Category Archives: Shipbuilding

Russia’s New Nuclear Icebreaker, Largest, Most Powerful

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NPR has some photos of the launching of Russia’s as yet uncompleted, 568 foot long nuclear powered icebreaker. which will be the largest and most powerful icebreaker in the world. The NPR story provided a link to a Sputniknews story.

According to sputniknews.com,

“The Project 22220 vessel is 189.5 yards long (568.5 ft–Chuck) and 37.1 yards wide (111.3 ft). The ship displaces 33,540 metric tons.”

That is almost three times as large as the Polar Star.

A second ship of the class is also expected to be completed before 2020.

Interestingly, while Russian navy projects are frequently subject to delays, this icebreaker is being launched more than a year earlier than originally planned.

Thanks to David for bringing this to my attention. 

 

New S. Korean Cutter

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SKoreaLargestCutter

Jane’s 360 is reporting that the S. Korean Coast Guard has commissioned their largest and most heavily armed cutter.

Lee Chung-ho has a length of 150.5 m, a beam of 16.5 m, a loaded displacement of 6500 tonnes and a complement of 104 persons, although 140 persons can be embarked.

The hybrid propulsion system has four MTU 20V1163M94 diesels (each rated at 9,900 bhp) and two 750KW electric motors that are connected to the propellers.

How big is it?

The cutter, at 6,500 tons, is 44% larger than the Bertholf class. While its length and beam are almost identical to Japan Coast Guard’s two largest cutters, the displacement is reportedly far less. I have seen no info on the draft, so that is at least possible. In any case, it is definitely much smaller than the huge cutters the Chinese have built.

The post compares the new cutter to the slightly smaller Sambong-ho (pennant 5001), which entered service in 2002 and was previously the largest cutter in the S. Korean Coast Guard, stating it is three knots faster. That would indicate a top speed of 24 knots. The new cutter has a four diesel power plant compared to its predecessor’s two engine plant. In addition, the two 750 HP electric motors mounted on the shafts which should allow the cutter to slow cruise while the main diesels are cold iron.

Weapons: 

According to Wikipedia, S. Korean has 34 cutters over 1000 tons. All are armed with one or more 20 mm Vulcan Gatling Guns and .50 caliber machine guns. Fourteen have Bofors 40 mm guns, and one other also has a 76 mm. The 20 mm and 40 mm mounts are locally produced in S. Korea.

Looking at the armament, it may be an upgrade compared to the typical S. Korean cutter, but only slightly better armed than what appears to be, becoming a world wide standard for offshore patrol vessels–a medium caliber gun, 57 or 76 mm, and a pair of 20 to 30mm machineguns in remotely controlled weapon stations. It is really no better armed than the 1,150 ton PC-1005, the Hankang, smallest of S. Korea’s 34 cutters major cutters, commissioned in 1985.

All the weapons appear to have been recycled from previous installations. In the photo, an older model OTO Melara 76 mm, like those used on the FRAMed Hamilton class WHECs and Bear class WMECs is clearly visible on the bow. There is also a Vulcan 20 mm mount on the O-3 deck superfiring over the 76 mm mount forward of the bridge. It also appears to have a locally built twin Bofors 40 mm compact mount using an earlier version of the Bofors than the 70 caliber weapon currently offered, which appears to be atop the superstructure aft. She has no CIWS, missiles, or ASW capability.

What is it with these very large cutters?:

Japan, China, and S. Korea, have now each built two very large cutters. Why to they exist?

It is their size, not their weapons, that make them exceptional. The Russian Coast Guard has smaller, but much more heavily armed ships (Krivak III frigates and Grisha II class corvettes).

There has been a general trend for ships of all types to grow in size. Their crews are not exceptionally large, so the operating cost may not be that much more.

Still these are significantly bigger than other cutters built by the same coast guards, at the same time, apparently for the same missions.

None of these three nations has a patrol area as distant and demanding as Alaska.

Japan did have a reason for building the first of these. Shikishima, commissioned in 1992, was intended to escort plutonium transport ships between Europe and Japan, but I have seen no explanation for the ships that followed.

Is it prestige, just “keeping up with the Jones?”

Are they intended for a future shoving match? If so, they are giving up agility for presence.

Are they perhaps intended as flag ships for long term operations?

