The Aviationist brings us photos of a C-27J fresh out of the paint shop, in Coast Guard colors. It also includes an updated of the status of the program.
Thanks to Andres for bringing this to my attention.
More photos here.
SouthCom, actually two SouthComs in a row, and the Commandant have noted that while they have excellent intelligence on drug smugglers in the transit zone, they simply do not have adequate numbers of vessels to respond. (Here, here, and here) There were never enough, but after decommissioning the Perry class frigates, the Navy’s contribution appears to have declined significantly. The Coast Guard seems to have upped their game, possibly more than making up for the Navy’s absence, but still–not enough ships.
There may be a way at least partially address this problem.
We now have 16 Webber class WPCs in three homeports in the Seventh District, six in Miami, six in Key West, and four, soon to be six, in Puerto Rico. These may be “Fast Response Cutters,” but clearly they are not all sitting in homeport waiting for SAR cases. These are law enforcement assets and they are meant to patrol. Could we perhaps, maintain as many as four in the Eastern Pacific by rotating cutters from the 7th District to fill this role in the transit zone? Obviously, it is not impossible, since the Navy is sending their similar sized Cyclone class PCs to the Eastern Pacific, but what would it take to make it work well?
Obviously they would need additional fuel and supplies while deployed. There is a good chance between Colombia, Panama, and Costa Rica, we could find a port willing to host these little white ships.
Aside from “beans and black oil” they might also need some administrative, maintenance, or medical support.
The Navy might make itself useful here by providing a simple MSC manned support vessel that could be as basic as an Offshore Support Vessel loaded with containerized offices and logistical support to provide support that the port cannot. The Navy has already chartered a number of ships of this type and could charter another.
We could start this small. First study the results of the Navy’s Cyclone class deployment. Then send a single ship from say Miami, a month later we get a second ship from Key West. Let them figure out what they need and how the problems they will inevitably encounter can be solved.
Because they cannot embark a helicopter, they will need a complementary fixed wing support, but this is already being done at least to some extent.
Once we get to a total of 18 Webber class in these three home ports, we could keep four ships assigned to SouthCom by sending two ships each month and rotating them back after two months. Seventh district would still four ships assigned to each home port, which would mean that even if two are down for maintenance they would still have two for SAR and local law enforcement.
The Congressional Research Service has issued another study, this one on the Arctic (pdf). It was authored by their Naval Expert Ronald O’Rourke, who has authored several reports on the Coast Guard, so you can be sure he has an understanding of the Coast Guard’s situation.
It is pretty long, but here is the summary.
“The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. On January 21, 2015, President Obama issued an executive order for enhancing coordination of national efforts in the Arctic. The United States assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council on April 24, 2015, and will serve in that capacity for two years.
“Record low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the region, and national security.
“The five Arctic coastal states—the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of which Greenland is a territory)—have made or are in the process of preparing submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding the outer limits of their extended continental shelves. The Russian submission includes the underwater Lomonosov Ridge, a feature that spans a considerable distance across the Arctic Ocean.
“The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic sea routes—the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Current international guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters are being updated.
“Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more exploration for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to onshore exploration activities. Increased oil and gas exploration and tourism (cruise ships) in the Arctic increase the risk of pollution in the region. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies have yet to be developed.
“Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic. The United States is currently meeting with other countries regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks. Changes in the Arctic could affect threatened and endangered species. Under the Endangered Species Act, the polar bear was listed as threatened on May 15, 2008. Arctic climate change is also expected to affect the economies, health, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples.
“Two of the Coast Guard’s three polar icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea—have exceeded their intended 30-year service lives, and Polar Sea is not operational. On May 12, 2011, representatives from the member states of the Arctic Council signed an agreement on cooperation on search and rescue in the Arctic.
“Although there is significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly being viewed by some observers as a potential emerging security issue. Some of the Arctic coastal states, particularly Russia, have announced an intention or taken actions to enhance their military presences in the high north. U.S. military forces, particularly the Navy and Coast Guard, have begun to pay more attention to the region in their planning and operations.”
