” Unlawful Boarding Of The Merchant Vessel St. Nikolas In The Gulf Of Oman” –Naval News

Picture from Atlantique 2 MPA showing tanker St. Nikolas escorted by Iranian Navy patrol vessel. EMASOH picture.

Naval News reports,

Yesterday, on the 11th of January, the merchant vessel St. Nikolas was boarded by armed personnel southeast of the Strait of Hormuz, off the coast of Oman. The boarders were reported to be wearing military style black uniforms with black masks. The Company Security Officer (CSO) of the shipping company also reported that the vessel had altered course towards Iranian territorial waters and communications had been lost. Acting on initial external information, EMASoH sent out a French maritime patrol aircraft Atlantique 2 that rapidly located the ship, which was escorted by two Iranian Navy patrol vessels. The Atlantique 2 continued to monitor the ship’s movement until she entered Iranian territorial waters. She is now at anchor near Bandar Abbas.”

Have to say, my first reaction was, who or what is EMASoH? Wikipedia has the answer, European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz. EMASoH is a,

 “…French-led maritime monitoring mission with the goal to protect maritime flows through the Strait of Hormuz. It is headquartered at the French naval base in Abu Dhabi and comprises a diplomacy track (EMASoH) and a military track (AGENOR).[1] The mission has 9 participating countries including Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and, with political support, Germany and Portugal. These are all European countries, however EMASOH is not initiated by the European Union.”

The situation there is confusing. I have a hard time keeping up with the players. Looks like the Europeans are about to create their own naval defensive coalition to defend shipping in the Red Sea. Wonder if it will be under AGENOR?

“Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Hits U.S.-Owned Container Ship In Gulf Of Aden” –The Drive

MV Gibraltar Eagle YouTube screencap

The Drive reports,

” A Marshall Islands-flagged, U.S. owned and operated container ship was struck by a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile on Monday, U.S. Central Command said.

“There were no injuries or significant damage to the vessel, the M/V Gibraltar Eagle, which is continuing its journey. The vessel is a 200-meter long Ultramax container ship, according to its U.S. owner, Eagle Bulk Shipping.”

The Drive also offers an overview of the Houthi anti-ship capabilities, “The Anti-Ship Missile Arsenal Houthis Are Firing Into The Red Sea.

I believe this is the first time in history, a ship, underway, has been hit by a ballistic missile.

“No Injuries or significant damage”:

At about 200 meters in length, M/V Gibraltar Eagle, is not particularly large. I would say that it is medium sized.

This is one of those rare times like, the Tanker War, when we get to see how modern ships, at least merchant ships survive modern weapons.

So far, I don’t think any of these Houthi attacks has resulted in a mobility kill, much less a sinking.

Modern merchant ships are extremely resilient. A lot of their bulk is made up of non-critical space.

This has implication for the Coast Guard’s own Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission. Explosions below the waterline, torpedoes and mines, remain the most effective way to forcibly stop a medium to large ship.

Very Interesting Questions: “Drone Warfare’s New Angle: Iran’s Shaheds Become Low-Cost Anti-Ship Missiles” –Covert Shores

Shahed-136One Way Attack Uncrewed Air Vehicle (), Source: Covert Shores

Covert Shores makes some interesting observations and asks pointed questions particularly in regard to the terminal homing phase of how the low-cost slow cruise missiles make their attacks on moving targets.

Hitting fixed target in Ukraine is very different from hitting a moving target hundreds of miles off the coast. Even an oil tanker is very small in the vastness of the ocean. The mission would need target location intelligence, and the drone would need targeting during its attack phase. The former is the same for any anti-ship weapon and can be achieved by patrol aircraft, fishing boats. Or, as possibly the case in the Chem Pluto attack, by the target broadcasting its position via AIS (automated information system).

The final phase targeting is more interesting. We do not know, at least in the public sphere, how the drones targeted the tankers. Whether it was a human-in-the-loop camera, or some form of automation.

Do they have satellite communications? Target recognition software? Home on AIS?

Presumably we have recovered at least one of the failed drones and can answer the question, but there is an even simpler solution.

