LRASM for Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security

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Lockheed Martin supplied Navy Recognition with the first image showing a deck-mounted quadruple Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) launcher. According to our source, this "top side" launcher graphic is a notional concept that could be used on an appropriately sized surface vessel, such as the Arleigh Burke class (DDG 51) or Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) classes.

Discussion on an earlier post suggesting the Coast Guard might want to fit our new major cutters “for but not with” Long Range Anti-ship Missiles (LRASM) has prompted me to rethink the suggestion and advocate for equipping them with the missile in peacetime.

One of the Coast Guard’s peacetime missions is of course Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS).

“The PWCS mission entails the protection of the U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS) …prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks… Conducting PWCS deters terrorists from using or exploiting the MTS as a means for attacks on U.S. territory, population centers, vessels, critical infrastructure, and key resources.”

I have been concerned that the Coast Guard has not had adequate weapons to deal with a terrorist attack using a medium to large sized merchant ship, and currently I don’t believe there is any other organization capable of answering this threat in the 30 or more port complexes terrorists might find worthwhile targets, in a timely manner. Navy surface forces are too geographically concentrated. The over 200 nautical mile range and the ability to strike selected locations on a target ship suggest LRASM could possibly provide an answer.

If we had LRASM on all National Security Cutters (NSC) and Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC), in perhaps a dozen ports on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts, Honolulu and Kodiak, its over 200 mile range fired from cutters, including possibly those in port, could cover all of these ports (except Guam), and have a weapon on target within about 20 minutes of launch.

To effectively counter the threat, I think we need to get a weapon on target within an hour of positive identification of the threat. This would require improved coordination between units. In addition to providing a datum, course, and speed, presumably an intercepting unit, boat or aircraft, would need to transmit a photograph of the target to be incorporated in the missiles memory and aim points would be chosen some time during mission planning. We would need to coordinate with air traffic control. A command decision to authorize use of the weapon and updates on the target position course and speed would also be needed. Because we might have 40 minutes or less from threat identification to launch, these steps would likely have to proceed in parallel with mission planning progressing prior to authorization.

New units appear to be on the way to developing the kind of common tactical picture we need to facilitate both decision making and targeting. We could start developing the capability with the National Security Cutters based at Alameda (San Francisco Bay) and Charleston, SC, even if the system could not be completed until the last OPCs are delivered in about 2034.

LRASM Topside Launchers

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Just a brief note on what is happening in the broader world of Naval warfare preparation. NavyRecognition provides conceptual drawings of topside launch tubes for the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM).

Significantly the launchers for this much more capable missile are not expected to require any more space or support than the Harpoon missile and with upgrades it is expected to also incorporate a land attack capability.

As I have noted, the Coast Guard does not seem to have been considered in the Navy’s plans to increase “distributed lethality,” but should the need arise it looks like these would fit well between the Bridge and the 57mm on the National Security Cutters. We might also find a place for them on the Offshore Patrol Cutter. It should be possible to provide the supporting wiring, piping, control systems, etc. to support these relatively easily, even if the missiles and launchers themselves are not mounted, allowing rapid upgrade. (Cutters on Alaska Patrol have to be among the closest US units to Russian Pacific bases.)

AN-SPQ-9B, the NSC’s Air-Search Radar/Firecontrol Gets New Capability

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Defense Industry Daily reports that the AN-SPQ-9B, the firecontrol system and secondary air-search on the Bertholf class National Security Cutters, is being modified to provide a Periscope Detection and Discrimination (PDD) capability.

The post also provides additional background information on the sensor.

Interestingly, the post also notes that the radar has a “Cooperative Engagement Capability” or CEC (See the April 24/12: CEC entry) which means that ships and aircraft can share a common tactical picture and weapons launched from one unit can be controlled by a different unit. If we ever get long range missiles, this could be useful.

Hopefully the Offshore Patrol Cutter will have either this system or a better replacement.

 

A Combined Air/Surface Search Radar for Boats

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The illustration here appears to show the system on a Combat Boat 90 (CB90) which is only a 52 foot long boat. 

I don’t see an immediate need for this, but it is an interesting new type of radar sensor.