Discussion on an earlier post suggesting the Coast Guard might want to fit our new major cutters “for but not with” Long Range Anti-ship Missiles (LRASM) has prompted me to rethink the suggestion and advocate for equipping them with the missile in peacetime.
One of the Coast Guard’s peacetime missions is of course Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS).
“The PWCS mission entails the protection of the U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS) …prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks… Conducting PWCS deters terrorists from using or exploiting the MTS as a means for attacks on U.S. territory, population centers, vessels, critical infrastructure, and key resources.”
I have been concerned that the Coast Guard has not had adequate weapons to deal with a terrorist attack using a medium to large sized merchant ship, and currently I don’t believe there is any other organization capable of answering this threat in the 30 or more port complexes terrorists might find worthwhile targets, in a timely manner. Navy surface forces are too geographically concentrated. The over 200 nautical mile range and the ability to strike selected locations on a target ship suggest LRASM could possibly provide an answer.
If we had LRASM on all National Security Cutters (NSC) and Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC), in perhaps a dozen ports on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts, Honolulu and Kodiak, its over 200 mile range fired from cutters, including possibly those in port, could cover all of these ports (except Guam), and have a weapon on target within about 20 minutes of launch.
To effectively counter the threat, I think we need to get a weapon on target within an hour of positive identification of the threat. This would require improved coordination between units. In addition to providing a datum, course, and speed, presumably an intercepting unit, boat or aircraft, would need to transmit a photograph of the target to be incorporated in the missiles memory and aim points would be chosen some time during mission planning. We would need to coordinate with air traffic control. A command decision to authorize use of the weapon and updates on the target position course and speed would also be needed. Because we might have 40 minutes or less from threat identification to launch, these steps would likely have to proceed in parallel with mission planning progressing prior to authorization.
New units appear to be on the way to developing the kind of common tactical picture we need to facilitate both decision making and targeting. We could start developing the capability with the National Security Cutters based at Alameda (San Francisco Bay) and Charleston, SC, even if the system could not be completed until the last OPCs are delivered in about 2034.
Just a brief note on what is happening in the broader world of Naval warfare preparation. NavyRecognition provides conceptual drawings of topside launch tubes for the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM).
Significantly the launchers for this much more capable missile are not expected to require any more space or support than the Harpoon missile and with upgrades it is expected to also incorporate a land attack capability.
As I have noted, the Coast Guard does not seem to have been considered in the Navy’s plans to increase “distributed lethality,” but should the need arise it looks like these would fit well between the Bridge and the 57mm on the National Security Cutters. We might also find a place for them on the Offshore Patrol Cutter. It should be possible to provide the supporting wiring, piping, control systems, etc. to support these relatively easily, even if the missiles and launchers themselves are not mounted, allowing rapid upgrade. (Cutters on Alaska Patrol have to be among the closest US units to Russian Pacific bases.)
Defense Industry Daily reports that the AN-SPQ-9B, the firecontrol system and secondary air-search on the Bertholf class National Security Cutters, is being modified to provide a Periscope Detection and Discrimination (PDD) capability.
The post also provides additional background information on the sensor.
Interestingly, the post also notes that the radar has a “Cooperative Engagement Capability” or CEC (See the April 24/12: CEC entry) which means that ships and aircraft can share a common tactical picture and weapons launched from one unit can be controlled by a different unit. If we ever get long range missiles, this could be useful.
Hopefully the Offshore Patrol Cutter will have either this system or a better replacement.
The illustration here appears to show the system on a Combat Boat 90 (CB90) which is only a 52 foot long boat.
I don’t see an immediate need for this, but it is an interesting new type of radar sensor.
Naval Today reports Saab is offering, “…a 3D, active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar offering simultaneous surface and air surveillance capabilities,” and “…the entire system weighs less than 650 pounds (294 kilograms) in total, which makes it suitable for smaller patrol ships.”
