“SOLICITATION FOR 270′ WMEC SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS (SME)” –ALCOAST

“Coast Guard Cutter Forward and Coast Guard Cutter Bear, homeported in Portsmouth, Virginia, finish an at-sea transfer while underway on a two-month patrol. Coast Guard Cutter Forward returned to homeport on April 10, 2021.” (U.S. Coast Guard photo)

This caught my attention, because I was not sure if the SLEP for 270s had begun. Apparently we are still in the planning stage.

Good to see deck plate users are being asked their opinion.

Maybe questions like the need for an multifunction radar, electronic warfare systems, and type and number of weapons are still open. See “Don’t Neuter the Medium-Endurance Cutter Fleet” –USNI

It would be nice if these ships came out of SLEP with some enhancements, not just reduced capabilities. The ability to operate UAS and enhanced EO/IR capabilities come to mind.

united states coast guard

R 051250Z NOV 21
FM COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
TO ALCOAST
BT
UNCLAS
ALCOAST 406/21
SSIC 5102
SUBJ: SOLICITATION FOR 270′ WMEC SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS (SME)
1. This ALCOAST solicits volunteers to participate in a three-day
270′ Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC) Service Life Extension Project
(SLEP) Operational Assessment (OA) in Portsmouth, VA from 25-27
January 2022. The OA is a review and analysis of intended work
items to determine the operational capability and effectiveness
expected to be delivered during the upcoming WMEC 270 SLEP. The
OA will be used to identify equipment or process discrepancies that
may degrade mission efficiency, and assesses the effectiveness and
suitability of a system or service during the WMEC 270 SLEP.
2. Background: The WMEC 270 SLEP is essential to maintaining viable
platforms while OPCs are being constructed so as not to have a gap
in offshore operational capacity.
3. The OA is a tabletop documentation review by experienced active
duty members who are currently serving, or have recently served on
WMEC 270s. SMEs will assist the Operational Test Director (OTD) in
determining suitability of system changes during the WMEC 270 SLEP.
An OA report will be submitted to the Vice Commandant and DHS’
Office of Test and Evaluation to assess the WMEC 270 SLEP proposal.
4. The OA mission areas are grouped below.
    a. Operations. Comprised of CO/XO, OPS, ET, and OS. This group
will focus on mobility, command and control, and launch and recovery
of cutter boats and helicopters.
    b. Deck. Comprised of 1LT, GM with Mk 38 Mod 2/3 experience, and
Deck BM. This group will focus on anchoring, launch and
recovery of cutter boats and helicopters, and employment of
the new 270 SLEP weapon suite.
    c. Engineering. Comprised of EO, AUXO, ENG, MK, and EM. This
group will focus on launch and recovery of cutter boats, the new
SLEP Electrical Power System, equipment and machinery maintenance
and repair, reliability, maintainability, and engineering casualty
control.
    d. Support. Comprised of F&S, and SK. This group will focus on
logistics supportability.
    e. Aviation. Comprised of helicopter pilots with ship deployment
experience. This group will focus on helicopter launch and recovery.
5. Personnel required.            Rate/Rank         Required Experience
CO                  1                     O-5/O-6               270′ WMEC CO
XO                  1                     O-4/O-5               270′ WMEC XO
EO                  2                     O-3/O-4               270′ WMEC EO
OPS                1                     O-3/O-4               270′ WMEC OPS
AUXO              2                     O-1/O-2              270′ WMEC AUXO
HH-65 PILOTS  2                     O-3/O-4              270′ WMEC Deployed
ENG                2                      CWO                   NESU/MPA
F&S                 1                      CWO                   SUPPO
BM (Deck)        2                      E-5/E-6               270′ WMEC
EM                   2                     E-5/E-6                270′ WMEC
ET                    1                     E-5/E-6                270′ WMEC/ESU
GM                   2                     E-5/E-6                MK38 Mod 2/3
MK                   2                     E-5/E-6                 270′ WMEC/MAT
OS                   1                      E-6/E-7                 270′ WMEC
SK                   1                      E-5/E-6                  270′ WMEC
6. Volunteers must be available for the entire three-day event.
SMEs will be provided read-ahead documents in preparation for
their role to ensure the OA is completed within the allotted
time. A detailed schedule of events will be provided via email
after participants have been identified.
7. Interested participants should contact the 270′ WMEC SLEP
Sponsor’s Representative, LTJG Louie Wu, by 10 December 2021 via
email. Member must include a copy of their employee summary sheet
from CGBI in-board view as an attachment and desired mission area
from paragraph 4. Email must be forwarded from your unit CO or XO
to demonstrate command approval for participation. COMDT (CG-9322)
will issue travel orders to members selected to participate.
8. Point of contact: LTJG Louie Wu, COMDT (CG-751), 202-372-2360,
Louie.Wu@uscg.mil.
9. RDML Todd C Wiemers, Assistant Commandant for Capability
(CG-7), sends.
10. Internet release is authorized.