Naval Today reports Saab is offering, “…a 3D, active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar offering simultaneous surface and air surveillance capabilities,” and “…the entire system weighs less than 650 pounds (294 kilograms) in total, which makes it suitable for smaller patrol ships.”

Apparently they are thinking UAVs, “To combat the growing UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) threat, Sea Giraffe 1X features Saab’s Enhanced Low, Slow and Small (ELSS) surveillance function. This feature allows the radar system to detect and classify small, low-flying, slow-moving air targets.”

I suppose this might also be used to control small UAVs, putting them over surface targets of interest. The Coast Guard is looking at small UAVs.

A Billion Dollar, Once in a Lifetime Opportunity

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I have been reading over Congressional Research Service’s Specialist in Naval Affairs Ronald O’Rourke’s prepared statement before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee Hearing on The Status of Coast Guard Cutter Acquisition Programs, February 3, 2016. The implications are a bit startling.

By using Block Buy Contracting (BBC) and Multi-Year Procurement (MYP), the Coast Guard might save as much as $1.2B. This is an opportunity that may not come again for at least 30 years.  

This breaks down to about $100M on contracting for the remaining 26 Fast Response Cutters, $100M on a contract for two heavy icebreakers, and a whopping $1B over the life of the Offshore Patrol Cutter procurement.

We have never used these contracting methods before, but the Navy has with great success in their Burke class DDG, Virginia class submarine, and LCS programs.

The Congress has already granted authority to use Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) for the Offshore Patrol Cutter program, but because of the requirement of the law covering MYP a contract under these provisions probably could not be negotiated until at least FY2022 by which time the first five ships would have already been contracted for. Block Buy Contracting would require specific enabling legislation but could allow additional savings beginning in FY2018.

I would encourage reading the entire statement. There are only seven pages of testimony and ten pages of background appendices, but I’ll provide a “Reader’s Digest” version. Hopefully the author will forgive me for re-editing his work.

“The Coast Guard has used contracts with options in cutter acquisition programs. A contract with options may look like a form of multiyear contracting, but operates more like a series of annual contracts. Contracts with options do not achieve the reductions in acquisition costs that are possible with MYP and BBC.

“MYP can reduce the unit procurement costs of ships by roughly 10%, compared to unit procurement costs under the standard or default approach of annual contracting. BBC can reduce the unit procurement costs of ships by amounts comparable to those of MYP, if the authority granted for using BBC explicitly includes authority for making economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases (i.e., up-front batch purchases) of components. If the authority granted for using BBC does not explicitly include authority for making EOQ purchases, then the savings from BBC will be less—in the range of roughly 5%. EOQ authority comes automatically with MYP authority, but must be explicitly included in legislation granting BBC authority.

BBC, unlike MYP, can be used at the outset of a shipbuilding program, starting with the lead ship in the class. (emphasis applied–Chuck) MYP, in contrast, cannot be used until the lead ship has completed construction. Thus, for a class of ships that is procured at a rate of one ship per year and in which each ship takes five years to build, BBC can be a contracting option starting with the first ship in the class, and MYP can become a contracting option starting with the fifth or sixth ship in the class. This difference is due to the requirement under the statute governing MYP (10 U.S.C. 2306b) that a program must demonstrate design stability to qualify for MYP. In a shipbuilding program, design stability is typically demonstrated by completing the construction of the lead ship in the class.

“The Coast Guard wants to procure a total of 25 OPCs, and currently plans to use a contract with options for acquiring the first 9 to 11 ships in the program. The OPC program can be viewed as a candidate for instead using BBC for the initial ships in the program, and either BBC or MYP for later ships in the program. If using BBC and MYP were to reduce the acquisition costs of OPCs by about 10% (compared to costs under a contract with options), the savings would amount to roughly $1 billion. An alternate way to characterize such savings would be to say that using BBC or MYP would enable the Coast Guard to get about two and a half of the 25 OPCs for “free,” or to pay for the acquisition of a polar icebreaker.