Apparently they are thinking UAVs, “To combat the growing UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) threat, Sea Giraffe 1X features Saab’s Enhanced Low, Slow and Small (ELSS) surveillance function. This feature allows the radar system to detect and classify small, low-flying, slow-moving air targets.”
I suppose this might also be used to control small UAVs, putting them over surface targets of interest. The Coast Guard is looking at small UAVs.
I have been reading over Congressional Research Service’s Specialist in Naval Affairs Ronald O’Rourke’s prepared statement before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee Hearing on The Status of Coast Guard Cutter Acquisition Programs, February 3, 2016. The implications are a bit startling.
By using Block Buy Contracting (BBC) and Multi-Year Procurement (MYP), the Coast Guard might save as much as $1.2B. This is an opportunity that may not come again for at least 30 years.
This breaks down to about $100M on contracting for the remaining 26 Fast Response Cutters, $100M on a contract for two heavy icebreakers, and a whopping $1B over the life of the Offshore Patrol Cutter procurement.
We have never used these contracting methods before, but the Navy has with great success in their Burke class DDG, Virginia class submarine, and LCS programs.
The Congress has already granted authority to use Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) for the Offshore Patrol Cutter program, but because of the requirement of the law covering MYP a contract under these provisions probably could not be negotiated until at least FY2022 by which time the first five ships would have already been contracted for. Block Buy Contracting would require specific enabling legislation but could allow additional savings beginning in FY2018.
I would encourage reading the entire statement. There are only seven pages of testimony and ten pages of background appendices, but I’ll provide a “Reader’s Digest” version. Hopefully the author will forgive me for re-editing his work.
“The Coast Guard has used contracts with options in cutter acquisition programs. A contract with options may look like a form of multiyear contracting, but operates more like a series of annual contracts. Contracts with options do not achieve the reductions in acquisition costs that are possible with MYP and BBC.
“MYP can reduce the unit procurement costs of ships by roughly 10%, compared to unit procurement costs under the standard or default approach of annual contracting. BBC can reduce the unit procurement costs of ships by amounts comparable to those of MYP, if the authority granted for using BBC explicitly includes authority for making economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases (i.e., up-front batch purchases) of components. If the authority granted for using BBC does not explicitly include authority for making EOQ purchases, then the savings from BBC will be less—in the range of roughly 5%. EOQ authority comes automatically with MYP authority, but must be explicitly included in legislation granting BBC authority.
BBC, unlike MYP, can be used at the outset of a shipbuilding program, starting with the lead ship in the class. (emphasis applied–Chuck) MYP, in contrast, cannot be used until the lead ship has completed construction. Thus, for a class of ships that is procured at a rate of one ship per year and in which each ship takes five years to build, BBC can be a contracting option starting with the first ship in the class, and MYP can become a contracting option starting with the fifth or sixth ship in the class. This difference is due to the requirement under the statute governing MYP (10 U.S.C. 2306b) that a program must demonstrate design stability to qualify for MYP. In a shipbuilding program, design stability is typically demonstrated by completing the construction of the lead ship in the class.
“The Coast Guard wants to procure a total of 25 OPCs, and currently plans to use a contract with options for acquiring the first 9 to 11 ships in the program. The OPC program can be viewed as a candidate for instead using BBC for the initial ships in the program, and either BBC or MYP for later ships in the program. If using BBC and MYP were to reduce the acquisition costs of OPCs by about 10% (compared to costs under a contract with options), the savings would amount to roughly $1 billion. An alternate way to characterize such savings would be to say that using BBC or MYP would enable the Coast Guard to get about two and a half of the 25 OPCs for “free,” or to pay for the acquisition of a polar icebreaker.
“The Coast Guard plans to soon award a contract with options for acquiring the final 26 ships in the 58- ship FRC program. The final 26 ships in the program can be viewed as a candidate for instead using either MYP or BBC. If using MYP or BBC were to reduce the acquisition costs of OPCs by about 10% (compared to costs under a contract with options), the savings would amount to more than $100 million. An alternate way to characterize such savings would be to say that using MYP or BBC could enable the Coast Guard to get about two and a half of the 26 FRCs for “free.”
