“Russia Selects India Over China To Construct Its ‘Cutting-Edge’ Icebreaker Ships; But Why Delhi Over Beijing?” –Eurasian Times

Russian Icebreaker Viktor Chernomyrdin, the largest diesel-electric icebreaker ever built by a Russian shipyard

The Eurasian Times reports,

Russia has chosen India over China for its non-nuclear icebreaker construction program. This decision comes as Russia seeks to develop its Northern Sea Route (NSR) and navigate the challenges posed by Western sanctions…In a significant move towards strengthening maritime cooperation, the Indian government is in talks with two shipbuilders—one state-owned and the other private—to construct four non-nuclear icebreaker ships valued at over Rs 6,000 crores ($750 million).

Does this really signify a preference for India over China? Not really, “…shipyards in China, South Korea, and Japan are fully booked until at least 2028.” India is probably eager for the business. Relations between Russia and India have been good for decades. While India has moved closer to the US in response to Chinese aggressiveness, India has maintained ties with Russia.

India has been developing their ship building industry, and logically they have the cheap labor that could make them very competitive, but they still lag far behind China, S. Korea, and Japan. That Russia is not building these ships in Russia is an indication of the weakness of their own shipbuilding industry.

I don’t think India has ever built an icebreaker. There is no indication of how large or powerful these icebreakers would be other than the price, four for $750M. (That is four icebreakers for about half the price of a Polar Security Cutter.) If this happens, it will be worth watching.

“India Rescues Iranian Fishing Vessel Hijacked By Pirates Off Somalia” –gCaptain

An Indian Navy carries out a rescue operation of an Iranian fishing vessel Al-Kambar 786 after it was seized by armed pirates off Somalia, in the Arabian Sea, according to a naval statement, in this handout photo released on March 30, 2024. SPOKESPERSONNAVY VIA X/Handout via REUTERS

gCaptain reports,

The Indian Navy said it had freed the 23-strong crew of an Iranian fishing vessel which was seized by armed pirates off Somalia….The vessel was intercepted by the navy’s INS Sumedha and INS Trishul, leading to “over 12 hours of intense coercive tactical measures” forcing the pirates to surrender…”

INS Sumedha (foreground in the photo above) is a Saryu-class 105 meter (344′) offshore patrol vessel, and was the first Indian vessel on scene.

Interestingly, the 23 member crew of this Iranian fishing vessel were all Pakistani nationals.

“U.S., Indian Coast Guards Drill Against Drone Attacks In Sea Defenders 2024” –Naval News

USCGC Bertholf and an ICG offshore patrol vessel sail together during Sea Defenders 2024.

Naval News reports,

U.S. and Indian Coast Guards held this year’s Sea Defender with recent events in the Red Sea in mind, training against both drone and piracy threats…Taking place off the Malacca Strait off the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, USCGC Bertholf (WMSL-750) and Indian Coast Guard vessels and aircraft held several maritime security activities in port and at sea over four days. This exercise also marked the first time a U.S. Coast Guard vessel visited New Delhi’s southernmost territory, strategically located at the entrance to the Malacca Strait between the Indian and Pacific oceans. 

The Indian Navy and Coast Guard both operate large numbers of Offshore Patrol Vessels. Established in 1978, the Indian Coast Guard has been growing rapidly and is now one of the largest in the world. Following the 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attack, which came by sea, the Indian Coast Guard grew even more rapidly.

The Indian Coast Guard now operates 27 Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV), all commissioned within the last 28 years, 18 within the last ten years. The Indian CG has ordered six more. The Indian Navy also operates ten OPVs, all commissioned in the last 35 years, four commissioned within the last eleven years. The Indian Navy has ordered eleven more OPVs.

The US Coast Guard operates, I believe, 36 OPVs now, soon to be 34. Only six of those have been commissioned in the last ten years. 26 of the USCG OPVs are over 33 years old.

The NSCs are doing things we would have never expected when they were conceived.

