Category Archives: Arctic

United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement

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Below you will find a verbatim press release. The US and Canadian Coast Guards are mentioned prominantly, particularly in regard to the formation of Low impact shipping corridors. Certainly the Coast Guard will enforce the fisheries restrictions as well. 

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
December 20, 2016

In March, President Obama and Prime Minister Trudeau announced a new partnership to embrace opportunities and confront challenges in the changing Arctic, with Indigenous and Northern partnerships, and responsible, science-based leadership. Over the past year, both countries have engaged a range of partners and stakeholders, including Indigenous peoples and Northern communities, state, provincial and territorial governments, nongovernmental organizations and businesses. Those consulted have expressed a strong desire for real and long-term opportunities to build strong families, communities, and robust economies. Today, President Obama and Prime Minister Trudeau are proud to launch actions ensuring a strong, sustainable and viable Arctic economy and ecosystem, with low-impact shipping, science based management of marine resources, and free from the future risks of offshore oil and gas activity. Together, these actions set the stage for deeper partnerships with other Arctic nations, including through the Arctic Council.

Science-based approach to oil and gas:

In March, the United States and Canada committed that commercial activities will occur only if the highest safety and environmental standards are met, and if they are consistent with national and global climate and environmental goals. Today – due to the important, irreplaceable values of its Arctic waters for Indigenous, Alaska Native and local communities’ subsistence and cultures, wildlife and wildlife habitat, and scientific research; the vulnerability of these ecosystems to an oil spill; and the unique logistical, operational, safety, and scientific challenges and risks of oil extraction and spill response in Arctic waters – the United States is designating the vast majority of U.S. waters in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas as indefinitely off limits to offshore oil and gas leasing, and Canada will designate all Arctic Canadian waters as indefinitely off limits to future offshore Arctic oil and gas licensing, to be reviewed every five years through a climate and marine science-based life-cycle assessment.[i]

Supporting strong Arctic communities:

In March, both countries committed to defining new approaches and exchanging best practices to strengthen the resilience of Arctic communities and continuing to support the well-being of Arctic residents, in particular respecting the rights and territory of Indigenous peoples.

Recently, in direct response to requests from Alaska Native communities, President Obama created the Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area protecting the cultural and subsistence resources of over 80 tribes as well as one of the largest seasonal migrations of marine mammals in the world of bowhead and beluga whales, walrus, ice seals, and sea birds. The United States also launched an interagency Economic Development Assessment Team in the Nome region of Alaska to identify future investment opportunities, with other regions to follow. In addition, the Arctic Funders Collaborative (AFC), a group of 11 U.S., Canadian, and international philanthropic foundations, announced the coordination and mobilization of an estimated $27 million in resources for programs across the Arctic over the next three years.

Today, for its part, Canada is committing to co-develop a new Arctic Policy Framework, with Northerners, Territorial and Provincial governments, and First Nations, Inuit, and Métis People that will replace Canada’s Northern Strategy. The Framework will include priority areas identified by the Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs’ Special Representative, such as education, infrastructure, and economic development. The Framework will include an Inuit-specific component, created in partnership with Inuit, as Inuit Nunangat comprises over a third of Canada’s land mass and over half of Canada’s coast line, and as Inuit modern treaties govern this jurisdictional space. In parallel, Canada is reducing the reliance of Northern communities on diesel, by deploying energy efficiency and renewable power. Canada will also, with Indigenous and Northern partners, explore how to support and protect the future of the Arctic Ocean’s “last ice area” where summer ice remains each year.

Low impact shipping corridors:

In March, the United States and Canada committed to working together to establish consistent policies for ships operating in the region. Today, both countries are launching the first processes ever to identify sustainable shipping lanes throughout their connected Arctic waters, in collaboration with Northern and Indigenous partners. The U.S. Coast Guard is launching a Port Access Route Study (PARS) in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas.[ii] Results from this analysis may be used to establish vessel routing measures including traffic separation schemes, recommended routes, Areas To Be Avoided, or other instruments such as fairways where no structures may be erected. The Canadian Coast Guard and Transport Canada is implementing Northern Marine Transportation Corridors, determining what infrastructure and navigational and emergency response services are needed.  Canada is also launching a new program to support training curriculum for Northerners, particularly Indigenous peoples, to join the marine field, as well as programming to support marine infrastructure and safety equipment for communities.

In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard, in consultation with industry, Indigenous communities, and the State of Alaska, has begun a strategy to phase down the use of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) in the Arctic. The Canadian Coast Guard is conducting similar outreach and consultations to develop proposals to phase down the use of HFO in 2017. The United States and Canada will each, or jointly, propose a plan for consideration at the International Maritime Organization’s spring 2017 meeting.

Science-based management of Arctic fisheries:

In March, the United States and Canada called for a binding international agreement to prevent the opening of unregulated fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean and to build on a precautionary, science-based approach to commercial fishing that both countries have put in place in their Arctic waters. Today, the United States commits to supporting and strengthening existing commercial fishing closures in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, and to conducting scientific research to improve our understanding of the Arctic. Canada commits to working with Northern and Indigenous communities to build world-leading and abundant Arctic fisheries – based on science – that firstly benefit Northern communities. Together, the United States’ and Canada’s actions will create the largest contiguous area of well-regulated fisheries in the world.

Both countries reaffirm their commitment to a legally binding agreement to prevent unregulated commercial fisheries in the Arctic High Seas until an internationally recognized Regional Fishery Management Organization is in place to provide effective management. Both countries are working towards such an agreement in the coming months.

