Changing Operational Priorities –The Coast Guard’s Force Posture Statement and an Aside on Area AORs

The Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations has issued “United States Coast Guard Force Posture 2024.” Dated October 2024, it is reportedly the first of its kind and a new edition will be published annually. I have appended the Coast Guard News Release regarding the publication below.

“This posture statement informs all audiences about the U.S. Coast Guard’s operational priorities, initiatives, requirements and future challenges across its missions and geographic regions. It conveys how we are “Advancing Mission Excellence” in accordance with the 2022 Coast Guard Strategy and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Strategic Plan. This posture statement serves as a window into the breadth and depth of the Coast Guard’s commitments and how it is posturing our workforce, capabilities, and assets to deliver operational services that best serve the American people.

It is organized under four major topics rather than by the eleven statutory missions.

  • Operating Environment (p.3)
  • Guiding Principles (p.3/4)
  • Operating Posture (p.4-7)
  • Geographic Operating Areas (p.7-11)

I love it, but it does lack a clear summary of what we will do differently. I will try to interpret some of that. Below I provide a readers’ digest version with a few comments, looking first at the eleven Coast Guard missions as listed in 6 U.S. Code § 468, at select Geographic Operating Areas, and finally I will speculate on the long term implications. Given the increased use of the Coast Guard as a tool of foreign policy, I also suggest changes to the Area Commanders’ areas of responsibility (AOR) to make them fit more easily into the national command structure.

MISSIONS

Some of the missions are specifically addressed in the “Operating Posture” section, others are not. The Eleven missions are:

Non-homeland security missions:

  • Marine safety
  • Search and rescue
  • Aids to navigation
  • Living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement)
  • Marine environmental protection
  • Ice operations.
Homeland security missions: 
  • Ports, waterways and coastal security
  • Drug interdiction
  • Migrant interdiction
  • Defense readiness
  • Other law enforcement.

I will just address them in alphabetical order:

Aids to Navigation: 

Aids to Navigation is not called out under a separate heading.

  • “Our comprehensive approach (to the Marine Transportation System (MTS)) encompasses…Maintaining aids to navigation…” (p.4)
  • The Coast Guard is reinforcing actions to be “brilliant at the basics” that strengthen…aids to navigation.
  • The Coast Guard is in the early phase of recapitalizing an aging fleet of inland aids to navigation tenders with new Waterways Commerce Cutters, crucial to maritime commerce in our inland river system. These investments are central to maintaining service delivery in an increasingly complex MTS (Maritime Transportation System–Chuck).

Sounds like minimal changes in the near term but expect improving technology may reduce manpower requirements. Elsewhere there is indications buoy tenders may increasingly be used for non-AtoN missions. This suggests that the number of sea-going buoy tenders (WLBs) is unlikely to be significantly reduced, but their character may change–more on this below.

Defense Readiness

We are increasing attention on the Coast Guard’s defense readiness mission given the increasing threat posed by nation-state competitors. Through integration with Department of Defense efforts, refreshing defense-related plans, and preparedness exercises, we are sharpening readiness to support homeland defense requirements and force deployment commitments for major overseas contingencies. We continue to meet our commitments to North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) for National Capital Region and deployable Rotary Wing Air Intercept and we are adjusting the structure of our Port Security Units (PSU) to address Reserve workforce shortages. We are also integrating PSU elements with DoD expeditionary units to increase their deployment readiness.

This is a welcome recognition of an increasingly hostile world and the emergence of non-state actors who, acting independently or as a proxy for hostile states, can impact national security.

Hopefully it also means we are considering adaptations to our cutter and air fleet to make them more useful early in a near peer conflict (i.e. with China).

Drug Interdiction:

Drug Interdiction is not called out as a separate topic. The only indication of a change is this statement under the section “Western Hemisphere,”

“We will maximize employment opportunities by conducting a mix of missions such as counter drug and combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing when appropriate.” (p.9)

Ice Operations: 

Ice operations is not called out as a separate mission, but it is addressed in the “Polar Regions” section (p.8/9) of the Geographic Operating Areas section.

Arctic and Antarctic Ice operation will get a big boost as we go from 2 polar icebreakers to eight. In the Arctic there will be a continuing need for non-icebreaking large cutters and we can expect increased exploitation of fixed wing aircraft and particularly satellite for communications and information.

Living Marine Resources

“We will increasingly favor shore-based law enforcement teams and our patrol boat fleet, supported by maritime domain awareness sensors, to ensure we best match this mission.”

Webber class WPCs have proven capable of assuming much of the fisheries protection mission. They can go anywhere fishing vessels can go and stand up to any weather they might be fishing in. So FRCs are stepping up to missions WMECs have traditionally done. Not mentioned, but on the other hand, in Alaska and the distant Pacific there is still a role for larger ships.

Marine Environmental Protection:

There was no section devoted to Marine Environmental Protection as a specific mission. MEP was referred to briefly in the Mission execution section (p.5) Arctic (p.8)

But there was this under Incident Management and Crisis Response” (p.6)

Management of large, complex incidents is a central Coast Guard competency. Employment of this capability enables success for the most consequential crises and events, builds trust, and supports DHS. However, the Coast Guard does not have a large contingency capacity “in garrison” for emergencies. We will continue to strengthen Coast Guard incident management capacity and proficiency to meet increasing demand, including in the Reserve workforce. The Coast Guard continues to respond to stakeholder requests for assistance for incident management while we prioritize incidents with a Coast Guard nexus and prevent overextending Coast Guard resources.

