Category Archives: Weapons

Project 22160 patrol ships, Russia’s Cutter X

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The Zelenodolsk Shipyard in the Volga area will lay down the third Project 22160 patrol ship Pavel Derzhavin on February 18, shipyard spokesman Andrei Spiridonov told TASS on Monday. "The shipyard will hold a solemn ceremony of laying down the Project 22160 patrol ship Pavel Derzhavin developed by the Severnoye Design Bureau in St. Petersburg [in northwest Russia]," the spokesman said.

Recently, NavyRecognition reported Russia was laying down a third Project 22160 patrol ship. The first of this class should enter service next year. In size they fall between the Offshore Patrol Cutter and the Webber class WPCs, in the range I have called “Cutter X.” The size (1200-1800 tons full load) seems to be favored by many navies and coast guards.These ships are a bit unusual among small Russian ships in having a substantial range.

Reportedly the Russians are building six of these. Specs are as follows:

  • Length: 94 meters (308 ft)
  • Beam: 14 meters (46 ft)
  • Draught: 3.4 meters (11.2 ft)
  • Speed: 30 knots
  • Range: 6,000 nmi
  • Endurance:  60 days
  • Crew: 80

At one point there was a public statement that these had been designed to counter piracy off the Horne of Africa. But it has been more recently reported that they will be quipped with Kalibr (Tomahawkski) land attack missiles, the type recently used by ships in the Caspian Sea to attack targets in Syria. The ship is “modular” and has a reconfigurable space under the rear of the flight deck. The missile will be mounted in containers under the flight deck. Adding anti-submarine or additional anti-ship capabilities would require trading off the Kalibr missiles.

Russian Project 22160

The ship has a new naval gun mount incorporating a 57mm gun. The gun is reportedly capable of 300 rounds per minute and a range of 12 km. Effective range is about 4 km. This is a development of gun with a long history in Soviet and Russian Service in both anti-air and anti-armor roles, and as is frequently the case with Russian weapons, the ammunition is shared in common with the Russian Army.

In addition they will carry short range Anti-Air missiles. It appears they will be vertical launched from canisters between the gun and superstructure.

While these ships do not have a strong self defense capability, the mounting of cruise missiles similar to the Tomahawk on small vessels, particularly on one like this, that has a relatively long range, gives them a sort of miniature maritime strike capability, far less capable, but also far cheaper than a Carrier Strike Group. While the ships are small and the weapons unobtrusive, the potential to accurately strike up to eight separate targets would have required an attack by dozens of aircraft not too many years ago.

Apparently all six ships are to be assigned to the Black Sea Fleet and will be home ported in Novorossiysk.

Interestingly, it appears the Russians may also be building a similar size anti-submarine warfare ship. Again NavyRecognition has the report.

Document Alert: World Wide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, 2/9/16

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We have a statement for the record (pdf) from James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, dated February 9, 2016. Perhaps it is the nature of the beast, but there is no good news, and much that is bad.

Smuggling of every type appears to be on the rise including drugs and people. We can expect an increase in illegal immigration as a result of violence, poverty, and disorder in Latin America and particularly Cuba and Central America.

It is a relatively compact document. There are sections on Terrorism (pp 4-6), transnational organized crime (pp 11-12), Arctic (p 13), Environmental Risks and Climate Change (pp 13-14), health (including potential pandemics) (pp 14-15), and Global Displacement, “These 60 million consist of approximately 20 million refugees, 38 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and approximately 2 million stateless persons, also according to UNHCR statistics.” (p.15)

There are also regional assessments including one on Latin America and the Caribbean (pp 28-29).

There is no regional assessment for the US. In terms of direct terrorist threats to the US, while there is a recognition of an aspiration on the part of various groups to attack the US, but the emphasis seems to be on “homegrown violent extremists” (HVEs) and there is nothing about the possibility of a maritime attack on the US. Is that because none exist?

Return of the Coast Artillery–and Ramblings on Weapons

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Since the “Pivot to the Pacific” and Russia’s increasing aggressiveness in Europe, the Army has been reconsidering its roles.  One possibility is to turn the concept of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) against the Chinese and fortify the “First Island Chain” with Army provided Anti-Ship and Anti-Air Systems. It has been proposed that the Army use mobile Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) launchers for this purpose, particularly in the vacinity of vital Straits providing access to the South China Sea and East China Sea, but it looks like they are going a different way.

