Document Alert: World Wide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, 2/9/16

We have a statement for the record (pdf) from James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, dated February 9, 2016. Perhaps it is the nature of the beast, but there is no good news, and much that is bad.

Smuggling of every type appears to be on the rise including drugs and people. We can expect an increase in illegal immigration as a result of violence, poverty, and disorder in Latin America and particularly Cuba and Central America.

It is a relatively compact document. There are sections on Terrorism (pp 4-6), transnational organized crime (pp 11-12), Arctic (p 13), Environmental Risks and Climate Change (pp 13-14), health (including potential pandemics) (pp 14-15), and Global Displacement, “These 60 million consist of approximately 20 million refugees, 38 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and approximately 2 million stateless persons, also according to UNHCR statistics.” (p.15)

There are also regional assessments including one on Latin America and the Caribbean (pp 28-29).

There is no regional assessment for the US. In terms of direct terrorist threats to the US, while there is a recognition of an aspiration on the part of various groups to attack the US, but the emphasis seems to be on “homegrown violent extremists” (HVEs) and there is nothing about the possibility of a maritime attack on the US. Is that because none exist?

US and Cuba Cooperate on Marine Conservation

BairdMaritime reports,

“The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the National Park Service (NPS) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Cuba’s Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment (CITMA). The MOU aims to facilitate joint efforts concerning science, stewardship, and management regarding Marine Protected Areas (MPAs).”

Check it out for more detail.

Presumably, the Coast Guard will have some role in enforcing restrictions on operations in these areas. Apparently the CG has had good long term relations with their Cuban counterparts.

The Navy’s New Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority–CNO

Download the pdf here.

Recently the new Chief of Naval Operations has issued a document , “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” that outlines how, hopefully, the US Navy can maintain a maritime superiority our foes will recognize and avoid confronting.

If you are looking for anything specifically regarding the Coast Guard here, you will not find it (other than the cutter in the formation on the cover). The Coast Guard is not mentioned even once, but it does talk about some things that are Coast Guard related. Perhaps we should not feel bad about this. It only mentions the Marine Corps once.

He talks about three forces that are changing the environment: 

  • The first global force is the traffic on the oceans, seas, and waterways, including the sea floor – the classic maritime system.
  • A second increasingly influential force is the rise of the global information system – the information that rides on the servers, undersea cables, satellites, and wireless networks that increasingly envelop and connect the globe.
  • The third interrelated force is the increasing rate of technological creation and adoption.”

Obviously the Coast Guard facilitates and regulates marine traffic and is tapped into the global information system. In wartime, these contacts will become essential. He also talks about new trade routes opening in the Arctic, that will only be reliable if we have new icebreakers. He also talks about illegal trafficing.

“This maritime traffic also includes mass and uncontrolled migration and illicit shipment of material and people.”

For once, finally, a document explicitly recognizes the competition,

“For the first time in 25 years, the United States is facing a return to great power competition. Russia and China both have advanced their military capabilities to act as global powers. Their goals are backed by a growing arsenal of high-end warfighting capabilities, many of which are focused specifically on our vulnerabilities and are increasingly designed from the ground up to leverage the maritime, technological and information systems. They continue to develop and field information-enabled weapons, both kinetic and non-kinetic, with increasing range, precision and destructive capacity. Both China and Russia are also engaging in coercion and competition below the traditional thresholds of high-end conflict, but nonetheless exploit the weakness of accepted norms in space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum. The Russian Navy is operating with a frequency and in areas not seen for almost two decades, and the Chinese PLA(N) is extending its reach around the world.

“…Coupled with a continued dedication to furthering its nuclear weapons and missile programs, North Korea’s provocative actions continue to threaten security in North Asia and beyond.

“…while the recent international agreement with Iran is intended to curb its nuclear ambitions, Tehran’s advanced missiles, proxy forces and other conventional capabilities continue to pose threats to which the Navy must remain prepared to respond.

“…international terrorist groups have proven their resilience and adaptability and now pose a long-term threat to stability and security around the world.”

He recognizes budgetary limitations.

“There is also a fourth ‘force’ that shapes our security environment. Barring an unforeseen change, even as we face new challenges and an increasing pace, the Defense and Navy budgets likely will continue to be under pressure. We will not be able to “buy” our way out of the challenges that we face. The budget environment will force tough choices but must also inspire new thinking.”