Marine Safety

There is a lot of activity here,

“The Coast Guard is reinforcing actions to be “brilliant at the basics” that strengthen marine inspection, investigation, Vessel Traffic Services, waterways management, and aids to navigation.”

Changes in the environment include autonomous vessels, offshore renewable energy installations, an emerging space launch and recovery industry, and alternative vessel fuels. All of which require determination of standards.

Migrant Interdiction

“The Coast Guard will deploy cutters and aircraft, and adaptive force packages where practical, sufficient to interdict migrant ventures, save lives, and deter maritime migration. We continue to prepare with partners to respond to a mass migration to mitigate a national crisis. We are also integrating new technology to better anticipate, detect, deter, and interdict migrant ventures.

No significant reprioritization here. This is an area where the Webber class WPCs (20 in D7 alone) have supplemented or replaced WMECs. It is an area where shore based Unmanned Air Systems and Unmanned surface vessels like saildrone could provide persistent initial detection and perhaps reduce demand for fixed wing search aircraft.

Other Law Enforcement

Not surprisingly there is no mention of this “mission” because the Coast Guard does it on an ad hoc incidental basis. The Coast Guard’s specific law enforcement missions, drug and migrant interdiction, marine environmental protection, and fisheries are addressed separately. It is a catchall for any illegal activities. So, no change.

Port, Waterways, and Coastal Security

The Coast Guard’s force posture for this mission was configured for the post 9/11 security environment and the Coast Guard is examining approaches to optimize our capabilities to meet emerging threats. For example, the proliferation of drones poses a growing risk to the MTS and we will continue to employ our counter-UxS technology in conjunction with DHS and other partners to prepare for this threat. We are also taking steps to ensure that our deployable specialized forces are configured for their role as threats and operational needs evolve.

Recognizing and preparing to counter the UxS threat is significant. I’ve already made several suggestions. I hope if we get a hard kill system, it will also improve effectiveness against other potential threats.

This was included under Defense Readiness,

“…we are adjusting the structure of our Port Security Units (PSU) to address Reserve workforce shortages. We are also integrating PSU elements with DoD expeditionary units to increase their deployment readiness.”

To me Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security is a subset of Defense Readiness once you understand that Defense Readiness is a full time, 24/7 job that does not wait until war is declared or the Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy Department. Attacks like 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, will likely come as a surprise, there may be no time to mobilize before an attack, and our Maritime Transportation System is a likely target.

Search and Rescue:

“Search and Rescue is an enduring, no-fail mission that is deeply ingrained in the Coast Guard’s identity. As it remains a top priority, technical advances now allow us to perform the mission more effectively and with fewer resources.

SAR success standards are not being lowered, but technology is increasingly taking the search out of search and rescue. Individual units have greater capability so fewer dedicated units may be required. Expect fewer personnel to be assigned to less demanding SAR missions that are also covered by local government first responders.

GEOGRAPHIC OPERATING AREAS

The Operational Posture goes on to discuss specific operating areas. Some of this has been addressed in the mission summaries above, so I will say no more about the Arctic, Western Hemisphere, Middle East and Europe, Caribbean, and Atlantic basin that are discussed individually in the Operational Posture, but I will talk about the Indo-Pacific, Eastern Pacific, and Antarctica.

Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific is a top regional priority given its geostrategic importance, criticality to global trade, and the threat contesting a free, open, and rules-based maritime commons.

Yes, we are paying more attention to the Pacific, the Indian Ocean not so much. We expect to have six Webber class WPCs in Guam. Harriet Lane (WMEC-903) has been moved from Atlantic Area to Hawaii and it looks like a second WMEC may also be moved. Two OPCs each are expected to go to Long Beach and Kodiak. Assuming Alex Healy stays in Kodiak and the last Pacific Area 210 is decommissioned or transferred to Atlantic Area, that will give Pacific Area 13 large patrol cutters–still fewer than the 16 that were in PacArea in 2000 and only 39.4% of the 33 large cutter total I think we have now and will have for the foreseeable future.

Given the great distances involved, the fact that 84% of the US EEZ is in Pacific Area, and because we have an obligation to the Compact of Free Associated States–Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau–that together have additional EEZ equal to about 50% of the entire US EEZ, it makes no sense for 60% of the large cutters to be in Atlantic Area. More than half of all large patrol cutters should be in Pacific Area. 

Eastern Pacific:

“…with declining major cutter and maritime patrol aircraft availability, we will increasingly employ fast response cutters, ocean-going buoy tenders, and adaptive force packages supported by expeditionary logistics.” I am not surprised; this is something that was begun when Admiral Fagan was Pacific Area Commander.

“…we remain committed to supporting the Mexican Navy as they expand their Captain of the Port authorities through increased information sharing, joint training and exercises, and capacity building engagements. This expanded partnership will enhance maritime governance in the Western Hemisphere and contribute to the fight against illicit trafficking of fentanyl and precursor chemicals through Mexican ports into the U.S.”

—-Let’s talk about Areas of Responsibility–An Aside

US navy fleets areas of responsibility. Source Wikipedia.

The only mitigating rationale I see for not transferring most of the large cutters to Pacific Area is that the Eastern Pacific drug transit zone is actually closer to Atlantic Area ports than to Pacific Area ports. This is why all of South America is under 4th Fleet, which is an Atlantic Fleet command. Probably an argument should be made for realigning the Coast Guard Area geographic descriptions to match those of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. A change of name to Eastern and Western Area might be appropriate and in fact a more accurate description.

