“GAPPED BILLET SQUALL ON THE HORIZON: THE USCG OFFICER CORPS COULD BE IN TROUBLE” –CIMSEC

CIMSEC has an interesting article by a serving officer, Lt. Joseph O’Connell.

He starts off talking about gapped billets in the Coast Guard in general, 200 in 2021, but then concentrates on gapped afloat billets, 11 in 2021.

” This shortage grows more acute when considering the critical billets O3 and O4 officers fill aboard Coast Guard cutters: Operations Officers, Engineer Officers, Executive Officers, and Commanding Officers, depending on the cutter class.”

I am sure his observations are accurate, as far as they go, but I think he may have missed an important aspect of the Coast Guard’s assignment policies that has resulted in many officers, with sea going ambitions, making the choice to leave the service at the O-3/4 level. If we don’t do something differently, the problem is going to get worse.

As the Coast Guard continues to bring new hulls online while operating legacy assets the demand for afloat officers will far outstrip the limited and dwindling supply, with projections anticipating a 25% increase in cutter billets from current levels.

A change in personnel assignment policy could make a big difference.

I am long out of the service, so it is best if you check to see if my assumptions are correct.

Assumptions:

  • The ambition of most seagoing officers is ultimately to have a command afloat.
  • Being a department head or XO is not an end in itself. It should be seen as a step toward command.
  • Assignment officers are more likely to select an officer to command if they have had a previous successful command tour.
  • If an O-3 sees that it is extremely unlikely he will ever get a command, he is unlikely to seek a department head or XO job and may very well leave the service.

Effects:

Coast Guard personnel policies have created a situation where if you have not gotten a command as an E-3, it is unlikely you ever will.

The service is procuring 65 Webber class WPCs. At least 51 have already been commissioned. While a few are commanded by warrants or O-4s, generally they are commanded by O-3s. These and the few other O-3 afloat command billets create a large pool of potential future COs to choose from.

Those that have been or expect to be O-3 COs are unlikely to seek billets as department heads or XOs.

Those who miss the opportunity to command at the O-3 level, will see little chance they will be an afloat CO in the future.

Proposal:

Make command of a Webber class an O-4 billet.

Require that those selected to command Webber class WPCs will have completed a successful department head or XO afloat tour.

Rationale:

While some may feel command of a patrol craft requires only a junior officer, consider that these little ships, unlike WPBs, are doing all the same missions as an MEC (except the aviation component) with a smaller crew and fewer senior personnel to advise and support the CO. These ships generally operate independently, unlike Navy patrol craft which generally operate in groups under a squadron commander. We are seeing some of them embark on voyages of thousands of miles, operating outside US waters.

This policy would provide an incentive for officers to seek department head or XO tours as O-3s.

The Officers chosen to be COs at the O-4 level will be more experienced and more mature.

The service will have had more time to evaluate the officers prior to assignment including direct observation by a CO afloat, who should make a recommendation for or against a future command afloat.

Ultimately some officers will determine that they really have no chance of getting a CO afloat tour, but it will happen later in their career, when they may have found other rewarding work and they are less likely to leave the service.

New Units for Alaska, the Haley, and Nome

Northeast Russia and Alaska. Photo: Shutterstock

One of our readers sent me an article from the Alaska Beacon about the need for additional housing for the military that includes some insight into the Coast Guard’s future in Alaska.

The information about the Coast Guard is toward the end of the article. This seems to be confirmation that the two FRCs in Ketchikan will be joined by four more, two in Kodiak and one each in Sitka and Seward, and that their additional supporting infrastructure is being provided.

We already knew the third and fourth OPCs, Ingham (917) and Rush (918), will be going to Kodiak.

What About USCGC Alex Haley?:

The crew of the USCGC Alex Haley (WMEC 39) transfers custody of the detained fishing vessel Run Da to a People’s Republic of China Coast Guard patrol vessel in the Sea of Japan, June 21, 2018. The Alex Haley and PRC Coast Guard crews detained the Run Da suspected of illegal high seas drift net fishing. U.S. Coast Guard photo. Petty Officer 1st Class William Colclough

The Alex Haley is currently homeported in Kodiak. When I saw that two OPCs were to be homeported in Kodiak, my first assumption was that they would replace the Haley as well as USCGC Douglas Munro also based there, but perhaps that assumption was unwarranted.