Forward observers in one or more of the many Dhows that traffic the area, who call in a UAV when they have a target, and who can take over control of the drone when it arrives on scene, steering it into the target. This would be a continuation of what we saw with the Houthi remote control explosive motorboats, which unlike the USVs we are seeing in the Russo-Ukraine War, had no satellite link and were apparently steered by a second vessel within line of sight of the target and the attacking USV.  It is not unlikely the Iranians and Houthi have a network of such nondescript vessels. 

The slow speed of the UAVs does present something of a challenge in getting to the right place at the right time, but that is mitigated by the predictability of shipping lanes and the consistent speed of merchant vessels.

“US, Britain Blast Dozens of Houthi Targets in Yemen in Retaliatory Strikes” –Voice of America

Topographic map in English of the Red Sea, UTM projection (WGS84 datum). Author: Eric Gaba – Wikimedia Commons user: Sting

Voice of America reports,

U.S. Central Command late Thursday said the series of strikes hit more than 60 targets at 16 locations in Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen, including command and control nodes, munitions depots, launching systems, and production facilities.

“Top Ten Navies by Aggregate Displacement, 1 January 2024” –Analysis and diagram by Phoenix_jz

Two years ago, I did a post with a similar title from the same source. Somehow, I missed the 2023 edition. As I said in the earlier post, I don’t know , but the data appears to be credible, and it looks like readers are checking his figures. 

It is very difficult to read the tonnages at the bottom of the graph unless you are using a computer and click on the graph to see it in a larger size. 

The creator’s notes and some additional comments are below. 


Hello all!

Well, 2024 is upon us, and as such so is the third edition of my top ten navy list. For those unfamiliar, here are links to 2022 and 2023, with a general explainer of the whole concept in the 2022 version.

The long and short of it is that this graph reflects a personal tracker I keep of almost every large and moderately sized navy, and calculates the aggregate displacement of these navies. It’s not a perfect way to display the size of navies – far from it in fact – but it is at least more representative than counting numbers of hulls alone, in my opinion.

To break down what each of these categories mean;

  • Surface Warships is an aggregate of all above-water warships and major aviation and amphibious assault platforms. This category includes CVNs, CVs, CVLs, LHDs, LHAs, LPDs, CGs, DDGs, FFGs, corvettes, OPVs, CPVs, lighter patrol craft, and MCM vessels.
  • Submarines is what it says on the tin – SSBNs, SSGNs, SSNs, SSKs, and for select nations where applicable (and where information is available), special purpose submarines. Please note dedicated training submarines are counted separately.
  • AORs includes all major fleet replenishment vessels (coastal vessels do not count, however).
  • Other Auxiliaries is a very wide net that essentially captures everything else. Special mission ships, support vessels, minor amphibious assault vessels (LSDs, LSTs, LCAC’s, LCM’s, LCU’s), training vessels, tugs, coastal support vessels, hydrography ships – all essential parts of navies, but generally often paid less attention to as they’re not as flashy as the warships proper.

Interesting trends in data that I thought I would share for various navies, and thoughts and observations otherwise;

The USN is, unsurprisingly, still top dog by a huge margin. In spite a net decommissioning of five ships this year, the USN has grown overall by about 32,000 tons – four ‘cruisers’, two SSNs, four LCS, and five patrol craft decommissioned against the introduction of three destroyers, an SSN, five LCS, and a replenishment ship. It is worth noting that 2023 is the first year since 2010 that the USN has commissioned three destroyers in a year, though a repeat performance in the next couple years is unlikely – these ships were launched in 2020 and 2021, and only one destroyer per year was launched in 2022 and 2023.

No one will be surprised to hear that the PLAN has grown for the nth consecutive year, adding the final Type 055 batch I and the remaining Type 054A Batch V, for almost 50,000 tons of new surface combatants. Much of the remaining increase in displacement for this year (which totaled nearly 90,000 tons) reflected a steady pace of modernization in mine warfare, landing forces, and logistical support/other auxiliaries. As with last year, the number of minor patrol craft continue to plummet as the PLAN continues to divest many of its obsolescent brown-water combatants, or relegates them to training duties.