Atlantic area includes not only the Atlantic coast but also the great lakes, inland areas, the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, and parts of the Arctic and Southern Oceans. Pacific Area also includes inland areas, the Indian Ocean (part of which is under Atlantic Fleet), and parts of the Arctic and Southern Oceans.

A realignment along Fleet dividing lines would also mean the dividing lines would more closely correspond to COCOM areas of responsibility and limit the number of cases where COCOMs would need to deal with both Coast Guard Areas to NORTHCOM. Currently there is also overlap in SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM, and CENTCOM. All three of those COCOMs would only need to deal with the Eastern (Atlantic) Area. That seems to be what is happening with AFRICOM and CENTCOM now anyway. PATFORSWA WPCs, Atlantic Area assets, operate routinely in the Indian Ocean, part of the PACAREA AOR. 

Unified Combatant Commander’s Areas of Responsibility.

As Pacific Area assumes more responsibility in the Western Pacific and potentially the Indian Ocean passing off responsibility for all Coast Guard operations in 4th Fleet’s Area of Operations to Atlantic Area might make sense.

Antarctic:

The U.S. priority for Antarctica remains maintaining “a continent reserved for peace and science in accordance with the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.”

No real change expected other than more and better icebreakers, but not everyone thinks like the US.

We should have the agility to react to a change from the present “continent reserved for peace and science.” We really have no reason for confidence that Antarctica will not become a zone of Conflict. Fortunately, actions to increase capabilities in the Arctic may also serve us well in Antarctica.

Implications for the Future

Cutter Design:

Patrol Cutters: Moving from “Patrol and Interdict” to “Target and Interdict” suggests that cruise speed endurance may become less important, and that higher max speed and an economical loiter speed may become more important. Greater emphasis on Defense Readiness would also suggest the desirability of greater speed. This suggest that we may want to build fewer than the currently planned 25 OPCs and shift investment to a new design based on a different set of priorities that we can build in greater number; ships with greater speed and increased modularity to accommodate an uncertain future.

Buoy Tenders: Improved aids to navigation may mean tenders will spend less time on routine AtoN maintenance. Still, they will need to be geographically distributed to respond to critical outages. It seems these ships will become more multi-mission by design. They should continue to be able to operate in ice. Their increased use for non-AtoN missions suggest that they may need overflow berthing and more fuel and stores capacity when supporting WPC deployments and to make them more effective in law enforcement roles–more speed, a flight deck and hangar for UAS and a deck gun such as the Mk38 Mod4.

Deployable Teams

Sounds like we will be getting more deployable Law Enforcement Detachments given the proliferation of capacity building objectives. Increased specialization and a desire for continuity in this area may someday result in a new rating.

Thanks to Paul for bringing the video to my attention. 


Oct. 25, 2024

Coast Guard unveils first Operational Posture Statement

By Zach Shapiro, MyCG Writer

The Coast Guard just released its first Operational Posture Statement, which outlines the service’s operational priorities, including its plans to adapt to personnel and resource challenges. Vice Adm. Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations (DCO), unveiled the document Friday during an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

Think of the new annual Operational Posture Statement as a tactical annual document that supports the long-term Coast Guard Strategy by providing more specificity.

To improve operational efficiency and effectiveness, for example, the Coast Guard will increasingly use intelligence and data to shift its approach from “patrol and interdict” to “target and interdict.”

And to improve readiness, the Coast Guard will focus on three key elements: the workforce, capabilities, and assets. The Operational Posture recognizes the need to meet increasing demand while addressing workforce and resource shortages. The service will also continue to recapitalize cutters, boats, aircraft, and infrastructure.

The Operational Posture “is our effort to communicate with our stakeholders and be transparent with the American people on how we will confront all of these challenges, this increasing mission demand, and provide the kind of services that Americans deserve,” Gautier said.

Six guiding principles underpin the Operational Posture Statement:

  1. Balance current operations with future readiness
  2. Strengthen maritime governance
  3. Counter strategic competitors while fulfilling our primary responsibility to secure and defend the homeland
  4. Adjust force structure and posture to maximize operational effectiveness while maintaining a high level of support for our people, platforms, and infrastructure
  5. Employ resources holistically to meet growing demands
  6. Leverage intelligence, information, and improved maritime domain awareness to shift from a “patrol and interdict” to “target and interdict” model

These priorities reflect the increasing national and global demands for Coast Guard services. As 90 percent of global trade moves by sea, maritime security is the bedrock of national security and economic prosperity. In the face of rising global maritime tensions, the Coast Guard has a unique and critical role as a law enforcement entity and military agency.

Amidst this evolving environment, Gautier emphasized, the Coast Guard remains committed to its Search and Rescue (SAR) mission. That mission is “a sacred trust with the American people and a no-fail mission. It is our primary lifesaving mission. It defines us as a humanitarian service,” he said.

Moving forward, the Coast Guard intends to release a new Operational Posture Statement annually to outline the ways in which the service is adapting to new challenges and missions to best serve the American people.

  • To read the Operational Posture Statement in full, please click here.
  • To view Vice Adm. Gautier’s remarks, click here.

Resources: 

“Coast Guard to hold rescheduled commissioning and ribbon-cutting ceremony for newest air station in more than 25 years” –D11

The first MH-60T medium range recovery helicopter to operate out of new Air Station Ventura lands on the station’s ramp on June 8, 2024. U.S. Coast Guard photo.

