gCaptain has a good exploration of what is being done to crack down on Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported (IUU) fishing.
This is an area where having a Coast Guard presence in AFRICOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) could make a real difference, perhaps SE Asia as well.
The US Naval Institute blog has a post recommending that the Coast Guard be moved into the Department of Defense.
The most significant part of the post appears to me to be that this concept has been put forward by Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA), who is the Chair of the Sub-Committee that has oversight of the Coast Guard. Representative Hunter is a Marine Reserve Major who served two tours in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. Having watched him perform in several sub-committee meetings, I have a great deal of respect for his opinions. He would like to see a stronger and better armed Coast Guard.
Personally I see still unrealized potential for the Coast Guard in the Department of Homeland Security and potential problems as well as opportunities in the Department of Defense.
How would the Coast Guard be funded within the DOD? Would it be a separate agency or would it be budgeted with the Department of the Navy?
The Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of the United States (U.S.). The major elements of these forces are the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The President is the Commander-in-Chief, while the Secretary of Defense exercises authority, direction, and control over the Department. This includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Organization of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the three Military Departments, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General, 17 Defense Agencies, 10 DoD Field Activities, and other organizations, such as the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)., Department of Defense organizational chart (December 2013)
Within the DHS budget, the Coast Guard is the third largest component behind FEMA and Customs and Border Protection. It has significant visibility.
In the DOD organization above, I cannot even find the National Guard Bureau. We might do well because we would be a very small part of the overall budget, or we might simply be too small to attract any attention. I think there is a real possibility that if we were transferred into the Navy Department, the Coast Guard might end up as little more than a Master at Arms Corps.
We should remember that in terms of personnel, while the US Navy (and the DOD) is now much smaller than it was 50 years ago, the Coast Guard is larger. I can recall when the Navy was about 25 times as large as the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps about 8 times as large. Now the Navy is less than eight times as large. The Marine Corps is only 4.4 times as large.
We can talk about how the Congress has not been kind to us, but at least funding has been relatively consistent, and of late there seems to be a recognition of greater need for capital improvements.
If our personnel end strength had followed the trend of the DOD we would now have fewer than 20,000 active duty rather than over 40,000.
In short, be careful what you wish for.
The US Naval Institute Proceedings May 2018 edition has an article, “Build a Great White Fleet for the 21st Century,” that recommends greater Coast Guard funding to support Combatant Commanders. It is written by Captain David Ramassini, USCG. The accompanying bio states,
“Captain Ramassini is an Operation Iraqi Freedom veteran and cutterman who has served in the Pentagon as Coast Guard Liaison on the Joint Staff and also in the Office of Secretary of Defense. Captain Ramassini is slated to assume his fifth command as the plankowner commanding officer of the national security cutter Kimball (WMSL-756).”
Unfortunately the article is “members only.” If you are a regular reader of my blog, you probably should also be a US Naval Institute member, but for those who are not, I’ll try to summarize his argument, including some quotations. After reviewing the article, I’ll offer some thought on how, and where, we might provide some assistance to the Combatant Commanders.
The Article
Captain Ramassini contends improved maritime governance and suppressing transnational crime is in the US interest where ever it occurs.
“As the line between terrorist and criminal activities continues to blur, the transactional connections between a wide range of unlawful organizations is likely to cloud the distinction between law enforcement and military operations.”
The Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) need afloat assets to aid in dealing with these problems.
Source: UNODC, responses to annual questionnaire and individual drug seizure database
The Coast Guard is uniquely qualified to leverage “vast authorities; capabilities; and interservice, interagency, intelligence community, and international partnerships” in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC).
There are not enough Coast Guard assets to do this now.
To provide additional assets funding for the fleet needs to be rebalanced, moving money from the Navy to the Coast Guard.
Rebalancing the national fleet composition would improve relationships and provide the United States and our partners advantages in a complex world filled with threats that go beyond the nation-state.
—
Recognizing the Coast Guard for the unique national, international, diplomatic, economic, and intelligence power that it is, the current administration has the opportunity to turn this tide and make the national fleet great again by directing a smart business decision. Specifically, prioritize Coast Guard cutter production to grow the fleet and provide a more cost-effective and adaptable instrument for the nation. A 21st-century Great White Fleet of Coast Guard cutters would begin a new era of sea power better suited to promote rule of law through cooperative partnership and distributed lethality, and allow the U.S. Navy to refocus its efforts on high-intensity conflict. It is time to rethink international engagement using the Coast Guard—an armed force at all times, but a more cooperative power known for its olive-branches-over-arrows approach.