“Eastern Shipbuilding looks to win Coast Guard cutter contract — again” –Defense News

Defense News has a report of Eastern Shipbuilding’s hopes and efforts regarding phase two of the Offshore Patrol Cutter program.

“the Coast Guard expects to award the OPC second stage detail design and construction contract in spring 2022.”

I am a little surprised, it is taking as long as it is, to make a decision, two years after award of contracts to nine ship builder for industry studies (March 20, 2020), and about a year after the deadline for submission of proposals (May 28, 2021), but it certainly is an important choice.

Start of the OPC program contract was too long delayed in the first place. Then a hurricane delayed Eastern’s efforts about a year, and raised the cost. The decision to recompete the contract resulted in more delays, in that previous plans to move to funding two OPCs a year were pushed even further into the future. Instead of delivering the first three OPCs, one per year 2021-2023 and delivering two per year beginning 2024 through 2034; the current notional deliver schedule is one per year 2022-2028 and then two per year 2029-2037.

One potential benefit, if Eastern should be chosen for Phase II, is that they might be able to transition more quickly to building two ships per year. To some extent, that may be true of other yards as well, but Eastern’s product will presumably remain the same and a decision about its suitability to proceed to full rate production can be made years before the same is true of OPCs produced by other yards that will not be built to the same detail plans.

European Patrol Corvette

European Patrol Corvette

Defense News reports on the status of the European Patrol Corvette program.

We did talk about this program earlier. France, Italy, and Spain are already committed for a total of 20 ships and Greece is also expected to participate. It seems likely other will join the program.

These ships will perform many of the functions we associate with Coast Guard cutters, particularly in the case of the French Navy. The ships are close in size and general characteristics to the Offshore Patrol Cutters but will be better armed and slightly faster.

If the program continues to grow, this will be a relative large class and will all most certainly will be exported.

“Between 2009 and 2018, China produced 136 military ships, of which 11 were exported, he said, while two U.S. shipbuilders built 78 ships, of which six were exported. Twelve European yards produced 80 ships, of which 49 were for the export market…”

This is part of a movement to “rationalize” the European shipbuilding industry. Recently we have seen a move by Fincantieri and Navantia to increase cooperation. Ultimately this may effect US shipbuilding. Fincantieri owns Marinette Marine that builds the Freedom class LCS and that built USCGC Mackinaw, the 16 Juniper class WLBs, and the 14 Keeper class WLMs. Navantia has partnered with Bath Iron Works, to among other things offer a candidate for the Offshore Patrol Cutter.

“Bad Jizz: New Generation Of Narco Submarine Builders Present A Problem” –Covert Shores

Caption from Covert Shores: A new type of ‘narco submarine’ captured by USCG Cutter Active in the Easter Pacific Ocean, May 5, 2021. There is enough that is distinct to give it a fresh family designation, LPV-OM-VSV-10. Although it appears well finished, as far as these things go, many details seem borrowed from other types. The unusual reinforced cockpit leading edge is strongly reminiscent of the LPV-IM-14 and related LPV-IM-VSV-1 types for example. But other features do not match that master boat builder. New narco submarine types are increasingly often copies of various features of established types.

Civilian analysist H. I. Sutton, who has spent a great deal of effort tracking the development of ocean smuggling craft, feels we may be seeing a change in how, and by whom, they are being built.