Below is a District eleven (California) media advisory. More information about the air station and the MH-60T program in this earlier post. The ribbon cutting was originally to have been done June 18. I’ve seen no explanation for the delay. There has been an aviation detachment in the LA/Long Beach area for some time. With the addition of Ventura, there will be five CG air stations in District Eleven, San Diego (MH-60T), Ventura (MH-60T), San Francisco (MH-65), Sacramento (C-27J), and Humbolt Bay (MH-65).

The new Coast Guard Air Station Ventura and its MH-60T hangar is located at Naval Base Ventura County in Point Mugu, California. U.S. Coast Guard photos.

Nov. 12, 2024

Editor’s Note: Media are asked to RSVP by 5 p.m., Tuesday, Nov. 12 by contacting District 11 public affairs at 206-815-6689 or PADETLA@USCG.MIL.

WHAT: Commissiong and ribbon-cutting ceremony for Coast Guard Air Station Ventura

WHO:

  • Vice Adm. Andrew J. Tiongson, commander, Coast Guard Pacific Area
  • Rear Admiral Joseph R. Buzzella, commander, Coast Guard District 11
  • Rear Adm. Mike E. Campbell, director, Coast Guard Acquisition Programs and Program Executive Officer
  • Cmdr. Amanda Sardone, commanding officer, Coast Guard Air Station Ventura

WHEN: Nov. 13, 2024 at 10 a.m. to 11 a.m.

WHERE: Naval Base Ventura County Point Mugu: 190 Third St., Point Mugu, CA 93042.

SAN PEDRO, Calif. — The Coast Guard is scheduled to hold a commissioning and ribbon-cutting ceremony for Coast Guard Air Station Ventura at Naval Base Ventura County in Point Mugu, Wednesday. The ceremony will mark the official establishment of the newest Coast Guard air station in more than 25 years.

Recently, the aircrew of Air Station Ventura conducted three rescues:

  • Oct. 13, 2024: Air Station Ventura medevac a 63-year-old woman suffering from abdominal pain from the Cruise Ship Grand Princess
  • Oct. 17, 2024: Air Station Ventura conducted hoist from vessel in 10-foot seas for a diver suffering decompression sickness near Anacapa Islands in Channel Islands.
  • Oct. 31, 2024: Air Station Ventura medevac a man suffering from seizures from Cruise Ship Celebrity Radiance 90-miles from Air Station Venture.

The air station serves a crucial role in protecting the maritime region from Orange County to San Luis Obispo County including the vital ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Its missions will include 24/7 emergency response; search and rescue; drug and migrant interdiction; law enforcement; and marine safety and environmental protection. The permanent presence of the Coast Guard in Ventura County provides enhanced security and quicker response times to emergencies, benefiting both the local community and maritime industries.

Air Station Ventura features:

  •  $70 million state-of-the-art, 43,000 square-foot hangar facility
  • 12,000 square-foot administration facility and berthing facility
  • One MH60-T Jayhawk helicopter and expected to receive two more
  •  Approximately 100 Coast Guard personnel

District 11 now consists of four active air stations ranging from Humboldt Bay down to San Diego.

DOD Arctic Strategy, 2024, a Critique

Screen grab from page 2 of the DOD Arctic Strategy, 2024

Here is a link to the new DOD Arctic Strategy here. I found it disappointing. There isn’t much strategy here. I would sum it up as–we are going to keep doing what we are doing, but we are going to do it better. (See critique below.)

“This strategy will strengthen the ability of the United States to build integrated deterrence and effectively manage risk to U.S. interests in the Arctic region by enhancing our domain awareness and Arctic capabilities; engaging with Allies, partners, and key stakeholders; and exercising tailored presence.”

About the US Coast Guard:

The US Coast Guard or USCG was mentioned in three places, once in a caption of a picture of USCGC Healy and these two paragraphs.

DoD will partner with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including through the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), which plays a vital role in maintaining U.S. presence in the Arctic region and supporting domain awareness. The USCG is responsible for operating and maintaining the United States’ icebreaking capability, and DoD will continue to support the USCG’s long-term acquisition of at least eight polar icebreakers that will provide needed icebreaking capability for both military and civilian purposes, including PR/SAR. While disaster response is not a force sizing or shaping requirement, DoD remains ready to support DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the event of disaster, terrorist attack, or other mass-casualty incident in the Arctic when directed by the President or when requested by a lead Federal department or agency and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Service-specific, Joint, Interagency, and Combined Exercises. Security and stability in the Arctic depend, in  part, on the Joint Force’s ability to respond rapidly and   effectively to threats in the region. Exercises increase interoperability with Allies and partners, validate plans, train our ability to rapidly deploy to all parts of the Arctic region, and provide an opportunity to test equipment in Arctic conditions. As such, the Joint Force will continue to exercise frequently in the Arctic through Service specific training, joint exercises —to include with USCG— and
combined exercises with our Allies and partners. DoD will
ensure CCMDs with Arctic equities work toward global integration through joint exercises and ensure key exercise lessons inform capability requirements and strategic planning.

That’s it.

About Icebreakers: Icebreakers are mentioned twice, it the paragraph above and here,

The PRC seeks to bolster its operational expertise in the Arctic, where its presence, while limited, is increasing. The PRC operates three icebreakers—the Xue Long, Xue Long 2, and Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di—which enable the PRC’s dual civil-military research efforts in the Arctic. Over the course of the PRC’s 13 Arctic research expeditions to date, the vessels have tested unmanned underwater vehicles and polar-capable fixed-wing aircraft, among other activities. People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels have also  demonstrated the capability and intent to operate in and around the Arctic region through exercises alongside the Russian Navy over the past several years.