BreakingDefense reports that the Army is looking at how they might use existing systems to provide these capabilities. If the Army develops these capabilities, and they are still based in the US, it might be possible to develop relationships that would allow the Coast Guard to call on them, if there is a threat to the US Coast. In US law, Coastal Defense is still an Army mission. The capability might be particularly useful in Alaska where available forces are at a minimum and the Coast Guard constitutes a substantial part of the military/naval presence and transportation capability.

The BreakingDefense post talks about the use of guided projectiles for the 155mm howitzer and Multiple Rocket Launcher System (MRLS) and use of the 30mm gun with air burst ammunition to provide a basic anti-aircraft (AAW) capability. Since the Coast Guard is or will be using the Mk38 mod2/3 on a the Webber class and the Offshore Patrol Cutter and this mount can also accept the 30mm gun, it might also provide the cutters with additional AAW capability.  

Shipboard use of the 155mm Howitzer and the Multiple Rocket Launcher System has been considered many times. They would provide a great Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) capability, but no naval systems have been actually developed. The additional capability to use these systems in an anti-ship mode might provide the motivation necessary to actually field one of these systems.

57 mm Guided Projectile

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NavyRecognition reports initial unguided tests have been conducted on the proposed guided round for the Mk110 57 mm gun that is mounted on the National Security Cutters (class of 9 ships) and is expected to be deployed on the projected 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters.

If we could get a laser designator with sufficient range (over 4000 yards) I would think the CG would be more interested in the laser seeker than the millimeter radar version because we are more likely to want to target a specific area on a large target than we are to need to engage multiple small targets which would suggest the fire and forget round.

Laser designators might would be useful with small missiles like Griffin or Hellfire as well. They might be used from small boats and aircraft as well.

GAO Report on Operational Test and Evaluation of the National Security Cutter

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GAO has published a report on the National Security Cutters, GAO-16-148, contending, “Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure Problems Discovered during Testing and Operations Are Addressed.” Note, it goes beyond problems discovered during tests and evaluation, to include other problems encountered during operation.

Results are interesting. In many ways it sounds discouraging, with ten major deficiencies found during testing, but on the basis of my very limited experience with this sort of thing, I suspect it is at least no worse than average. After all, the cutter was rated as operationally effective and suitable. The Littoral Combat Ship program is very much a contemporary program, and it is also still undergoing testing.

During testing there were problems with the gantry on the stern, the single point davit, the gun, air search radar, and the Nulka decoy system. I did find it a bit troubling that essentially, all the weapon systems seemed to be having problems.

Probably more troubling are the problems encountered during operations, “…the NSC’s engines and generators have experienced persistent problems, the reasons for which are not yet known. As a result of these and other equipment casualties, the NSC has been operating in a degraded condition in some mission areas, even while having spent fewer days away from home port than planned.” Problems with the main engines include an inability to maintain full power while operating in warm water due to over heating and incidents of cracked cylinder heads at a higher than normal rate, page 31-35.  Generator bearings are overheating and failing at an unacceptable rate, page 35/36. The generator problems have resulted in ships operating with no functional back-up generator.

You can find a list of “Initial Operational Test and Evaluation Major Deficiencies and Coast Guard plans to resolve them” in Table 5, page 23/24.

Table 6, page 28 identifies “Retrofits and Design Changes for the National Security Cutter Class with Costs over $1 Million as of June 2015” totaling $202.1M. This is of course an incomplete list, in that additional changes are expected. Changes are also expected for the ammunition hoists, and the stern and side doors.

Replacement of the Gantry Crane (page 29): The crane, intended to move boats around the stern, was not designed for a salt water environment. I’m sorry, whose idea was this? How was this ever acceptable. If the shipyard picked the crane, I think they owe us at least the cost of replacement. A replacement has apparently been successfully prototyped.

Single Point Davit, page 30: The davit doesn’t work in high sea states, and it is not compatible with the Over the Horizon Boat IV so the ships end up with three different type boats. A replacement for this has also been prototyped.