I would love to hear the reasoning from someone in the know.

 

 

 

FY2017 Budget

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NSC&FRC

It is still a long way from being a law, but you can see the bill as it currently stands here.

I would like to note that while the FY2017 budget bill includes $95M for  long lead time materials for the tenth National Security Cutter, most of the cost will fall in FY2018 when we will also be funding the OPC and FRC programs, and maybe an icebreaker.

Are they really thinking ahead? If they are going to fund a 10th NSC, they need to do it this year.

China Coast Guard Cutter Built on Frigate Hull

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China Defense Blog is reporting the Chinese Coast Guard is getting at least one cutter based on the same hull used for the Type 054 frigate. I have to believe there will be several more.

The Type 054 is a large and apparently successful class of frigate. The ships are only slightly smaller than the Bertholf class, displacement 4,053 tons full load, length 134.1 m (440 ft), beam 16 m (52 ft), 30,400 HP, 27 knots, compared to the Bertholf’s 4,500 tons, 127.4 m (418 ft), 16.46 m (54 ft), 49,875 HP, and 28 knots.

My first reaction is that they should make very good cutters. They have a four diesel power plant that should be economical to operate and very flexible. The frigates reportedly have a range of over 8,000 miles. They also have reasonably good aviation facilities.

Type054A800px-Aft-deck_of_the_PLAN_frigate_Yi_Yang_(FF_548)

US Navy photo:  120917-N-YF306-107 GULF OF ADEN (Sept. 17, 2012) Sailors from the guided-missile destroyer USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) board the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Navy) frigate Yi Yang (FF 548) to meet prior to conducting a bilateral counter-piracy exercise.

The Chinese Coast Guard has been experiencing explosive growth. China has built some huge cutters, they have gotten some hand-me-down frigates from their navy, and there have been reports that the China Coast Guard will be getting ships based on the Type 056 Corvette, but until recently, new construction Chinese cutters were not warships. They looked more like research vessels. Most have been armed with nothing heavier than 14.5 mm machine guns. This ship may mark a change.

Building based on a Navy design assures that should the need arise, these ships can be upgraded to a more combat ready configuration. How they are equipped when commissioned will give us an indication of the future direction of the Chinese Coast Guard. Will it remain essentially civilian, or will it become an increasingly capable naval auxiliary?

Which systems will be retained from the frigate configuration, and which systems are deleted? My guess is, that they will emerge with a medium caliber gun (either the 76 mm being currently fitted to the Navy’s Type 054As or the older 100 mm that was fitted on the original Type 054s) and two 30 mm gatling guns (these may be older model AK-630s rather than the newer CIWS fitted on current Navy Type 054As). I don’t expect to see the Vertical Launch Systems that support AAW and ASW systems, Anti-Ship Cruise missiles, torpedo tubes, or the sonars which are being fitted to the Navy versions, but if any of these are fitted, it will mark a drastic change in the character of the Chinese Coast Guard.

Thanks to Lee for bringing this to my attention.

Senate Homeland Security Appropriations–Plus Up

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MarineLog is reporting:

The homeland security measure provides $10.4 billion for the d Coast Guard, an increase of $292 million above the FY2017 requested level.

“This level supports a robust USCG operating expenses budget, including a grant program for commercial fishing safety, purchase of additional response boats, and funds for the National Coast Guard Museum,” says the Committee. “This bill also provides necessary increases for acquisitions, including funding long lead time materials for a tenth National Security Cutter, continuing activities associated with the Offshore Patrol Cutter, two additional Fast Response Cutters (for six total), and support for multiple sustainment efforts and program offices such as the C-130J, C-27J, and HH-65. The measure also includes program management and personnel costs associated with the Polar Icebreaker Recapitalization Project in addition to funding in the Senate FY2017 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill.”

The Defense Appropriations Bill includes $1B for the Navy to build a new Icebreaker for the Coast Guard. We will have more to say about this later.

Document Alert: Cutter Procurement–Another Report to Congress

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Once again, the Congressional Research Service’s Ronald O’Rourke has revised his “Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress” with the new edition issued April 15. This has got to be a hot topic because previous revisions were issued March 22, January 27, and December 14, 2015. That is four revisions in four months, on average every six weeks, but the latest is only 24 days after the previous edition. I have begun to sense, we may have turned a corner. The tone of the reports has changed over these four months, from, how long will it take us to reach the “Program of Record” (POR), to consideration of, if we should perhaps go beyond the POR.