Critique:

“DoD will reach this end state through a monitor-and-respond approach.”

In other words, we will be reactive rather than proactive. 

The threat to Europe in the Polar regions is just part of the long running NATO defense problem. No real change there, except the formal extension of NATO into Sweden and Finland.

The Air Threat over the Pole to North America is looked after by NORAD. Apparently, NORAD does not look after Greenland, but that does not seem to be a central problem.

Ground operations in the Arctic are always going to be difficult. There may be small unit operations but no need to worry about an invasion of North America coming over the pole. NORTHCOM is exercising both land and air assets that would be needed to deal with realistic threats.

The North Slope oil fields and the associated pipeline are probably a target if we become engaged in a long-term conflict that involves combat in or over the arctic. The oil fields are not mentioned in the strategy,

What has changed?

The opening of the Arctic Ocean to maritime commerce has made it a possible avenue for logistics between Russia and China with the potential for militarily valuable shipments moving both ways between the Russian Arctic coast on one end and the Russian Pacific Coast, North Korea, or China on the other. The weakness of Russian transcontinental land transportation systems makes the Northern Sea Route particularly important.

The door to be shut or left open is the Bering Strait.

Bering Strait. 44 Nautical miles (82km) wide, with the Diomede Islands in the center.

The “strategy” mentions the Bering Straits only as a choke point,

The Arctic includes multiple strategically significant maritime chokepoints. Reduction in sea ice
due to climate change means chokepoints such as the Bering Strait between Alaska and Russia and the Barents Sea north of Norway, are becoming more navigable and more economically and militarily significant.

We would certainly want to deny use of the Strait by our enemies and ensure that we and our allies have the option to transit through the Strait.

The planned deep-water port in Nome (currently on hold) will be essential to forces that might be used to control access to the Bering Strait. We would also want to make sure St Lawrence Island and Little Diomede remain in US hands. The US might also want to seize Big Diomede. None of these strategic locations are mentioned in the plan.

Diomede Islands: Little Diomede Island or Kruzenstern Island (left) and Big Diomede Island or Ratmanov Island in the Bering Sea. Photo is from the north. Photo by Dave Cohoe.

But who is in charge?

First look at the map at the head of this post. They have divided the Arctic so that operations there are under three different Unified Combatant Commands, USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USNORTHCOM. In other words, no one below the President is in charge over the whole area.

These are the Unified Combatant Commander’s Areas of Responsibility. What is not made clear in this graphic is that all of Russia including the larger Asian part is under USEUCOM.

Perhaps most critically, the Pacific interface with the Arctic is under all three COCOMs.

  • USEUCOM is responsible for the Russian land areas in spite of the fact that the Bering Strait is 4521 statute miles from the COCOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, and that is the shorter distance West from Stuttgart across the Atlantic and over the US, rather than over Russia. –This has got to be wrong.
  • USNORTHCOM has the Bering Strait and the Eastern half of the Bering Sea but normally they have no significant naval force. Their primary responsibility is the air defense of the US and Canada.
  • USINDOPACOM, which has the naval assets in the Pacific that might be used to attack Russian assets in Asia has responsibility for only the Western half of the Bering Sea below the Bering Strait.

This division of responsibility, placing Russian Asia under USEUCOM, also means that if the US should be at war with both China and Russia, then at least officially, conducting the war in the Pacific would be under two or perhaps three different COCOMs. I doubt this would actually work this way.

“USACE cancels solicitation for Nome’s port expansion project, future uncertain” –KNOM.org

USCGC Alex Haley moored in Nome, AK.

KNOM.org reports,

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) says plans to build the country’s first deep draft port in the Arctic are too expensive.

USACE canceled its port expansion contract solicitation on Wednesday, October 16. It cited two key factors: the proposed pricing exceeded both the cost limits set by U.S. law and the available funding for the project.

Plans were to dreg to 40 feet. Sounds like they may need to be another Congressional action before work can proceed.

Rendering provided by the City of Nome shows how the Port of Nome, Alaska, would have appeared following an expansion project that would have cost more than $600 million.  (PND Engineers Inc./City of Nome via AP)

“Enhancing Domain Awareness in the Arctic” –Third Fleet

A U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon takes off at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, Sept. 14, 2024. The P-8 Poseidon aircrew assigned to Patrol Squadron (VP) 9 and a U.S. 3rd Fleet Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE) supported joint and bi-national forces from Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command Region and Alaskan Command during Operation POLAR VORTEX by providing maritime domain awareness in conjunction with the 611th Air Operations Center air component to provide domain awareness during operations and exercises in remote regions of Alaska and the Arctic. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Quatasia Carter)

Below is a 3rd Fleet press release. Notably missing is any mention of the Coast Guard, that might be understandable, but I have also seen no Coast Guard news release about participation in Operation POLAR VORTEX. If you are doing Maritime Domain Awareness anywhere around Alaska, you would think the Coast Guard would be involved.


Oct. 28, 2024

Enhancing Domain Awareness in the Arctic

By Tech. Sgt. Donald Hudson

During Operation POLAR VORTEX, a Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE) led by U.S. 3rd Fleet and supported by U.S. Fleet Forces was embedded into the bi-national Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Region at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.