Alex Haley is nominally a medium endurance cutter, but with a 10,000 nautical mile range and a 3,484 tons full load displacement, she is more of a high endurance cutter with the crew of a 270 foot WMEC.

She is an old ship, having been originally commissioned in 1971, but still younger than any of the 210 and considerably more capable. She is well suited to the Alaskan environment, so I don’t see her being moved outside the 17th District (Alaska). She is simple, meaning she is relatively easy to maintain, but with twin shafts and four engines, she also has redundancy.

She was extensively renovated, and her engines replaced before she was recommissioned into the Coast Guard in 1999, more than eight years after the last 270 was commissioned.

The second OPC to be based in Kodiak probably will not arrive before 2028. The last 210 will probably not be decommissioned until about 2033.

If the intention is to ultimately have three OPCs in Kodiak, as I believe may be the case, there is a good possibility that the Haley could hang on until that ship arrives.

What about Nome?:

USCGC Alex Haley moored in Nome, AK.

There is also mention of the planned port expansion in Nome with a suggestion that the Coast Guard may have units there.

One tight spot may be Nome, where there are plans to expand the city port into a deepwater, Arctic-service port which Moore called a “fantastic opportunity” for Coast Guard operations.

I don’t think we will see either large patrol cutters (unless it is the Alex Haley) or FRCs based there, but moving one of the Juniper class seagoing buoy tenders there, with its light icebreaking capability might make sense. I suppose a medium icebreaker might be a possibility, but that is a very long shot.

There will probably be a seasonal air detachment stationed in Nome.

Thanks to Paul for bringing this to my attention.

“The Ukrainian Navy and the Fight for Democracy” –USNI

Ukrainian Navy Island-class patrol boats, formerly of the U.S. Coast Guard, conduct maritime security operations in the Black Sea off the coast of Odesa, Ukraine. UKRAINIAN NAVY

The US Naval Institute’s May 2023 issue of “Proceedings” includes an article by Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa, Ukrainian Navy discussing the Ukrainian Navy’s role in the war with Russia.

Because the Ukrainian Navy used all available assets, including unmanned vehicles, it has achieved a strategic effect. We forced the enemy fleet to move east of the meridian of Cape Tarkhankut (Crimean Peninsula) and denied Russian operational activity in the northwestern part of the Black Sea, even near Crimean harbors. These Ukrainian Navy efforts created a gray zone and enabled the Grain from Ukraine Initiative, which ensures the export of Ukrainian grain to countries in need. In 2022, more than 24 million tons of agricultural products were exported from initially blocked Ukrainian ports.

He is obviously very proud of the accomplishments of their small navy. It is a good article, but I would have had to reference if for no other reason than to post the accompanying photo above.

China Coast Guard in the Russian Arctic?

Chinese Coast Guard officials observed the April 25 anti-terror exercise conducted by FSB Coast Guard in the Kola Bay north of Murmansk. Photo: Murmanski Vestnik

The Barents Observer has an interesting article, “Russia’s Coast Guard cooperation with China is a big step, Arctic security expert says,” that seems to portend a China Coast Guard presence in the Arctic, perhaps shepherding their fishing vessels.

“The Russia-China memorandum signed in Murmansk opens for joint efforts to combat terrorism, illegal migration, fighting smuggling of drugs and weapons, as well as stopping illegal fishing. The deal was signed by top leaders with FSB Border Guards and the Chinese Coast Guard.”

It may be noteworthy that this meeting was not in Asia, in one of Russia’s Pacific ports. It was in Europe, in Murmansk, on the Kola Peninsula, home of the Russian Arctic Fleet.

This agreement may turn out to be a first step toward joint China and Russia exploitation of Russia’s, as yet unrecognized, extensive continental shelf claims in the Arctic extending all the way to the North Pole and beyond into areas also claimed by Canada and Denmark (from Greenland).

“Frozen Frontiers, China’s Great Power Ambitions in the Polar Regions” –CSIS

Adapted from a 2021 Chinese environmental evaluation report submitted to the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. Source CSIS

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has an excellent overview of Chinese interests in the polar regions.

Chinese activities in the Arctic have gotten a lot of coverage, but their activities in Antarctic have been underreported and are, I believe, of much greater concern long term. Their coverage of China’s efforts in Antarctic is at the end of post. It is less extensive than that of China’s Arctic activities, but is perhaps the best I have seen.