The NSC, OPC, and FRC programs pose several issues for Congress, including the following:

“whether to fund the acquisition of a 10th NSC in FY2017;

“whether to fund the acquisition of four FRCs in FY2017, as requested, or some other number, such as six, which was the number projected for FY2017 under the Coast Guard’s FY2016 budget submission;

“whether to use annual or multiyear contracting for procuring FRCs;

“whether to use annual or multiyear contracting for procuring OPCs;

“planned procurement quantities for NSCs, OPCS, and FRCs;

“the cost, design, and acquisition strategy for the OPC;

“initial testing of the NSC; and

“rotational crewing of the NSC.”

The latest revision includes three substantial Appendices:

  • Appendix A. Planned NSC, OPC, and FRC Procurement Quantities (pp 17-22)
  • Appendix B. Funding Levels in AC&I Account (pp 23-26)
  • Appendix C. Additional Information on Status and Execution of NSC, OPC, and FRC Programs from March 2016 GAO Report (pp 27-34)

Appendix C is entirely new and appears to have been the reason for the revision.

Appendix A (p. 17-22) is a fairly detailed discussion of the results of the Fleet Mix Study and asks why we so seldom hear that the program of record is not enough to assure the Coast Guard to successfully accomplish its assigned missions.

The Fleet Mix Study was made public in 2012 long after its completion in 2009. It is due for a reexamination and the Commandant has said another will be done. When that happens, we seriously need to look at more than just more of the same assets. We need to look at additional technology, equipment, and weapons that might allow us to accomplish these missions without a major increase in personnel.

Looking at “Table A-3. Force Mixes and Mission Performance Gaps” (document page 18) I would note that if we get to Fleet Mix Analysis Phase 1 (FMA-1, an increase over the POR including 9 Bertholf class NSCs, 32 OPCs and 63 Webber Class FRCs, for a total of 104 vessels), we will have addressed all the “Very High Risk Gaps” found in the Fleet Mix Study that included SAR capability, “Defense Readiness Capacity,” and “Counter Drug capacity.” What will remain are “High” or lower risks in Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) and Living Marine Resources (LMR), and a low to very low risk to the Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations (AMIO) mission. This total of more than 40 NSCs and OPCs certainly should not be out of the question, after all the Coast Guard has included over 40 ships larger than a thousand tons for the last several decades.

Still, I would note that, no matter how many ships we have, the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission will always be at risk, unless weapons are available to quickly and reliably stop terrorists’ exploitation of a larger merchant vessel to make an attack. Guns alone are simply not up to the task. I have identified two weapons that might address this threat, (1) equipping our WPCs and possibly WPBs with light weight torpedoes that target a ships propellers or (2) equipping our larger ships with the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) which might allow our larger cutter to effectively support our smaller cutters and respond to an attack, even if the large cutter 200 miles from the targeted port. Either would also make our ships much more capable of making a meaningful contribution to Defense Readiness.

A Billion Dollar, Once in a Lifetime Opportunity

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I have been reading over Congressional Research Service’s Specialist in Naval Affairs Ronald O’Rourke’s prepared statement before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee Hearing on The Status of Coast Guard Cutter Acquisition Programs, February 3, 2016. The implications are a bit startling.

By using Block Buy Contracting (BBC) and Multi-Year Procurement (MYP), the Coast Guard might save as much as $1.2B. This is an opportunity that may not come again for at least 30 years.  

This breaks down to about $100M on contracting for the remaining 26 Fast Response Cutters, $100M on a contract for two heavy icebreakers, and a whopping $1B over the life of the Offshore Patrol Cutter procurement.

We have never used these contracting methods before, but the Navy has with great success in their Burke class DDG, Virginia class submarine, and LCS programs.

The Congress has already granted authority to use Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) for the Offshore Patrol Cutter program, but because of the requirement of the law covering MYP a contract under these provisions probably could not be negotiated until at least FY2022 by which time the first five ships would have already been contracted for. Block Buy Contracting would require specific enabling legislation but could allow additional savings beginning in FY2018.