As included in this exercise, it appears there is an emerging requirement for the Coast Guard to be prepared to counter unmanned systems of various types, both for self defense and for the defense of maritime assets. Unmanned systems are likely the weapon of choice for future terrorist attacks.

Of all Coast Guard assets, the large cutters are currently the most capable against the various types of one-way attack unmanned systems, but they are unlikely to be involved in the most likely scenarios. Attacks on passenger ships, submarines, or aircraft carriers, during transit from port to open sea seem most probable. Here we are decidedly unprepared, but perhaps PATFORSWA is leading the way.

“Top Ten Navies by Aggregate Displacement, 1 January 2024” –Analysis and diagram by Phoenix_jz

Two years ago, I did a post with a similar title from the same source. Somehow, I missed the 2023 edition. As I said in the earlier post, I don’t know , but the data appears to be credible, and it looks like readers are checking his figures. 

It is very difficult to read the tonnages at the bottom of the graph unless you are using a computer and click on the graph to see it in a larger size. 

The creator’s notes and some additional comments are below. 


Hello all!

Well, 2024 is upon us, and as such so is the third edition of my top ten navy list. For those unfamiliar, here are links to 2022 and 2023, with a general explainer of the whole concept in the 2022 version.

The long and short of it is that this graph reflects a personal tracker I keep of almost every large and moderately sized navy, and calculates the aggregate displacement of these navies. It’s not a perfect way to display the size of navies – far from it in fact – but it is at least more representative than counting numbers of hulls alone, in my opinion.

To break down what each of these categories mean;

  • Surface Warships is an aggregate of all above-water warships and major aviation and amphibious assault platforms. This category includes CVNs, CVs, CVLs, LHDs, LHAs, LPDs, CGs, DDGs, FFGs, corvettes, OPVs, CPVs, lighter patrol craft, and MCM vessels.
  • Submarines is what it says on the tin – SSBNs, SSGNs, SSNs, SSKs, and for select nations where applicable (and where information is available), special purpose submarines. Please note dedicated training submarines are counted separately.
  • AORs includes all major fleet replenishment vessels (coastal vessels do not count, however).
  • Other Auxiliaries is a very wide net that essentially captures everything else. Special mission ships, support vessels, minor amphibious assault vessels (LSDs, LSTs, LCAC’s, LCM’s, LCU’s), training vessels, tugs, coastal support vessels, hydrography ships – all essential parts of navies, but generally often paid less attention to as they’re not as flashy as the warships proper.

Interesting trends in data that I thought I would share for various navies, and thoughts and observations otherwise;

The USN is, unsurprisingly, still top dog by a huge margin. In spite a net decommissioning of five ships this year, the USN has grown overall by about 32,000 tons – four ‘cruisers’, two SSNs, four LCS, and five patrol craft decommissioned against the introduction of three destroyers, an SSN, five LCS, and a replenishment ship. It is worth noting that 2023 is the first year since 2010 that the USN has commissioned three destroyers in a year, though a repeat performance in the next couple years is unlikely – these ships were launched in 2020 and 2021, and only one destroyer per year was launched in 2022 and 2023.

No one will be surprised to hear that the PLAN has grown for the nth consecutive year, adding the final Type 055 batch I and the remaining Type 054A Batch V, for almost 50,000 tons of new surface combatants. Much of the remaining increase in displacement for this year (which totaled nearly 90,000 tons) reflected a steady pace of modernization in mine warfare, landing forces, and logistical support/other auxiliaries. As with last year, the number of minor patrol craft continue to plummet as the PLAN continues to divest many of its obsolescent brown-water combatants, or relegates them to training duties.