Appendix II provides a “Summary of the Key Performance Parameters of the National Security Cutter,” page 42/43.

“As we found in 2015, during 2013 and 2014 the NSC fleet spent fewer days away from home port than the Coast Guard’s interim goal of 210 days. In addition, the NSCs operated in a degraded condition in one or more mission areas during a majority of their time spent in operations from 2010 to 2014 due to major equipment casualties.”

But the ships have a degree of redundancy and a depth of capability that allowed them to carry on.

“Although the NSC was often operating with major casualties during the period we examined, during the period from September 2013 through September 2015 the NSC was not mission capable as a result of maintenance needs only about 2 percent of the time, indicating that the casualties experienced during those years did not prevent the NSC from maintaining at least partial mission capability.”

Despite the lack of maturity of these assets, in terms of routing out systemic problems, that 2% figure is far better than the legacy fleet.

There was also a somewhat surprising note that the NSCs have space, weight, and power for a mine detection system.

We have Bryant’s Maritime Consulting to thank for the link to this document. 

Guided Projectile for 57mm Coming

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NSCfires57mm

The US Naval Institute News Service recently published an article, “A Year Into Distributed Lethality, Navy Nears Fielding Improved Weapons, Deploying Surface Action Group.” As you might expect, it talked primarily about anti-ship cruise missiles, but there was a paragraph of particular interest to the Coast Guard.  It appears there may be guided 57 mm projectiles in the Coast Guard’s future.

“The service is working on developing a guided 57mm round for its Mk 110 guns on the LCS and other Navy and Coast Guard ships, Surface Ship Weapons Office Program Manager Capt. Michael Ladner told USNI News last month. Fanta said at the SNA symposium that the project, which is funded and working its way through the development process now, was important because it would leverage research already being done for the guided Hypervelocity Projectile for the Electromagnetic Railgun.”

If that means we will be able to both target selected areas on a vessel and avoid the possibility of collateral damage, by shells gone astray, it will be good news.

 

The Navy’s New Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority–CNO

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Download the pdf here.

Recently the new Chief of Naval Operations has issued a document , “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” that outlines how, hopefully, the US Navy can maintain a maritime superiority our foes will recognize and avoid confronting.

If you are looking for anything specifically regarding the Coast Guard here, you will not find it (other than the cutter in the formation on the cover). The Coast Guard is not mentioned even once, but it does talk about some things that are Coast Guard related. Perhaps we should not feel bad about this. It only mentions the Marine Corps once.

He talks about three forces that are changing the environment: 

  • The first global force is the traffic on the oceans, seas, and waterways, including the sea floor – the classic maritime system.
  • A second increasingly influential force is the rise of the global information system – the information that rides on the servers, undersea cables, satellites, and wireless networks that increasingly envelop and connect the globe.
  • The third interrelated force is the increasing rate of technological creation and adoption.”

Obviously the Coast Guard facilitates and regulates marine traffic and is tapped into the global information system. In wartime, these contacts will become essential. He also talks about new trade routes opening in the Arctic, that will only be reliable if we have new icebreakers. He also talks about illegal trafficing.

“This maritime traffic also includes mass and uncontrolled migration and illicit shipment of material and people.”

For once, finally, a document explicitly recognizes the competition,

“For the first time in 25 years, the United States is facing a return to great power competition. Russia and China both have advanced their military capabilities to act as global powers. Their goals are backed by a growing arsenal of high-end warfighting capabilities, many of which are focused specifically on our vulnerabilities and are increasingly designed from the ground up to leverage the maritime, technological and information systems. They continue to develop and field information-enabled weapons, both kinetic and non-kinetic, with increasing range, precision and destructive capacity. Both China and Russia are also engaging in coercion and competition below the traditional thresholds of high-end conflict, but nonetheless exploit the weakness of accepted norms in space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum. The Russian Navy is operating with a frequency and in areas not seen for almost two decades, and the Chinese PLA(N) is extending its reach around the world.

“…Coupled with a continued dedication to furthering its nuclear weapons and missile programs, North Korea’s provocative actions continue to threaten security in North Asia and beyond.

“…while the recent international agreement with Iran is intended to curb its nuclear ambitions, Tehran’s advanced missiles, proxy forces and other conventional capabilities continue to pose threats to which the Navy must remain prepared to respond.