I would encourage reading the entire statement. There are only seven pages of testimony and ten pages of background appendices, but I’ll provide a “Reader’s Digest” version. Hopefully the author will forgive me for re-editing his work.

“The Coast Guard has used contracts with options in cutter acquisition programs. A contract with options may look like a form of multiyear contracting, but operates more like a series of annual contracts. Contracts with options do not achieve the reductions in acquisition costs that are possible with MYP and BBC.

“MYP can reduce the unit procurement costs of ships by roughly 10%, compared to unit procurement costs under the standard or default approach of annual contracting. BBC can reduce the unit procurement costs of ships by amounts comparable to those of MYP, if the authority granted for using BBC explicitly includes authority for making economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases (i.e., up-front batch purchases) of components. If the authority granted for using BBC does not explicitly include authority for making EOQ purchases, then the savings from BBC will be less—in the range of roughly 5%. EOQ authority comes automatically with MYP authority, but must be explicitly included in legislation granting BBC authority.

BBC, unlike MYP, can be used at the outset of a shipbuilding program, starting with the lead ship in the class. (emphasis applied–Chuck) MYP, in contrast, cannot be used until the lead ship has completed construction. Thus, for a class of ships that is procured at a rate of one ship per year and in which each ship takes five years to build, BBC can be a contracting option starting with the first ship in the class, and MYP can become a contracting option starting with the fifth or sixth ship in the class. This difference is due to the requirement under the statute governing MYP (10 U.S.C. 2306b) that a program must demonstrate design stability to qualify for MYP. In a shipbuilding program, design stability is typically demonstrated by completing the construction of the lead ship in the class.

“The Coast Guard wants to procure a total of 25 OPCs, and currently plans to use a contract with options for acquiring the first 9 to 11 ships in the program. The OPC program can be viewed as a candidate for instead using BBC for the initial ships in the program, and either BBC or MYP for later ships in the program. If using BBC and MYP were to reduce the acquisition costs of OPCs by about 10% (compared to costs under a contract with options), the savings would amount to roughly $1 billion. An alternate way to characterize such savings would be to say that using BBC or MYP would enable the Coast Guard to get about two and a half of the 25 OPCs for “free,” or to pay for the acquisition of a polar icebreaker.

“The Coast Guard plans to soon award a contract with options for acquiring the final 26 ships in the 58- ship FRC program. The final 26 ships in the program can be viewed as a candidate for instead using either MYP or BBC. If using MYP or BBC were to reduce the acquisition costs of OPCs by about 10% (compared to costs under a contract with options), the savings would amount to more than $100 million. An alternate way to characterize such savings would be to say that using MYP or BBC could enable the Coast Guard to get about two and a half of the 26 FRCs for “free.”

“The Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program and the polar icebreaker (PIB) program can be viewed as candidates for using BBC, and the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) program can be viewed as a candidate for using either MYP or BBC. Using MYP and BBC for all three of these programs might produce savings totaling about $1.2 billion, an amount roughly equivalent to the average annual funding level in the Coast Guard’s Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account. In considering whether to grant authority for using MYP or BBC for these programs, Congress may weigh the potential savings of these contracting mechanisms against the tradeoffs…From a congressional perspective, tradeoffs in making greater use of MYP and BBC include the following:  reduced congressional control over year-to-year spending, and tying the hands of future Congresses;  reduced flexibility for making changes in Coast Guard acquisition programs in response to unforeseen changes in strategic or budgetary circumstances (which can cause any needed funding reductions to fall more heavily on acquisition programs not covered by MYP or BBC contracts);  a potential need to shift funding from later fiscal years to earlier fiscal years to fund EOQ purchases of components;  the risk of having to make penalty payments to shipbuilders if multiyear contracts need to be terminated due to unavailability of funds needed for the continuation of the contracts; and  the risk that materials and components purchased for ships to be procured in future years might go to waste if those ships are not eventually procured.”

There seems little doubt we will need all the ships currently planned. The commitment is only a minuscule percentage of the Federal Budget, and therefore constitutes an extremely small risk. Use of Block Buy and Multi-Year Procurement could bring stability to the Coast Guard’s AC&I funding and result savings equal to an entire year’s worth of AC&I funding.

More on the Navy’s New Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority

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Waesche Carat 2012

This is a post I wrote for CIMSEC. under the title “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority”–A Coastie’s View.” It is an expanded version of an earlier post that appeared here. The rewrite really begins about half way down under the header, “What I Want to See.”