Moving on to ongoing construction, progress on the new destroyer batches continues at pace. At least two Type 055 Batch II appear to be under construction, and the overall number of Type 052D Batch IV appears to be at least ten. The first ship actually launched at the very end of 2022 (at Jiangnan), and two further have been launched by the same yard as well as three at Dalian. Two more remain under construction at each yard. The first of these ships to be launched appears to be on trials and will likely commission this coming year. The Type 054A program of the navy appears to have finally wrapped up (construction of the hull for the China Coast Guard continues), and the Type 054B program has continued at pace if not scale – two ships were launched this year, but modules of further units have been scarce. Rounding things out for major surface vessels, a new Type 075 LHD was launched this past December. Conspicuously absent has been sightings of any modules for new carriers. Considering Fujian (Type 003) began construction at some point from 2015 to 2017, one has to wonder if we will see China launch another carrier before the end of the decade.

Perhaps most consequential of all, however, has been the completion of new production facilities at Bohai and a resumption of Type 093 SSN launches. The first of the new Type 093B launched in 2022, and has been followed up by two more launches this year (possibly up to three). A sustained pace of two submarines a year, or even just three submarines every two years, would quickly add up could see anywhere from nine to eleven new SSNs launched by the end of 2027, and in service by early 2030s. Only time will tell what the actual drumbeat of production will be.

Russia’s VMF woes in the Black Sea have continued unabated, except less at sea and largely fueled by the Franco-British SCALP cruise missile. The most dramatic loss by far was the destruction of the Project 636.3 ‘Improved’ Kilo Rostov-on-Don in drydock at Sevastopol, but similar attacks claimed the destruction or constructive loss of a Karakurt-class corvette (under construction, not in service) and two Ropucha-class LSTs. The infamous TB-2 made a brief return to destroy a Serna-class LCU, and two other LCU’s may have finally become the first victims of Kamikaze USVs this past November, for a total of 11,407 tonnes lost.

In regards to the more regular cycle of commissioning and decommissioning, one frigate, one MCM vessel, and three corvettes were brought into service, as well as a new SSGN, SSBN, and SSK each. Against this a corvette, SSGN, SSBN, and SSK were decommissioned. Overall, in spite of losses the VMF managed a net gain of 6,324 tonnes of surface warships and submarines. Anyone who checks against my figures from last year will note that the increase in the VMF’s overall tonnage this year is far more substantial, due to the auxiliary category. Though some of this was from new vessels, this was mostly down to a badly needed overhaul and reorganization of that part of my tracker, particularly for the tug fleet. Did you know the Russian navy tug fleet displaces more than either the Argentine or Canadian navies? Now you do! Seriously – it would be the 20th largest navy in the world by itself.

As a final note on the VMF – it is worth remembering that ships commissioned in the Russian navy are not always actually in service, as ships can often languish in near-terminal refits or simply be left inactive without a formal decommissioning. Almost half the remaining Projekt 877 Kilo’s, for example, appear to be inactive at this point (5 of 10).

(In comments the author noted the following, “Russian naval losses during the war have totalled 13 vessels for 29,870 tonnes. Quite a bit – but also only about 1.4% of their current overall tonnage.” –Chuck)

The British Royal Navy observes a second year of marginal reduction in overall tonnage (-2,640t, or -0.3%), losing another Type 23 frigate as well as the last Echo-class survey ship. Against this the RFA brought into service the first MROSS, ProteusProteus represents a considerable increase in subsurface capability, though the loss of a frigate with no replacement ship to replace it for another thee to four years is painful, especially given how many of the remaining eleven ships are deep in LIFEX/Post-LIFEX refits. With that said, their new frigate programs are moving on steadily. Steel was cut on two new frigates this year – the future HMS Birmingham (4th Type 26) and HMS Active (2nd Type 31), bringing the total construction volume to five frigates building and one fitting out.

The JMSDF continues to grow, albeit at a more moderate pace this year (+6,530t, or +0.9%), inducting a new Mogami-class frigate and Taigei-class attack submarine, while shifting another Oyashio-class from the active fleet to a training role. Two more FFM were launched this year, though surprisingly they have not started construction on the next pair. This past November, it was announced that the Mogami-class FFM would be curtailed at 12 units (of 22 planned), and followed on by an evolution of the design known as FMF-AAW. The FMF-AAW will feature greater air and surface warfare capabilities. Twelve such ships are planned.