China’s activities in the Arctic are just a part of their progress toward making Russia a client state. The relationship is not one of equals, it is very unbalanced, akin to Fascist Italy’s relationship to Nazi Germany. Ultimately Russia will be a victim of China’s determination to recover any territory that was once part of China. There is a lot of Asian Russia that China thinks should be theirs.

China is pouring assets into Antarctic, including potentially dual use facilities. They are setting themselves up to claim parts of the continent once the current treaty expires. This is probably going to put them in conflict with the US and some of our allies.

“Turkish “MIR” USV Test-Fires Torpedo For The First Time” –Naval News

MIR USV firing torpedo (Screenshot from SSB video)

Naval News reports,

On April 18, 2023, the Turkish armed unmanned surface vessel (USV) “MIR” fired a light torpedo from a double torpedo tube at the stern of the ship. The test firing was the first torpedo launch from a Turkish USV.

This is offered as an ASW system, but if you are a regular reader here, you know I had to show the photo to illustrate how even a very small vessel can launch light weight torpedoes. (Of course, we have had previous examples, see photos at the end of the post.)

This is important because the Coast Guard has an unaddressed Required Operational Capability implicit in its Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Mission, that the Coast Guard needs to be able to forcibly stop any vessel regardless of size. A lightweight torpedo that targets a ship’s propeller(s) seems to be the best solution for stopping larger vessels (hopefully without sinking it and causing a major pollution incident).

Existing lightweight ASW torpedoes, like those launched from the USV illustrated above, might do the job if they also have an anti-surface capability. Distribution to Coast Guard units might be thought of as a storage option for a war reserve, in that, while the Coast Guard would need to have them widely distributed, even in the worst case the Coast Guard would actually use very few.

The author notes,

“…submarines are unlikely to engage these small units because of the limited minimum depth of some torpedoes or the limited amount of torpedoes the submarines have loaded.”

But if USVs become a threat to submarines, it will not be long before there is a counter. In fact, the already existing 6.75″ diameter (171.45mm), 220 pound (100 kilos), Very Light Weight Torpedo that would not displace any existing submarine weapons might anticipate this need. This weapon system might meet the Coast Guard’s needs.

A Navy briefing slide showing the internal components and describing the various features of the PSU_ARL Common Very Light Weight Torpedo (CVLWT) design

Camera drone’s-eye view of IRGC boats on display, March 2023. A) The air defense boat. B) Light missile boat with Bladerunner hull. C) light missile boats on Interceptor hull. D) light missile boats on Interceptor hull (alternative design). E) Missile boat, with type of missile unclear. F) RIB, possibly explosive boat or uncrewed. G) RIB with lightweight anti-ship torpedoes, can be carried aboard a Shahid Soleimani-class missile corvette. H) Interceptor boat. I) Interceptor boat with new type of missile.

Elbit Systems’ Seagull unmanned surface vessel launching a lightweight torpedo. 

APKWS in Use

As you probably know, I am a fan of the APKWS (Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System) because I think it could provide a substantial upgrade for our cutters, particularly the smaller ones. The system is quick, accurate, effective, light weight, uncomplicated, inexpensive, requires little training, has minimum impact on the platform, and limits collateral damage.

The VAMPIRE system can fit in almost any pickup or vehicle with a cargo bed. (Courtesy of L3Harris)

Thanks to Walter for alerting me to this short video of the system in use.

Looks to me, like they are targeting observation posts along the river.

“Homeland Security Task Force – Southeast sustains enhanced migration enforcement posture”

A good Samaritan notified Sector Miami watchstanders of a migrant vessel about 10 miles east of Sunny Isles, Florida, Jan. 8, 2023. The people were repatriated to Cuba on Jan. 16, 2023. (U.S. Coast Guard photo)

We have noted a surge in alien migrant interdiction.

Below is a news release regarding changing procedures to deal with the problem and discourage illegal immigration.

April 28, 2023

Homeland Security Task Force – Southeast sustains enhanced migration enforcement posture

MIAMI— Yesterday, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of State announced sweeping new measures to further reduce irregular migration, including irregular maritime migration, and to significantly expand lawful pathways to facilitate the safe, orderly and humane processing of migrants. The measures announced Thursday draw on the success of recent processes that have significantly reduced unlawful migration through a combination of expanded lawful pathways and swift returns and removal of those who fail to use those lawful pathways.