“…international terrorist groups have proven their resilience and adaptability and now pose a long-term threat to stability and security around the world.”

He recognizes budgetary limitations.

“There is also a fourth ‘force’ that shapes our security environment. Barring an unforeseen change, even as we face new challenges and an increasing pace, the Defense and Navy budgets likely will continue to be under pressure. We will not be able to “buy” our way out of the challenges that we face. The budget environment will force tough choices but must also inspire new thinking.”

Throughout there is an emphasis on understanding history and the strategic concepts of the past. There is also a recognition of the need to work with partners.

“EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN OUR NETWORK OF PARTNERS: Deepen operational relationships with other services, agencies, industry, allies and partners – who operate with the Navy to support our shared interests.

Other than the Marine Corps, the US Navy has no closer partner than the USCG. The partnership has been a long and successful one, but I would like to see the Navy be a better partner to the Coast Guard.

What I want to see:

If we have “run out of money, now we have to think.” One thing we can do, is to try to get the maximum return from the relatively small investment needed to make the Coast Guard an effective naval reserve force.

  • We need explicit support from the Navy at every level, particularly within the Congress and Administration, for Coast Guard recapitalization.
  • We need an explicit statement from the Navy that they expect the Coast Guard to defend ports against unconventional threats, so that they can keep more forces forward deployed.
  • We need the Navy to supply the weapons we need to defend ports against unconventional attack with a probability approaching 100% ,including small missile systems like Hellfire or Griffin to stop small, fast, highly maneuverable threats and light weight anti-ship torpedoes that target propellers to stop larger threats, and we need those systems on at least all cutters of Webber class and larger.
  • We need to reactivate the Coast Guard’s ASW program and insure that all the new large cutters (NSC and OPC) have and ASW capability, if not installed on all of the cutters, at least planned, prototyped, tested, and practiced on a few ships (particularly in the Pacific).

(Note there is another post on this looking at the “design” from a Navy point of view.)

Turkey’s OPC

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DOST class, Turkish CG

Photo: NavalAnalyses.Blogspot.Com. Click on the photo to enlarge

The German Navy Blog “Marine Forum,”

“5 January, Turkey, Acting on a tip-off / intelligence input, Turkish Coast Guard ships „Yasam“ and „Umut“ intercept Bolivian-flagged freighter „Joudi“ in international waters off Tobruk (Libya) … after receiving Bolivian government permission to board and search ship, boarding team finds 13 tonnes of cannabis.
“(rmks: first such action distant from Turkish waters; made feasible with induction of large DOST class patrol ships–emphasis applied–Chuck)”

So I looked up the class. The four ships of this class are the largest vessels in the Turkish Coast Guard. The next largest are only 210 tons. They are based on the Italian Sirio Class patrol vessels which operate under the Italian Navy but were paid for by the Transport and Navigation Ministry. I suspect the Sirio Class (appropriately modified) may have been the basis of the Marinette Marine’s OPC proposal.

Specs for the Turkish ships from my Combat Fleets of the World, 16th ed. with my translation to English units are:

  • Displacement: 1,700 tons (full load)
  • Overall Length: 88.4m (292 ft)
  • Length at Waterline: 80.3m (265 ft)
  • Beam: 12.2m (40.26 ft)
  • Draught: 4.6m (15.2 ft)
  • Speed: 22 knots
  • Power 4 MTU 16V, diesels, 2CP props, 14,120 BHP

The Gun: The Beda Bofors twin 40mm/70 gun is not a bad choice. It has been around for a while and it has improved over time. Current models are rated at 450 rounds per minute per barrel for 900 rounds per minute for the twin mount. That is faster than a .50 cal. M2 machine gun. The Italian Navy used this as a CIWS before switching to the improved 120 round per minute 76mm. It also has adequate range, 13,675 yards (12,500 m). This is less range than either a 57mm or 76mm, but adequate for most Coast Guard missions. There are at least four different projectiles available. The standard projectiles are about two pounds. There is also a high velocity solid tungsten alloy rod armour-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) projectile that would probably be good for destroying fairly large diesel engines. .

If I read this correctly, the video is 380 rounds in 43 seconds.