Moving on to ongoing construction, progress on the new destroyer batches continues at pace. At least two Type 055 Batch II appear to be under construction, and the overall number of Type 052D Batch IV appears to be at least ten. The first ship actually launched at the very end of 2022 (at Jiangnan), and two further have been launched by the same yard as well as three at Dalian. Two more remain under construction at each yard. The first of these ships to be launched appears to be on trials and will likely commission this coming year. The Type 054A program of the navy appears to have finally wrapped up (construction of the hull for the China Coast Guard continues), and the Type 054B program has continued at pace if not scale – two ships were launched this year, but modules of further units have been scarce. Rounding things out for major surface vessels, a new Type 075 LHD was launched this past December. Conspicuously absent has been sightings of any modules for new carriers. Considering Fujian (Type 003) began construction at some point from 2015 to 2017, one has to wonder if we will see China launch another carrier before the end of the decade.

Perhaps most consequential of all, however, has been the completion of new production facilities at Bohai and a resumption of Type 093 SSN launches. The first of the new Type 093B launched in 2022, and has been followed up by two more launches this year (possibly up to three). A sustained pace of two submarines a year, or even just three submarines every two years, would quickly add up could see anywhere from nine to eleven new SSNs launched by the end of 2027, and in service by early 2030s. Only time will tell what the actual drumbeat of production will be.

Russia’s VMF woes in the Black Sea have continued unabated, except less at sea and largely fueled by the Franco-British SCALP cruise missile. The most dramatic loss by far was the destruction of the Project 636.3 ‘Improved’ Kilo Rostov-on-Don in drydock at Sevastopol, but similar attacks claimed the destruction or constructive loss of a Karakurt-class corvette (under construction, not in service) and two Ropucha-class LSTs. The infamous TB-2 made a brief return to destroy a Serna-class LCU, and two other LCU’s may have finally become the first victims of Kamikaze USVs this past November, for a total of 11,407 tonnes lost.

In regards to the more regular cycle of commissioning and decommissioning, one frigate, one MCM vessel, and three corvettes were brought into service, as well as a new SSGN, SSBN, and SSK each. Against this a corvette, SSGN, SSBN, and SSK were decommissioned. Overall, in spite of losses the VMF managed a net gain of 6,324 tonnes of surface warships and submarines. Anyone who checks against my figures from last year will note that the increase in the VMF’s overall tonnage this year is far more substantial, due to the auxiliary category. Though some of this was from new vessels, this was mostly down to a badly needed overhaul and reorganization of that part of my tracker, particularly for the tug fleet. Did you know the Russian navy tug fleet displaces more than either the Argentine or Canadian navies? Now you do! Seriously – it would be the 20th largest navy in the world by itself.

As a final note on the VMF – it is worth remembering that ships commissioned in the Russian navy are not always actually in service, as ships can often languish in near-terminal refits or simply be left inactive without a formal decommissioning. Almost half the remaining Projekt 877 Kilo’s, for example, appear to be inactive at this point (5 of 10).

(In comments the author noted the following, “Russian naval losses during the war have totalled 13 vessels for 29,870 tonnes. Quite a bit – but also only about 1.4% of their current overall tonnage.” –Chuck)

The British Royal Navy observes a second year of marginal reduction in overall tonnage (-2,640t, or -0.3%), losing another Type 23 frigate as well as the last Echo-class survey ship. Against this the RFA brought into service the first MROSS, ProteusProteus represents a considerable increase in subsurface capability, though the loss of a frigate with no replacement ship to replace it for another thee to four years is painful, especially given how many of the remaining eleven ships are deep in LIFEX/Post-LIFEX refits. With that said, their new frigate programs are moving on steadily. Steel was cut on two new frigates this year – the future HMS Birmingham (4th Type 26) and HMS Active (2nd Type 31), bringing the total construction volume to five frigates building and one fitting out.

The JMSDF continues to grow, albeit at a more moderate pace this year (+6,530t, or +0.9%), inducting a new Mogami-class frigate and Taigei-class attack submarine, while shifting another Oyashio-class from the active fleet to a training role. Two more FFM were launched this year, though surprisingly they have not started construction on the next pair. This past November, it was announced that the Mogami-class FFM would be curtailed at 12 units (of 22 planned), and followed on by an evolution of the design known as FMF-AAW. The FMF-AAW will feature greater air and surface warfare capabilities. Twelve such ships are planned.

The Indian Navy’s growth in 2023 was far less dramatic than in 2022, but still noteworthy (+9,200t, or +1.5%), as adding a new conventional attack submarine and destroyer to the fleet has finally pushed them over the 600,000-tonne line.