Throughout there is an emphasis on understanding history and the strategic concepts of the past. There is also a recognition of the need to work with partners.

“EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN OUR NETWORK OF PARTNERS: Deepen operational relationships with other services, agencies, industry, allies and partners – who operate with the Navy to support our shared interests.

Other than the Marine Corps, the US Navy has no closer partner than the USCG. The partnership has been a long and successful one, but I would like to see the Navy be a better partner to the Coast Guard.

What I want to see:

If we have “run out of money, now we have to think.” One thing we can do, is to try to get the maximum return from the relatively small investment needed to make the Coast Guard an effective naval reserve force.

  • We need explicit support from the Navy at every level, particularly within the Congress and Administration, for Coast Guard recapitalization.
  • We need an explicit statement from the Navy that they expect the Coast Guard to defend ports against unconventional threats, so that they can keep more forces forward deployed.
  • We need the Navy to supply the weapons we need to defend ports against unconventional attack with a probability approaching 100% ,including small missile systems like Hellfire or Griffin to stop small, fast, highly maneuverable threats and light weight anti-ship torpedoes that target propellers to stop larger threats, and we need those systems on at least all cutters of Webber class and larger.
  • We need to reactivate the Coast Guard’s ASW program and insure that all the new large cutters (NSC and OPC) have and ASW capability, if not installed on all of the cutters, at least planned, prototyped, tested, and practiced on a few ships (particularly in the Pacific).

(Note there is another post on this looking at the “design” from a Navy point of view.)

Indonesia Attempts to use Big Data to Manage Fisheries

The Jakarta Post reports that the Indonesian government will attempt to use the Automatic Identification System (AIS) to manage their fisheries.

They plan to exploit an open source system called “Global Fishing Watch,” a partnership between SkyTruth, Oceana and Google. There are certainly limitations on the data available from this system. AIS can be turned off or spoofed, but the Global Fishing Watch website has some answers for these limitation, and careful tracking can to some extent mitigate the problems.

More here (pdf).

CG/Navy/Islander Partnership in the Western Pacific

USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Edwardo Proano

Generally I feel the CG and the US in general is not paying enough attention to the US EEZ in the Western Pacific and to the island nations there, that we have a continuing relationship with. It is good to see some efforts to maintain good governance in these areas. Published below is a Navy news release. As you read it you note that maritime law enforcement efforts in this are a still very thin. Use of an MSC T-AKE for support of CG LEDETs is a welcomed innovation. Still the high sides of a T-AKE can not be the best for boat ops. Would love to see the T-AKE used as mother ship for WPBs or WPCs.

Story Number: NNS151026-13 Release Date: 10/26/2015 3:17:00 PM, By Grady Fontana, Military Sealift Command Far East

PACIFIC OCEAN (NNS) — Military Sealift Command’s (MSC) dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1) arrived at Tarawa, Republic of Kiribati, Oct. 24, as part of its continuing support of Exercise KOA MOANA (KM) 15-3.

Exercise KM 15-3 is a four-month international exercise allowing participants from the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to work with host nation participants from various countries in the Pacific Island Nations of Oceania.

The first portion of the exercise was in Tahiti, followed by a leg in Fiji, where Marines conducted theater security cooperation (TSC) activities with host nation partners.

After Tarawa, the Lewis and Clark, which is also part of Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron (MPSRON) 2, will carry her personnel and cargo to Vanuatu for more TSC events, then finish off the exercise in Timor Leste in November. The Lewis and Clark is scheduled to return to its homeport in early December.

While training in Tarawa, the Marines will conduct military-to-law enforcement activities with local police. Members of the Navy and Coast Guard will participate in Oceanic Maritime Security Initiative (OMSI) operations, as they did in Fiji, in support of maritime law enforcement operations along with partners from the Police Maritime Unit Tarawa.

“While the Marines are training on the island with the host nation military or law enforcement agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard has taken this opportunity to use USNS Lewis and Clark, which is the platform for KOA MOANA 15-3, to conduct OMSI patrols with the nations these TSCs have been scheduled,” said Navy Capt. Paul D. Hugill, commodore, MPSRON-2.

OMSI is a Secretary of Defense program aimed to diminish transnational illegal activity on the high seas in the Pacific Island Nations of Oceania’s exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and enhance regional security and interoperability with partner nations.