The NALE is primarily a function of the Navy Reserve, with Reserve personnel filling roughly 98 percent of NALE billets, given the operational tempo of this unique work. NALE Sailors train in mobilization to billet (MOB to-billet) positions and generally deploy on 90 to 270-day orders, responding both to planned operations and emergent crises, including training exercises, freedom of navigation operations, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. MOB-to-billet is the activation (other than for training) of SELRES Sailors to serve in the authorized and funded manpower billet at the command to which they are permanently assigned.

NALE units are attached to U.S. Fleet Forces Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa, and most numbered fleets.

While in Alaska, the NALE worked alongside U.S. Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) members in the 611th Air Operations Center (AOC) to increase domain awareness in the Arctic region during Operation POLAR VORTEX by instantly linking maritime and air domain awareness.

“The situational awareness the NALE has provided is the most maritime awareness the AOC has had in the 14 years I’ve been here,” said Alaska Air National Guard Col. Jeff Smith, deputy commander, 611th AOC. “It’s been great to see the coordinated efforts between air and maritime domains.”

By co-locating, the NALE and 611th AOC were able to coordinate information instantly to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and provide a detailed real-time operating picture from the surface to air across some of the most remote operating areas in Alaska.

The NALE worked to seamlessly integrate their expertise of maritime domain awareness and employ a Navy P-8 Poseidon alongside joint and bi-national air assets. The cooperation increased tactical performance of joint forces validating command and control and tactical execution of mission objectives between various aircraft including exercising simulated air-to-surface strikes.

“The NALE has been essential to air operations,” said RCAF Brig. Gen. David Moar, deputy commander, Alaskan NORAD Region. “They were key in synchronizing air operations with naval air assets and providing information to enable the JFACC to coordinate and support the maritime component.”

3rd Fleet operations in U.S. Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM) area of responsibility throughout the Gulf of Alaska aligned with Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet objectives to demonstrate resolve and credible deterrence in defense of the homeland in the area. The operations also supported USNORTHCOM and NORAD’s mission of homeland defense, aerospace warning and control, and preserving a stable Arctic region in cooperation with U.S. Allies and partners.

“The NALE is an essential part of integrating the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) and AOC to provide multi-domain awareness to both Component Commanders,” said U.S. Navy Capt. Chris “Turtle” Turl, NALE director. “By coordinating information between each Commander’s guidance, the NALE facilitates the planning and execution of the mission to effectively meet the commander’s intent.”

NALE Sailors regularly engage in training exercises, freedom of navigation operations, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to enable better integration between joint air assets. The NALE provide the necessary face to-face contact among planner, commanders and staff to ensure mutual understanding, unity of effort and reduce friction between components.

Operating across the vast distances and remote areas in the Arctic comes with many operational hurdles to overcome such as harsh weather and sea conditions causing increased risk to aircrews should an incident occur. Enhancing communication between joint forces is essential to meet the mission while overcoming obstacles and lowering operational risks.

Through joint and bi-national teamwork the NALE and 611th AOC were able to maximize domain awareness and more effectively employ air assets saving time, and costs while reducing risk and increasing efficient use of tactical air assets and manpower.

“Coast Guard to send 3 more cutters to Guam, has no plans to escort Philippine ships” –Stars and Stripes

A U.S. Coast Guard boat crew and boarding team from U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Oliver Berry (WPC 1124) approaches a foreign fishing vessel to conduct a joint boarding inspection with members of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission on the high seas in Oceania, Sept. 22, 2024. U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Oliver Berry’s crew recently completed a 45-day patrol in Oceania in support of Operation Blue Pacific, promoting security, safety, sovereignty, and economic prosperity in the region.

Stars and Stripes reports,

The Coast Guard will double its Guam fleet to six cutters but doesn’t plan to accompany the Philippine coast guard as it struggles to maintain territorial claims in the South China Sea, the service’s Pacific-area commander said Friday.

This is based on a video news conference by Pacific Area Commander Vice Adm. Andrew Tiongson speaking from Japan.

“The Coast Guard will not escort Philippine resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre, a grounded warship garrisoned by Filipino troops at the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, according to Tiongson.”

The Philippines has not asked for escorts, Tiongson said. “We do advise, and we do assist,” he said. “We provide what we would do in this situation.”

He also said, “It’s possible we may get another Indo-Pacific support cutter,” using the description applied to USCGC Harriet Lane, recently arrived in the Pacific Area to support operations in the Western Pacific.

There is more in the article.

“U.S. Coast Guard encounters joint Chinese Coast Guard, Russian Border Guard patrol in Bering Sea” –Coast Guard News

Russian Okean class Patrol Ship. This is the larger of the two Russian ships. “An HC-130J Super Hercules airplane crew from Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak observes two Russian Border Guard ships and two Chinese Coast Guard ships approximately 440 miles southwest of St. Lawrence Island Sept. 28, 2024. This marked the northernmost location where Chinese Coast Guard vessels have been observed by the U.S. Coast Guard. (U.S. Coast Guard courtesy photo)”

Below is a CG news release, presumably from District 17 (Alaska).

An earlier post reported joint Russian/Chinese Coast Guard exercises and the formation of this four-ship combined task force.

They are in the Bering Sea. Will be interesting to see if they go up into the Arctic. It is a period of near minimal ice.

There is an interesting contrast between the two Russian ships and the two Chinese ships. In spite of the fact that this is happening in Russia’s back yard, the Chinese ships clearly outclass the Russian ships, being newer, larger, and faster.