“The Coast Guard plans to soon award a contract with options for acquiring the final 26 ships in the 58- ship FRC program. The final 26 ships in the program can be viewed as a candidate for instead using either MYP or BBC. If using MYP or BBC were to reduce the acquisition costs of OPCs by about 10% (compared to costs under a contract with options), the savings would amount to more than $100 million. An alternate way to characterize such savings would be to say that using MYP or BBC could enable the Coast Guard to get about two and a half of the 26 FRCs for “free.”

“The Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program and the polar icebreaker (PIB) program can be viewed as candidates for using BBC, and the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) program can be viewed as a candidate for using either MYP or BBC. Using MYP and BBC for all three of these programs might produce savings totaling about $1.2 billion, an amount roughly equivalent to the average annual funding level in the Coast Guard’s Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account. In considering whether to grant authority for using MYP or BBC for these programs, Congress may weigh the potential savings of these contracting mechanisms against the tradeoffs…From a congressional perspective, tradeoffs in making greater use of MYP and BBC include the following:  reduced congressional control over year-to-year spending, and tying the hands of future Congresses;  reduced flexibility for making changes in Coast Guard acquisition programs in response to unforeseen changes in strategic or budgetary circumstances (which can cause any needed funding reductions to fall more heavily on acquisition programs not covered by MYP or BBC contracts);  a potential need to shift funding from later fiscal years to earlier fiscal years to fund EOQ purchases of components;  the risk of having to make penalty payments to shipbuilders if multiyear contracts need to be terminated due to unavailability of funds needed for the continuation of the contracts; and  the risk that materials and components purchased for ships to be procured in future years might go to waste if those ships are not eventually procured.”

There seems little doubt we will need all the ships currently planned. The commitment is only a minuscule percentage of the Federal Budget, and therefore constitutes an extremely small risk. Use of Block Buy and Multi-Year Procurement could bring stability to the Coast Guard’s AC&I funding and result savings equal to an entire year’s worth of AC&I funding.

Naval Science and Technology, “Future Force”

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Eaglespeak has brought to my attention a quarterly magazine that is available on line, that I had not been previously aware of: Naval Science and Technology, “Future Force”

It has a number of interesting articles, including:

  • Weather satellites
  • Wave Prediction
  • Ice prediction
  • Using unmanned ground vehicles for maritime interdiction boardings, and
  • Detecting Lasers

I have added the magazine to the recommended blog lis for future reference.

 

Argentine Coast Guard Sinks Chinese Fishing Vessel

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This Video does not appear to show the sinking of the fishing vessel. Speckles on the hull of the F/V seen at time 0:20 and 0:50 may be bullet holes. The video does appear to show the participants.  

We have reports (here and here) that the Argentine Coast Guard (Prefectura Naval Argentina (PNA)) fired on and sank a Chinese fishing vessel (F/V), the Lu Yan Yuan Yu 010, believed to have been fishing illegally, after the F/V failed to stop after shots were fired across its bow and it allegedly attempted to ram the Coast Guard vessel. The crew reportedly was rescued, without fatalities, four by the Argentine vessel and the rest of the crew by another Chinese F/V.

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Photo by Diegoventu: PNA Doctor Manuel Mantilla (GC-24), a sistership of the Argentine vessel involved.

The PNA vessel seen in the video, Prefecto Durbes (GC-28) is one of five offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) built in Spain for Argentina. The Mexican Navy also has six similar vessels with larger flight decks and more powerful engines. In size they slot between the Reliance Class and the Bear Class, being 67 meters (220 feet) overall. Unlike the Reliance class, they have a hangar for their version of the H-65.

In addition to machine guns, these ships are reportedly armed with a Bofors 40mm/70, but looking at the video, the location where the gun was mounted (on the platform forward of the bridge and one deck above the foc’sle) is vacant. This suggest that the damage was probably done by .50 cal. machine guns. We know from our Vietnam experience that .50 cal. can sink fishing vessels, but the ranges are very short. Looking at the video the ships appeared to be no more than 300 yards apart.