Recently the new Chief of Naval Operations issued a document “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” that outlines how, hopefully, the US Navy can maintain a maritime superiority our foes will recognize and avoid confronting.

If you look for anything specifically regarding the Coast Guard here, you will not find it (other than the cutter in the formation on the cover). The Coast Guard is not mentioned even once, but it does talk about some things that are Coast Guard related. Perhaps the Coast Guard should not feel bad about this. It only mentions the Marine Corps once.

Three Forces that are Changing the Environment

  • The first global force is the traffic on the oceans, seas, and waterways, including the sea floor – the classic maritime system.
  • A second increasingly influential force is the rise of the global information system – the information that rides on the servers, undersea cables, satellites, and wireless networks that increasingly envelop and connect the globe.
  • The third interrelated force is the increasing rate of technological creation and adoption.

Obviously the Coast Guard facilitates and regulates marine traffic, and is tapped into the global information system. In wartime, these contacts will become essential since they will form the basis for naval control of shipping. He also talks about new trade routes opening in the Arctic. These will only be reliable if we have new icebreakers. He also talks about illegal trafficking.

“This maritime traffic also includes mass and uncontrolled migration and illicit shipment of material and people.”

A Document That Explicitly Recognizes the Competition

“For the first time in 25 years, the United States is facing a return to great power competition. Russia and China both have advanced their military capabilities to act as global powers. Their goals are backed by a growing arsenal of high-end warfighting capabilities, many of which are focused specifically on our vulnerabilities and are increasingly designed from the ground up to leverage the maritime, technological and information systems. They continue to develop and field information-enabled weapons, both kinetic and non-kinetic, with increasing range, precision and destructive capacity. Both China and Russia are also engaging in coercion and competition below the traditional thresholds of high-end conflict, but nonetheless exploit the weakness of accepted norms in space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum. The Russian Navy is operating with a frequency and in areas not seen for almost two decades, and the Chinese PLA(N) is extending its reach around the world.

“…Coupled with a continued dedication to furthering its nuclear weapons and missile programs, North Korea’s provocative actions continue to threaten security in North Asia and beyond.

“…while the recent international agreement with Iran is intended to curb its nuclear ambitions, Tehran’s advanced missiles, proxy forces and other conventional capabilities continue to pose threats to which the Navy must remain prepared to respond.

“…international terrorist groups have proven their resilience and adaptability and now pose a long-term threat to stability and security around the world.”

Recognizing Budgetary Limitations

“There is also a fourth ‘force’ that shapes our security environment. Barring an unforeseen change, even as we face new challenges and an increasing pace, the Defense and Navy budgets likely will continue to be under pressure. We will not be able to “buy” our way out of the challenges that we face. The budget environment will force tough choices but must also inspire new thinking.”

Throughout there is an emphasis on understanding history and the strategic concepts of the past. There is also a recognition of the need to work with partners.

“EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN OUR NETWORK OF PARTNERS: Deepen operational relationships with other services, agencies, industry, allies and partners – who operate with the Navy to support our shared interests.”

Other than the Marine Corps, the US Navy has no closer partner than the US Coast Guard. And while only about one eighth the size of the US Navy, in terms of personnel, the US Coast Guard is larger than Britain’s Royal Navy or the French Navy. The partnership has been a long and successful one, but I would like to see the Navy be a better partner to the Coast Guard. This is how the Navy can help the Coast Guard help the Navy.

What I Want to See

If we have a “run out of money, now we have to think” situation, one thing we can do is to try to get the maximum return from the relatively small investment needed to make the Coast Guard an effective naval reserve force.

WPC Kathleen_Moore

We need explicit support from the Navy at every level, particularly within Congress and the Administration, for Coast Guard recapitalization. While the Navy’s fleet averages approximately 14 years old. The Coast Guard’s major cutters average over 40. The proposed new ships, are more capable than those they replace. They are better able to work cooperatively with the Navy. The nine unit 4,500 ton “National Security Cutter”program is nearing completion with funds for the ninth ship in the FY2016 budget. The 58 unit, 154 foot, 353 ton Webber Class  program is well underway with 32 completed, building, or funded. But the Coast Guard is about to start its largest acquisition in history, 25 LCS sized Offshore Patrol Cutters. Unfortunately, it appears that while the first ship will be funded in FY2018 the last will not be completed until at least 2035. This program really needs to be accelerated.