The Indian Navy’s growth in 2023 was far less dramatic than in 2022, but still noteworthy (+9,200t, or +1.5%), as adding a new conventional attack submarine and destroyer to the fleet has finally pushed them over the 600,000-tonne line.

The Marine Nationale grew by almost 9,000 tonnes (2.1%) this year, largely down to the retirement and replacement of a patrol ship, nuclear attack submarine, and tugs with an equal number of replacements. Though it is worth noting that the new attack submarine is not fully operational yet – that will happen in 2024 – so technically the MN’s attack submarine fleet is really four boats at this point in time.

The saga of eight and ninth place swapping around continues, as the ROKN has managed to move back to the position of eighth largest navy in the world. In 2023 they added a net 15,374t (+4.3%), commissioning four Daegu-class frigates, a second KSS-III class attack submarine, an MCM vessel and a pair of LCACs, against the decommissioning of two corvettes and five PKM’s.

In contrast, the Marina Militare continues to feel the bite from the two FREMM sold to Egypt, as well as delays in brining the LHD Trieste into service – intended for 2023 but again pushed back, now to the spring of 2024. The first PPA ‘Light+’, Raimondo Montecuccoli, was brought into service in 2023 – an OPV on paper, but light frigate in practice. Against this one of the elderly Maestrale-class frigates, Zeffiro, was retired, as was one of the fleet’s AORs (Vesuvio) and a water tanker (Bormida), resulting in a real drop of 7,073 tonnes (-1.9%). The drop seen versus the chart versus last year is more dramatic (totals 16,632 tonnes), which reflects both cleaning up data on old auxiliary platforms for which information is scarce, and correcting some minor sheet errors, which totaled 9,559 tonnes.

The outlook should be looking up in the future – as previously mentioned, the LHD Trieste should enter service this year, as should the fourth and fifth PPA. The first of two replacement FREMM (GPe) was launched in late 2023 and a second will follow this spring, with both being slated to enter service in 2025 alongside the sixth PPA and second Vulcano-class replenishment ship – barring any delays.

Finally, the Indonesian Navy saw another year of growth, adding a net 9,930 tonnes (+3.1%), with another hospital ship commissioned, a new survey ship, corvette, and two new MCM vessels and FACs each, as well as several patrol boats. The TNIAL continues a steady program of domestic construction of patrol craft, and construction is ongoing on two Iver Huitfelt derivative frigates, with the keel of the first vessel laid down this past August. They have also cut steel on a new hydrography ship, which will launch in Indonesia and complete fitting out in Germany.

What comes next in terms of major platforms for the TNIAL is somewhat up in the air. As with the year prior, there has been no progress made on the procurement of six FREMM from Italy, despite a contract being signed two and a half years ago (June 2021). In spite of this, they have expressed interest in procuring two PPA to bolster their patrol fleet. In the interest of expediting procurement, they are looking at two ‘Light+’ configuration vessels currently fitting out at Muggiano – Marcantonio Colonna (due for delivery to the MMI in the latter half of 2024) and Ruggiero di Lauria (due for delivery to the MMI in mid-2025). According to the General Manager of Fincantieri’s Naval Vessels Division, Dario Deste, a contract for the two vessels could be signed in the first half of 2024.

(In answer to a question the author added this in the comments–Chuck)

No.11 to 20 are as follows for 1 January 2024;

  • 11: Turkey – 297,298t
  • 12: Taiwan – 268,958t
  • 13 Egypt – 232,046t
  • 14: Spain- 229,373t
  • 15: Germany – 226,655t
  • 16: Australia – 224,074t (decided to add the National Support Squadron, which added about 30kt)
  • 17: Greece – 189,184t
  • 18: Brazil – 162,29t
  • 19: Chile – 161,404t
  • 20: Argentina – 138,620t
(A reader, , added this–Chuck)

Listed by ranking for this year:

Nation Change from 2023 (tonnes) 2023 Ranking Change from 2022 (tonnes) 2022 Ranking
United States +55,658 1st +250,308 1st
China +93,567 2nd +99,299 2nd
Russia + 211,333 3rd +166,682 3rd
United Kingdom -2,640 4th -5,815 4th
Japan +6,530 5th +23,790 5th
India +9,200 6th +62,349 6th
France +8,925 7th +12,145 7th
South Korea +15,374 9th +7,153 8th
Italy -16,632 8th -3,452 9th
Indonesia -70 10th +17,709 10th

Probably not surprising given all these nations are competing more or less with each other, but the rankings have basically remained the same except for Italy and South Korea trading places in 2023, then reverting to their 2022 places again this year. Nobody previous top 10 navy has left the club either.

However, do note that not all of the year-to-year tonnage differences are due to actual changes in fleet size/composition. As Phoenix mentioned in his post, the Russians in particular got a huge tonnage jump this year because he changed the way he counts auxiliaries, and given the discrepancy between his reported +32k figure for the USN and the numbers, there’s probably some math correction involved there too.

 

“Indian Navy Commandos Retake Ship In Arabian Sea” gCaptain/Reuters

The Indian Navy approaches the M/V Lila Norfolk in the Indian Ocean, January 5, 2024. Photo courtesy Indian Navy

gCaptain reports,

“An Indian Navy warship intercepted the MV Lila Norfolk on Friday afternoon, less than a day after the navy received news that it had been hijacked off Somalia’s coast in the North Arabian Sea.”

The crew of 21 had taken shelter in a citadel. By the time the Indian Navy destroyer, INS Chennai, had arrived, the pirates had fled.

The MV Lila Norfolk “was kept under continuous surveillance using MPA (Maritime Patrol Aircraft–Chuck), Predator MQ9B & integral helos.

Notably, the Indian Navy is one of several users of the MQ-9B Sea Guardian Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAS including the Japan Coast Guard, the UK, Taiwan, and Greece. The US Coast Guard after years of observation of Customs and Border Protection’s use of earlier model MQ-9 Predators, the USCG has yet to procure or even experiment with a shore based long endurance UAS.

“India orders six next-gen offshore patrol vessels from Mazagon Dockyard” –Naval Today

105 meter, Off Shore Patrol Vessel (OPV) ICGS Samarth, 10 November 2015, lead ship of a class of 11, photo Indian Coast Guard

Naval Today reports, “The Indian Ministry of Defence has signed a contract with Mazagon Dockyard Shipbuilders (MDL) for the construction of six next-generation offshore patrol vessels (OPVs).”

The six new ships are to be 115 meters (377′) in length, about the size of the Hamilton class cutters. I have not been able to find any additional information on their characteristics, but historically, Indian CG OPVs evolve from preceding designs, so I expect they will share many characteristics with the preceding 105 meter class pictured above and the 97 meter Vikram class; e.g. speed 23 to 26 knots; powered by two diesel engines; armed with a 30mm gun; hangar and flight deck for at least a five ton helicopter.

As for what they change, “Along with several high-tech advanced features and equipment, these 115m OPVS would be equipped with multipurpose drones, AI capability, and wirelessly controlled remote water rescue craft lifebuoy.”

The six ships are to be designed and delivered in 66 months. From contract to completion of six ships in five and a half years may sound like a tight schedule considering the US Coast Guard’s recent experience. Looking back on the previous class of eleven ships, procured in two batches, it looks possible. A $400M contract to build six vessels was awarded to GSL on 9 May 2012. All six were commissioned by 21 December 2017, less than 68 months after contract award. A follow-on contract for five ships was awarded in August 2016. The fifth ship was commissioned 16 March 2022, about 67 months from award to completion of five ships.

India benefits from the near continuous construction of Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs). Over the last ten years, 22 Indian built OPVs were commissioned, 18 for the Indian Coast Guard, two for the Indian Navy, and two for export.

In addition to these six OPVs, the Indian Navy is also building eleven similarly named but different 105 to 110 meter “Next Generation Offshore Patrol Vessels.

“Indian Navy’s INS Sunayna Pays Visit to Beira, Mozambique” –BNN

INS Sunanya (P57) at sea, 21 May 2020. Photo Credit: Indian Ministry of Defence.

BNN reports on the visit of the Indian Navy Offshore Patrol Vessel Sunayna to the Nation of Mozambique.

During the port call, personnel from the Indian Navy and the Mozambique Navy engaged in a variety of professional and training engagements, deck visits, and sporting events. Joint training sessions in navigation, fire fighting, damage control, VBSS, and asymmetric warfare were held as part of the maritime partnership exercise.

Sounds like they were engaged in the same sort of “capacity building” the US Coast Guard engages in. Fishing is an important part of the Mozambique economy so Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported fishing is a problem for them.

There has been increasing cooperation between the US and India in response to Chinese aggressiveness. We might want to spend a little time with the Indian Navy/Coast Guard to gain their insights and benefit the efforts of both nations. Perhaps the Coast Guard should participate in the annual Malabar exercise.

INS Sunayna (P57) is a 105 meter (344 foot) Saryu class Offshore Patrol Vessel. May be worth noting that this visit was done by the Indian Navy rather than the Indian Coast Guard, though they have similar ships.

“US, Japan coast guards formally expand cooperation” –PAC AREA News Release / “Royal Navy and US Coast Guard to Forge Closer Bonds”

Ships from the U.S. Coast Guard and Japan Coast Guard conducted exercises near the Ogasawara Islands of Japan, Feb. 21, 2021. The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Kimball and Japan Coast Guard Ship Akitsushima, two of the respective services’ newest and most capable vessels, operated alongside helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles to practice interdicting foreign vessels operating illegally inside Japanese waters. (U.S. Coast Guard photo courtesy of the Coast Guard Cutter Kimball/Released)

The Coast Guard has been busy increasing its international visibility. Below is a news release concerning increased cooperation with the Japanese Coast Guard that came out yesterday. Today, I see a SeaWaves report, also dated yesterday that,

“The Royal Navy and US Coast Guard have vowed to work more closely to fight crime and protect the planet. The two services already combine to stop drugs traffickers in the Caribbean and Middle East, assist each other with operations in the polar regions, run exchange programs for sailors and frequently work and train side-by-side around the globe.”

The new relationship with the Royal Navy includes expanded personnel postings that began back in 2014.

There are also plans to build on already successful exchange programs, which allows USCG engineers to work with the Royal Navy but will soon also allow pilots and aircrew to do the same. (emphasis applied–Chuck)

Perhaps we are not too far from exercising something like my proposed “Combined Maritime Security Task Force Pacific” with a US Coast Guard Cutter, a Japanese Coast Guard Cutter, and a Royal Navy River Class OPV working with navies and coast guards of SE Asia to protect their EEZ. Perhaps the Indian Coast Guard will join as well.

News Release

May 19, 2022
U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area

US, Japan coast guards formally expand cooperation

US, Japan coast guards formally expand cooperation US, Japan coast guards formally expand cooperation

Editors’ Note: Click on images to download high resolution version.

TOKYO — The United States and Japan coast guards formally expanded cooperative agreements and established a new perpetual operation during a ceremony Wednesday in Tokyo.

Vice Adm. Michael McAllister, commander of U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area, and Vice Adm. Yoshio Seguchi, Japan Coast Guard vice commandant for operations, represented their respective services during the historic document signing ceremony and celebration at Japan Coast Guard Headquarters.

Although a memorandum of cooperation between the sea services has existed since 2010, strengthened relationships, increasing bilateral engagements and continued focus on maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific necessitated expansion of the memorandum.

The new operation’s name, SAPPHIRE, is an acronym for Solid Alliance for Peace and Prosperity with Humanity and Integrity on the Rule of law based Engagement, and it honors the gem regarded as an emblem of integrity and affection found throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Operation Sapphire encompasses all the annual interactions between the Japan and U.S. coast guards, with the goal of increasing interactions over time.