Narco submarine production may have entered a new phase. After the period of Productionization, we are now seeing greater variance again. This suggests more one-off vessels and, likely, more people designing and building them. It can be characterized as a Commoditization of narco submarine technology.

From the Coast Guard’s perspective, this may not make much difference on the interdiction side, but it may make it more difficult for our partners to attack the problem from shore side.

“Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress” –CRS, October 19, 2021

Photo of a model of Halter Marine’s Polar Security Cutter seen at Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exhibition have surfaced. Photo credit Chris Cavas.

The Congressional Research Service has once again updated their look at the Polar Security Cutter (heavy icebreaker) program. (See the latest version here.) My last look at this evolving document was in regard to the September 15, 2021 revision.

The one page summary, which has not changed, is reproduced below, but first I will point out what appears to have changed since the September 15 edition.

The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended funding for Long Lead Time items for the third Polar Security Cutter be deferred. (See Table 2 on page 28.) They also recommended additional support for acquisition of a Great Lakes icebreaker. (see below)

If approved, this will mean that the FY2022 ship building budget will be extremely low. The reasons are logical and valid, but generally GAO and Congress like to see consistency from one year to the next. I hope this does not set a pattern.

On the other hand, this could make room on the top line for increases in infrastructure and operations funding. If that results in an improved pattern for these accounts, it could be a good thing.

Or, we could use about $120M to exercise an existing option and buy two more Webber class FRCs to meet a recognized need for a Coast Guard presence in the South Pacific. Spending a little more could buy three Webber class FRCs that could be based in Pago Pago, American Samoa and provide an essentially continuous 24/7/365 underway Coast Guard presence in the South Pacific.

From pages 28/29:

Senate

The Senate Appropriations Committee, in the explanatory statement it released on October 18, 2021, for the FY2022 DHS Appropriations Act (S. XXXX), recommends the funding level shown in the SAC column of Table 2. The explanatory statement states:

Polar Ice Breaking Vessel.—The Committee recognizes the value of heavy polar icebreakers in promoting the national security and economic interests of the United States in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. Due to delays that are consistent with complex, first-in-class surface acquisition programs as well as management delays exacerbated by the global pandemic, the schedule projects that the amount requested for LLTM for the third heavy polar icebreaker is not necessary in fiscal year 2022. Therefore, the recommendation does not include $120,000,000 from the request. (PDF page 69 of 160; see also PDF page 145 of 160)

Regarding the Coast Guard’s Operations and Support (O&S) account, funding for which is not shown in Table 2, the explanatory statement states:

Great Lakes Icebreaking [GLIB] Program Management Office.—The recommendation includes $5,500,000, $3,500,000 above the request for pre-acquisition activities, for a new Great Lakes icebreaker that is as capable as USCGC MACKINAW. (PDF page 65 of 160)


Summary

The Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program is a program to acquire three new PSCs (i.e., heavy polar icebreakers), to be followed years from now by the acquisition of up to three new Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs) (i.e., medium polar icebreakers). The PSC program has received a total of $1,754.6 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion) in procurement funding through FY2021, including $300 million that was provided through the Navy’s shipbuilding account in FY2017 and FY2018. With the funding the program has received through FY2021, the first two PSCs are now fully funded.

The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2022 budget requests $170.0 million in procurement funding for the PSC program, which would be used for, among other things, procuring long leadtime materials (LLTM) for the third PSC.

The Navy and Coast Guard in 2020 estimated the total procurement costs of the PSCs in then year dollars as $1,038 million (i.e., about $1.0 billion) for the first ship, $794 million for the second ship, and $841 million for the third ship, for a combined estimated cost of $2,673 million (i.e., about $2.7 billion). Within those figures, the shipbuilder’s portion of the total procurement cost is $746 million for the first ship, $544 million for the second ship, and $535 million for the third ship, for a combined estimated shipbuilder’s cost of $1,825 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion).

On April 23, 2019, the Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office for the PSC program awarded a $745.9 million fixed-price, incentive-firm contract for the detail design and construction (DD&C) of the first PSC to VT Halter Marine of Pascagoula, MS, a shipyard owned by Singapore Technologies (ST) Engineering. VT Halter was the leader of one of three industry teams that competed for the DD&C contract. The first PSC is scheduled to begin construction in 2021 and be delivered in 2024, though the DD&C contract includes financial incentives for earlier delivery.

The DD&C contract includes options for building the second and third PSCs. If these options are exercised, the total value of the contract would increase to $1,942.8 million (i.e., about $1.9 billion). The figures of $745.9 million and $1,942.8 million cover only the shipbuilder’s costs; they do not include the cost of government-furnished equipment (GFE), which is equipment for the ships that the government purchases and then provides to the shipbuilder for incorporation into the ship, post-delivery costs, costs for Navy-specific equipment, or government program-management costs.

The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, and one medium polar icebreaker, Healy. In addition to Polar Star, the Coast Guard has a second heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea. Polar Sea, however, suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then. Polar Star and Polar Sea entered service in 1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now well beyond their originally intended 30-year service lives. The Coast Guard plans to extend the service life of Polar Star until the delivery of at least the second PSC. The Coast Guard is using Polar Sea as a source of spare parts for keeping Polar Star operational

 

“Report to Congress on Coast Guard Cutter Procurement” –CRS, Updated October 19, 2021″ –CRS

The Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf enters the San Francisco Bay en route to their Alameda, California homeport following a three-month multi-mission patrol, Oct. 3, 2020. Bertholf is one of four Legend-class national security cutters homeported in Alameda. (Photo by Pablo Fernicola)

The Congressional Research Service has again updated their “Report to Congress on Coast Guard Cutter Procurement”. (This link will always take you to the most recent edition of the report.) My last post on this evolving document was in reference to a 15 September, 2021 update. The questions raised in that report remain largely unanswered. I have reproduced the one page summary in full below. The summary does not appear to have changed, except to reflect the commissioning of the 45th FRC. But first I will highlight what I believe to be the changes since the last update. The significant changes reflect the Senate’s actions reported on pages 27 and 28.

Senate

The Senate Appropriations Committee, in the explanatory statement it released on October 18, 2021, for the FY2022 DHS Appropriations Act (S. XXXX), recommends the funding levels shown in the SAC column of Table 2. (PDF page 144 of 160) The explanatory statement states:

Offshore Patrol Cutter [OPC].—The Committee provides the requested amount of $597,000,000 for the construction of the fourth OPC and LLTM for the fifth OPC. While the Committee supports OPC procurements, the Committee remains concerned about costs for the program and continues the requirement for the Coast Guard to brief the Committee within one week prior to taking any procurement actions impacting estimated costs for the OPC program.

Fast Response Cutter [FRC] Program.—In accordance with the Coast Guard’s recapitalization plan, the Committee has completed funding for the replacement of legacy 110-foot Island Class patrol boats with FRCs that will operate similarly in the coastal zone. The Coast Guard is encouraged to notify the Committee if additional FRCs are necessary to support the Department of Defense in Patrol Forces Southwest Asia. (PDF page 69 of 160)

The explanatory statement also states:

Fleet Mix Analysis.—The Committee recognizes ongoing acquisition programs for various cutter classes that are responsible for many of, but not all, Coast Guard missions. While programs have correctly been prioritized around recapitalizing the oldest vessels in the fleet, several cutter classes are rapidly approaching the end of their service lives, while others have long surpassed their service lives. In order to best understand future capital investment needs, the Coast Guard shall provide to the Committee within 180 days of the date of enactment of this act, a comprehensive analysis that provides a fleet mix sufficient to carry out the assigned missions of the Coast Guard and other emerging mission requirements. The Coast Guard shall brief the Committee within 60 days of the date of enactment of this act on its plans to carry out this requirement.

Full-Funding Policy.—The Committee again directs an exception to the administration’s current acquisition policy that requires the Coast Guard to attain the total acquisition cost for a vessel, including long lead time materials [LLTM], production costs, and postproduction costs, before a production contract can be awarded. This policy has the potential to make shipbuilding less efficient, to force delayed obligation of production funds, and to require post-production funds far in advance of when they will be used. The Department should position itself to acquire vessels in the most efficient manner within the guidelines of strict governance measures.

Domestic Content.—To the maximum extent practicable, the Coast Guard shall utilize components that are manufactured in the United States when contracting for new vessels. Such components include: auxiliary equipment, such as pumps for shipboard services; propulsion equipment, including engines, reduction gears, and propellers; shipboard cranes; and spreaders for shipboard cranes. (PDF page 68 of 160)


Summary

The Coast Guard’s program of record (POR), which dates to 2004, calls for procuring 8 National Security Cutters (NSCs), 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and 58 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) as replacements for 90 aging Coast Guard high-endurance cutters, medium-endurance cutters, and patrol craft. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2022 budget requests a total of $695.0 million in procurement funding for the NSC, OPC, and FRC programs, including $597 million for the OPC program.

NSCs are the Coast Guard’s largest and most capable general-purpose cutters; they are replacing the Coast Guard’s 12 Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters. NSCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $670 million per ship. Although the Coast Guard’s POR calls for procuring 8 NSCs to replace the 12 Hamilton-class cutters, Congress through FY2021 has fully funded 11 NSCs, including the 10th and 11th in FY2018. In FY2020, Congress provided $100.5 million for procurement of long lead time materials (LLTM) for a 12th NSC, so as to preserve the option of procuring a 12th NSC while the Coast Guard evaluates its future needs. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2022 budget requests $78.0million in procurement funding for activities within the NSC program; this request does not include further funding for a 12th NSC. The Coast
Guard’s proposed FY2022 budget also proposes rescinding $65.0 million of the $100.5 million in FY2020 funding for LLTM for a 12th NSC, “allowing the Coast Guard to focus investments on building, homeporting, and crewing Polar Security Cutters and Offshore Patrol Cutters.” The remaining $35.5 million appropriated in FY2020 for LLTM would be used to pay NSC program costs other than procuring LLTM for a 12th NSC. Nine NSCs have entered service; the ninth was commissioned into service on March 19, 2021.

OPCs are to be less expensive and in some respects less capable than NSCs; they are intended to replace the Coast Guard’s 29 aged medium-endurance cutters. Coast Guard officials describe the OPC and PSC programs as the service’s highest acquisition priorities. OPCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $411 million per ship. The first OPC was funded in FY2018. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2022 budget requests $597.0 million in procurement funding for the fourth OPC, LLTM for the fifth, and other program costs. On October 11, 2019, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), of which the Coast Guard is a part, announced that DHS had granted extraordinary contractual relief to Eastern Shipbuilding Group (ESG) of
Panama City, FL, the builder of the first four OPCs, under P.L. 85-804 as amended (50 U.S.C. 1431-1435), a law that authorizes certain federal agencies to provide certain types of extraordinary relief to contractors who are encountering difficulties in the performance of federal contracts or subcontracts relating to national defense. The Coast Guard is holding a full and open competition for a new contract to build OPCs 5 through 15. On January 29, 2021, the Coast Guard released a Request for Proposals (RFP) for this Stage 2 contract, as it is called. Responses to the RFP were due by May 28, 2021. The Coast Guard plans to award the Stage 2 contract in the second quarter of FY2022.

FRCs are considerably smaller and less expensive than OPCs; they are intended to replace the Coast Guard’s 49 aging Island-class patrol boats. FRCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $65 million per boat. A total of 64 have been funded through FY2021, including four in FY2021. Six of the 64 are to be used by the Coast Guard in the Persian Gulf and are not counted against the 58-ship POR quantity for the program, which relates to domestic operations. As of October 19, 2021, 45 of the 64 have been commissioned into service. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2022 budget requests $20.0 million in procurement funding for the FRC program; this request does not include funding for any additional FRCs

Britain and France Fight Over Fish

British and French fishing vessels were involved in clashes in the English Channel on Tuesday over a longstanding dispute over scallop fishing regulations.

British and French fishing vessels were involved in clashes in the English Channel, 2018, over scallop fishing regulations. Photo: France Televisions

Europeans take their fishing seriously as demonstrated by the latest conflict between the UK and France. Here is one of many reports on the subject.

The question revolves around the Brits agreeing to license a number of French fishing vessels, but requiring proof that they had fished in British waters prior to Brexit.

If it were I, I would say, you French can decide which boats should get the limited number of licenses, that would make it an internal French conflict rather than UK vs France (and EU).