Also from “Combat Fleets” this on the Turkish Coast Guard.

“Personnel: Approx. 2,200 total including 800 regulars and 1,400 conscripts, plus 1,050 on loan from the navy.

“Aviation: Coast Guard air assets include one Maule MX-7 light fixed-wing  and three CASA CN-235 maritime patrol aircraft (the basic airframe for the HC-144, Chuck). Three Austa-Bell AB-206B Helicopters and thirteen search and rescue configured Agusta-Bell 412 helicopters. The aircraft are pained white with an orange diagonal stripe.”

Equipment for the Offshore Patrol Cutter

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The National Fleet Plan had some clues regarding equipment that we can expect on the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC). Apparently there will be a lot of commonality between the Navy’s LCS and future generation frigates, the Coast Guard’s Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC), and the Bertholf Class NSCs. My last discussion of the equipment on the OPC can be found here: “Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC), the Other LCS” which contains information not addressed here. Generally the information below does not look much different but I will try to point out any significant differences.

Command, Control, and Communications (Ref. Section 5.5):

The recommended NTNO (Navy Type Navy Owned–Chuck)systems to meet C3 commonality and interoperability for the OPC are as follows: MIL UHF LOS 225-400 MHZ (Digital Modular Radio (DMR), ARC-210, PRC-117); MIL UHF SATCOM (DMR, ARC-210, PRC-117); Messaging (DMR SATCOM, ARC-210, PRC-117); Tactical Data Link (LINK 11; Joint Range Extension (JRE) Link-16, forwarded LINK 22); VACM (KY-100M, KY-58M, KYV-5M). (p. 22)

I am very pleased to see LINK 11, 16, and 22 on the list although this is probably a “junior edition” of these systems. These systems are becoming so ubiquitous if you don’t have them, you are more of a burden than an asset. The table on page 24 seems to indicate that the OPCs will not have an airsearch radar, but will have a multi-mode radar that will be common with Navy systems (p.50). Its not clear what that will really mean for the ship’s capabilities. As far as I can tell, the only air search on the NSCs is the EADS 3D TRS-16 which is also a multimode radar combining air search, surface search, and fire control functions. This radar is likely to be replaced by the newer EADS Cassadian TRS-4D multi-function radar.

Sensors (Ref. Section 5.6): The OPC will have a multi-mode radar, Electronic Warfare Systems, Decoy launching system, Sensitive compartmented information Network, TACAN, and CCOP (Cryptologic Carry-On Program).

 The recommended systems to meet Sensor commonality and interoperability for the Offshore Patrol Cutter are as follows: TACAN; Multi-Mode Radar; IFF; SEWIP (SLQ-32/SSX-1 replacement); and MK-160 Gun System. (p. 25, 5.6.b.2)

NSCfires57mm

Weapon Systems: The OPC will have a 57mm, 25mm, and .50 cal guns. (It is not addressed in this document, but there have been indications that two of the .50 cal. are to be mounted in stabilized remotely controlled weapon stations. The 25mm will presumably be a Mk38 mod2 or 3) The OPCs will not incorporate either a CIWS or degaussing (p.32). (I do have reason to suspect that the OPC is fitted for upgrade to include CIWS.)

It will also have ADNS (Automated Digital Network System), Sensitive Compartmented Information Network (SCI-Networks), Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Service (CANES).

Notes on the Ship’s Signals Exploitation Equipment System and Unmanned Aircraft System, “OPC has the same space, weight and power requirements (as the NSC–Chuck) reserved but a system has not been selected.” (p. 24)

It appears the gun firecontrol system, may include only Electro-Optical control cued by the multimode radar, and that it will not include the AN/SPQ-9B which is used on the National Security Cutters (I think this may be a change).  There is a note on the Gun Fire Control System: “OPC will have a fire control radar capability (MMR-presumably multimode radar–Chuck) to provide tracking information and slew of the GWS camera, but slew and fire of the GWS cannon remains under manual control.” (p.24) Hopefully, an integration of the multimode radar with the weapon 57mm and perhaps the 25mm will permit blind firing of these systems, otherwise some visibility conditions may preclude effective fire control and certainly reaction times, particularly against air targets, will not be as good as they might have been.