China Coast Guard type 818 cutter like the two deployed with the Russian Coast Guard

Why four ships hanging together when the US Coast Guard does Alaska Patrols in the Bering with only one ship? The Chinese tend to operate in groups. We haven’t seen this with the Russian Coast Guard, but I really haven’t seen much from them anyway.

Could the Chinese be teaching the Russians how to do gray zone operations, or is it just that totalitarian regimes need someone to do the work and someone to watch them?

On the other hand, the China Coast Guard has lots of ships but relatively few aircraft, and they operate primarily in two heavily trafficked, contested areas, the South and East China Seas.

News Week also has a good report on this.


Oct. 1, 2024

JUNEAU, Alaska – The U.S. Coast Guard located four vessels from the Russian Border Guard and Chinese Coast Guard conducting a joint patrol in the Bering Sea, Saturday.

While patrolling the maritime boundary between the United States and Russia on routine patrol in the Bering Sea, a HC-130J Super Hercules airplane crew from Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak observed two Russian Border Guard ships and two Chinese Coast Guard ships approximately 440 miles southwest of St. Lawrence Island.

The vessels were transiting in formation in a northeast direction, remaining approximately five miles inside the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone. This marked the northernmost location where Chinese Coast Guard vessels have been observed by the U.S. Coast Guard.

 “This recent activity demonstrates the increased interest in the Arctic by our strategic competitors,” said Rear Adm. Megan Dean, commander of the 17th Coast Guard District. “The demand for Coast Guard services across the region continues to grow, requiring continuous investment in our capabilities to meet our strategic competitors’ presence and fulfill our statutory missions across an expanding operational area.”

The HC-130 aircrew operated under Operation Frontier Sentinel, an operation designed to meet presence with presence when strategic competitors operate in and around U.S. waters. The Coast Guard’s presence strengthens the international rules-based order and promotes the conduct of operations in a manner that follows international law and norms.

Fisheries Enforcement from a Littoral Combat Ship

PACIFIC OCEAN – Sailors from USS Omaha (LCS 12), along with five U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement members, transit in a rigid-hull inflatable boat to a foreign flagged fishing vessel in support of the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative (OMSI) in the Pacific Ocean, Sept. 12. Omaha, assigned to U.S. 3rd Fleet, is operating in support of OMSI in the Indo-Pacific region. A U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachment from the Pacific Tactical Law Enforcement Team embarked aboard Omaha is supporting maritime fishery law enforcement operations for U.S. and Pacific Island nations in Oceania. OMSI is a Secretary of Defense program that leverages Department of Defense assets to increase U.S. Coast Guard maritime security and maritime domain awareness support in Oceania through operations in remote U.S. Exclusive Economic Zones and bilateral maritime law enforcement agreements with Pacific Island nations. (U.S. Navy photo by Hospital Corpsman First Class Weiju Lai)

Below is a news release from 3rd Fleet. TACLET taking the opportunity to use a Navy unit’s transit time to do some fisheries enforcement. Photo below for reference.

PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 8, 2021) The Independence variant littoral combat ship USS Omaha (LCS 12) simulates a refueling-at-sea with the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Javier Reyes)


Sept. 20, 2024

USS Omaha participates in Oceania Maritime Security Initiative

By Commander, Littoral Combat Ship Squadron 1

The Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Omaha (LCS 12), with an embarked detachment from Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 35 and a law enforcement detachment from U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Team Pacific, began operations in support of Oceania Maritime Security Initiative (OMSI) Sept. 8.

A Secretary of Defense program, OMSI is aimed at diminishing transnational illegal activity on the high seas in the Pacific Island nations of Oceania’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), as well as increasing interoperability with partner nations.

Omaha’s range and capabilities allow the embarked U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachment the ability to access the remote U.S. and Pacific Island nations’ EEZs.

“We embrace the opportunity to work closely with the U.S. Coast Guard as we help enforce economic policies among some of our closest partners in the Western and Central Pacific,” said U.S. Navy Cmdr. Kevin Smith, commanding officer of Omaha. “It is rewarding to work with these island nations to patrol their waters, maintaining a free and open region.”

The objective of OMSI is to reduce and eliminate illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, combat transnational crimes in EEZs of the Western and Central Pacific region and enhance regional security.

“The partnership between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard plays an integral role in the OMSI mission,” said Coast Guard Chief Maritime Enforcement Specialist Kyle Smouse. “Deploying U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachments aboard U.S. Navy vessels allows the Coast Guard to have a greater presence and impact in enforcing Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) regulations. These areas of operation would be difficult to reach without the support of the U.S. Navy.”

The WCPFC international fisheries agreement focuses on the long-term conservation and sustainable use of fish stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. The WCPFC seeks to address problems in the management of the high seas fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, where there is unregulated fishing and vessel re-flagging to evade controls.

Omaha, homeported in San Diego and assigned to U.S. 3rd Fleet, is on a scheduled deployment in the Pacific Ocean. Littoral combat ships are fast, optimally manned, mission-tailored surface combatants that operate in near-shore and open-ocean environments, winning against 21st-century coastal threats.