(Below are apparently footnotes–Chuck)

[i] Taking into account the respective obligations of the United States and Canada under international law to protect and preserve the marine environment, these steps also support the goals of various international frameworks and commitments concerning pollution, including those reflected in the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation, the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, and the U.S.-Canada Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan.  Furthermore, with respect to areas of the Beaufort Sea where the U.S.-Canada maritime boundary has not yet been agreed, these practical arrangements are without prejudice to either side’s position and demonstrate self-restraint, taking into account the principle of making every effort not to jeopardize or hamper reaching a final maritime boundary agreement.

[ii] In conducting this study, and consistent with existing authorities, the Coast Guard will consider traditional knowledge from local communities, the effects of shipping and vessel pollution on the marine environment, marine mammal migratory pathways and other biologically important areas, subsistence whaling, hunting, and fishing, and the needs of maritime safety and commerce.

This came to my attention through the Bryant’s Maritime Consulting Blog.

Canada Chooses Airbus C-295 as New SAR Aircraft

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Airbus C-295 seleccted as Canada's Fixed Wing SAR aircraft.

Airbus C-295 seleccted as Canada’s Fixed Wing SAR aircraft.

FlightGlobal reports, after 14 years, Canada has selected the Airbus C-295 as their future Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft.

The deal means Airbus will supply 16 C295s to replace six de Havilland Canada CC-155 Buffalos and 13 CC-130H Hercules at four bases spread across Canada, providing search and rescue services from the Arctic to the southern border with the USA.

The article is not correct in saying, “The aircraft is in service with the US Coast Guard as the HC-144A, serving as a maritime patrol and rescue aircraft.” The HC-144 (max takeoff weight 36,380 lb (16,502 kg)) is based on the smaller C-235. The C-295 (max takeoff weight 51,146 lb (23,200 kg)) is a direct competitor of the C-27J (max takeoff weight 67,241 lb (30,500 kg)).

Coast Guard Overview

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If you haven’t seen it already, the Coast Guard has a web site that provides a lot of information about the status of the service. The Coast Guard Overview includes sections on Missions, Workforce, Force Laydown, Assets, Authorities, Strategy, Budget, Leadership, Partnerships, and a Resource Library. (You do have to scroll down from the intro.)

I had not seen this before. It seems to be connected to the preparation for the Presidential Transition Team.

Added a link to the web site to the top of my Reference page, so it will be easy to find. I have to say I have not kept my Reference page up to date. I’ll be pay more attention to it.

Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee Hearing on Coast Guard Arctic Implementation Capabilities 7/12/16

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In referring to this video I will identify the position on the recording in the format h-hours (omitted for the first hour), m-minutes, and s-seconds (may be omitted) as 1h22m45s would indicate one hour, 22 minutes and 45 seconds into the video. 

Note: it doesn’t really start until 10m24s

On July 12, 2016, the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s Coast Guard and Maritime Transporttion Subcommittee held a hearing on “Coast Guard Arctic Implementation Capabilities.”

Witnesses were:

  • ADM. Charles Michel, Vice Commandant United States Coast Guard
  • Ms. Allison Stiller Principal Civilian Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy Research, Development and Acquisition United States Navy Department of Defense
  • Ms. Jennifer Grover Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues United States Government Accountability Offic
  • Mr. Ronald O’Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs Congressional Research Service
  • Ms. Heather A. Conley Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic Center For Strategic and International Studies
  • Mr. Matthew O. Paxton President Shipbuilders Council of America

Admiral Michel’s written statement for the subcommittee can be found here.

Mr. O’Rourke’s written statement can be found here. For background you might also reference his earlier report. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O’Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs May 27, 2016

Topics:

The discussion was wide ranging. Topics inluded:

  • Gaps in icebreaker availability and coverage
  • US Shipyard building capacity
  • US Defense requirements in the Arctic
  • Arctic infrasturcture
  • The possibility of leasing or chartering
  • The possibility of a “block buy”
  • Medium Icebreakers
  • The possibility of a Mass Casualty incident in the Arctic
  • Single mission vs Multi-mission ships!
  • Military vs Civilian construction standards

I’ll try to comment on some of this. It is the nature of the hearing process that topics may be revisited at any point in the hearing, so it may a bit difficult to follow any particular topic.

Frustration

It was not a specific topic of discussion, but a high level of frustration was apparent throughout the proceeding. It was evident in Representative Hunter’s opening remarks. Check out the sarcasm at minute 13. This was followed shortly by Representative Garamendi’s remarks about the extent of planning that has failed to bear fruit. (15m30sec). There are more comments throughout the hearing. The comments between the representatives and the Vice commandant get particularly hot about 1h57m. One representative went so far as to call one of the Vice Commandant’s answers “bull shit.”

The “Gap(s)”

There was much talk about the gap. This usually referred to the expected gap between the projected end of service life for the Polar Star and the delivery of the new Polar Icebreaker (PIB), which may begin as early as 2020 or as late as 2023 and should end in 2026 with the delivery of the PIB. But if you consider the new PIB will be fully operational only in 2028, this gap may be anywhere from five to eight years. But this is not the only gap.

We want heavy icebreakers because of their capacity to operate in the Arctic year round. As long as we only have one heavy and one medium icebreaker, we will never do that, because the Heavy will always be sent to Antarctica during the Northern Hemisphere’s winter, while the medium icebreaker will be sent to the Arctic during the summer, so there will be a seasonal gap in the Arctic. We will never have “assured year round access to the Arctic” as long as we only have two icebreakers.

Because we deploy only one icebreaker to the Arctic and only one to the Antarctic there is always a gap in the capability to come to the aid of one of these icebreakers. This is a particularly serious concern with regard to sending the Polar Star to the Antarctic. There is of course great distance, and because it is probably the most capable icebreaker sent to Antarctica, it is also the most capable of getting itself in the deepest trouble. the Additionally the Polar class have never been particularly reliable.

The remaining gap that might be discussed is the difference between what we have and the three heavy and three medium icebreakers we have been saying we need.

Currently there is “No plan to address the gap” (58m). While the Vice Commandant says we are looking into alternatives, he suggests that a rolling life extension (spreading the work over successive yard periods) for Polar Star, rather than a renovation of Polar Sea appears the most likely way to retain a heavy icebreaker in service. That would of course be no improvement over our current situation (2h13m).

Three U.S. Navy icebreakers push an iceberg to clear a channel leading to McMurdo Station, Antarctica, 1965

Building Capacity:

Mr Paxton (President Shipbuilders Council of America) reported that there are ten US shipyards interested in building the PIB, and they have a demonstrated capability to work steel exceeding the thickness and quality required for Polar Icebreakers  (m44-48).

Defense 

Ms. Conely’s (Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic Center For Strategic and International Studies) prepared testimony suggest that in terms of our defense posture in the Arctic, we have been living on good luck and borrowed time (m37-44). She heavily emphasized the need for infrastructure in the Arctic. I was a bit surprised at the apparent depth of concern among the Representatives for defense operations in the Arctic.

There were several unfavorable references to the comparison between our icebreaker fleet and the Russian’s, but that was mitigated somewhat by explanations for the Russian’s greater interest in the Arctic. Still the tone was that we were well behind.  Additionally Representative Young expressed frustration that he had seen no progress in addressing his concern about military aspects of security (1h21m).

Discussion of Defense in the Arctic lead perhaps inevitably to questions of “Why isn’t this a Navy mission?” and a discussion of the need for Military specs for Icebreakers?  (1h3m)

Infrastructure:

There was somewhat surprising support for creation of infrastructure in the form of a deepwater port and airfield (1h45m).

Leasing/Chartering

Can the Coast Guard operate leased or chartered vessels?

Ms Grover indicates that to perform certain Coast Guard mission, the vessel needs to be a “public vessel” meaning government owned or a demise (bare boat) charter (31m).

Demise charter is a contract whereby the ship owner leases its vessel to the charterer for a period of time during which the whole use and management of the vessel passes to the charterer. In such a situation, the charterer pays all expenses for the operation and maintenance of the vessel. Officers and crew become servants of the charterer. A demise charter whereby the charterer has the right to place its own master and crew on board of the vessel is called a bareboat charter.

The Vice Commandant reported that the Coast Guard had been unable to locate any heavy icebreakers available for lease or purchase and that while there were single misssion medium icebreakers built to commercial standards available there were no multi- mission icebreakers suitable for military service “without a major refit.” (55m)

There was also testimony that normally leasing would cost more than purchase over the long term. Mr O’Rourke clarified that a shorter term arrangement that he referred to as a charter was a possibility and it had been done in the past (1h53m).

It appears to me we find ourselves in an unusual circumstance. We definitely have a gap in our capabilities, and while I would agree that leasing is usually more expensive than ownership, we find ships sitting idle while their owners have abandoned the purpose for which they were built. They might be available at favorable terms.

Actually, we have a recent example of a civilian owned icebreaker being first chartered and then purchased outright for naval service.

The Royal Navy’s HMS Protector (A173) required a refit of only ten days to convert it from Norwegian civilian icebreaker. The ship was initially chartered for three years in 2011 but was then purchased outright in 2013. Over her relatively short life as a Royal Navy vessel in addition to icebreaking she has done SAR, fisheries patrols, inspection of research stations to ensure compliance with the Antarctic Treaty, resupply,  hydrographic survey operations, performed training for humanitarian assistance, and patroled to demonstrate sovereignty in the waters around Britain’s South Atlantic Overseas territories.

The Navy has a lot of experience chartering ships, including having them modified for naval service.

Block Buy:

Mr. O’Rourke’s prepared testimony primarily addressed the possibility of a block buy purchase of two or more heavy icebreakers (33m to 37m). His opinion is that a block buy of two heavy icebreakers would save at least $100M and perhaps as much as $200M.

The Vice Commandant stated he could only support the construction of one heavy icebreaker (1h8m). I find it hard to understand why our leadership cannot simply state they would welcome additional resourses. (There is a pattern here, I saw the same thing happen in another hearing.) No one expects Coast Guard admirals to establish priorities across all government programs, that is the job of the civilian Administration and Congress, but when asked, if we would like more assets, and particularly if there is already an established requirement for more assets, why not say yes? It is after all other peoples’ job to decide if it will fit in the budget.

The idea of a block buy was generally well recieved. By the end of the hearing Representative John Garamendi stated that it appeared to make the most sense to proceed with block buy of two (or three) icebreakers (2h8m). He ask for assistance with the wording to be inserted into a bill to authorize a block buy. “I’m in the mode to make a decision.” (2h10m)

Polar-Icebreaker

Canadian shipbuilder Davie’s proposal (pdf) to convert the Aiviq for the Canadian Coast Guard

Medium Icebreakers:

There is as yet, no idea when there will be a budget request for new construction medium icebreakers. The planning process is just beginning. We will build heavy icebreakers first, with the first completed by perhaps 2026. It will probably be four years more for the second and third. We probably cannot expect new construction medium icebreakers before 2032, sixteen years from now. We are not likely to see three medium icebreakers until 2034.

Two civilian owned medium icebreakers that do appear to be available are the M/V Aiviq and a similar partially completed icebreaker.

When the Vice Commandant stated that there were none available for lease or purchase suitable for military service without substantial refit (1h51m), that is not a final answer. It really just the start of a discussion. Considering the two potentially available domestically built icebreakers, what would be required to bring them up to our minimum standards? What would it cost?  We should keep in mind that, we may have higher standard in mind for future icebreakers, but the icebreakers we currently have are not really built to current Naval Vessel Rules. If we were to assume that a new medium icebreaker will cost approximately $500M and last for forty years then, using simple math, we should be willing to pay at least $62.5M to have this capability for five years (actually it should be worth substantially more given the discounted value of money spent in out years). If we could get 20 years out of them, it should be worth $250M Apparently there is already a proposal on the table to convert the Aiviq (1h57m30s).

Single Mission vs Multi-Mission?

The Vice Commandant seemed to indicate that the Coast Guard only operates multi-mission vessels, and while I would agree that it is true, I would add that they are multi-mission because of there crews–their authorities, their skills, and their initiative.

In fact many of our vessels are single mission by design. In addition to buoy tenders and construction tenders I would include our existing icebreakers. That they incidentally do other missions as well, would also apply to any civilian owned vessel we might bring into Coast Guard service.

Does it take a military vessel?

There was a substantial discussion (1h59m30s) about whether we need a “military vessel” to do this job. I would start by saying any Coast Guard manned vessel is automatically a military vessel, by virtue of its crew. We have lots of vessels that don’t look very military, and are not built to military standards, but that does not mean they are not military.

If you have read much of my stuff, you would know that I would welcome ships with more military character, but I also recognize that the ships we have have doing icebreaking now are not particularly “military” by design. Shortly after the Polar Star was commissioned, she came down to Fleet Training Group San Diego, where I was the CG liaison officer, for a short training assist. Really her military characteristics were unimpressive at best. Additionally, the ability to launch a boat, so necessary for many CG missions was actually dangerous in anything other than relatively calm conditions.

Mass Casualties in the Arctic: 

There was a great deal of interest in the preparations for the possibility of mass casualties if something should go wrong during the planned Northwest Passage cruise of the Crystal Serenity (1h14m).

Bringing the Polar Sea Back into Service:

As noted above, the Vice Commandant tentatively expects that in order to maintain a heavy icebreaker capability, the most likely solution appears to be a rolling life extension of the Polar Star, rather than renovation of the Polar Sea. He noted that the repair of the Polar Star cost $7M and that bringing back the Polar Sea would be a multiple of that.

Still, extending the life of Polar Star leaves with no improvement over the current situation:

  • no year round capability in the Arctic
  • no rescue capability in the Antarctic
  • a complete loss of Heavy icebreaker capability should the Polar Star suffer a major machinery casualty

To obtain those capabilities before the new PIB is operational, we need to bring Polar Sea back into service in addition to keeping Polar Star operational. Trying to restore the Polar Sea to her original condition is probably not realistic. The equipment is just too old.

Still it might be possible to do a major renovation that would make the ship as capable and more reliable than the Polar Star.

How much should it be worth to us. Logically, we would want to have it last until the third new PIB is operational (and keep the Polar Star on line until the second PIB is complete). That means the Polar Sea would need to last until at least 2030, maybe a bit longer.

If a heavy icebreaker with a service life of 40 years is worth $1B, then getting perhaps 15 years out of a major renovation may be worth up to $375M.

Expected Reports: 

According to the testimony, by now, the Congress should have in their hands a new report on the condition of the Polar Sea and what it will take to fix it. For some reason I doubt that that will include the possibility of a major renovation.

By the end of the year, the Coast Guard has promised Congress a report that will include a suggested way to proceed, including a determination of what to do with Polar Sea.

Conclusion: 

Is it any wonder the committee member’s patience is wearing thin?

It appears that we will continue to have only one heavy and one medium icebreaker until the new PIB is completed, hopefully in 2026, but even then it will not be fully operational until 2028.

Authorization for at least a two ship block buy appears likely.

Unless we change course, we are unlikely to reach a six icebreaker fleet until at least 2034.

What we might do:

If the Congress and and Administration really want to fix this, there are options, but it will take money. In addition to AC&I funds, it would also require additional operating funds and more personnel, both for the crews, and for support personnel, in addition to funding the ships themselves. We certainly should not sacrifice the Offshore Patrol Cutter program for this capability.

If  the Congress and Administration want to get as close as possible to our professed need for three heavy and three medium icebreakers, we could conceivably have two heavy and three medium in six years of less.

That would require that keep Polar Star on line, that we bring back the Polar Sea, and that we obtain the two medium icebreakers currently available in the near term, the Aiviq and the still unfinished vessel that was being built by Edison-Chouest, and make those changes necessary to bring them into Coast Guard service.

What would this allow us to do?

  • Have a medium icebreaker available in the Arctic during the summer, as we do now.
  • Have a heavy icebreaker and a medium icebreaker available in the Arctic during the winter, something we do not currently do.
  • Have a heavy icebreaker in the Antarctic during the summer as we do now, but accompanied by a medium icebreaker.

A Warning: 

Given the tone I heard from the Representitive, if we are not careful, and do not start showing more enthusiasm for the mission, we may find the icebreaking mission transferred, in whole or in part, to the Military Sealift Command.

China to Build Nuclear Icebreaker, Ready in 2018

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512px-Antarctica_CIA_svg

Maritime Executive is reporting China will build a nuclear powered Polar Icebreaker.

“The vessel will feature higher ice capabilities, better research capabilities and be more comfortable and environmentally friendly than Xue Long. It is expected to be 122.5 meters (400 feet) long and will be able to break ice of up to 1.5 meters (five feet) thick at a speed of around two knots. It will be able to operate bow or stern first using two ABB Azipod units with combined power of 15MW.”

This is what the Coast Guard would call at best a medium icebreaker. 15MW or about 20,000 HP is far less than even the Healy’s 22.4 MW, but while we don’t expect a new icebreaker for a decade, they expect theirs will be finished in two years.

Polar Icebreaker Operational Requirements Document, Industry Version

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If you would like to take a look at the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the proposed polar icebreaker (PIB in the document), you can find it here (pdf). (Sorry I did not publish this earlier.)

The bad news is that it does not look like it will be fully operational until 2028.

I”1.3.1 Initial Operational Capability Date: The Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date is anticipated to occur during or before FY-2026. IOC is defined as the delivery of the vessel. ”

1.3.2 Coast Guard Support Date The Coast Guard Support Date (CGSD) is the formal transition from CG-932 to Surface Forces Logistics Center Product Line (SFLC PL) and is anticipated to occur during or before FY-2028.”

1.4 Full Operational Capability Date: The Full Operational Capability (FOC) date occurs upon the successful completion of operational testing and evaluation and is anticipated to occur during or before FY-2028.

Here are the basics. I have cherry picked the list. There are many more requirements, but I think these are the most significant:

  • “The PIB will operate worldwide and will be exposed to extreme environmental conditions found in the Polar, Tropical, and Temperate regions. The PIB will experience ice up to large concentrations of multiyear consolidated pack ice with ridging, air temperatures ranging from -72 degrees Fahrenheit (°F) to 114°F, sea water temperatures ranging from 28.8°F to 87°F, wind speeds that can exceed 100 miles per hour (mph) (87 knots (kts)) and sea conditions up to sea state 8. …
  • “The PIB shall be capable of independently breaking through ice with a thickness > 6 ft (threshold) / > 8 ft (objective) at a continuous speed > 3 kts.
  • “The PIB shall be capable of independently breaking through ridged ice with a thickness of 21 ft.
  • “The PIB shall have a fully mission capable (in accordance with Table 20) cutter endurance per deployment without replenishment (subsistence and fuel) > 80 days underway (threshold) / > 90 days underway (objective).
  • “The PIB shall have the capability to exchange information (voice and data) with: USCG, DoD, DHS, NATO, DoS, NSF and NOAA.
  • “The PIB shall be capable of breaking a single-pass channel to a width of at least 83 ft.
  • “The PIB shall have a sustained speed of 15 kts.
  • “The PIB shall have a minimum range of 21,500 nautical miles at 12 kts in ice free waters
  • “The PIB shall have the capability of performing 3,300 Operational Hours (threshold) / 4,050 Operational Hours (objective) per year. (The USCG is currently transitioning from the use of DAFHP to Operational Hours as the metric for operational tempo. The threshold and objective figures contained in this requirement represent 185 and 225 DAFHP respectively.)
  • “The PIB shall be capable of delivering aviation fuels, diesel fuels, and potable water while underway from storage and service tanks to United States Navy (USN)/USCG/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) vessels 240 feet or less in length in either astern tow or alongside
  • “The PIB shall be capable of receiving underway replenishment of fuel and water from USN/NATO/Allied Navy vessels, Military Sealift Command or other designated vessels.
  • “The PIB shall be able to pump aviation fuels, diesel fuels, and water to shore facilities, including U.S. Scientific Research Stations.
  • “The PIB shall have a designated topside cargo area capable of transporting (not simultaneously): 3.1.9.7.1 Three 9 ft x 35 ft buoys including associated buoy mooring equipment (or) 3.1.9.7.2 Six twenty foot equivalent units (TEU) with a maximum weight of 20 tons each.
  • AVIATION: “The PIB shall be able to hangar a total of two of any combination of the following aircraft: 3.1.10.2.1 USCG H-65 with blade-folding capability. 3.1.10.2.2 USCG/USN H-60 with blade-folding capability. 3.1.10.2.3 UAS (not to exceed the footprint of an USCG H-60 with blade folding capability). (plus  meet certification criteria for Level I, Class 1 aviation operations for those aircraft–Chuck) The PIB shall have the capability for an H-65 to be mechanically secured to the flight deck immediately after landing without the use of tie-down personnel. The PIB shall have the capability to support mobile mechanical traversing of the USCG/USN H-60. The PIB shall have the aviation fuel capacity to operate an H-60 for 250 flight hours with 24 flight hours of fuel capacity in service tanks. (also TACAN equipped–Chuck)
  • BOATS: The PIB shall have the capability to independently launch, recover, fuel, maintain and operate two assigned boats with over-the-horizon (OTH) capability. The PIB shall have the capability to launch, recover, fuel, maintain, and operate at least one assigned cargo landing boat capable of landing a minimum capacity of 4,500 pounds (e.g., people, cargo, and equipment). The PIB shall have the capability to launch and recover on both port and starboard sides.
  • The PIB shall have the capability to deliver, support, and recover one 8-person boarding team and their gear, trained and outfitted in accordance with the Maritime Law Enforcement Manual, COMDTINST M16247.1 (Series) via cutter boat operated by a boat crew in accordance with USCG policy.
  • The PIB shall have the capacity to tow astern a vessel not exceeding an equivalent displacement to that of the PIB. (Shouldn’t this say the ability to tow a vessel of equivalent tonnage to the PIB or perhaps some minimum?–Chuck)
  • The PIB shall have the capability to support a DIVEDET of 7 personnel and their equipment, in accordance with the USCG Diving Policies and Procedures Manual, COMDTINST M3150.1 (Series) and the USN Diving Manual, SS521-AG-PRO-010 (Series).
  • The PIB shall provide dedicated location(s) and reserved space, weight, power, hotel services, data network and phones to accommodate six 10 ft x 20 ft science vans that do not interfere with flight deck operations. (Shouldn’t this be 8x8x20 foot vans?–Chuck)
  • WEAPONS: The PIB shall have the capability to employ removable weaponry. The PIB shall have the ability to conduct disabling fire against surface targets.
  • The PIB shall have a heavy lift capability with a minimum capacity of 20 tons extending to at least one lift point 25 feet past the widest point of the ship’s beam on both the port and starboard side of the  ship.
  • The PIB shall provide messing, berthing, sanitary facilities, and workspaces for all permanently attached crewmembers and 50 embarked personnel. Includes DIVEDET and LEDET deployed with 20 person AVDET (if LEDET is embarked, SCIDET (Science) will remain ashore).
  • The PIB shall be capable of wintering over for a minimum of 210 days.
  • The PIB shall be designed to provide airspace management for organic aircraft operating in controlled and uncontrolled airspace by providing installed organic systems.

Additionally it should be able to conduct boat and helo operations to Sea State Four (8.2 feet/2.5 meters)

COMMENTS: I would like to offer some comments on the document.

CONTAINERS:

Inclusion of “dedicated location(s) and reserved space, weight, power, hotel services, data network and phones to accommodate six 10 ft x 20 ft science vans that do not interfere with flight deck operations.” (3.1.16.6 page 29) is promising. It offers an avenue to address emerging requirement or the need for capabilities that might might have been unrecognized. In addition to scientific support they might be used for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, as holding cells, as class room space, for upgraded communications, accommodations, or medical facilities.

AVIATION:

If we are going to be able to operate, hangar, and service Navy H-60s, we also need to be able to store their associated weapons and equipment including sonobuoys and torpedoes. I suspect this means we will need more space (and perhaps specialized space) than required to support CG H-60s (which I doubt will ever deploy on the PIB anyway). The containerized mission modules might be one way to address this if the need arises.

WEAPONS:

Polar Icebreakers will undoubtedly go to Antarctica so the Antarctic Treaty will apply.  Contrary to what you may have heard, the treaty does not require that ships entering the area be unarmed, only that they be open to inspection. Article VII para. 3. “All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.”

Obviously we do not want to send the PIB down there mounting classified weapons. The document addresses this by saying, “The PIB shall have the capability to employ removable weaponry.” This might mean only .50 caliber machine guns like the Polar Class, but there is also an operational requirements in table 6 (PIB Activities, page 11) is “Stop/neutralize a vessel through the use of force continuum.” Notably this is in the group “Boarding Operations” rather than Defensive/Offensive Operations.

If  we are going to enforce US sovereignty and ” the ability to conduct disabling fire against surface targets” is not limited to surface targets powered by outboard motors, the ship will need something more. There is also a strong possibility that the target could outrun a 15 knot PIB so we either need to be able to do this at a distance, or using the ship’s boats or helicopters.

Ultimately all weapons are removable. In some cases, like missiles or torpedoes the launchers themselves may be unclassified as long as the weapon itself is not installed.

The LCS classes have incorporated removable weapons in their design with reconfigurable weapon stations. We might consider something similar for the PIB,

In wartime, if fighting is in the Arctic or Antarctic, the polar Icebreakers will be unique high value naval auxiliaries that may become critical to naval operations. They will need to be adequately protected. We might consider fitting them “for but not with” defensive weapons. A minimum of two Mk38 25 mm and two SeaRAM CIWS appears to be appropriate, while requiring a minimum impact on command and control and manning requirements.

Photos: A removable weapon system. The Mk46 Gun Weapons System. This is used in the LCS anti-surface mission module. The armor piercing, fin stabilized discrding sabot round would probably be effective as a disabling round against even large diesel engines. 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

It is a pretty large document, running 89 pages total. The last 17 pages are appendices. Reportedly it was the product of a “46-member, 11-Agency Integrated Product Team (IPT)” There is a lot of detail, but there are also a lot of statements that are so nebulous as to be meaningless and as far as I can see do not contribute to an understanding of the requirements. This applies to most of the capabilities listed in Table 5 on page 9 and virtually all of the following,

  • “6 CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES Critical Operational Issues (COIs) are the operational effectiveness and operational suitability issues (not characteristics, parameters, or thresholds) that shall be examined during Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) to evaluate/assess the system’s capability to safely perform its mission.6.1 Operational Effectiveness COIs 6.1.1 Protection Response (PR) 6.1.1.1 Can the PIB perform USCG Emergent Response for Search and Rescue (SAR) and National Emergency Response Operations (NERO)?
  • 6.1.2 Law Enforcement Response (LER) 6.1.2.1 Can the PIB perform USCG Enforcement Response for Law Enforcement and Homeland Security?
  • 6.1.3 Surveillance and Reconnaissance (SR) 6.1.3.1 Can the PIB contribute to Maritime Domain Awareness?
  • 6.1.4 Defense Readiness (DR) 6.1.4.1 Can the PIB provide Defense Readiness to Combatant Commanders?
  • 6.1.5 Maintain Mobility (MM) 6.1.5.1 Can the PIB provide USCG services to maintain movement of vessels and equipment in civil and military maritime environments
  • 6.1.6 Transport (TRAN) 6.1.6.1 Can the PIB provide USCG organic transportation of people and equipment?
  • 6.1.7 Force Movement (FM) 6.1.7.1 Can the PIB be prepared for operational employment and move from ready locations to the intended area of operations?
  • 6.1.8 Information Management (IM) 6.1.8.1 Can the PIB perform Information Management in support of USCG Missions?
  • 6.1.9 Force Protection (FP) 6.1.9.1 Can the PIB provide Force Protection?”

Perhaps I have missed something or these will be clarified in the future.

Will the Navy Be Funding and Managing Our Next Icebreaker Procurement?

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PolarisAzipodsLookingAft

Azipods, state of the art propulsion technology for icebreakers. 

The Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee has proposed that $1B be added to the Navy’s shipbuilding budget for the construction of an icebreaker for the Coast Guard.

This sounds like good news, and there is precedence for this, in the form of USCGC Healy. Still, there are reasons, this may not be the best approach for the project, for the Coast Guard, or for the Navy, particularly since this should not be a one time procurement, it should be the first of a series.

The Navy contracted for the Healy and it did not turn out so badly, but there were difficulties as discussed here.

There are really two issues.

  • Who gets the money?
  • Who should manage the project?

Who gets the money?

The Coast Guard has been trying to get the government to recognize that it needs an AC&I budget of $2-2.5B/year. It needs to be a new norm. Funding icebreakers is part of that. Putting the money in the Navy budget is deceptive, and it does nothing to address the true needs of the Coast Guard..

Because of sequestration it is easier to add money to a DOD budget than to the Coast Guard budget, but if they can make exceptions for one military service, you would think they could make an exception for the Coast Guard as well.

Who would be the best project manager?

The Coast Guard got a black eye for the Deepwater project, but that was largely the result of a misguided Reagan era directive that project management be outsourced to the private sector that was followed by a gutting of in-house expertise in DOD as well as the Coast Guard. NAVSEA also lost much of its in house expertise. Since then, the Coast Guard’s Acquisitions Directorate has been rebuilt into an award winning organization. In fact, while I don’t necessarily think it is true, the GAO has suggested that the Coast Guard’s procedures may be superior to those of the Navy.

The Coast Guard has been preparing for this acquisition for years. If the Navy is to manage it, the Coast Guard will have to spend time bringing them up to speed.

There is also the question of who will procure the follow-on icebreakers. We have been saying we need three heavy and three medium icebreakers. the Coast Guard needs to continue to increase its icebreaker procurement expertise to build these vessels as well.

If the project is given to NAVSEA, it may be low on their priority list. NAVSEA is currently building or planning:

If NAVSEA were to divert their personnel from these projects to the procurement of an icebreaker, it would hurt supervision of these projects.

All of these projects are far larger than construction of one icebreaker. So, if they are given the icebreaker project, will they put their best people on it? Do they have any icebreaker expertise? Will they have to hire new people who will need to go through a time consuming clearance process and take the time to be brought up to speed?

NAVSEA may want to do their own lengthy and costly study & review process. They may impose requirements that the Coast Guard would not. These would add to the cost and these costs would likely be added on to any future icebreakers that would probably be built to the same design.

A troubling “encouragement”:

There was a particularly troubling requirement quoted on page 31 of the  Congressional Research Service’s report, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.” from the FY2017 DOD Appropriations Act (S. 3000) apparently from pages 98-99.

“While the effort to speed polar icebreaker acquisition by 2 years is commendable, the Committee believes more must be done now to expand our capabilities and to defend interests in the Polar Regions. In addition to concerns about our current fleet, the Committee notes that Russia has roughly 40 operational icebreakers and 11 icebreakers either planned or under construction. Therefore, to further accelerate production, the Committee recommends $1,000,000,000 in the “Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy” account to construct domestically the first U.S. Coast Guard operated ship for the Polar Icebreaker Recapitalization Project. In order to achieve an earlier start on this project and to reduce cost and schedule risk, the Committee encourages the selection of an in-service U.S. hull design and the setting of limitations on overall ship specifications and requirements. The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees not later than September 30, 2016 which provides polar icebreaker requirements, preferred design, overall acquisition strategy, and a breakout of funds necessary to support the acquisition.”

I find the direction to forego an opportunity to improve on the designs we have, in favor of decades old hull designs that no longer represent the best in current icebreaker design troubling, particularly since this may be the first of three heavy icebreakers, not just a single stop-gap design.

USCGC Polar Sea

USCGC Polar Sea

There are of course only two large, in service, US hull designs.

ice-breakers-540688_1280

USCGC Healy (foreground)

Our most modern, but frequently forgotten Great Lakes Icebreaker, USCGC Mackinaw (WLBB-30), is a few years younger but still designed about two decades ago, was built by Marinette Marine, which is at least still an operational shipyard, producing Freedom Class LCS for the Navy.

Would it be enough to simply say we are going to scale up the Mackinaw hull (say double all the dimensions) so that we could have a ship that at least uses azipods like most modern icebreakers?

Launch of USCGC Mackinaw (WLBB-30) on April 2, 2005. Photo by Peter J. Markham.

Launch of USCGC Mackinaw (WLBB-30) on April 2, 2005. Photo by Peter J. Markham.

Do we need the Navy?:

I would note that the Coast Guard’s intention had been to fund the Icebreaker in FY2018 not 2022, but somehow we had an unannounced delay of four years which was reduced by a much publicized decision to accelerate construction to 2020. Not only does this strike me as dishonest, but it also seems to suggest that the Coast Guard, given supporting funding, could be ready to contract for the Icebreaker on its own prior to 2020.
If the money were given to the Coast Guard instead of the Navy, I believe the icebreaker would be ready earlier, be delivered cheaper, and will be more in line with our true needs.
If we have to live with this:
As much as I dislike the prospect, we may have to live with this, because of the Congress’ self imposed “sequestration” silliness. If so, how the Navy/Coast Guard team that manages the procurement will be important. The Coast Guard needs to continue to grow its icebreaker expertise.

Perhaps NAVSEA could sub-contract the Coast Guard Acquisitions Directorate (CG-9) to procure the icebreaker.

Thanks to Tups for bringing the encouragement to select an in-service U.S. hull design to my attention.

 

Commandant’s Strategic Intent, Mid-Term Report

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Coast Guard Capt. Douglas Nash, commanding officer of Coast Guard Air Sation Sacramento, salutes a Coast Guard C-27J pilot during a change of watch ceremony at Air Station Sacramento's hanger in McClellan Park, Thursday, July 1, 2016. The ceremony marked the final day that an HC-130 Hercules crew stood the watch at Air Station Sacramento and introduced the newest aircraft. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Loumania Stewart

Procurement of 14 C-27J aircraft was one of the achievements sited. C-27Js replace C-130s at CGAS Sacramento. 

The Commandant has issued a mid-term update on his earlier published “Strategic Intent, 2015-2019” (pdf). The new document is available in pdf format. You can find it here: “United States Coast Guard Commandant’s Strategic Intent, 2015-2019, Mid-Term Report.”

It is relatively short and readable at 21 pages. The recurring themes of the Commandant’s administration are all there, starting with TOC (transnational organized crime) and its deleterious effect on Western Hemisphere governance and prosperity. It does read a little like an Officer Evaluation Report input.

There is nothing particularly surprising here, but even for me, the enumeration of the scope the Coast Guard’s authorities, responsibilities, and international contacts is still mind boggling.

I am not going to try to summarize the report, but there were a few things that struck me.

The Commandant mentions service life extension programs for the seagoing buoy tenders (already begun), the 47 foot MLBs, and the 87 foot WPBs (in the future), but there is no mention of what we will do about the inland tender fleet. There will also be a life extension program for helicopters before they are finally replaced.

“Extend the service life of our rotary wing assets and align with DOD’s Future Vertical Lift initiative.”

There is mention of a program I was not aware of, the “Defense Threat Reduction Agency National Coast Watch System project.” The Defense Threat Reduction Agency attempts to track and reduce the WMD threat. It is not really clear what our role is here. We know about the container inspection programs in foreign ports. Is that it, or is there more to this? (that can be discussed at an unclassified level.)

Russians Building Missile Armed Arctic Patrol Vessel

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Project23550IceClassPatrolVessel

Concept image issued by the Russian Ministry of Defence of the Project 23550 ice-class patrol ships for the Russian Navy. Source: Russian MoD

Janes360 is reporting that the Russian Ministry of Defense has awarded contracts for two new ice class patrol vessels that are reportedly capable of operating in ice up to 1.5 meters thick (approx. 5 feet).

The class is described (in Russian) by the MoD as being “without analogues in the world”, and combining “the qualities of tug, ice-breaker, and patrol boat”.

To me it looks an awful lot like the Norwegian Coast Guard vessel Svalbard or Canada’s Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship that is based on the Svalbard’s design.

Jane’s notes, “A concept image released by the MoD showed the vessel armed with a medium-calibre main gun on the foredeck (likely an A-190 100 mm naval gun), a helicopter deck and hangar, and two aft payload bays each fitted with a containerised missile launch system (akin to the Club-K system offered for export) armed with four erectable launch tubes – presumably for either Club anti-ship or Kalibr-NK land-attack missiles. Although billed as patrol boats, this level of armament makes them better armed than many corvettes.”

If these are in fact containerized missile systems, then they may simply be optional equipment, added to the conceptual image to give the ship a bit more swagger, and we may never actually see this. If you are breaking ice for a vessel following close behind, you may not want missiles with their warheads and high energy fuel located near the stern where a collision with a vessel following too close might rupture a missile and start a fire.

It does suggest that a few spaces for containers could turn almost any ship into a potential missile platform.