The Marine Nationale grew by almost 9,000 tonnes (2.1%) this year, largely down to the retirement and replacement of a patrol ship, nuclear attack submarine, and tugs with an equal number of replacements. Though it is worth noting that the new attack submarine is not fully operational yet – that will happen in 2024 – so technically the MN’s attack submarine fleet is really four boats at this point in time.

The saga of eight and ninth place swapping around continues, as the ROKN has managed to move back to the position of eighth largest navy in the world. In 2023 they added a net 15,374t (+4.3%), commissioning four Daegu-class frigates, a second KSS-III class attack submarine, an MCM vessel and a pair of LCACs, against the decommissioning of two corvettes and five PKM’s.

In contrast, the Marina Militare continues to feel the bite from the two FREMM sold to Egypt, as well as delays in brining the LHD Trieste into service – intended for 2023 but again pushed back, now to the spring of 2024. The first PPA ‘Light+’, Raimondo Montecuccoli, was brought into service in 2023 – an OPV on paper, but light frigate in practice. Against this one of the elderly Maestrale-class frigates, Zeffiro, was retired, as was one of the fleet’s AORs (Vesuvio) and a water tanker (Bormida), resulting in a real drop of 7,073 tonnes (-1.9%). The drop seen versus the chart versus last year is more dramatic (totals 16,632 tonnes), which reflects both cleaning up data on old auxiliary platforms for which information is scarce, and correcting some minor sheet errors, which totaled 9,559 tonnes.

The outlook should be looking up in the future – as previously mentioned, the LHD Trieste should enter service this year, as should the fourth and fifth PPA. The first of two replacement FREMM (GPe) was launched in late 2023 and a second will follow this spring, with both being slated to enter service in 2025 alongside the sixth PPA and second Vulcano-class replenishment ship – barring any delays.

Finally, the Indonesian Navy saw another year of growth, adding a net 9,930 tonnes (+3.1%), with another hospital ship commissioned, a new survey ship, corvette, and two new MCM vessels and FACs each, as well as several patrol boats. The TNIAL continues a steady program of domestic construction of patrol craft, and construction is ongoing on two Iver Huitfelt derivative frigates, with the keel of the first vessel laid down this past August. They have also cut steel on a new hydrography ship, which will launch in Indonesia and complete fitting out in Germany.

What comes next in terms of major platforms for the TNIAL is somewhat up in the air. As with the year prior, there has been no progress made on the procurement of six FREMM from Italy, despite a contract being signed two and a half years ago (June 2021). In spite of this, they have expressed interest in procuring two PPA to bolster their patrol fleet. In the interest of expediting procurement, they are looking at two ‘Light+’ configuration vessels currently fitting out at Muggiano – Marcantonio Colonna (due for delivery to the MMI in the latter half of 2024) and Ruggiero di Lauria (due for delivery to the MMI in mid-2025). According to the General Manager of Fincantieri’s Naval Vessels Division, Dario Deste, a contract for the two vessels could be signed in the first half of 2024.

(In answer to a question the author added this in the comments–Chuck)

No.11 to 20 are as follows for 1 January 2024;

  • 11: Turkey – 297,298t
  • 12: Taiwan – 268,958t
  • 13 Egypt – 232,046t
  • 14: Spain- 229,373t
  • 15: Germany – 226,655t
  • 16: Australia – 224,074t (decided to add the National Support Squadron, which added about 30kt)
  • 17: Greece – 189,184t
  • 18: Brazil – 162,29t
  • 19: Chile – 161,404t
  • 20: Argentina – 138,620t
(A reader, , added this–Chuck)

Listed by ranking for this year:

Nation Change from 2023 (tonnes) 2023 Ranking Change from 2022 (tonnes) 2022 Ranking
United States +55,658 1st +250,308 1st
China +93,567 2nd +99,299 2nd
Russia + 211,333 3rd +166,682 3rd
United Kingdom -2,640 4th -5,815 4th
Japan +6,530 5th +23,790 5th
India +9,200 6th +62,349 6th
France +8,925 7th +12,145 7th
South Korea +15,374 9th +7,153 8th
Italy -16,632 8th -3,452 9th
Indonesia -70 10th +17,709 10th

Probably not surprising given all these nations are competing more or less with each other, but the rankings have basically remained the same except for Italy and South Korea trading places in 2023, then reverting to their 2022 places again this year. Nobody previous top 10 navy has left the club either.