The Coast Guard is responsible for patrolling the waters around the numerous islands associated with the U.S. throughout the region. Each of these islands has territorial waters stretching out to 12 miles from shore. Beyond that, stretching out 200 nautical miles are EEZs, an area defined by international law that allows each nation exclusive rights to the exploration and use of marine resources.

During the OMSI portion of KM 15-3, law enforcement agents from the Police Maritime Unit Tarawa, and Navy and Coast Guard personnel, will ride the Lewis and Clark and intercept and board commercial fishing vessels operating inside the Kiribati EEZ. The combined team will be looking for potential violations.

According to Taraa Teekea, vessel monitor system officer for Police Maritime Unit Tarawa, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing has a significant negative effect on Kiribati’s economy.

Outside of KOA MOANA, the Police Maritime Unit Tarawa conducts their own operations about six to eight times a year. Their missions are typically 10 days at-sea, with boarding an average of 30 suspected fishing boats during each operation.

“We are looking for those who are conducting illegal fishing,” said Teekea. “Some of the common violations are invalid fishing license, no license to transit through our EEZ, over-fishing certain types of fish, and vessels with no [EEZ] entry and exit reports.”

The OMSI memorandum of understanding between the Department of Defense (DoD), the U.S. Coast Guard and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration helps to deter and prevent various threats to maritime security and transnational crime, encourage mutually beneficial partnerships with Pacific Island Nations, promote interoperability, enhance maritime domain awareness and improve economic stability throughout Oceania.

The program leverages DoD assets transiting the region to increase the Coast Guard’s maritime domain awareness, ultimately supporting maritime law enforcement operations in Oceania.

According to USCG Lt. Lisa M. Hatland, OMSI liaison, U.S. Coast Guard District 14 out of Honolulu and on board the Lewis and Clark for KM 15-3, since the Coast Guard doesn’t have all the assets it requires in order to patrol this region as often as they would like or to enact all the bilateral ship rider’s agreements that they have with partner nations, the [memorandum of understanding] (MOU) with the Navy allows them to use naval vessels.

“Through OMSI, the Coast Guard exacts an MOU with the DoD in order to supplement Coast Guard cutter deployments with naval assets that are transiting across Oceania,” the lieutenant added. “The MOU allows us to put Coast Guard boarding teams on board DoD ships to conduct Coast Guard missions, and it also permits us to embark foreign maritime law enforcement agents so they can enforce laws in their own sovereign waters.”

Initiatives like OMSI help the U.S. to project a maritime law enforcement presence beyond what the U.S. Coast Guard can do alone.

KOA MOANA also serves as a test for the Lewis and Clark on how well cargo and ammunition ship platforms will perform in this type of mission. The exercise is the first time a dry cargo and ammunition ship is being used for a Coast Guard mission.

“The Lewis and Clark is performing well. During KOA MOANA, we’re doing everything that a [US combatant ship] can do with regards to command and control,” said Hugill. “The reasons the Lewis and Clark is a good platform are the abundance of space, the capabilities of the deck crew and the ability to carry out around the clock operations.”

Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron 2, currently embarked aboard USNS Lewis and Clark and operating in the Southern Eastern Pacific, maintains tactical control of the 10 ships that are forward deployed to Diego Garcia and carrying afloat prepositioned U.S. military cargo for the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force. The squadron’s mission is to enable the force from the sea by providing swift and effective transportation of vital equipment and supplies for designated operations.

MSC operates approximately 115 non-combatant, civilian-crewed ships that replenish U.S. Navy ships, conduct specialized missions, strategically preposition combat cargo at-sea around the world and move military cargo and supplies used by deployed U.S. forces and coalition partners.

Exercise KOA MOANA 15-3 is a Marine Forces Pacific-sponsored exercise designed to enhance senior military leader engagements between allied and partner nations with a collective interest in military-to-military relations, and to discuss key aspects of military operations, capability development and interoperability.

Closer Coast Guard Ties with Vietnam

The Vietnamese have not had a coast guard very long, just two years, but it looks like after a recent visit by our Commandant, the US Coast Guard will be working more closely with them. The US had already committed to financing the purchase of US made patrol boats for the Vietnamese Coast Guard to the tune of $18M. We discussed this earlier here and here.

As you probably know, the Vietnamese and Chinese have an ongoing dispute over a large area of the South China Sea. A recent change has authorized the their Coast Guard to use force as necessary to expel those who violate law from Vietnamese waters.