To formalize the expanded cooperation, annexes were added to the existing memorandum of cooperation outlining Operation Sapphire to include standard operating procedures for combined operations, training and capacity building, and information sharing.

“We rely on our partners, allies, and like-minded nations to achieve our shared missions,” said McAllister. “As evidenced by this agreement, our relationship with the Japan Coast Guard is stronger than ever, and I am looking forward to many more decades of partnership and collaborative operations in the Indo-Pacific.”

“We will conduct smooth cooperation in the fields of joint operation, capacity building and information sharing by this agreement” said Seguchi. “Sapphire embodies the rule-of-law based engagement between the coast guards, and we will expand the principle of Free and Open Indo-Pacific to other nations.”

 

Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States

U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Munro and Japan Coast Guard Patrol Vessel Large Aso, transit together in formation during a maritime engagement in the East China Sea Aug. 25, 2021. U.S. Coast Guard members aboard the Munro deployed to the Western Pacific Ocean to strengthen alliances and partnerships and improve maritime governance and security in the region. (Photo courtesy of Japan Coast Guard)

The Whitehouse has issued a new Indo-Pacific Strategy, and it specifically mentions the US Coast Guard.

The document calls out China for its aggressive behavior,

This intensifying American focus is due in part to the fact that the Indo-Pacific faces mounting challenges, particularly from the PRC. The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power. The PRC’s coercion and aggression spans the globe, but it is most acute in the Indo-Pacific. From the economic coercion of Australia to the conflict along the Line of Actual Control with India to the growing pressure on Taiwan and bullying of neighbors in the East and South China Seas, our allies and partners in the region bear much of the cost of the PRC’s harmful behavior. In the process, the PRC is also undermining human rights and international law, including freedom of navigation, as well as other principles that have brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific.

It recognizes the value and values of our allies and partners,

For centuries, the United States and much of the world have viewed Asia too narrowly—as an arena of geopolitical competition. Today, Indo-Pacific nations are helping to define the very nature of the international order, and U.S. allies and partners around the world have a stake in its outcomes. Our approach, therefore, draws from and aligns with those of our closest friends. Like Japan, we believe that a successful Indo-Pacific vision must advance freedom and openness and offer “autonomy and options.” We support a strong India as a partner in this positive regional vision. Like Australia, we seek to maintain stability and reject coercive exercises of power. Like the ROK, we aim to promote regional security through capacity-building. Like ASEAN, we see Southeast Asia as central to the regional architecture. Like New Zealand and the United Kingdom, we seek to build resilience in the regional rules-based order. Like France, we recognize the strategic value of an increasing regional role for the European Union (EU). Much like the approach the EU has announced in its Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, American strategy will be principled, long-term, and anchored in democratic resilience.

It calls for action in five areas:

  1. ADVANCE A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC
  2. BUILD CONNECTIONS WITHIN AND BEYOND THE REGION
  3. DRIVE REGIONAL PROSPERITY
  4. BOLSTER INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY
  5. BUILD REGIONAL RESILIENCE TO TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

There is mention of the Coast Guard is in the section “BOLSTER INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY” on page 13.

We will also innovate to meet civilian security challenges, expanding U.S. Coast Guard presence, training, and advising to bolster our partners’ capabilities. We will cooperate to address and prevent terrorism and violent extremism, including by identifying and monitoring foreign fighters traveling to the region, formulating options to mitigate online radicalization, and encouraging counterterrorism cooperation within the Indo-Pacific. And we will strengthen collective regional capabilities to prepare for and respond to environmental and natural disasters; natural, accidental, or deliberate biological threats; and the trafficking of weapons, drugs, and people. We will improve cybersecurity in the region, including the ability of our partners to protect against, recover from, and respond to cybersecurity incidents.

Coast Guard roles presumably extend beyond interdiction and fisheries to include assistance with intelligence, port security, and maritime industry cybersecurity.