“The Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program and the polar icebreaker (PIB) program can be viewed as candidates for using BBC, and the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) program can be viewed as a candidate for using either MYP or BBC. Using MYP and BBC for all three of these programs might produce savings totaling about $1.2 billion, an amount roughly equivalent to the average annual funding level in the Coast Guard’s Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account. In considering whether to grant authority for using MYP or BBC for these programs, Congress may weigh the potential savings of these contracting mechanisms against the tradeoffs…From a congressional perspective, tradeoffs in making greater use of MYP and BBC include the following: reduced congressional control over year-to-year spending, and tying the hands of future Congresses; reduced flexibility for making changes in Coast Guard acquisition programs in response to unforeseen changes in strategic or budgetary circumstances (which can cause any needed funding reductions to fall more heavily on acquisition programs not covered by MYP or BBC contracts); a potential need to shift funding from later fiscal years to earlier fiscal years to fund EOQ purchases of components; the risk of having to make penalty payments to shipbuilders if multiyear contracts need to be terminated due to unavailability of funds needed for the continuation of the contracts; and the risk that materials and components purchased for ships to be procured in future years might go to waste if those ships are not eventually procured.”
There seems little doubt we will need all the ships currently planned. The commitment is only a minuscule percentage of the Federal Budget, and therefore constitutes an extremely small risk. Use of Block Buy and Multi-Year Procurement could bring stability to the Coast Guard’s AC&I funding and result savings equal to an entire year’s worth of AC&I funding.
Eaglespeak has brought to my attention a quarterly magazine that is available on line, that I had not been previously aware of: Naval Science and Technology, “Future Force”
It has a number of interesting articles, including:
I have added the magazine to the recommended blog lis for future reference.
This Video does not appear to show the sinking of the fishing vessel. Speckles on the hull of the F/V seen at time 0:20 and 0:50 may be bullet holes. The video does appear to show the participants.
We have reports (here and here) that the Argentine Coast Guard (Prefectura Naval Argentina (PNA)) fired on and sank a Chinese fishing vessel (F/V), the Lu Yan Yuan Yu 010, believed to have been fishing illegally, after the F/V failed to stop after shots were fired across its bow and it allegedly attempted to ram the Coast Guard vessel. The crew reportedly was rescued, without fatalities, four by the Argentine vessel and the rest of the crew by another Chinese F/V.
Photo by Diegoventu: PNA Doctor Manuel Mantilla (GC-24), a sistership of the Argentine vessel involved.
The PNA vessel seen in the video, Prefecto Durbes (GC-28) is one of five offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) built in Spain for Argentina. The Mexican Navy also has six similar vessels with larger flight decks and more powerful engines. In size they slot between the Reliance Class and the Bear Class, being 67 meters (220 feet) overall. Unlike the Reliance class, they have a hangar for their version of the H-65.
In addition to machine guns, these ships are reportedly armed with a Bofors 40mm/70, but looking at the video, the location where the gun was mounted (on the platform forward of the bridge and one deck above the foc’sle) is vacant. This suggest that the damage was probably done by .50 cal. machine guns. We know from our Vietnam experience that .50 cal. can sink fishing vessels, but the ranges are very short. Looking at the video the ships appeared to be no more than 300 yards apart.
It is a bit surprising no casualties were reported, although the reports say no fatalities, they do not say no injuries so that is still a possibility. Did the crew of the OPV order the Chinese crew to abandon before sinking the F/V, or did they perhaps tell them where they were not going to shoot so that the crew could assemble safely? It does not sound like it. We have only this statement from an Argentine representative that after actions by the Chinese vessel, “…the order was given to fire on different sections of the vessel, damaging it,” It is unlikely, but not impossible, the crew helped the ship sink to destroy any evidence of wrong doing.
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