However, do note that not all of the year-to-year tonnage differences are due to actual changes in fleet size/composition. As Phoenix mentioned in his post, the Russians in particular got a huge tonnage jump this year because he changed the way he counts auxiliaries, and given the discrepancy between his reported +32k figure for the USN and the numbers, there’s probably some math correction involved there too.

 

“Indian Navy Commandos Retake Ship In Arabian Sea” gCaptain/Reuters

The Indian Navy approaches the M/V Lila Norfolk in the Indian Ocean, January 5, 2024. Photo courtesy Indian Navy

gCaptain reports,

“An Indian Navy warship intercepted the MV Lila Norfolk on Friday afternoon, less than a day after the navy received news that it had been hijacked off Somalia’s coast in the North Arabian Sea.”

The crew of 21 had taken shelter in a citadel. By the time the Indian Navy destroyer, INS Chennai, had arrived, the pirates had fled.

The MV Lila Norfolk “was kept under continuous surveillance using MPA (Maritime Patrol Aircraft–Chuck), Predator MQ9B & integral helos.

Notably, the Indian Navy is one of several users of the MQ-9B Sea Guardian Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAS including the Japan Coast Guard, the UK, Taiwan, and Greece. The US Coast Guard after years of observation of Customs and Border Protection’s use of earlier model MQ-9 Predators, the USCG has yet to procure or even experiment with a shore based long endurance UAS.

“Joint Warning To Houthis: Cease Attacks Or Face Consequences” –The Drive

The Drive reports,

A dozen nations on Wednesday issued a joint warning to the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, demanding that they cease attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea…“We call for the immediate end of these illegal attacks and release of unlawfully detained vessels and crews” the U.S., Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom demanded in the joint statement published by the White House Wednesday.

The text of the warning is below the break.

Click on the graphic to enlarge. Credit: Intelschizo@Schizointel


Coast Guard Patrol Forces Southwest Asia, PATFORSWA, Three FRCs, Three Drug Seizures in Four Days

ARABIAN SEA (Dec. 28, 2023) Bags of illegal narcotics seized from a vessel are stacked on the deck of the U.S. Coast Guard Sentinel-class fast response cutter USCGC Robert Goldman (WPC 1142) in the Arabian Sea, Dec. 28. Robert Goldman was operating under Combined Task Force 150, one of five task forces under Combined Maritime Forces, the largest multinational naval partnership in the world. CTF 150 focuses on maritime security operations outside the Arabian Gulf. (Photo by U.S. Coast Guard courtesy photo)

Below is a U.S. Naval Forces Central Command – Combined Maritime Forces – U.S. 5th Fleet news release, followed by a second earlier news release. Something puzzling is that there seems to be a relatively new “catch and release” policy regarding the smugglers and smuggling vessels. 

CMF-assigned Cutter Seizes Hashish and Methamphetamines in North Arabian Sea | January 02, 2024, MANAMA, Bahrain

A U.S. Coast Guard cutter patrolling under the command of Combined Task Force 150 of the Combined Maritime Forces seized hashish and methamphetamines with a total estimated street value of $24.3 million Dec. 28 in the North Arabian Sea.

It was the third seizure by a CMF-assigned cutter in four days, following seizures by USCGC Clarence Sutphin Jr. (WPC 1147) and USCGC John Scheuerman (WPC 1146) of hashish, heroin, methamphetamines and pills with a total estimated street value of $24.5 million Dec. 24 and Dec. 26 in the Gulf of Oman.

A team from USCGC Robert Goldman (WPC 1142), a Sentinel-class cutter, boarded a dhow at approximately 6:30 a.m. local time Dec. 28 after it displayed indicators consistent with illicit drug trafficking.

Aboard, the team discovered over 300 bags of drugs containing 3,514 kilograms of hashish and 417 kilograms of methamphetamines.

The Robert Goldman team released the dhow and disposed of the illicit drugs.

The mission of Combined Task Force 150 is to disrupt the ability of non-state actors to move weapons or drugs, or engage in other illicit activities, in the Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.

This interdiction marked the twelfth time Combined Task Force 150 assets have seized illegal narcotics at sea since France took command in July 2023.

