Category Archives: Antarctic

Polar Icebreaker Operational Requirements Document, Industry Version

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ice-breakers-540688_1280

If you would like to take a look at the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the proposed polar icebreaker (PIB in the document), you can find it here (pdf). (Sorry I did not publish this earlier.)

The bad news is that it does not look like it will be fully operational until 2028.

I”1.3.1 Initial Operational Capability Date: The Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date is anticipated to occur during or before FY-2026. IOC is defined as the delivery of the vessel. ”

1.3.2 Coast Guard Support Date The Coast Guard Support Date (CGSD) is the formal transition from CG-932 to Surface Forces Logistics Center Product Line (SFLC PL) and is anticipated to occur during or before FY-2028.”

1.4 Full Operational Capability Date: The Full Operational Capability (FOC) date occurs upon the successful completion of operational testing and evaluation and is anticipated to occur during or before FY-2028.

Here are the basics. I have cherry picked the list. There are many more requirements, but I think these are the most significant:

  • “The PIB will operate worldwide and will be exposed to extreme environmental conditions found in the Polar, Tropical, and Temperate regions. The PIB will experience ice up to large concentrations of multiyear consolidated pack ice with ridging, air temperatures ranging from -72 degrees Fahrenheit (°F) to 114°F, sea water temperatures ranging from 28.8°F to 87°F, wind speeds that can exceed 100 miles per hour (mph) (87 knots (kts)) and sea conditions up to sea state 8. …
  • “The PIB shall be capable of independently breaking through ice with a thickness > 6 ft (threshold) / > 8 ft (objective) at a continuous speed > 3 kts.
  • “The PIB shall be capable of independently breaking through ridged ice with a thickness of 21 ft.
  • “The PIB shall have a fully mission capable (in accordance with Table 20) cutter endurance per deployment without replenishment (subsistence and fuel) > 80 days underway (threshold) / > 90 days underway (objective).
  • “The PIB shall have the capability to exchange information (voice and data) with: USCG, DoD, DHS, NATO, DoS, NSF and NOAA.
  • “The PIB shall be capable of breaking a single-pass channel to a width of at least 83 ft.
  • “The PIB shall have a sustained speed of 15 kts.
  • “The PIB shall have a minimum range of 21,500 nautical miles at 12 kts in ice free waters
  • “The PIB shall have the capability of performing 3,300 Operational Hours (threshold) / 4,050 Operational Hours (objective) per year. (The USCG is currently transitioning from the use of DAFHP to Operational Hours as the metric for operational tempo. The threshold and objective figures contained in this requirement represent 185 and 225 DAFHP respectively.)
  • “The PIB shall be capable of delivering aviation fuels, diesel fuels, and potable water while underway from storage and service tanks to United States Navy (USN)/USCG/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) vessels 240 feet or less in length in either astern tow or alongside
  • “The PIB shall be capable of receiving underway replenishment of fuel and water from USN/NATO/Allied Navy vessels, Military Sealift Command or other designated vessels.
  • “The PIB shall be able to pump aviation fuels, diesel fuels, and water to shore facilities, including U.S. Scientific Research Stations.
  • “The PIB shall have a designated topside cargo area capable of transporting (not simultaneously): 3.1.9.7.1 Three 9 ft x 35 ft buoys including associated buoy mooring equipment (or) 3.1.9.7.2 Six twenty foot equivalent units (TEU) with a maximum weight of 20 tons each.
  • AVIATION: “The PIB shall be able to hangar a total of two of any combination of the following aircraft: 3.1.10.2.1 USCG H-65 with blade-folding capability. 3.1.10.2.2 USCG/USN H-60 with blade-folding capability. 3.1.10.2.3 UAS (not to exceed the footprint of an USCG H-60 with blade folding capability). (plus  meet certification criteria for Level I, Class 1 aviation operations for those aircraft–Chuck) The PIB shall have the capability for an H-65 to be mechanically secured to the flight deck immediately after landing without the use of tie-down personnel. The PIB shall have the capability to support mobile mechanical traversing of the USCG/USN H-60. The PIB shall have the aviation fuel capacity to operate an H-60 for 250 flight hours with 24 flight hours of fuel capacity in service tanks. (also TACAN equipped–Chuck)
  • BOATS: The PIB shall have the capability to independently launch, recover, fuel, maintain and operate two assigned boats with over-the-horizon (OTH) capability. The PIB shall have the capability to launch, recover, fuel, maintain, and operate at least one assigned cargo landing boat capable of landing a minimum capacity of 4,500 pounds (e.g., people, cargo, and equipment). The PIB shall have the capability to launch and recover on both port and starboard sides.
  • The PIB shall have the capability to deliver, support, and recover one 8-person boarding team and their gear, trained and outfitted in accordance with the Maritime Law Enforcement Manual, COMDTINST M16247.1 (Series) via cutter boat operated by a boat crew in accordance with USCG policy.
  • The PIB shall have the capacity to tow astern a vessel not exceeding an equivalent displacement to that of the PIB. (Shouldn’t this say the ability to tow a vessel of equivalent tonnage to the PIB or perhaps some minimum?–Chuck)
  • The PIB shall have the capability to support a DIVEDET of 7 personnel and their equipment, in accordance with the USCG Diving Policies and Procedures Manual, COMDTINST M3150.1 (Series) and the USN Diving Manual, SS521-AG-PRO-010 (Series).
  • The PIB shall provide dedicated location(s) and reserved space, weight, power, hotel services, data network and phones to accommodate six 10 ft x 20 ft science vans that do not interfere with flight deck operations. (Shouldn’t this be 8x8x20 foot vans?–Chuck)
  • WEAPONS: The PIB shall have the capability to employ removable weaponry. The PIB shall have the ability to conduct disabling fire against surface targets.
  • The PIB shall have a heavy lift capability with a minimum capacity of 20 tons extending to at least one lift point 25 feet past the widest point of the ship’s beam on both the port and starboard side of the  ship.
  • The PIB shall provide messing, berthing, sanitary facilities, and workspaces for all permanently attached crewmembers and 50 embarked personnel. Includes DIVEDET and LEDET deployed with 20 person AVDET (if LEDET is embarked, SCIDET (Science) will remain ashore).
  • The PIB shall be capable of wintering over for a minimum of 210 days.
  • The PIB shall be designed to provide airspace management for organic aircraft operating in controlled and uncontrolled airspace by providing installed organic systems.

