition of the “Violent Extremist Organization” either acting alone or with support of a Nation State in a form of “Hybrid Warfare.”
DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND
There may be more emphasis on “defense of the homeland,” but we are a long way from providing the kind of commitment to this, that we saw in the late 1950s and early 60s when we had Nike missile launchers around every US city and hundreds of interceptors on strip alert around the country. At that time there were also Naval Sea Frontiers that were ready to respond to naval threats.
DOD has recently begun to talk about defense against cruise missiles, but really, it is easier to get a weapon of mass destruction into the country by boat than by missile or aircraft.
I would like to particularly highlight the explanation that accompanies the #2 priority, after #1–maintaining a nuclear deterrent, because it certainly involves the Coast Guard,
“Provide for Military Defense of the Homeland. Emerging state and non-state capabilities pose varied and direct threats to our homeland. Thus we are striving to interdict attack preparations abroad, defend against limited ballistic missile attacks, and protect cyber systems and physical infrastructure. Key homeland defense capabilities include resilient space-based and terrestrial indications and warning systems; an integrated intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination architecture; a Ground-Based Interceptor force; a Cyber Mission Force; and, ready ground, air and naval forces, (emphasis applied–Chuck). We also are leveraging domestic and regional partnerships to improve information sharing and unity of effort. These capabilities will better defend us against both high technology threats and terrorist dangers.
Make no mistake, for countering any covert maritime surface threat to the US, the Coast Guard is the “ready naval force,” that is ready to investigate possible hostile contacts. Even if the US had aircraft armed and ready to engage surface vessels, which I doubt, I don’t think anyone is going to send aircraft to sink a ship based on a suspicion, however well founded, that the ship has some nefarious intent. Someone is going to have stop the vessel and attempt a boarding. Navy Bases are few and far between. The only Navy surface combatant on the Atlantic coast based North of the Norfolk complex is the USS Constitution. The only surface ships based on the East Coast are around Norfolk and Jacksonville. On the West Coast they are either in Everett or San Diego. There are none based in Alaska and none on the Gulf Coast. Unless they are holding a Navy Day, celebration the majority of US ports are hundreds of miles from the nearest Navy surface combatant.
The Coast Guard’s position ought to be that we see a problem here, and the Coast Guard is the solution (and here I am not talking about the larger cutters, because they are either going to be deployed or in some sort of stand down if they are in port). The vessels that are going to do the stopping and boarding are most likely to be WPCs or WPBs, but currently they are not really armed to handle anything much more threatening than an angry outboard.
In addition to better weapons, we certainly need to continue to exploit the DOD’s intelligence organization and the Navy’s Maritime Domain Awareness hopefully including JLENS if they become more than prototypes.
REACTION. Of course the Chinese had a comment, as did Russia, “Clearly Anit-Russsian.”
This is a straight news release, but I decided to quote it in its entirety because it is says a lot about the importance of what the Coast Guard does for the country. Note these increases are compared to pre-recession activity levels.–Chuck
New U.S. Port Economic Impacts Report Released
Since last nationwide analysis in 2007, U.S. seaport contributions to economy up dramatically
Lancaster, Pa.-based Martin Associates, a leading provider of economic and strategic assessments of the world’s transportation systems, today released the results of its latest economic impact study of United States seaports. Dr. John Martin, Martin Associates’ president, debuted his firm’s 2014 National Economic Impact of the U.S. Coastal Port System report during the second day of the American Association of Port Authorities’ (AAPA) 2015 Spring Conference in Washington, D.C.
In the seven years since Martin Associates’ last nationwide ports economic impact study, the contributions of America’s seaports to the nation’s economy have risen dramatically. From 2007 to 2014, the total economic value that U.S. coastal ports provide in terms of revenue to businesses, personal income and economic output by exporters and importers rose 43 percent to $4.6 trillion. This accounted for 26 percent of the nation’s $17.4 trillion economy in 2014, up from 20 percent of its $16.1 trillion economy in 2007.
Other notable gains since 2007 in Martin Associates’ new report include:
•Federal, state and local tax revenues generated by port-sector and importer/exporter revenues rose 51 percent to $321.1 billion;
•Jobs generated by port-related activity jumped 74 percent to 23.1 million; and,
•Personal wages and local consumption related to the port-sector increased to $1.1 trillion, with the average annual salary of those directly employed by port-related businesses equating to $53,723.
“The growth in jobs and economic importance of America’s seaports reflects the fact that the value of international cargo handled at these ports increased by $400 billion since 2007, reaching about $1.8 trillion in 2014,” said Dr. Martin. “It’s important to emphasize that the key growth in our international trade was in U.S. exports, which saw a 60 percent increase in value over the past seven years.”
Dr. Martin noted that each dollar increase in the value of export cargo supports significantly more jobs in the U.S. than does a dollar value of growth in imports. He also emphasized that the robust growth in the economic impact value from U.S. ports occurred despite the economic recession that severely hampered marine cargo activity between 2008 and 2012.
“The growth in the contributions of our ports to the nation’s economy underscores the need to invest in infrastructure and technology to support and foster good jobs, national security, international trade and our standard of living,” said Dr. Martin.
In agreement with Dr. Martin’s assessment is AAPA President and CEO Kurt Nagle, who said that particularly with the economic contributions of America’s seaports growing rapidly, there’s a significant and urgent need for more federal investment in enhancing the connections with those ports. He added, “On the land-side alone, AAPA’s U.S. member ports have identified at least $28.9 billion in needed investments by 2025. These necessary road, rail, bridge and tunnel improvements are crucial to enable our seaports to efficiently handle their expected cargo volumes, continue providing dramatic economic and jobs impacts, and enhance America’s international competitiveness.”
—————————————————————————————————
About AAPA
Founded in 1912, AAPA today represents 160 of the leading seaport authorities in the United States, Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean and more than 300 sustaining and associate members, firms and individuals with an interest in seaports. As a critical link for access to the global marketplace, each year, Western Hemisphere seaports generate trillions of dollars of economic activity, support the employment of millions of people and, in 2008, imported and exported more than 7.8 billion tons of cargo, valued at $8.6 trillion, including food, clothing, medicine, fuel and building materials, as well as consumer electronics and toys. The volume of cargo shipped by water is expected to dramatically increase by 2020 and the number of passengers traveling through our seaports will continue to grow. To meet these demands, the AAPA and its members are committed to keeping seaports navigable, secure and sustainable.
FOR RELEASE – April 21, 2015
Contact: Aaron Ellis, Public Affairs Director, aellis@aapa-ports.org
(703) 684-5700 or (703) 254-7098
American Association of Port Authorities
1010 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone: (703) 684-5700
Fax: (703) 684-6321
http://www.aapa-ports.org
MarineLink is reporting that the Bangladesh Coast Guard has reached agreement with Italy and Fincantieri for the refurbishment and transfer of four Minerva Class Corvettes, “Minerva”, “Sibilla”, “Urania”, and “Danaide”, for use as Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs). The 87 meter (285 foot), 1,285 ton, diesel powered, 25 knot vessels had been previously employed in this role by the Italian Navy. They first entered service between 1987 and 1991.
My trusty “Combat Fleets of the World,” 16th Ed., copyright 2013, indicates that the Bangladeshi Coast Guard consisted of approximately 20 officers and 250 enlisted. The Wikipedia entry, which appears very up to date, says they have 1,282 personnel and 57 vessels. Apparently the organization is growing rapidly, helped by the Bangladesh Navy. It is probable they would welcome some assistance from the USCG. It sounds like the Bangladesh Coast Guard closely follows the USCG model in terms of missions and general structure, in that it is a military organization outside the regular defense organization having law enforcement authority and a military mission in time of war.
The intention is to extend the life of these four ships another 20 years. Delivery is expected to take two years. There is no specific information about what the conversion would include.
The U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) last week adopted a formal resolution to develop a legally-binding treaty for the conservation of marine biodiversity on the ‘high seas’.
The new ocean regulations are proposed to include: area-based management tools, such as marine planning and marine protected areas; environmental impact assessment (EIA) requirements; the transfer of marine technology; and a regime for managing marine genetic resources, including benefit-sharing. These developments have potentially significant implications for ocean economic activities, such as shipping, oil and gas, cruise tourism, fishing, marine mining, biotechnology, submarine cable, as well as for related sectors, such as maritime law, insurance and investment.
Apparently they are seeking comment with a meeting scheduled for November in Singapore.
What are the chances we will see some results from this? Given how long it took to have UNCLOS accepted, I would not expect anything soon, but you have to start somewhere.
“SAFE Boats International informs it has been awarded a contract from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to build up to 52 coastal interceptor vessels (CIV). Should all options be executed, the contract value would exceed $48 million.”
SAFE 41 Center Console—Offshore, from which the CIV is derived
It is perhaps interesting to contrast this boat with the Coast Guard’s Response Boat Medium (CRB-M). The CIV is optimized for speed, while the RB-M, although still relatively fast, is optimized for staying power. The CIV is apparently powered by four outboard motors while the RB-M is powered by two inboard diesels. This gives the CIV its greater 54 knot speed compared to RB-M’s 42 knots. The engine choice suggest that the RB-M has greater range. The RB-M provides greater protection from the elements for the crew and equipment. This again suggests that the CIVs are not expected to stay underway as long, and perhaps additionally, that they are only expected to operate in relatively mild climates like Southern California and Florida. The closed cockpits of the RB-Ms would also make communications, necessary for coordinated operations, easier, because of the lower noise level.
It appears that while the CIV cost slightly less than $1M each the RB-Ms cost slightly less than $2.5M each.
In addition to the CIV, SAFE Boats is also making the “Over the Horizon” cutter boat for the Coast Guard and the Mk VI patrol boat for the Navy.
Photo from Naval Open Source INTelligence
If there was any doubt that the Chinese intend to build a Blue Water fleet this 12,000 ton destroyer should dispel any doubts. It is larger the any of the Burke class DDGs, still not as large as the Zumwalts, but probably better armed.
Janes is reporting Singapore’s Navy has recently acquired some new boats that are different to say the least. The 22 meter (72 foot) vessels are intended for base defense, force protection, and maritime security operations.
Their remotely operated .50 caliber mount, the Oto Melara Hitrole G remote weapons station, is also interesting.
There is a new report on piracy available.
Oceans Beyond Piracy has launched the fifth installment of its annual reports detailing the economic and human costs of maritime piracy. “The State of Maritime Piracy 2014” examines both human and economic costs incurred as a result of piracy occuring in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Guinea, with a never before included analysis of the human cost of piracy in Southeast Asian waters.
A couple of things stand out. The number of seaman being held hostage is way down. The ocean areas around SE Asia are again the most significant areas of danger for piracy (or for robbery inside territorial waters, which is also included in the report, but not technically piracy). That is not to say that the probability of any particular vessel being attacked is higher off SE Asia than in the Gulf of Guinea given the volume of traffic through the waters of SE Asia.
Since before recorded history, merchant vessels have been adapted for offensive purposes by navies, pirates, and privateers to destroy enemy commerce or to launch attacks ashore. Frequently they employed disguise and deception. The UK employed Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) during the 1982 Falklands War, the Malaysian Navy has converted two container ships into pirate hunters, and the US Navy has leased ships to support special operations, but I think the last time they were used to attack commerce was WWII. By the end 1943, it appeared that technology, primarily in the form of reliable radios, plus robust challenge-and-reply procedures, a comprehensive naval control of shipping organization, and a seemingly impervious blockade of the German coast, had made this type of warfare very dangerous, but new technology may now be working in favor of using converted merchant ships as clandestine warships.
The German Experience
During World Wars I and II, the German Navy achieved considerable success using armed merchant ships as clandestine merchant raiders. At small cost they sank or captured a large number of allied merchant vessels, tied down a number of warships searching for the raiders, and even managed to sink allied warships.
In World War I, three raiders, Wolf, Moewe, and Seeadler (a full rigged sailing ship), sank or captured 78 ships totaling 323,644 tons. In addition to the merchant ships they captured or sank directly, merchant raiders proved effective mine layers. One victim of a mine laid by the raider Moewe was the pre-dreadnought battleship EdwardVII, sunk on 6 January, 1915.
In World War II nine German Merchant raiders, Atlantis, Komet, Kormoran, Michel, Orion, Pinguin, Stier, Thor, and Widder, sank or captured 129 ships, totaling 800,661 tons. While this pales in comparison to the sinkings by U-boats, they were far more effective than the regular navy surface raiders, including the vaunted pocket battleships, heavy cruisers, and battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, that managed to sink or captured only 59, totaling 232,633 tons. The merchant raider Kormoran even managed to torpedo and sink the light cruiser HMAS Sydney, before the Kormoran herself was also sunk.
Typically, the raiders of WWII were equipped with six obsolescent 5.9″ guns and large numbers of torpedoes to allow ships to be sunk rapidly. Most were also equipped with aircraft and some with torpedo boats. They were also equipped to change their appearance while underway.
Several of their voyages were extraordinarily long. Michel’s first voyage was 346 days. Orion’s was 510 days. Thor was away 329 days and managed to sink HMS Voltaire, an armed merchant cruiser. Pinguin for 357 days. Komet for 512 days. Kormoran for 350 days before her fatal encounter with HMAS Sydney. The ships were refueled and rearmed by supporting vessels that also took their prisoners. Raiders were also used to resupply submarines.
Perhaps surprisingly, none of these WWII raiders were underway when the war began, when they might have been most effective. They were sortied in two waves in 1940 and 1942.
END OF THE MERCHANT RAIDER
Despite their successes, by the time the last German raider at sea was sunk on 7 September, 1943, by a US submarine shortly after it had sortied from Japan, it had become impossible for ships to sortie from Germany and make it to open sea. Komet and a tenth raider were both sunk attempting to do so. Three of the nine, Atlantis, Pinguin, and Kormoran, were sunk in distant seas by British cruisers. One, Stier, was sunk by the Naval Armed Guard on the Liberty ship Stephen Hopkins. One was destroyed by a nearby explosion while moored in Yokohama. Two, Orion and Widder, survived their career as raiders long enough to return to Germany and be repurposed.
REBIRTH–Weapons and Sensors, Old and New
Technological changes in the form of containerized cruise missiles, satellites and UAVs and other Unmanned Vehicles may have made the merchant cruiser once again a viable option.
Cruise missiles mean that the raider no longer needs to come with visible range of the their victim. With sufficient range and use of way points, the shooter can be over 100 miles from its victim and the missile can come from any direction, not necessarily from the direction of the raider. Plus they can now attack land targets as well as ships. The US has begun to think seriously about the threat of a cruise missile attack on the US and innocent looking container ships are a possible source.
UAVs can provide over the horizon targeting and are likely to be undetected by the target.
Satellites may help or hurt potential raiders. If they have the support of satellites, it may help them find their pray. If the defenders are sufficiently sophisticated (and they are looking in the right place) they may be able to recognize a missile launch as the first step in finding, fixing and destroying the raider.
Similarly the Automatic Identification System may help the raider or the defender. It may help the raider find targets, but it may also help the defender react more swiftly to an attack or help him identify the raider from among all the other ships in the area. There is always the possibility the information may be bogus. Unmanned Surface Vessels might be used to create false targets. We might want to plan for a system of encrypted information for contingencies. Limiting use of the systems is an option that may require careful consideration.
Mines are still potentially effective. The large carrying capacity of cargo ships means they could potentially lay large mine fields. A raider could knowing a war will start soon might lay a large field to be activated when hostilities begin. If hostilities have already begun, the raider is unlikely approach a port closely enough to lay the mines itself, but mobile mines already exist, and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles or even simple semi-submersible unmanned vessels that can lay an minefield should be relatively easy technology.
China, Perpetrator or Target
From an American point of view, China with its huge merchant fleet and large inventory of cruise missile may appear a possible user of Merchant Raiders, but their large merchant fleet and need to import may also make them vulnerable to this this type of warfare if employed by weaker nations.
We know China has a Naval Militia. that will allow them to rapidly increase the size of their naval force. China has recently said it would require its ship builders to incorporate features that would make them usable for military purposes in wartime. These requirements are to be applied to five categories of vessels – container, roll-on/roll-off, multipurpose, bulk carrier and break bulk. What these additional features are to be, is not clear. This could mean upgraded communications, either external or internal. It could mean improved survivability, greater speed, or foundations for weapons upgrades. They may only be thinking of using these ships to support amphibious operations, but these improvements may also make a large number of ships potential merchant raiders.
China’s large merchant fleet and need to import raw materials may make her vulnerable to Guerre d’Course. In the kind of low intensity conflict we have seen between China and her neighbors, it has seemed China has had all the advantages, but if they are pushed too far, China’s neighbors might see this form of warfare as a way to push back.
Non-State Actors
There is also the possibility of terrorist organizations attempting something similar, but they are more likely to attack highly visible targets of a symbolic nature, such as port facilities or major warships. Cruise missile could of course be used to attack major landmarks. They may also be less interested in living to fight another day.
Conclusion: I don’t think we have seen the end of offensive use of Merchant vessels.
Sources:
Addendum:
Lee has seen me some photos of vessels that are being used for military purposes, so I am adding them here:
MSC has chartered the MV Craigside to support SOCOM requirements. It is undergoing conversion in Mobile.
SD Victoria lifts boats and supports crews for UK Special Forces (SBS and SAS).
Malaysian auxiliary warship Bunga Mas Lima
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 