Photo of a model of Halter Marine’s Polar Security Cutter seen at Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exhibition have surfaced. Photo credit Chris Cavas.
The US Naval Institute news service reports,
According to the estimate from GAO, which cites Coast Guard and Navy officials, as well as shipbuilders – the final design for the 23,0000-ton ice breaker won’t be complete until next March. Construction is scheduled to start shortly after the design is approved. Coast Guard commandant Adm. Linda Fagan told Congress last month that the delivery of the first hull is expected in 2028.
This goes back to the fact that while the Polar Security Cutter was supposed to have been based on a proven design of a successful icebreaker, in fact the selected shipyard used a design that never got past the preliminary design stage.
But really, the problem goes back much further than that.
Polar Star was commissioned in 1976. A new class of ships typically takes ten years from concept to commissioning. 30 years is a generally expected lifespan for military ships. That suggests the program to replace the Polar class should have begun in 1996. Not even close. A replacement program was not initiated until 2012. By then the High Latitude Study had identified the need for three heavy and three medium icebreakers in 2010. Launching the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program in 2012 should have given us an icebreaker in 2022. In 2016 a Polar Icebreaker Operational Requirements Document was issued. Arguably the High Latitude Study should have simultaneously launched both a heavy and a medium icebreaker procurement program.
13 years after the High Latitude Study identified the need, we have seen no movement in an effort to procure medium icebreakers.
In the movie “King Richard,” about Richard Dove Williams Jr., father of tennis players Venus Williams and Serena Williams, he is quoted as saying, “If you fail to plan, you plan to fail.”
This was not a problem with Congress.
We have failed to plan.
The only fleet mix plan we have ever done is now 12 years old. In the interim, much has changed.
There is not now, nor has there ever been, a 30 year ship building plan or any kind of comprehensive long range plan comparable to the Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans which the Navy revises every few years.
The first National Security Cutter was ordered in 2001 but was not commissioned until 2008. The first four were commissioned at essentially two year intervals, but even after that, it has taken nine years to complete next six. Looks like the eleventh ship will not be finished until 2025. When the first Hamilton Class WHEC was decommissioned, it was 44 years old. When the last one was decommissioned, it was almost 50 years old.
The Coast Guard currently has 27 WMECs, every single one of them is over 30 years old. 14 of them are over 50 years old. The average age is about 46.4 years. That is the fruit of poor planning.
We did not plan to run ships for 50 to 60 years, but we also have had no plan that defined when they would be decommissioned, that would have informed when replacements had to be completed.
Planning for the Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) began with the Deepwater Program. Concepts were revised in light of the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001. The acquisition process for the OPC began at least as early as 2010. At that time, we thought all would be delivered by 2027 (and here). The first ship was supposed to have been delivered in calendar year 2019. Now we plan on continuing to build them until 2038 meaning this acquisition program is supposed to run 28 years. 28 years building the same ship without looking at mission and technology changes?
We should decide right now that once we get some experience with the first OPCs, we will start looking at the next class of cutters. It might replace the OPC in future year budgets, or it might be built along with additional OPCs. We might even decide the OPC is exactly what we need to continue building, but we need to reevaluate. Cutter design should evolve. There should be improvements. There should be new capabilities.
The Coast Guard enjoys bipartisan Congressional support. We need to educate the administration, the Congress, and the GAO about our needs, but first we need to decide what they are, because we don’t really know.
We can start by identifying when ships will be decommissioned. The prospect of loss can be a strong incentive for funding their replacements.
We need a new Fleet mix analysis, one that actually looks at our missions, geographic distances and a range of possible solutions.
We also need a long term plan for our major capital resources, particularly the ships and aircraft.