The announcement made clear that the United States, in coordination with our regional partners, have dramatically scaled up the number of removal flights per week. That includes flights to Cuba, which resumed this week following a pause due to COVID-19. The number of weekly flights will double or triple for some countries. With this increase in removal flights, migrants who cross the U.S. border without documents sufficient for lawful admission, which includes migrants who attempt to make landfall by sea, and who fail to qualify for relief or protection should expect to be swiftly returned.

DHS also made Cubans and Haitians who attempt to migrate irregularly to the U.S. via maritime means after April 27, 2023, ineligible for the parole processes announced in January, including those interdicted at sea.

“This announcement provides important clarity for at-sea interdictions. Anyone interdicted at sea while trying to enter the United States irregularly will be ineligible for the Cuban and Haitian parole processes announced in January,” said Rear Adm. Brendan C. McPherson, director of HSTF-SE and commander of U.S. Coast Guard Seventh District. “Taking to the sea in unsafe and unseaworthy vessels is inherently dangerous and is often deadly. Our Task Force will continue to rescue and repatriate, in accordance with governing policies and guidance, anyone attempting to enter the U.S. irregularly through maritime routes. We encourage everyone planning to come to the U.S. to do so through safe and lawful pathways.”

Since August 21, 2022, HSTF-SE partners have repatriated more than 11,747 migrants. Migrants rescued at sea or interdicted ashore are provided food, water, shelter, basic medical attention, and are processed to determine if they have a legal basis to enter or remain in the U.S.

The sustained surge of DHS personnel, interagency coordination and surge of air and sea assets to save lives and prevent unlawful entry into the United States is the largest federally-led response to irregular maritime migration in the region since 2010.

HSTF-SE serves as the DHS lead for operational and tactical planning, command and control, and as a standing organization to deter, mitigate and respond to maritime mass migration in the Caribbean Sea and the Straits of Florida. HSTF-SE is the supported DHS entity for Caribbean maritime migration operations, and HSTF-SE partners include federal, state and local agencies. HSTF-SE continues enhanced enforcement efforts in support of Operation Vigilant Sentry (OVS), the 2004 DHS plan to respond to irregular maritime migration in the Caribbean Sea and the Straits of Florida. The Task Force provides the organizational framework to plan for and execute a scalable operational plan under OVS, detect maritime migration indicators, monitor maritime migration trends, and conduct joint training, exercises and planning. The following federal, state and local law enforcement and emergency management components work together as part of the task force: DHS, USCG, USBP, CBP-AMO, CBP-OFO, HSI, ICE-ERO, USCIS, FEMA, HHS, FDEM, FDLE, Miami-Dade County and Monroe County.

For updates on HSTF-SE enforcement efforts, follow us on Twitter @HSTF_Southeast.

For more information about newly announced immigration programs:  

Fact Sheet: U.S. Government announces sweeping new actions to manage regional migration

Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas at a Joint Press Availability

Implementation of a Change to the Parole Process for Haitians 

Implementation of a Change to the Parole Process for Cubans

“Last Cyclone Patrol Ships Leave U.S. Navy, Many Will Serve in Foreign Forces” –USNI

USS thundebolt (PC-12) Seen here in 1998 in both Coast Guard and Navy markings. U.S. Coast Guard photo by David Schuffholz

The US Naval Institute News Service reports the decommissioning and transfer of the last of the Cyclone class US Navy patrol craft. Seven of the class (PCs 1, 2,4, 8, 12, 13, and 14) were loaned to the Coast Guard at various times.

Their departure will leave the six Coast Guard Patrol Force SW Asia Webber class WPCs the only US patrol craft in the 5th Fleet.

Of the 14:

  • Two, Zephyr (PC-8) and Shamal (PC-13), are to be scrapped.
  • Five, Tempest (PC-2), Typhoon (PC-5), Squall (PC-7), Firebolt (PC-10), and Whirlwind (PC-11), have been transferred to the Royal Bahrain Naval Forces.
  • Three, Hurricane (PC-3), Sirocco (PC-6), and Thunderbolt (PC-12), have been transferred to the Egyptian Navy.
  • Two more, Monsoon (PC-4) and Chinook (PC-9), will join the former Cyclone (PC-1) in the Philippine Navy.
  • One, Tornado (PC-14) is expected to be sold, but is awaiting disposition.