It is a bit surprising no casualties were reported, although the reports say no fatalities, they do not say no injuries so that is still a possibility. Did the crew of the OPV order the Chinese crew to abandon before sinking the F/V, or did they perhaps tell them where they were not going to shoot so that the crew could assemble safely? It does not sound like it. We have only this statement from an Argentine representative that after actions by the Chinese vessel,  “…the order was given to fire on different sections of the vessel, damaging it,” It is unlikely, but not impossible, the crew helped the ship sink to destroy any evidence of wrong doing.

More on the Navy’s New Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority

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Waesche Carat 2012

This is a post I wrote for CIMSEC. under the title “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority”–A Coastie’s View.” It is an expanded version of an earlier post that appeared here. The rewrite really begins about half way down under the header, “What I Want to See.”

Recently the new Chief of Naval Operations issued a document “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” that outlines how, hopefully, the US Navy can maintain a maritime superiority our foes will recognize and avoid confronting.

If you look for anything specifically regarding the Coast Guard here, you will not find it (other than the cutter in the formation on the cover). The Coast Guard is not mentioned even once, but it does talk about some things that are Coast Guard related. Perhaps the Coast Guard should not feel bad about this. It only mentions the Marine Corps once.

Three Forces that are Changing the Environment

  • The first global force is the traffic on the oceans, seas, and waterways, including the sea floor – the classic maritime system.
  • A second increasingly influential force is the rise of the global information system – the information that rides on the servers, undersea cables, satellites, and wireless networks that increasingly envelop and connect the globe.
  • The third interrelated force is the increasing rate of technological creation and adoption.

Obviously the Coast Guard facilitates and regulates marine traffic, and is tapped into the global information system. In wartime, these contacts will become essential since they will form the basis for naval control of shipping. He also talks about new trade routes opening in the Arctic. These will only be reliable if we have new icebreakers. He also talks about illegal trafficking.

“This maritime traffic also includes mass and uncontrolled migration and illicit shipment of material and people.”

A Document That Explicitly Recognizes the Competition

“For the first time in 25 years, the United States is facing a return to great power competition. Russia and China both have advanced their military capabilities to act as global powers. Their goals are backed by a growing arsenal of high-end warfighting capabilities, many of which are focused specifically on our vulnerabilities and are increasingly designed from the ground up to leverage the maritime, technological and information systems. They continue to develop and field information-enabled weapons, both kinetic and non-kinetic, with increasing range, precision and destructive capacity. Both China and Russia are also engaging in coercion and competition below the traditional thresholds of high-end conflict, but nonetheless exploit the weakness of accepted norms in space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum. The Russian Navy is operating with a frequency and in areas not seen for almost two decades, and the Chinese PLA(N) is extending its reach around the world.

“…Coupled with a continued dedication to furthering its nuclear weapons and missile programs, North Korea’s provocative actions continue to threaten security in North Asia and beyond.

“…while the recent international agreement with Iran is intended to curb its nuclear ambitions, Tehran’s advanced missiles, proxy forces and other conventional capabilities continue to pose threats to which the Navy must remain prepared to respond.

“…international terrorist groups have proven their resilience and adaptability and now pose a long-term threat to stability and security around the world.”

Recognizing Budgetary Limitations

“There is also a fourth ‘force’ that shapes our security environment. Barring an unforeseen change, even as we face new challenges and an increasing pace, the Defense and Navy budgets likely will continue to be under pressure. We will not be able to “buy” our way out of the challenges that we face. The budget environment will force tough choices but must also inspire new thinking.”

Throughout there is an emphasis on understanding history and the strategic concepts of the past. There is also a recognition of the need to work with partners.

“EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN OUR NETWORK OF PARTNERS: Deepen operational relationships with other services, agencies, industry, allies and partners – who operate with the Navy to support our shared interests.”

Other than the Marine Corps, the US Navy has no closer partner than the US Coast Guard. And while only about one eighth the size of the US Navy, in terms of personnel, the US Coast Guard is larger than Britain’s Royal Navy or the French Navy. The partnership has been a long and successful one, but I would like to see the Navy be a better partner to the Coast Guard. This is how the Navy can help the Coast Guard help the Navy.