Combined Maritime Forces is a multinational maritime partnership committed to disrupting criminal and terrorist activities by restricting their freedom of maneuver across approximately 3.2 million square miles of international waters encompassing some of the world’s most important shipping lanes.

Since 2021, units assigned to the Combined Maritime Forces have seized more than $1 billion in illegal drugs while patrolling waters across the Middle East.


CMF Forces Seize Illegal Drugs in Gulf of Oman, January 02, 2024, MANAMA, Bahrain

U.S. Coast Guard cutters assigned to the Combined Maritime Forces seized illegal drugs with a total estimated street value of $24.5 million on Dec. 24 and Dec. 26 from vessels in the Gulf of Oman.

GULF OF OMAN (Dec. 26, 2023) Bags of illegal narcotics seized from a vessel are stacked on the deck of the U.S. Coast Guard Sentinel-class fast response cutter USCGC John Scheuerman (WPC 1146) in the Gulf of Oman, Dec. 26. John Scheuerman was operating under Combined Task Force 150, one of five task forces under Combined Maritime Forces, the largest multinational naval partnership in the world. CTF 150 focuses on maritime security operations outside the Arabian Gulf. (Photo by U.S. Coast Guard courtesy photo)

At approximately 2 p.m. local time (10 a.m. Greenwich Mean Time) on Dec. 24, a team from USCGC Clarence Sutphin Jr. (WPC 1147), a Sentinel-class cutter patrolling under the command of Combined Task Force 150 of the Combined Maritime Forces, boarded a dhow after it displayed several indicators consistent with illicit drug trafficking.

Aboard, the crew discovered 90 kilograms of heroin with an estimated street value of $3.2 million.

After testing and seizing the narcotics, the team disembarked the dhow, allowing it to continue on its journey.

GULF OF OMAN (Dec. 26, 2023) Bags of illegal narcotics seized from a vessel are stacked on the deck of the U.S. Coast Guard Sentinel-class fast response cutter USCGC John Scheuerman (WPC 1146) in the Gulf of Oman, Dec. 26. John Scheuerman was operating under Combined Task Force 150, one of five task forces under Combined Maritime Forces, the largest multinational naval partnership in the world. CTF 150 focuses on maritime security operations outside the Arabian Gulf. (Photo by U.S. Coast Guard courtesy photo)

At approximately 5 a.m. local time (9 a.m. Greenwich Mean Time) on Dec. 26, a team from USCGC John Scheuerman (WPC 1146), a Sentinel-class cutter patrolling under the command of Combined Task Force 150 of the Combined Maritime Forces, boarded a dhow after it also displayed several indicators consistent with illicit drug trafficking.

Aboard, the team discovered 261 kilograms of methamphetamines, 2,936 kilograms of hashish, 142 kilograms of heroin and 75,000 pills with the potential to be abused as opium substitutes, with a total estimated street value of more than $21.3 million.

The John Scheuerman team released the dhow’s crew and disposed of the illicit drugs.

The mission of Combined Task Force 150 is to disrupt the ability of non-state actors to move weapons or drugs, or engage in other illicit activities, in the Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.

These interdictions marked the tenth and eleventh times Combined Task Force 150 assets have seized illegal narcotics at sea since France took command in July 2023.

Combined Maritime Forces is a multinational maritime partnership committed to disrupting criminal and terrorist activities by restricting their freedom of maneuver across approximately 3.2 million square miles of international waters encompassing some of the world’s most important shipping lanes.

Since 2021, units assigned to the Combined Maritime Forces have seized more than $1 billion in illegal drugs while patrolling waters across the Middle East.

PATFORSWA Photo from USNI

Five U.S. Coast Guard Sentinel-class fast-response cutters and two Avenger-class mine countermeasures (MCM) ships sail together in the Gulf of Oman, Nov. 3, 2023. Click on the photo to enlarge. US Navy Photo

An unusual photo from the December 28 edition of the US Naval Institute News Service’s Fleet and Marine Tracker. The Avenger class, like the cutters, are based in Bahrain.

Why this get together? I presume this is an exercise in which the FRCs protect the MCM ships from Iranian drones or small craft swarm tactics. Alternately the exercise may have been for the cutters to protect high value units, with the MCM ships simulating larger ships, but FRCs already routinely escort high value units, though I don’t think I have seen this many involved in a single operation.

Late addition: