An Indian Navy frigate, the Vindhyagiri, slightly smaller than a 378, (and slightly newer) was involved in a collision off Mumbai, caught fire, and after being brought into port, capsized and sank. There were no causalities. Video of the ship on fire, in port is here.
With the end of the Soviet Union, it looked like there was no longer a significant threat from submarines. The Coast Guard, whose ASW assets were already largely obsolete, took the opportunity to simplify its training and maintenance requirements by eliminating what remained of the Coast Guard’s ASW capability. It made sense at the time, but times have changed.
The Emerging Threat
For the first time, with narcotics traffickers starting to use true submarines, it looks like an ASW capability is essential to do a peacetime mission. (The primary surface ship ASW sensor, the towed array, can also help us find semi-submersibles and possibly other targets as well.)
In addition, the threat of military submarines has reemerged. There are still relatively few nuclear submarines in the hands of possible adversaries (other than possibly Russia) but their numbers are growing, and new air independent submarine technologies are making diesel electric submarines deadlier then ever.
Why the Navy will need Help
The Navy has admitted they made a mistake by attempting to minimize the manning of their ships using a concept called “Optimal Manning.” As unfortunate as the mistake may have been–and it has resulted in a lot of pain and may have weakened the service for years to come–poor morale and broken ships–at least now it has been acknowledged. There has been some soul searching about how the mistake was made. The general consensus seems to be that a new generation of leaders was absolutely positive they have evolved to be smarter than those that went before, and since their solution is so obviously superior, there is no need to test it on a small scale be for applying it service wide.
Has the Coast Guard made a similar mistake in attempting to replace twelfve 378s with only eight National Security Cutters, based on an untried concept called “Crew Rotation Concept (CRC)?” Unlike the Navy’s mistake, if we have made a mistake in adopting this concept, it cannot be quickly reversed by moving billets ashore back afloat.
The Chinese have built a large number of 140 foot long, 225 ton vessels (perhaps 100) using a relatively exotic hull form, and there is a suggestion that they may start offering export derivatives of the hull for maritime policing.
You can see the type in motion here. Click on “Type 022 (Houbei Class).” The video is 2m 11s long. (What is the device at the stern seen at 1:51 in the video? dipping sonar?)
There is more information describing the technology and the origin of the design here.
There is an interesting, but unconventional, view of how these ships may be used here.
There are some still pictures here.
For those of you who may be US Naval Institute members, there is an article on the class here. Unfortunately, it is only accessible to members.
The Taiwan Coast Guard, has just accepted two new major ships, the “Tainan” a 2,462 tons “frigate” and “Patrol Boat No. 7,” 1,845 tons. Both appear similar in configuration and capability to Japanese and Chinese Cutters–they appear to be made to merchant standards, and their armament is modest.
The Taiwanese President, Ma Ying-jeou, presided over the commissioning of the larger vessel. The “feel good” statements are here. A more forthright statement of their purpose is here.
The Taiwan (Republic of China) Coast Guard is a relatively recent addition, having been formed in 2000. They seems to have followed the USCG model in many respects.
The Taiwanese Coast Guard is charged with policing a total area of 540,000 square kilometers, which is 15 times larger than the island of Taiwan.
Taiwan is the third party in the dispute with China and Japan over the islands variously known as Senkaku, Diaoyu, Diaoyutai, or the Pinnacle Islands.
(This photo, found on the first link, shows a Taiwan Coast Guard ship that looks an awful lot like a 270.)
A number of presentations made at the Surface Navy Association’s National Symposium are available on line. One of these is the Commandant’s own presentation. It is about 45 minutes long.
I haven’t watched all the presentations yet, but you might also be interested in watching the “Updating the Surface Navy Vision” presentation by RADM Frank C. Pandolfe, Director, Surface Warfare, N86, OPNAV, it’s a fine bit of salesmanship, including a lot of information about the Littoral Combat Ship.
Other presentations were:
Looking a little further into the proposal for the Philippine Navy to take over one or more of our 378s, I got curious about the Philippine Coast Guard. In some ways they are in much better shape than the Philippine Navy, on average their vessels are newer. Like the Philippine Navy, their air arm is very weak, but they actually seem to have more flight decks (at least four) than their Navy.
Wikipedia has a description of the Philippine Coast Guard but was a bit short on pictures and descriptions of the vessels. I found photos here, just click on the names in blue, in most, but not all cases, they links to pictures. There are also some additional pictures further down the thread.
A report the Philippines would like to acquire one of the Hamilton Class; that they are in talks now; and that the ship “might arrive in the country within the first semester of this year.”
Sounds like the Philippine Navy is one of the few out there with a fleet older than the Coast Guard’s.
The Philippines has ongoing struggles with at least two insurgent groups, one Maoist, one Islamic radical, and is perhaps militarily the weakest of several countries, including the Peoples’ Republic of China, with competing claims to the Spratly Islands. A 378 will be a major increase in their capabilities. There is some indication they may want more than one.
Not really a “tour,” but gCaptain offers a good view of this monster in operation as it seemingly effortlessly makes its way to the North Pole.
25,000 tons, 521 ft long, 55 MegaWatts (75,000 HP) from two reactors, hangers for two helicopters, capable of breaking ice 9 feet thick.
Some refreshing news on the piracy front. In what must be seen as a unique operation, S. Korean forces stormed a ship, the Samho Jewelry, that had been in the control of pirates for six days, and in a five hour firefight, which included supporting fire from a helicopter and a destroyer, the Choi Young, retook the ship, freed the hostages, killed eight pirates and captured five. Three South Korean military were wounded and one of the hostages wounded, shot in the stomach by a pirate. The ship was also being used as a mothership. So take it, also protects other shipping.
The intensity of the five hour firefight is evident in pictures of the ship in this video. Hundreds if not thousands of rounds were fired, many appear to be heavier than small arms, perhaps 30 mm from the destroyer’s Goalkeeper CIWS which uses the same gun installed on the A-10. The superstructure is riddled with bullet holes. (Photos in this AP article)
This case illustrates the complexity, globalization has brought to the shipping industry. This ship was Maltese flagged, Norwegian owned, S. Korean operated, with a crew of 11 Burmese, eight South Koreans and two Indonesians. Is it any wonder it is hard to figure out who is responsible. I think the old concept that piracy is a universal crime against all flags, has to be applied. We all have a dog in this fight.
In a more familiar scenario, Malaysian commandos retook a vessel under attack by pirates after the crew had taken refuge in a citadel.
Meanwhile the AP reports, “On Thursday, pirates seized the MV Hoang Son Sun, a Vietnamese-owned bulk carrier with a crew of 24, the European Union Naval Force said. The Mongolian-flagged ship…was boarded about 520 miles (840 kilometers) southeast of the port of Muscat, Oman…There are now 29 vessels and 703 hostages being held by pirates off the coast of Somalia.”
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 
