Bad Week for Turkish CG & a Maritime IED?

The German Navy blog, Marine Forum, reports, 17 August.

“Turkish Coast Guard vessel TCSG-25 (KAAN-15 class) (pictured above) off Istanbul collided with a merchant vessel, capsized … 3 sailors said to be trapped inside … rescue efforts underway”

A later report indicates there are three dead.

In a separate incident, a Turkish Coast Guardsman was killed and a fisherman injured when they attempted to tow a life raft with two bodies aboard near the Syrian boarder.

Are Cruise Ships Prepared for ISIS?–Jim Walker

It has been over 30 years since the seizure of the Achille Lauro by Palestinian Terrorists. Are cruise ships better protected? You would like to think so, and it is certainly possible steps have been taken that are not obvious, but there are doubts. CuiseLawNews discusses the question.

This in particular caught my eye.

“Just last month, the Miami-Dade County Police Department said: ‘We ended up concluding that now they’re targeting the cruise industry. We’re the cruise capital of the world. It’s the same possibility of having two planes crash into the World Trade Center.'”

From an earlier post that discussed the implications of various threats on the choice of homeports for major cutters, “Ruminating on Homeports While Playing the Red Cell,” the Top Cruise Ship Ports are:

  1. Miami, FL
  2. Fort Lauderdale, FL
  3. Port Canaveral, FL
  4. New York, NY
  5. San Juan, PR
  6. Galveston, TX
  7. Tampa, FL
  8. Seattle, WA
  9. Long Beach, CA
  10. New Orleans, LA
  11. Los Angeles, CA
  12. Baltimore, MD
  13. Cape Liberty, NJ
  14. Jacksonville, FL
  15. Charleston, SC

How About a Coast Guard Sink-Ex?

Test firing of the 57mm Bofors aboard USCGC Bertholf, photo by MMagaro

Test firing of the 57mm Bofors aboard USCGC Bertholf, photo by MMagaro

Are our weapons adequate for the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Mission? Let’s find out.

The Navy Times is reporting that the Navy will have an unusually large number of ships available for “Sink-Ex” exercises in 2017.

The SINKEX fleet grew from five ships last year to seven ships available in 2017, including four frigates, the landing ship tank Racine and two attack cargo ships.

According to the source document, the Navy’s 30 year shipbuilding plan (pp 13/14), one of the stated purposes of a Sink-EX is weapons effectiveness evaluation. I think this might be a good opportunity for us to test out our weapons for the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission. This mission implies we must have the ability to forcibly stop a ship, regardless of its size. A Sink-Ex could be an opportunity to answer once and for all the question “Is the Coast Guard adequately armed for the mission?”  Personally I don’t think so, and what little evidence we have seems to indicate that is the case.

The two attack cargo ships are Charleston class LKAs, the ex-Durham (LKA-114) and ex-St. Louis (LKA-116), built in the late ’60s. These are medium sized auxiliary ships, 9,000 tons light and 18,500 tons fully loaded, 576 feet (176 meters) in length. Structurally they are not much different from merchant ships of the period. Unfortunately they don’t have the big diesel engines found on modern merchant ships, and the are far smaller than many current merchant ships but they are still, in most respects, representative of the target set the Coast Guard should be interested in.


Photo: USS Charleston (LKA-113)

We have four gun systems that might be tested. .50 cal., 25 mm, 57 mm, and 76 mm. The 25 mm and 57 mm are particularly important as the .50 cal is probably too small and short ranged and the 76 mm is going out of service. Still, we should still attempt to include the 76 mm because if the 57 mm proves inadequate, our next question should be, “Would the 76 mm have been successful?” Testing the 25, 57, and 76 mm guns would require use of at least two ships, a 378 for both the 76 and 25 mm, and a Bertholf class for the 57 mm. (Alternately an LCS might provide the 57 mm, a Bear class the 76 mm, and a 110 or Webber class the 25 mm.)


This could be a CG R&D project, but of course it would require Navy assistance, perhaps a joint project. Because our objective is to at least stop the target, rather than sink it, loss of power or steering would constitute a success. To determine if this is the case, we need information about what is happening inside the hull when the we get a hit. Will the round penetrate not only the hull but also critical systems, the loss of which would result in loss of power or control of the ship? Because it would probably be dangerous to go back on board the target after it has been shelled, the target would need to be instrumented with sensors and the results broadcast back. Aside from putting cameras inside the spaces, a technique might be to seal up and pressurize equipment like boilers, turbines, and steering gear and have them instrumented to detect any loss of pressure that would indicate a breach.

We would also want to conduct the exercise at a reasonable ranges. Since the real targets might be equipped with weapons that might be typically available to terrorist organizations, including anti-tank missiles and Soviet era antitank and anti-aircraft guns,that might target critical systems on the cutter, I believe the cutter should stand off at least 4000 yards, but for the 25 mm, we would probably need to close to 3,000 yards. A logical sequence might be,

  1. 378 closes to 3000 yards engages with 25 mm then withdraws
  2. NSC closes to 4,000 yards and engages, then withdraws
  3. 378 closes to 4,000 yards and engages.

We would also want to fire a reasonable number of rounds, probably about 150 rounds of 25 mm, about 100 rounds of 57 mm, and about 80 rounds of 76 mm, basically shoot enough to exhaust the ammunition normally carried on the mount.

Realistically this would have to be part of a larger Sink-Ex with more than one target, but it might be reasonable to allow the Coast Guard a day to try their systems against one of the targets before the other firing units come on scene.

Should our current systems prove not up to the task, we would also want to know the results for possible candidate systems, so we might ask that these candidate systems be used against the target as well. These might include, APKWS, Griffin, Hellfire, the 5″ gun, and the light weight torpedo. I don’t think it has ever been tried, but with the right depth settings, is it possible to hit a deep draft surface target with our current light weight torpedoes?

Let’s at least find out if we have a chance of succeeding in this mission. 

ASuW Hellfire Test Success–Operational Late 2017

Navyrecognition reports that a successful test of modified Hellfire missiles for use in the Surface to Surface Missile Module (SSMM) planned for the Littoral Combat Ship has paved the way for operational deployment of the system in late 2017.

We have talked about these missiles before. They seem to be an ideal way to deal with the threat of small, fast, highly maneuverable boats that might be employed by terrorists, and absent more effective weapons, may provide some capability against even large vessels. Unlike gun systems, they promise high first round accuracy and lethality, with very little chance of a round going astray and hitting something unintended.

The projected SSMM would provide storage and launch facilities for up to 24 rounds. 24 rounds would weigh only about 2500 pounds. The launcher and support systems is unlikely to weigh more than that, suggesting and all up weight of about 5000 pounds, far less than either the 76mm Mk75 gun or the 57mm Mk110 (two and a half tons compared to eight or nine tons). Both of these guns are commonly used on missile and patrol boats smaller than the Webber class WPCs. Also unlike a gun system, the SSMM is unlikely to require any significant deck reinforcement.  It would almost certainly fit on all large cutters and perhaps the WPCs and WPBs as well. (It should be included on Offshore Patrol Cutters from day 1.) If the 24 round system is too large to be comfortably carried by smaller cutters, it is likely a smaller, say four round, system could be quickly and economically developed for Coast Guard use and perhaps for the Navy’s MkVI patrol boat as well.

If we take the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission seriously we really should be looking seriously at acquiring these systems, not just for the new ships as they are built, but also for the existing fleet with the idea that the systems would be transferred to the newer ships as the older ones are replaced.

The Navy should be willing to pay for these systems under existing inter-service agreements.

As noted before, if we need to stop a terrorist attack, we are far more likely to have a WPC or WPB on scene than a larger cutter. For this reason, arming some the Webber class in each homeport should be the first priority. Unfortunately the Webber Class are not geographically wide-spread, so we should look at mounting systems on existing MECs and WPBs to insure all potential targets have some protection until the entire fleet is armed.

I would say there are places where they might be mounted on Coast Guard stations ashore, to act as gate keepers for the ports against clandestine attacks, but coast defense is still an Army mission. Perhaps this is something we should be talking about too. If not Coast Guard manned defenses (which is probably the proper solution), then perhaps placement of unused SSMMs with their associated Navy crews on Coast Guard facilities or small detachments of army troops with their weapons to perform this function.

Coast Guard Impact of “USA FREEDOM Act of 2015”

The “USA FREEDOM Act of 2015” is intended to impose limits on the NSA’s collection of data on US citizens. But like many laws it goes beyond its apparent purpose. There is an “Easter Egg” in Title VIII, “Safety of Maritime Navigation and Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation.”

Frankly, I have a hard time interpreting what this new law really means. But because it appears that it will extend enforcement authority over many ships that are not US flag, I presume this will bring the Coast Guard, as the primary Federal maritime law enforcement agency, additional authority and responsibilities.  Here is a short review. I am unfamiliar with the source, so I can’t really vouch for it, but sounds like this may be important.

If any of the readers is knowledgeable on this topic, I would appreciate your perspective.