We need an explicit statement from the Navy that they expect the Coast Guard to defend ports against unconventional threats, so that they can keep more forces forward deployed. This is in fact the current reality. The Sea Frontiers are long gone. Navy vessels no longer patrol the US coast. The surface Navy is concentrated in only a handful of ports. No Navy surface combatants are homeported on the East Coast north of the Chesapeake Bay. If a vessel suspected of being under the control of terrorists approaches the US coast the nearest Navy surface vessel may be hundreds of miles away.

We need the Navy to supply the weapons the Coast Guard need to defend ports against unconventional attack using vessels of any size, with a probability approaching 100%. These should include small missile systems like Hellfire or Griffin to stop small, fast, highly maneuverable threats and we need a ship stopper, probably a light weight anti-ship torpedoes that target propellers to stop larger threats. We need these systems on not just the largest cutters, in fact they are needed more by the the smaller cutters that are far more likely to be in a position to make a difference. These include the Webber class and perhaps even the smaller WPBs.

We need to reactivate the Coast Guard’s ASW program and ensure that all the new large cutters (National Security Cutters and Offshore Patrol Cutters) have an ASW capability, if not installed on all of the cutters, at least planned, prototyped, tested, and practiced on a few ships (particularly in the Pacific). The National Security Cutters and the Offshore Patrol Cutters are (or will be) capable of supporting MH-60R ASW helicopters. Adding a towed array likeCAPTAS-4 (the basis for the LCS ASW module) or CAPTAS-2 would give them a useful ASW capability that could be used to escort ARGs, fleet train, or high value cargo shipments. Towed arrays might even help catch semi-submersible drug runners in peacetime.

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The Coast Guard is the low end of America’s Naval high-low mix. It is a source of numbers when numbers are needed. The Coast Guard has more assets for low end functions like blockade than the Navy. The Navy has about 105 cruisers, destroyers, LCS, PCs, and is not expected to have more than 125 similar assets for the forseeable future. The Coast Guard has about 165 patrol cutters  including 75 patrol boats 87 feet long, about 50 patrol craft 110 to 154 feet in length (58 Webber class WPCs are planned), and about 40 ships 210 foot or larger that can be called on, just as they were during the Vietnam War, when the Coast Guard operated as many as 33 vessels off the coast in support of Operation MarketTime, in spite of the fact that the Navy had almost three times as many surface warships as they do now. The current program of record will provide 34 new generation cutters including nine 4500 ton National Security Cutters and 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters that should be at least 2500 tons.

The Coast Guard provides peacetime maritime security, but is currently under-armed even for this mission. A small investment could make it far more useful in wartime.

(Note there is another post on this looking at the “design” from a Navy point of view.)

Project 22160 patrol ships, Russia’s Cutter X

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The Zelenodolsk Shipyard in the Volga area will lay down the third Project 22160 patrol ship Pavel Derzhavin on February 18, shipyard spokesman Andrei Spiridonov told TASS on Monday. "The shipyard will hold a solemn ceremony of laying down the Project 22160 patrol ship Pavel Derzhavin developed by the Severnoye Design Bureau in St. Petersburg [in northwest Russia]," the spokesman said.

Recently, NavyRecognition reported Russia was laying down a third Project 22160 patrol ship. The first of this class should enter service next year. In size they fall between the Offshore Patrol Cutter and the Webber class WPCs, in the range I have called “Cutter X.” The size (1200-1800 tons full load) seems to be favored by many navies and coast guards.These ships are a bit unusual among small Russian ships in having a substantial range.

Reportedly the Russians are building six of these. Specs are as follows:

  • Length: 94 meters (308 ft)
  • Beam: 14 meters (46 ft)
  • Draught: 3.4 meters (11.2 ft)
  • Speed: 30 knots
  • Range: 6,000 nmi
  • Endurance:  60 days
  • Crew: 80

At one point there was a public statement that these had been designed to counter piracy off the Horne of Africa. But it has been more recently reported that they will be quipped with Kalibr (Tomahawkski) land attack missiles, the type recently used by ships in the Caspian Sea to attack targets in Syria. The ship is “modular” and has a reconfigurable space under the rear of the flight deck. The missile will be mounted in containers under the flight deck. Adding anti-submarine or additional anti-ship capabilities would require trading off the Kalibr missiles.