Additionally it should be able to conduct boat and helo operations to Sea State Four (8.2 feet/2.5 meters)

COMMENTS: I would like to offer some comments on the document.

CONTAINERS:

Inclusion of “dedicated location(s) and reserved space, weight, power, hotel services, data network and phones to accommodate six 10 ft x 20 ft science vans that do not interfere with flight deck operations.” (3.1.16.6 page 29) is promising. It offers an avenue to address emerging requirement or the need for capabilities that might might have been unrecognized. In addition to scientific support they might be used for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, as holding cells, as class room space, for upgraded communications, accommodations, or medical facilities.

AVIATION:

If we are going to be able to operate, hangar, and service Navy H-60s, we also need to be able to store their associated weapons and equipment including sonobuoys and torpedoes. I suspect this means we will need more space (and perhaps specialized space) than required to support CG H-60s (which I doubt will ever deploy on the PIB anyway). The containerized mission modules might be one way to address this if the need arises.

WEAPONS:

Polar Icebreakers will undoubtedly go to Antarctica so the Antarctic Treaty will apply.  Contrary to what you may have heard, the treaty does not require that ships entering the area be unarmed, only that they be open to inspection. Article VII para. 3. “All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.”

Obviously we do not want to send the PIB down there mounting classified weapons. The document addresses this by saying, “The PIB shall have the capability to employ removable weaponry.” This might mean only .50 caliber machine guns like the Polar Class, but there is also an operational requirements in table 6 (PIB Activities, page 11) is “Stop/neutralize a vessel through the use of force continuum.” Notably this is in the group “Boarding Operations” rather than Defensive/Offensive Operations.

If  we are going to enforce US sovereignty and ” the ability to conduct disabling fire against surface targets” is not limited to surface targets powered by outboard motors, the ship will need something more. There is also a strong possibility that the target could outrun a 15 knot PIB so we either need to be able to do this at a distance, or using the ship’s boats or helicopters.

Ultimately all weapons are removable. In some cases, like missiles or torpedoes the launchers themselves may be unclassified as long as the weapon itself is not installed.