—
Coast Guard national security, offshore patrol, and fast response cutters could serve as powerful instruments for GCCs. They are large enough to operate globally, yet small enough to gain access and foster cooperative partnerships. In addition, these more affordable naval assets could be produced more expediently than Navy surface combatants to build a credible national fleet. The goal of a 355-ship Navy needs to be expanded to a 400+ ship national fleet with utility across civil and military disciplines and a better return on investment.
—
It is time to change the costly Navy-centric approach toward peace and security and focus on restoring the underpinnings of rule of law to regain the trust and confidence of partner nations. The Coast Guard is capable of more finely tuned and less costly persistent presence. It is an affordable, accountable, and reliable instrument of national power well equipped to execute international engagement. Bolstering white hull numbers within the national fleet by doubling the number of cutters could provide a 21st century advantage to the United States and our international partners in this ever-evolving global environment.
Captain Ramassini suggests that large cutters could be upgraded so that they can fill the frigate role.
One approach worth examining is up-arming the Coast Guard’s fleet with a vertical-launch system (Mk-41 VLS) and SeaRAM close-in weapon system to provide increased warfare interoperability. Imagine a forward-deployed “international security cutter” capable of operating with a carrier strike group and/or surface action group and assuming a role historically filled by a Navy frigate.
Commentary
There are currently six Unified Combatant Commands. Two, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM already have substantial Coast Guard assets available, although SOUTHCOM could use more. CENTCOM has the six WPBs of PATFORSWASIA. Three Unified Combatant Commands, PACOM, EUCOM, and AFRICOM, have no regular Coast Guard representation.
EUCOM (European Command) probably has far less need for a US Coast Guard presence, since they already have several sophisticated coast guard organizations among allied nations.
PACOM probably could use more Coast Guard assets for capacity building and suppression of Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported (IUU) fishing in the Western Pacific. Seventh Fleet has already asked for more Coast Guard presence to confront Chinese white hulls.
Africa has a serious problem with Maritime crime and could use training, capacity building, and more international inter-agency cooperation. The Coast Guard has sent ships to the area intermittently, but the area has been largely neglected. China is making serious inroads in Africa. We need a presence, but gray hulls are not what we need. The six boats of Patrol Force South West Asia (PATFORSWA) could help address the problem in East Africa, but that would require some sharing by CENTCOM. There is an unrealized opportunity to do a lot of good in West Africa, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea where piracy, kidnapping, IUU fishing, and other marine crimes are common.
Gulf of Guinea, from Wikipedia
To maintain a single large cutter off the West coast of Africa or in the Western Pacific would require three ships in rotation, assuming they are homeported in the US. Larger ships are more difficult to homeport in foreign ports, smaller vessels are likely more feasible.
It appears more likely we could replicate the six boat PATFORSWA organization with similar organizations in East Africa and the Western Pacific. There are several ports in each area that might be worth considering.
Obviously we would not send more now overage 110s, we would be sending Webber class WPCs. This would require extending the current program beyond the 58 in the program of record. There is already discussion about six additional WPCs to replace the six 110s assigned to CENTCOM. Adding six for AFRICOM and six for PACOM would extend the current program by two or three years. The shipbuilding costs for 12 more WPCs are on the order of $700M spread over two or three years, not much more than a single NSC. Basic personnel requirements for 12 vessels with a crew of 24 are 288 crew members. Rotational crews and supporting personnel would probably push this up to about 500, a notable increase for the Coast Guard, but “small change” in the defense budget. The PATFORSWA costs are paid for from the DOD budget, so I would expect a similar arrangement for similar squadrons assigned to AFRICOM and PACOM.
Perhaps at some point. we should also consider a similar forward deployed squadron for SOUTHCOM.
Fletcher Launcher for Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS)–Arnold Defense showcased its new rocket launcher for non-air applications at SOFEX 2018 on an Oshkosh S-ATV. (Jen Judson/Staff)
Defense News brings us another report of the new four round surface launch system for the BAE Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) made by Arnold Defense of St. Louis, MO.
I did a post on this system earlier, Guided Weapons Made Easy, but I had almost forgotten about it, and that would be a shame, because this may be exactly what we need give our small units both precision and a much heavier punch.
APKWS is an upgrade to the long serving (and very numerous) 70 mm Hydra rocket, that adds passive laser homing. Reportedly BAE is working up to providing 20,000 APKWS kits a year.
Current range for this system is about eight kilometer, probably enough for us, but there is also mention of an improved motor to extend the range. Reportedly the seeker is good for up to 14 km, so a motor upgrade might push the range out that far.
The launcher seems to have similar footprint to a .50 caliber machine gun. The empty launcher weighs only 30 pounds and the individual missiles 32 pounds. If it can fit on a light land vehicle, its likely it will fit on many of the Coast Guard’s smaller patrol assets.
This is old, but a discussion on Facebook, brought it back. The loss of a friend and a fine officer. Tragic. I think there are lessons to be learned here. I won’t presume to tell you what they are.
“No Laughing Matter” by Karl Vick, Washington Post, July 7, 1996.
Let’s keep any comments thoughtful and civil.
3-View line drawing and dimensions of MQ-1B Predator UAV, – Department of the Air Force, Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 09-1: Airfield Planning and Design Criteria for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), 28 Sept 2009
The Acquisitions Directorate has issued a Request for Proposal for demonstration of a Long Range/Ultra-Long Endurance (LR/U-LE) Unmanned Air System (UAS).
The Statement of Work (Attachment_1_-_Statement_of_Work_.pdf) indicates demonstration is expected to take place at Eglin Air Force Base. “The period of performance will be one year from the date of award which is estimated to occur in September 2018.”
The Requirements
The sensor package will include Electro-optical (EO) and Infrared (IR) Full Motion Video (FMV), Maritime Surveillance Radar, Radio Frequency/Direction Finding (RF/DF) sensor, with tactical communications radio/data link.
Minimum airframe performance in the full up configuration include 50 knot patrol speed, 15,000 foot ceiling, 24 hour endurance.
Takeoff and Recovery Wind Limits are 20 knot headwind, seven knot crosswind, and up to five knot gusts.
For identification the airframe will be equipped with Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System, Identification Friend or Foe, Mark XII/Mark XIIA, Systems (AIMS) certified (AIMS 03-1000A) Mode 3 A/C transponder with “IDENT” capability.
Commentary
Presumably this will result in a RFP for a land based LR/U-LE UAS, but probably not before FY2021.
The specifications make it clear the Coast Guard is not looking at obtaining their own version of the Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) MQ-4C Triton UAS.
I would note that the demonstration provides no slack for trade-offs between search width, speed, and endurance to determine total area searchable. The 24 hour endurance is fixed. There is also no dash speed requirement. To me this suggest that the system is more for tracking than searching, although it could also do that as well.
There is also no mention of ViDAR as an alternative to Radar.
Given distance to operating area and the relatively slow speed of these assets, to maintain an asset on scene is going to require more than one sortie per day, probably more like two per day. That suggest that a 24/7/365 on scene capability will require five or six airframes.
gCaptain has an interesting report on a conflict between fishermen that resulted in two F/Vs almost simultaneously ramming a third vessel. The Coast Guard has ruled the third vessel had violated the rules of the nautical road.
Former crest of US 2nd Fleet. US Navy Image.
US Naval Institute News Service is reporting the Navy will be reestablishing the Second Fleet, which will cover the Western Atlantic. In the past it also covered the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific drug transit zones.
Second Fleet will be the Atlantic counterpart of the Third Fleet in the Pacific.
How it will relate to Forth Fleet that currently handles the drug transit zones is not yet clear.
We are certain to see interaction with the CG Atlantic Area Commander, and probably at least one liaison officer.
A recent announcement that the PT-8 Oceanwatch image-based wide area maritime search system has been integrated with the Schiebel Camcopter S-100 vertical take-off and landing UAS, prompted me to take another look at this system. (Manufacturer’s brochure here.)
There have been numerous improvement since the introduction of the S-100 over a decade ago. It has been integrated with more sensors including a synthetic aperture radar. A heavy fuel engine compatible with JP-5, Jet A-1 or JP-8 jet fuels is now optional, as a replacement for the original gasoline engine. Using an auxiliary fuel tank it now possible to extend its normal six hour endurance to up to 10 hours.
This Oceanwatch PT-8 sounds a lot like a “ViDAR” (Visual Detection and Ranging) that has been tested by the Coast Guard.
The S-100 is very widely used. Operators or those who are buying the system include the German Navy, the French Navy, the Italian Navy, the Australian Navy, and the Chinese Navy. The Russian Coast Guard uses a license built version.
They have been testing sense and avoid capability.
The S-100 at 440 pounds max take-off is about nine times greater than that of the 48.5 pound ScanEagle, but less than a seventh that of the MQ-8B Fire Scout (3,150 lb). It doesn’t have the endurance of the ScanEagle, but with a ten times larger payload (75 lb vice 7.5 lb), given better sensors, it may be able to search a larger area per sortie. With a higher speed (120 knots max vice 80) it can get to a probability area and search it faster.
Once again Sanjay Badri-Maharaj provides a look inside the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard, (TTCG). This time, he relates its often frustrating history and its recent attempts to return to relevancy. The story should make USCG members feel very fortunate. Sanjay’s earlier post related to the TTCG’s most recent major procurement, “How the SPa was Chosen – The Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard’s Spa 5009 fleet.”
British built OPV that was to have been the Trinidad and Tabago Ship (TTS) Port of Spain, seen here in TTS colors. Now the Brazilian Ship Amazonas.
At the Visakhapatnam International Fleet Review 2016, a ship graced the show with her presence – the Brazilian Navy Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) BN Amazonas (P120) commanded by Commander Alessander Felipe Imamura Carneiro. While this ship would have gone largely unnoticed by the naval fraternity so gathered, being as it is, of sound but unspectacular design and performance, the vessel has a peculiar significance for the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard (TTCG) as it was originally built for the said formation and was very nearly commissioned as the TTS Port of Spain. However, an abrupt and controversial cancellation of the order in September 2010, following a change in government in May 2010, brought an end to a planned expansion plan that would have allowed the TTCG to regain its place as the premiere naval unit of the Caribbean. The cancellation of the OPV contract combined with poor serviceability of surviving assets led to a scramble for assets between the years 2013 and 2015 which culminated in the procurement of a fleet of vessels that have restored a degree of capability and viability to the TTCG surface ship squadron.
Trinidad and Tobago’s Maritime Domain:
Source: Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard
As an archipelagic island state, Trinidad and Tobago’s Maritime Domain and the TTCG’s ability to patrol and secure the same are of paramount importance for the security and the economic well-being of the country. The Maritime Domain can be divided into three parts:
Exclusive Economic Zone
Trinidad and Tobago claims an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of up to two hundred nautical miles (200 n.m.).
Territorial Sea
The territorial sea limits are up to 12 nautical miles from the archipelagic baseline.
Internal Waters
Internal waters, of up to 3 nautical miles from the archipelagic baseline are also part of the responsibility of the Coast Guard.
Activities within the Maritime Domain
Energy Exploration and Exploitation
Commercial Shipping and Maritime Transport
Fisheries
Search and Rescue
Trafficking in Narcotics, Arms and Ammunition
Natural Resource Poaching
Human Trafficking and Illegal Immigration
Maritime Terrorism/ Piracy/ Natural Disasters
Development of the TTCG Surface Fleet
The Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard began its operational history with two 103ft Vosper Ltd patrol boats – the TTS Trinity (CG-1) and the TTS Courland Bay (CG-2) – commissioned on 20th February 1965, each 31.4m long, displacing 123 tons. These were followed by TTS Chaguaramas (CG-3) and the TTS Buccoo Reef (CG-4), commissioned on 18th March 1972, each 31.5m long, displacing 125 tons. CG-1 and CG-2 were decommissioned in 1986 and CG-3 and CG-4 in 1992.
Photo by Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
These Vospers were followed on 15th June 1980 by two modified Spica class vessels – TTS Barracuda (CG-5) and TTS Cascadura (CG-6) – each 40.6m long and displacing 210 tons. After a failed attempt at local repair and refurbishment, these vessels were decommissioned after nearly 15 years of inactivity. CG-5 was scrapped while CG-6 remains at Chaguaramas Heliport completely derelict, bereft of sensors, engines, weapons and accommodation, yet the vessel remains ostensibly in commission.
On 27th August 1982, 4 Souter Wasp 17 metre class (TTS Plymouth CG27, TTS Caroni CG28, TTS Galeota CG29, TTS Moruga CG30) were commissioned. In addition, the Coast Guard was augmented in the mid-to-late 1980s with vessels from the disbanded Police Marine Branch – 1 Sword Class patrol craft (TTS Matelot CG 33) , and 2 Wasp 20 metre class (TTS Kairi CG31 & TTS Moriah CG 32). All of these vessels have now been decommissioned.
The years 1986 to 1995 saw the decommissioning of almost all the TTCG patrol assets and the de facto retirement of CG-5 and CG-6 for lack of serviceability and an inability of the TTCG to undertake routine maintenance due to severe funding shortfalls. This left the formation incapable of performing its assigned tasks on any sort of credible basis. This period, not surprisingly, saw a significant increase in narcotics and illegal weapons shipments being transhipped through Trinidadian waters.
Photo by Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
After a number of years with almost no serviceable vessels, the period 1999-2001 saw the TTCG receive a boost with the acquisition of the ex-Royal Navy Island class OPV, HMS Orkney as the TTS Nelson (CG-20) and four 82ft Point-class cutters, each displacing some 66tons, from the United States (TTS Corozal Point CG7, TTS Crown Point CG8, TTS Galera Point CG9 and TTS Bacolet Point CG10). The Point class cutters were nominally on strength until 2009-10 when they were decommissioned, but in reality, they had been unseaworthy for some years prior. A half-hearted attempt was made to refit CG-7 but was abandoned. It is a depressing fact that these vessels were well over 20 years old when procured. The stark reality was that not a single new-build patrol vessel was acquired between 1980 and 2009.
Photo by Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
In 2003-2004, the then Government of Patrick Manning, began a phased expansion of the formation which included the purchase of six new Austal PB30 Fast Patrol Craft (FPC) –CG11 TTS Scarlet Ibis, CG12 TTS Hibiscus, CG13 TTS Humming Bird, CG14 TTS Chaconia, CG 15 TTS Poui and CG16 TTS Teak – commissioned between 2009-2010 and two modified oilrig support vessels – each over 15 years old – armed and re-tasked as Coastal Patrol Vessels (CPVs) – CG-21 TTS Gaspar Grande and CG-22 TTS Chacachare – commissioned on 23rd April 2008. In addition, 4 Midnight Express Interceptors were delivered in 2005 and were extensively deployed in anti-narcotics operations.
The “crown jewels” of this expansion plan were three 90m long OPVs – to be named the Port of Spain, Scarborough and San Fernando – ordered from VT Shipbuilding (later BAE Systems Surface Ships). Easily the most advanced vessels in the Caribbean (after the demise of the Cuban navy), the OPVs were adequately armed with 25mm and 30mm guns and possessed the ability to stage medium-lift helicopters from their flight decks. However, an overly-ambitious integrated fire-control system and some unrealistic expectations from the TTCG in respect of the performance of the 30mm guns led to significant delays and problems during trials. In September 2010, the Government of then Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, cancelled the contract in decision that in retrospect may have been ill-advised.
Of interest is the fact that the procurement of new vessels did not lead to a commensurate increase in the TTCG operational budget relative to the larger fleet. In addition, archaic bureaucratic procedures together with shortcomings in the TTCG engineering and maintenance branches combined to cripple efforts to restore serviceability to repairable vessels with contractors going unpaid for work done and vessels being laid-up for extended periods of time. Procurement and payment procedures and policy have also played a significant part handicapping the ability of the TTCG to meet its commitments to suppliers and contractors, largely because of a bureaucratic system that moves slowly and which fails to accord due priority to essential items necessary for the operations of the TTCG. It is a continuing area of concern that there has been no attempt to streamline urgent procurement or even payment of suppliers with basic necessities such as fuel running dangerously low on occasions. The then government attempted to circumvent these problems by entering into comprehensive logistics and support arrangements with VT and Austal. However, the former was stillborn through the cancellation of the OPVs and the latter never worked as planned, in part because of inherent deficiencies in the TTCG maintenance structure and in part because of unreformed bureaucratic processes that ensured that the TTCG was unable to meet its contractual obligations in respect of the Austal support contract.
Thus between 2001 and 2010, the TTCG, while still not improving its serviceability or operational efficacy, did formulate plans, which were accepted which led to the signing of contracts for the purchase of OPVs and FPCs. However, a change in government let to budgetary priorities shifting to the detriment of the TTCG. Despite an impressive strength on paper, the TTCG was, by 2013, in dire straits, leading to an operational audit of the TTCG surface assets which revealed the extremely poor state of repair of the surface fleet:
| Type | Quantity | Age
(years) |
Assigned Area of Operation | Status |
| OPV
TTS Nelson |
1 |
37 |
Offshore – EEZ and beyond |
Unserviceable |
| CPV
Chacachacare Gaspar Grande |
2 |
19 17 |
Offshore & Territorial Sea | Unserviceable |
| Austal Built FPCs |
6 |
4 |
Territorial Sea & Inshore |
Serviceability is variable.
2 serviceable, 4 unserviceable. |
| Interceptors | 17 | 2-4 | Inshore & Internal Waters | 4 serviceable, 13 unserviceable. |
Source: Author’s primary research
Acquiring New Vessels for the TTCG
In January 2014, the Government appointed the Naval Assets Acquisition Implementation Team (NAAIT) and tasked them with procuring, inter alia, 7 new CPVs and 2 OPVs (now curiously termed Long-Range Patrol Vessels or LRPVs) within the very short period of two years. For budgetary reasons the figures were reduced to 4 CPVs and 1 LRPV. The new procurement attracted some international attention and shipyards invited the NAAIT to inspect the yards and the products available. Directed by the Government, the NAAIT visited the Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) shipyard in Ulsan, Republic of Korea, the China State Shipbuilding Company (CSSC) in Guangzhou, COTECMAR at Cartagena, Colombia and Damen Shipyards Ltd at Gorinchem, Holland. Damen, COTECMAR and HHI offered viable products meeting TTCG requirement but CSSCs products were viewed as not quite meeting TTCG specifications.
After deliberating and assessing the vessels and designs on offer, the NAAIT recommended that the 4 CPVs be acquired from Damen with two additional vessels of a similar design being acquired as “utility vessels” but so armed and equipped that they could augment the 4 dedicated CPVs in the patrol role. The vessels selected were the SPa 5009 CPV and the FCS 5009 utility vessel. The CPVs were fitted with a surveillance system which drew heavily on high-end civilian products. In addition they were fitted with a remotely controlled 20mm gun. The FCS 5009 was delivered in standard configuration but with accommodation increased for a larger crew, a manually operated 20mm gun (from TTCG stocks) and a slightly enhanced surveillance fit.
The bureaucratic procurement process, however, was slower than expected as the bureaucracy initially questioned the NAAIT’s authority, grudgingly acquiescing to the fact that it had Cabinet sanction. Furthermore, unforeseen lethargy among the bureaucrats tasked with enabling procurement, ignorance of systems and a failure to communicate in a timely fashion very nearly stymied the process. In addition, the NAAIT faced a deliberate attempt at sabotage when accusations were made by a highly-connected individual who was representing the interests of another shipyard. These accusations were found to be untrue but the procurement of the vessels was delayed. Eventually, the contract was signed enabling delivery of the vessels
The LRPV procurement was not so fortunate as the NAAIT recommendation for a formal Request for Proposals to be sent out to all the shipyards visited by the team was initially approved and then, to the surprise of the NAAIT, circumvented by the direct intervention of Prime Minister Persad-Bissessar who decided, against advice, to procure a ready-made, unarmed, LRPV from CSSC of China which compared badly with the cancelled OPVs.
Potential Lessons for Procurement
The NAAIT wound down at the end of February 2016 having completed much of its mandate. In the Trinidadian context, the NAAIT was a unique experiment. While its experience may not translate easily for other countries some lessons can be shared:
Photo from Damen Shipyards, Netherlands
Conclusion
One of the most intriguing points to note is that the TTCG followed a systematic and rational procurement process until 1980. After that, its recovery from decades of neglect has been slow, painful and littered with the false dawn of the ill-fated OPV contract. Nonetheless, the frantic efforts to rejuvenate the TTCG have finally produced results. It remains to be seen whether the new vessels will meet a better end.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 