The strategy refers to ten lines of effort that are to be pursued in the next 12 to 24 months. The first is “Drive New Resources to the Indo-Pacific” (p.15),

Building shared capacity requires the United States to make new regional investments. We will open new embassies and consulates, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, and increase our strength in existing ones, intensifying our climate, health, security, and development work. We will expand U.S. Coast Guard presence and cooperation in Southeast and South Asia and the Pacific Islands, with a focus on advising, training, deployment, and capacity-building. We will refocus security assistance on the Indo-Pacific, including to build maritime capacity and maritime-domain awareness.

Sounds like this may include Coast Guard attachés attached to diplomatic staffs and possibly some new basing.

There is a second line of effort that will undoubtably involve the Coast Guard, “Partner to Build Resilience in the Pacific Islands” (p.17),

The United States will work with partners to establish a multilateral strategic grouping that supports Pacific Island countries as they build their capacity and resilience as secure, independent actors. Together, we will build climate resilience through the Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility; coordinate to meet the Pacific’s infrastructure gaps, especially on information and communications technology; facilitate transportation; and cooperate to improve maritime security to safeguard fisheries, build maritime-domain awareness, and improve training and advising. We will also prioritize finalization of the Compact of Free Association agreements with the Freely Associated States.

A Maritime Executive post, New U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Singles Out China’s “Coercion”, notes,

In the security arena, the new strategy reiterates that the United States has maintained “a strong and consistent defence presence necessary to support regional peace, security, stability, and prosperity”, pointing to the South China Sea and the East China Sea as a priority. However, it is interesting that while the document underscores the importance of freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific, not a single paragraph mentions the US Freedom of Navigation Operations Program (FONOPS) carried out by the US Navy, which has stirred controversy. Conversely, the strategy emphasises the importance of the Coast Guard to lead maritime security cooperation in the region, in “advising, training, deployment, and capacity-building … including to build maritime capacity and maritime-domain awareness”. Indeed, in 2021, the US Coast Guard announced a joint maritime training centre with the Indonesian Coast Guard in Batam.

The emphasis on coast guard cooperation can be seen as a positive gesture since it will be less provocative and sensitive compared to a military presence in the region. And more importantly, coast guard operations in Southeast Asia are very much required to tackle maritime security threats such as illegal fishing.

Thanks to Paul for bringing this to my attention. 

New Addition to “Recommended Blogs” –Indo-Pacific Defense Forum

Coast Guard Cutter Stratton (WMSL 752) sales alongside the Indian coast guard ships Abheed and Shaurya (16) Aug. 23, 2019, while transiting in the Bay of Bengal off the coast of Chennai, India. The Stratton is participating in a professional exchange with the Indian coast guard that includes operational exercises at sea and on shore. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Stephen Esterly)

I have made an addition to my “Recommended Blogs” page (which is also my daily reading list) that you may find interesting, the Indo-Pacific Defense Forum.

Below I have duplicated the self description from their “About Us” page. The page also includes contact information not duplicated here.

In addition to English, this site is also published in Chinese, Indonesian, Thai, Korean, and Japanese.

Not all the content is Coast Guard related, but it seems much of it is.

Thanks to Lee for bringing this to my attention.


About Us

IPDefenseForum.com is the online version of Indo Pacific Defense Forum magazine and is sponsored by the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).

Our Mission

Indo-Pacific Defense Forum is a professional military magazine published quarterly by the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command to provide an international forum for military personnel of the Indo-Pacific areas. The opinions expressed in this magazine do not necessarily represent the policies or points of view of this command or any other agency of the United States government. All articles are written by IPD Forum staff unless otherwise noted.

The site features articles from the IPD Forum magazine staff as well as news from across the region and analysis, interviews and commentary by paid IPDefenseForum.com correspondents and contributors.

The Secretary of Defense has determined that publication of this magazine is necessary for conducting public business as required of the Department of Defense by law.