What I Want to See

If we have a “run out of money, now we have to think” situation, one thing we can do is to try to get the maximum return from the relatively small investment needed to make the Coast Guard an effective naval reserve force.

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We need explicit support from the Navy at every level, particularly within Congress and the Administration, for Coast Guard recapitalization. While the Navy’s fleet averages approximately 14 years old. The Coast Guard’s major cutters average over 40. The proposed new ships, are more capable than those they replace. They are better able to work cooperatively with the Navy. The nine unit 4,500 ton “National Security Cutter”program is nearing completion with funds for the ninth ship in the FY2016 budget. The 58 unit, 154 foot, 353 ton Webber Class  program is well underway with 32 completed, building, or funded. But the Coast Guard is about to start its largest acquisition in history, 25 LCS sized Offshore Patrol Cutters. Unfortunately, it appears that while the first ship will be funded in FY2018 the last will not be completed until at least 2035. This program really needs to be accelerated.

We need an explicit statement from the Navy that they expect the Coast Guard to defend ports against unconventional threats, so that they can keep more forces forward deployed. This is in fact the current reality. The Sea Frontiers are long gone. Navy vessels no longer patrol the US coast. The surface Navy is concentrated in only a handful of ports. No Navy surface combatants are homeported on the East Coast north of the Chesapeake Bay. If a vessel suspected of being under the control of terrorists approaches the US coast the nearest Navy surface vessel may be hundreds of miles away.

We need the Navy to supply the weapons the Coast Guard need to defend ports against unconventional attack using vessels of any size, with a probability approaching 100%. These should include small missile systems like Hellfire or Griffin to stop small, fast, highly maneuverable threats and we need a ship stopper, probably a light weight anti-ship torpedoes that target propellers to stop larger threats. We need these systems on not just the largest cutters, in fact they are needed more by the the smaller cutters that are far more likely to be in a position to make a difference. These include the Webber class and perhaps even the smaller WPBs.

We need to reactivate the Coast Guard’s ASW program and ensure that all the new large cutters (National Security Cutters and Offshore Patrol Cutters) have an ASW capability, if not installed on all of the cutters, at least planned, prototyped, tested, and practiced on a few ships (particularly in the Pacific). The National Security Cutters and the Offshore Patrol Cutters are (or will be) capable of supporting MH-60R ASW helicopters. Adding a towed array likeCAPTAS-4 (the basis for the LCS ASW module) or CAPTAS-2 would give them a useful ASW capability that could be used to escort ARGs, fleet train, or high value cargo shipments. Towed arrays might even help catch semi-submersible drug runners in peacetime.

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The Coast Guard is the low end of America’s Naval high-low mix. It is a source of numbers when numbers are needed. The Coast Guard has more assets for low end functions like blockade than the Navy. The Navy has about 105 cruisers, destroyers, LCS, PCs, and is not expected to have more than 125 similar assets for the forseeable future. The Coast Guard has about 165 patrol cutters  including 75 patrol boats 87 feet long, about 50 patrol craft 110 to 154 feet in length (58 Webber class WPCs are planned), and about 40 ships 210 foot or larger that can be called on, just as they were during the Vietnam War, when the Coast Guard operated as many as 33 vessels off the coast in support of Operation MarketTime, in spite of the fact that the Navy had almost three times as many surface warships as they do now. The current program of record will provide 34 new generation cutters including nine 4500 ton National Security Cutters and 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters that should be at least 2500 tons.

The Coast Guard provides peacetime maritime security, but is currently under-armed even for this mission. A small investment could make it far more useful in wartime.

(Note there is another post on this looking at the “design” from a Navy point of view.)

Japan CG Vice Commandant for Ops Interview

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Maritime Reporter & Engineering News interviews VADM Satoshi NAKAJIMA, Vice Commandant for Operations, Japan Coast Guard.

The Japan Coast Guard has a long association with the USCG, Capt. Frank Meals provided advice, prior to its formation.

It is apparent Chinese claims regarding, and actions around, the Senkaku Islands are much on his mind. The Japan Coast Guard making moves to assist similar organizations, notably the Coast Guards of Vietnam and the Philippines.

There is also a brief description of the Japan Coast Guard.