The LCS classes have incorporated removable weapons in their design with reconfigurable weapon stations. We might consider something similar for the PIB,

In wartime, if fighting is in the Arctic or Antarctic, the polar Icebreakers will be unique high value naval auxiliaries that may become critical to naval operations. They will need to be adequately protected. We might consider fitting them “for but not with” defensive weapons. A minimum of two Mk38 25 mm and two SeaRAM CIWS appears to be appropriate, while requiring a minimum impact on command and control and manning requirements.

Photos: A removable weapon system. The Mk46 Gun Weapons System. This is used in the LCS anti-surface mission module. The armor piercing, fin stabilized discrding sabot round would probably be effective as a disabling round against even large diesel engines. 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

It is a pretty large document, running 89 pages total. The last 17 pages are appendices. Reportedly it was the product of a “46-member, 11-Agency Integrated Product Team (IPT)” There is a lot of detail, but there are also a lot of statements that are so nebulous as to be meaningless and as far as I can see do not contribute to an understanding of the requirements. This applies to most of the capabilities listed in Table 5 on page 9 and virtually all of the following,

  • “6 CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES Critical Operational Issues (COIs) are the operational effectiveness and operational suitability issues (not characteristics, parameters, or thresholds) that shall be examined during Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) to evaluate/assess the system’s capability to safely perform its mission.6.1 Operational Effectiveness COIs 6.1.1 Protection Response (PR) 6.1.1.1 Can the PIB perform USCG Emergent Response for Search and Rescue (SAR) and National Emergency Response Operations (NERO)?
  • 6.1.2 Law Enforcement Response (LER) 6.1.2.1 Can the PIB perform USCG Enforcement Response for Law Enforcement and Homeland Security?
  • 6.1.3 Surveillance and Reconnaissance (SR) 6.1.3.1 Can the PIB contribute to Maritime Domain Awareness?
  • 6.1.4 Defense Readiness (DR) 6.1.4.1 Can the PIB provide Defense Readiness to Combatant Commanders?
  • 6.1.5 Maintain Mobility (MM) 6.1.5.1 Can the PIB provide USCG services to maintain movement of vessels and equipment in civil and military maritime environments
  • 6.1.6 Transport (TRAN) 6.1.6.1 Can the PIB provide USCG organic transportation of people and equipment?
  • 6.1.7 Force Movement (FM) 6.1.7.1 Can the PIB be prepared for operational employment and move from ready locations to the intended area of operations?
  • 6.1.8 Information Management (IM) 6.1.8.1 Can the PIB perform Information Management in support of USCG Missions?
  • 6.1.9 Force Protection (FP) 6.1.9.1 Can the PIB provide Force Protection?”

Perhaps I have missed something or these will be clarified in the future.

Will the Navy Be Funding and Managing Our Next Icebreaker Procurement?

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PolarisAzipodsLookingAft

Azipods, state of the art propulsion technology for icebreakers. 

The Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee has proposed that $1B be added to the Navy’s shipbuilding budget for the construction of an icebreaker for the Coast Guard.

This sounds like good news, and there is precedence for this, in the form of USCGC Healy. Still, there are reasons, this may not be the best approach for the project, for the Coast Guard, or for the Navy, particularly since this should not be a one time procurement, it should be the first of a series.

The Navy contracted for the Healy and it did not turn out so badly, but there were difficulties as discussed here.

There are really two issues.

  • Who gets the money?
  • Who should manage the project?

Who gets the money?

The Coast Guard has been trying to get the government to recognize that it needs an AC&I budget of $2-2.5B/year. It needs to be a new norm. Funding icebreakers is part of that. Putting the money in the Navy budget is deceptive, and it does nothing to address the true needs of the Coast Guard..

Because of sequestration it is easier to add money to a DOD budget than to the Coast Guard budget, but if they can make exceptions for one military service, you would think they could make an exception for the Coast Guard as well.

Who would be the best project manager?

The Coast Guard got a black eye for the Deepwater project, but that was largely the result of a misguided Reagan era directive that project management be outsourced to the private sector that was followed by a gutting of in-house expertise in DOD as well as the Coast Guard. NAVSEA also lost much of its in house expertise. Since then, the Coast Guard’s Acquisitions Directorate has been rebuilt into an award winning organization. In fact, while I don’t necessarily think it is true, the GAO has suggested that the Coast Guard’s procedures may be superior to those of the Navy.

The Coast Guard has been preparing for this acquisition for years. If the Navy is to manage it, the Coast Guard will have to spend time bringing them up to speed.

There is also the question of who will procure the follow-on icebreakers. We have been saying we need three heavy and three medium icebreakers. the Coast Guard needs to continue to increase its icebreaker procurement expertise to build these vessels as well.

If the project is given to NAVSEA, it may be low on their priority list. NAVSEA is currently building or planning:

If NAVSEA were to divert their personnel from these projects to the procurement of an icebreaker, it would hurt supervision of these projects.

All of these projects are far larger than construction of one icebreaker. So, if they are given the icebreaker project, will they put their best people on it? Do they have any icebreaker expertise? Will they have to hire new people who will need to go through a time consuming clearance process and take the time to be brought up to speed?

NAVSEA may want to do their own lengthy and costly study & review process. They may impose requirements that the Coast Guard would not. These would add to the cost and these costs would likely be added on to any future icebreakers that would probably be built to the same design.

A troubling “encouragement”:

There was a particularly troubling requirement quoted on page 31 of the  Congressional Research Service’s report, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.” from the FY2017 DOD Appropriations Act (S. 3000) apparently from pages 98-99.

“While the effort to speed polar icebreaker acquisition by 2 years is commendable, the Committee believes more must be done now to expand our capabilities and to defend interests in the Polar Regions. In addition to concerns about our current fleet, the Committee notes that Russia has roughly 40 operational icebreakers and 11 icebreakers either planned or under construction. Therefore, to further accelerate production, the Committee recommends $1,000,000,000 in the “Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy” account to construct domestically the first U.S. Coast Guard operated ship for the Polar Icebreaker Recapitalization Project. In order to achieve an earlier start on this project and to reduce cost and schedule risk, the Committee encourages the selection of an in-service U.S. hull design and the setting of limitations on overall ship specifications and requirements. The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees not later than September 30, 2016 which provides polar icebreaker requirements, preferred design, overall acquisition strategy, and a breakout of funds necessary to support the acquisition.”

I find the direction to forego an opportunity to improve on the designs we have, in favor of decades old hull designs that no longer represent the best in current icebreaker design troubling, particularly since this may be the first of three heavy icebreakers, not just a single stop-gap design.

USCGC Polar Sea

USCGC Polar Sea

There are of course only two large, in service, US hull designs.

ice-breakers-540688_1280

USCGC Healy (foreground)

Our most modern, but frequently forgotten Great Lakes Icebreaker, USCGC Mackinaw (WLBB-30), is a few years younger but still designed about two decades ago, was built by Marinette Marine, which is at least still an operational shipyard, producing Freedom Class LCS for the Navy.

Would it be enough to simply say we are going to scale up the Mackinaw hull (say double all the dimensions) so that we could have a ship that at least uses azipods like most modern icebreakers?

Launch of USCGC Mackinaw (WLBB-30) on April 2, 2005. Photo by Peter J. Markham.

Launch of USCGC Mackinaw (WLBB-30) on April 2, 2005. Photo by Peter J. Markham.

Do we need the Navy?:

I would note that the Coast Guard’s intention had been to fund the Icebreaker in FY2018 not 2022, but somehow we had an unannounced delay of four years which was reduced by a much publicized decision to accelerate construction to 2020. Not only does this strike me as dishonest, but it also seems to suggest that the Coast Guard, given supporting funding, could be ready to contract for the Icebreaker on its own prior to 2020.
If the money were given to the Coast Guard instead of the Navy, I believe the icebreaker would be ready earlier, be delivered cheaper, and will be more in line with our true needs.
If we have to live with this:
As much as I dislike the prospect, we may have to live with this, because of the Congress’ self imposed “sequestration” silliness. If so, how the Navy/Coast Guard team that manages the procurement will be important. The Coast Guard needs to continue to grow its icebreaker expertise.

Perhaps NAVSEA could sub-contract the Coast Guard Acquisitions Directorate (CG-9) to procure the icebreaker.

Thanks to Tups for bringing the encouragement to select an in-service U.S. hull design to my attention.

 

Commandant’s Strategic Intent, Mid-Term Report

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Coast Guard Capt. Douglas Nash, commanding officer of Coast Guard Air Sation Sacramento, salutes a Coast Guard C-27J pilot during a change of watch ceremony at Air Station Sacramento's hanger in McClellan Park, Thursday, July 1, 2016. The ceremony marked the final day that an HC-130 Hercules crew stood the watch at Air Station Sacramento and introduced the newest aircraft. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Loumania Stewart

Procurement of 14 C-27J aircraft was one of the achievements sited. C-27Js replace C-130s at CGAS Sacramento. 

The Commandant has issued a mid-term update on his earlier published “Strategic Intent, 2015-2019” (pdf). The new document is available in pdf format. You can find it here: “United States Coast Guard Commandant’s Strategic Intent, 2015-2019, Mid-Term Report.”

It is relatively short and readable at 21 pages. The recurring themes of the Commandant’s administration are all there, starting with TOC (transnational organized crime) and its deleterious effect on Western Hemisphere governance and prosperity. It does read a little like an Officer Evaluation Report input.

There is nothing particularly surprising here, but even for me, the enumeration of the scope the Coast Guard’s authorities, responsibilities, and international contacts is still mind boggling.

I am not going to try to summarize the report, but there were a few things that struck me.

The Commandant mentions service life extension programs for the seagoing buoy tenders (already begun), the 47 foot MLBs, and the 87 foot WPBs (in the future), but there is no mention of what we will do about the inland tender fleet. There will also be a life extension program for helicopters before they are finally replaced.

“Extend the service life of our rotary wing assets and align with DOD’s Future Vertical Lift initiative.”

There is mention of a program I was not aware of, the “Defense Threat Reduction Agency National Coast Watch System project.” The Defense Threat Reduction Agency attempts to track and reduce the WMD threat. It is not really clear what our role is here. We know about the container inspection programs in foreign ports. Is that it, or is there more to this? (that can be discussed at an unclassified level.)

Thoughts on State of the CG, 2016

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You can read the Commandant’s State of the Coast Guard speech here (pdf). It is only eight pages.

The Commandant continues to hammer on themes he has addressed in the past–the Arctic Strategy in response to the opening of a new ocean and the Western Hemisphere Strategy in response to lawlessness in Central America and the resulting immigration crisis (plus the ships needed to employment the strategies–OPCs and Icebreakers in particular), and duty to our people (the Human Capital Strategy). While the topics are familiar, his tone is more optimistic.

The Coast Guard budget for FY2016 included the largest acquisitions, construction, and improvements (AC&I) budget in its history and the Commandant appears to believe this will not be a flute.

The Commandant has chosen his battles and is doing well in terms of conveying what he sees as the critical narrative. Now it sounds like he is about to expand his objectives.

The Commandant has promised an analysis of Coast Guard personnel requirements.

Most people have seen the great American cinema classic Jaws. In it, Police Chief Brody, when he first lays eyes on the 30-foot Great White shark attacking New England beachgoers, says to his colleague, “You’re going to need a bigger boat.” It is a great line that lives on as an expression to state the obvious.
We’ll let me nuance that a bit. Looking at the challenges we’re facing in the world today: ladies and gentlemen, you’re going to need a bigger Coast Guard….As required by our 2015 Authorization Act, I am directing a Coast Guard Manpower Requirements Plan to formally establish a force size informed by strategy, analysis and risk management.

Allow me to look even further down the road,

The world seems to becoming an increasingly dangerous place. The brief window when the US ruled a mono-polar world is closed. It may be time for the Coast Guard to reemphasize its military character. If you look at long term trends, the size of the Coast Guard, in terms of personnel has generally been stable or growing, while the still much larger, Navy has continued to shrink. When I was commissioned in 1969, the Navy was about 21 times larger than the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps was over eight times as large. Now the Navy is less than eight times the size of the Coast Guard, and the Marine Corps is less than five times as large. In terms of personnel the Coast Guard is already larger than the British or French Navy. This suggest that its potential as a significant naval force should not be ignored. 

The Coast Guard now seems poised to have a future fleet of nine frigate sized National Security Cutters and 25 corvette (or light frigate) sized Offshore Patrol Cutters. That is 34 surface combatants, not an insignificant number when you consider the Navy has and will have only about 120 cruisers, destroyers frigates and LCS. While the cutters quality as warships is far below that of DDG, they are not far removed from that of an LCS and in some respects, particularly endurance, they are superior. We really need to look at what we could do, for relatively small marginal costs, to make these ships effective contributions to the National Fleet. In a similar fashion we need to look at how other elements of the Coast Guard could strengthen national defense.

The Coast Guard may be the US’s secret naval edge, unrecognized by our enemies and by our own government, the Navy and many of our own people, but risking the stealthy nature of our contribution to national defense, a more formalized and recognized military tasking could justify continued expansion that could also improve performance in other mission areas, and give us the bigger Coast Guard the Commandant think we need.

 

Chilean Icebreaker/Supply Vessel, plus Other News From Chile

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ChileanIcebreaker

Photo: New Chilean Icebreaker/Antarctic Supply Vessel.  

I recently had an exchange of emails with Andrés Tavolari, a lawyer and Chilean Marine Reserve Officer, who wrote one of our most popular posts, Three Nations Share German OPV Design.

He tells me Chile is building an icebreaker/supply ship. In terms of horsepower, it will be more powerful than the old Wind class icebreakers and only slightly less powerful than the Glacier. Our resident icebreaker expert, Tups, talked about this ship in a comment on an earlier post.

VARD is designing an icebreaker for the Chilean Navy:

http://www.marinelink.com/news/icebreaker-antarctic404371.aspx

One thing that puzzles me is the performance. 14.5 MW for 2 knots in 1 m ice? I mean, the bigger South African research vessel S. A. Agulhas II can do 5 knots with just 9 MW propulsion power (12 MW installed power).

My initial comment was that “Some times they just call out the minimum contract specs. Does not mean they might not be capable of more.” While that might be the case, there is an alternate possibility, perhaps the hull will not be strong enough to break heavier ice or to break one meter of ice at a faster rate. If you look at where Chile has their Antarctic stations, they are all about as far from the Pole as you can get and still be in Antarctica. Perhaps they do not need great icebreaking performance to accomplish their mission. Shaping very thick steel plate is undoubtably difficult and one of the more demanding aspects of building an icebreaker. Perhaps lighter plate is seen as a reasonable compromise.

512px-Antarctica_CIA_svg

Antarctic claims. This chart from Wikipedia Commons. 

Chile’s current icebreaker is the former Canadian Icebreaker CCGS Norman McLeod Rogers, which entered service originally in 1969.

Also of interest, the Chilean Navy magazine has published a special edition with some nice pictures regarding several naval and maritime activities. The text is written in Spanish, but it is mostly pictures and graphics. So the language doesn’t preclude understanding much of it.

Andres pointed out, on pages 36 and 37, there is a graphic with the ships and aircraft of the Navy. Among others there are 3 OPVs, 18 Protector class boats, 4 Grumete / Dabur class boats, 26 Archangel boats and 15 Defender boats, and 3 C-295 Persuader MPA and 8 HH-65 Dolphin helicopters. All in all, there are 22.000 men and women in the navy, including some 2.800 marines. The icebreaker is illustrated on page 44.

On page 45 there is some information regarding the OPVs project called “Danubio”. This is a continuation of the OPV project Andres posted about earlier.

Andres also sent along some information about their Navy’s Shipyard, in the form of a power point presentation including some pictures of the damage suffered by the 2010 tsunami, and its reconstruction (slides 19 – 26). Slide 39 covers the icebreaker.

We also talked a little about the organization of Chile’s Coast Guard counterpart, DIRECTEMAR. It is a part of the Navy organization. While heads of DIRECTEMAR have gone on to head the Navy, these officers have not come up through the ranks in DIRECTEMAR, they have been regular Navy officers.

DIRECTEMAR’s counterpart to our WPBs are the 16 Danubio Class, delivered 1999-2004.

  • 125 tons fl
  • 25 knots
  • 33.1×6.6×1.9 meters or 109x22x6.2 feet
  • one 12.7mm
  • 2 MTU 16V2000 M90 diesels 3,200HP
  • 2 off, 8 enlisted
Many of DIRECTEMAR’s small boats will look familiar. They have a number of USCG type boats procured through Foreign Military Sales, which have proven effective in countering illegal fishing activities.

Early Icebreaker Specs

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USCGC Polar Sea

USCGC Polar Sea

FedBizOpps.gov has published  a draft document that gives us a first look at possible specs for the proposed polar icebreaker,

Polar_Icebreaker_Replacement_Draft_Data_Package_13_J…(913.98 Kb)

This is different from what we saw on FedBizOpps only a few days ago.

There is a notional Polar Icebreaker Acquisition Schedule that anticipates contract award between Q4 FY 2018 and Q4 FY2019.

Some of the provisions/characteristics I found interesting were:

  • Sustained Speed, 15 knots.
  • Minimum range of 21,500 nautical miles at 12 kts
  • Capable of independently breaking though ice with a thickness ≥ 6 ft (threshold) / ≥ 8 ft (objective) at a continuous speed ≥ 3 kts.
  • Capable of independently breaking through ridged ice with a thickness of 21 ft.
  • Capable of breaking a single-pass channel to a width of at least 83 ft.
  • Three 9 ft x 35 ft buoys including associated buoy mooring equipment.
  • Six twenty foot equivalent units (TEU) with a maximum weight of 20 tons each.
  • Capable of underway replenishment.
  • Weapons limited to four .50 cal. and boarding party weapons.
  • Aviation facilities include hangaring two H-60s with blades folded.
  • Air-search radar.
  • Capacity to tow astern a vessel not exceeding an equivalent displacement to that of the PIB (Polar Icebreaker) (Not an overly ambitious spec,why don’t we just say 20,000 tons or specify bollard pull?–Chuck)

Again we have Bryant’s Maritime Consulting to thank for the link.

Icebreaker Requirements Published

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USCGC Polar Sea

USCGC Polar Sea

BreakingDefense.com has reported the Commandant has announced the release of  “a notional program schedule [and] notional Polar Icebreaker requirements” for two new heavy icebreakers today.

Details have been released to qualified contractors, but not the general public.

The reference to two icebreakers is a bit of a surprise. The source of the funding is not clear, but the Commandant suggest there is strong support in Congress and he sees some of it coming in 2017.

UPDATE: The additional details on the requirements from DefenseNews.

Specifically, the new ships need to be able to continuously push through up to six feet of ice — but preferably eight — going at least 3 knots.

In ice-free waters, it will need a sustained speed of 15 knots, or the speed at max horsepower.

The new icebreakers must also be able to:

  • Sail a range of 21,500 nautical miles at 12 knots.
  • Go 80 days underway without replenishment.
  • Run at least 3,300 operational hours a year.
  • Visually evaluate ice conditions for 12 nautical miles in each direction.
  • Land a range of military and federal helicopters.
  • Hangar two Coast Guard helicopters or future unmanned systems.

 

Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress–Updated

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POLAR SEA and POLAR STAR side by side in McMurdo Sound, Antarctica

The US Naval Institute News Service has provided a copy of the Dec. 14, 2015 Congressional Research Service report, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” by Naval Ronald O’Rourke.

This updates a series of earlier reports.

It is quite clear from the report that even if things go as planned, which I doubt it will, we will have a period of two to six years when we will have only one medium icebreaker and no heavy icebreakers.

If we do as currently planned, we will not see a new icebreaker until at least 2024.

We have looked at alternatives that might carry us through until the US can truly recapitalize its current fleet.

We can renovate Polar Sea. Clearly Congress is running out of patience waiting for a decision about what to do with this ship. We ought to ask for the funds to renovate it one way or the other.

We can lease one or two of these excess icebreakers. We could put one in the Great Lakes to satisfy those interests and it could in worst case exit the Great Lakes and go to the assistance of a polar icebreaker or break into resupply Thule airbase in Greenland.

Both of these are relatively low cost options. They deserve serious consideration.

France and Britain Building Ships for Antarctica

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MarineLog reports the French are building a new vessel to support their presence in Antarctica. It is to be operated by the French Navy. Not a lot of details–The story is really about their choice of Wärtsilä equipment to power the ship. Looks like a typical offshore industry support vessel.

Meanwhile British shipyard Cammell Laird has announced that they have secured a contract to build a vessel to be operated by NERC’s British Antarctic Survey (BAS).