“U.S. Coast Guard encounters Russian naval vessels near Point Hope, Alaska” — CG News

“The crew of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Stratton (WMSL 752) encountered and shadowed four Russian Federation Navy (RFN) vessels 57 miles northwest of Point Hope, Alaska, Sept. 15, 2024. The Russian Surface Action Group consisted of a Severodvinsk-class submarine, a Dolgorukiy-class submarine, a Steregushchiy– class Frigate, and a Seliva-class tug. Stratton patrolled under Operation Frontier Sentinel, a Coast Guard operation designed to meet presence with presence when strategic competitors operate in and around U.S. waters. (U.S. Coast Guard courtesy photo)”

Below is a news release from Coast Guard news.

Point Hope, Alaska is well North of the Bering Strait and the Arctic Circle, bordering the Chukchi Sea, 312 miles SW of Utqiagvik (formerly Pt. Barrow) and almost a thousand miles North of Dutch Harbor. None of my Alaska Patrols ever got that far North.

Russian Yasen class SSGN

The Severodvinsk or Yasen class submarine is a nuclear submarine equipped with eight missile silos for up to 32 cruise missiles and ten torpedo tubes.

Russian Borei class SSBN

The Dolgorukiy or Borei class submarine is a SSBN with 16 silos for ballistic missiles.

The surface combatant seems to have been miss identified. It is Gremyashchiy (337) lead ship of her class of 2,500 ton Project 20385 corvettes (NATO considers them frigates).

Note, USCGC Stratton is not an ice strengthened vessel.

This may have been a transfer of the SSGN and SSBN to the Russian Pacific Fleet.

The post story seems to indicate Stratton stumbled across this group. Shouldn’t we have known they were there?


Sept. 16, 2024

JUNEAU, Alaska — The U.S. Coast Guard located four Russian Federation Navy (RFN) vessels Sunday, 57 miles northwest of Point Hope, Alaska.

While on a routine patrol in the Chukchi Sea, the crew of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Stratton (WMSL 752) observed the RFN vessels transiting southeast along the Russian side of the Maritime Boundary Line (MBL).

The crew of the Stratton witnessed the RFN vessels cross the MBL into the U.S. Arctic and moved to observe the vessels. The Russian vessels were assessed to be avoiding sea ice on the Russian side of the MBL and operated in accordance with international rules and customs as they transited approximately 30 miles into the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone.

“We are actively patrolling our maritime border in the Bering Sea, Bering Strait, and Chukchi Sea, with our largest and most capable cutters and aircraft, to protect U.S. sovereign interests, U.S. fish stocks, and to promote international maritime norms,” said Rear Adm. Megan Dean, Commander of Coast Guard District Seventeen. “Coast Guard Cutter Stratton ensured there were no disruptions to U.S. interests.”

The Russian Surface Action Group consisted of a Severodvinsk-class submarine, Dolgorukiy-class submarine, Steregushchiy– class Frigate, and Seliva-class tug.

The Stratton is patrolling under Operation Frontier Sentinel, an operation designed to meet presence with presence when strategic competitors operate in and around U.S. waters. The Coast Guard’s presence strengthens the international rules-based order and promotes the conduct of operations in a manner that follows international law and norms.

Coast Guard Cutter Stratton is a 418-foot legend class national security cutter homeported in Alameda, Calif.

“Runaway costs and design delays: Are Coast Guard’s new icebreakers worth it?” –The Sandboxx

Xue Long 2 on sea trials. Photo by PRIC.

The Sandboxx has a brief look at the problems the US has had in fielding replacement icebreakers.

What I think they leave out of the article is that while the Chinese seem to be planning heavy icebreakers including possibly nuclear-powered ones, the Chinese icebreakers built so far are nowhere near as powerful as Polar Star or the Polar Security Cutter. Mostly they have been ice capable research ships. Their only Chinese built medium ice breaker, Xue long-2, is smaller and a third less powerful than Healy. The three Chinese icebreakers currently in the Arctic include the much smaller 5,600-ton, 8,600 HP (6.4KW) Polar Class 6 Ji Di, smaller than the old Wind class icebreakers.

Aerial view of China’s icebreaker Ji Di berthing at the pier of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Center on July 3 in Qingdao, Shandong Province of China.
© Sun Qimeng/VCG via AP, “China and Russia to Expand Scientific Cooperation in Arctic: Report” –Newsweek

By some counts the US, and most notably Canada, have more icebreakers than China. All of China’s icebreaker construction is not directed at the Arctic. They also have interests in Antarctica (which I find more troubling), and they have ports that ice over requiring domestic icebreaking.

The Sandboxx also describes the 8,500 ton Project 23550 ice class patrol vessels as Russia’s “… first “combat icebreaker,” a small, agile, and armed-to-the-teeth escort ship with launchers installed for anti-ship and cruise missiles.” That is hyperbole. It has provision for placing two containers on the stern. Those containers could contain cruise missiles, but any ship that can mount containers in a position where the space above the container is unobstructed could have a similar capability. Other than being armed with containers, they are armed very much like a Coast Guard cutter. They have a single medium caliber gun, either 76mm or 100mm. They have no surface-to-air missile system other than perhaps man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and no CIWS of any kind. Furthermore, they are not Russia’s first armed icebreaker. Russia has had armed icebreakers since at least WWII, including the Project 23550’s predecessors, the Ivan Susanin class, eight ships completed 1973 to 1982, four of which are still in service. I went aboard one of them in San Francisco, when they came to help celebrate the 200th anniversary of the beginning of the US Coast Guard.

It would not be too difficult for the US to build counterparts to the Project 23550s for the US Coast Guard or Navy, especially after the recent ICE Pact agreement with Canada and Finland. Ships don’t have to be as capable as the Polar Security Cutters to be useful. The Chinese are proving that.