Russian Project 22160

The ship has a new naval gun mount incorporating a 57mm gun. The gun is reportedly capable of 300 rounds per minute and a range of 12 km. Effective range is about 4 km. This is a development of gun with a long history in Soviet and Russian Service in both anti-air and anti-armor roles, and as is frequently the case with Russian weapons, the ammunition is shared in common with the Russian Army.

In addition they will carry short range Anti-Air missiles. It appears they will be vertical launched from canisters between the gun and superstructure.

While these ships do not have a strong self defense capability, the mounting of cruise missiles similar to the Tomahawk on small vessels, particularly on one like this, that has a relatively long range, gives them a sort of miniature maritime strike capability, far less capable, but also far cheaper than a Carrier Strike Group. While the ships are small and the weapons unobtrusive, the potential to accurately strike up to eight separate targets would have required an attack by dozens of aircraft not too many years ago.

Apparently all six ships are to be assigned to the Black Sea Fleet and will be home ported in Novorossiysk.

Interestingly, it appears the Russians may also be building a similar size anti-submarine warfare ship. Again NavyRecognition has the report.

Chilean Icebreaker/Supply Vessel, plus Other News From Chile

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ChileanIcebreaker

Photo: New Chilean Icebreaker/Antarctic Supply Vessel.  

I recently had an exchange of emails with Andrés Tavolari, a lawyer and Chilean Marine Reserve Officer, who wrote one of our most popular posts, Three Nations Share German OPV Design.

He tells me Chile is building an icebreaker/supply ship. In terms of horsepower, it will be more powerful than the old Wind class icebreakers and only slightly less powerful than the Glacier. Our resident icebreaker expert, Tups, talked about this ship in a comment on an earlier post.

VARD is designing an icebreaker for the Chilean Navy:

http://www.marinelink.com/news/icebreaker-antarctic404371.aspx

One thing that puzzles me is the performance. 14.5 MW for 2 knots in 1 m ice? I mean, the bigger South African research vessel S. A. Agulhas II can do 5 knots with just 9 MW propulsion power (12 MW installed power).

My initial comment was that “Some times they just call out the minimum contract specs. Does not mean they might not be capable of more.” While that might be the case, there is an alternate possibility, perhaps the hull will not be strong enough to break heavier ice or to break one meter of ice at a faster rate. If you look at where Chile has their Antarctic stations, they are all about as far from the Pole as you can get and still be in Antarctica. Perhaps they do not need great icebreaking performance to accomplish their mission. Shaping very thick steel plate is undoubtably difficult and one of the more demanding aspects of building an icebreaker. Perhaps lighter plate is seen as a reasonable compromise.

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Antarctic claims. This chart from Wikipedia Commons. 

Chile’s current icebreaker is the former Canadian Icebreaker CCGS Norman McLeod Rogers, which entered service originally in 1969.

Also of interest, the Chilean Navy magazine has published a special edition with some nice pictures regarding several naval and maritime activities. The text is written in Spanish, but it is mostly pictures and graphics. So the language doesn’t preclude understanding much of it.

Andres pointed out, on pages 36 and 37, there is a graphic with the ships and aircraft of the Navy. Among others there are 3 OPVs, 18 Protector class boats, 4 Grumete / Dabur class boats, 26 Archangel boats and 15 Defender boats, and 3 C-295 Persuader MPA and 8 HH-65 Dolphin helicopters. All in all, there are 22.000 men and women in the navy, including some 2.800 marines. The icebreaker is illustrated on page 44.

On page 45 there is some information regarding the OPVs project called “Danubio”. This is a continuation of the OPV project Andres posted about earlier.

Andres also sent along some information about their Navy’s Shipyard, in the form of a power point presentation including some pictures of the damage suffered by the 2010 tsunami, and its reconstruction (slides 19 – 26). Slide 39 covers the icebreaker.

We also talked a little about the organization of Chile’s Coast Guard counterpart, DIRECTEMAR. It is a part of the Navy organization. While heads of DIRECTEMAR have gone on to head the Navy, these officers have not come up through the ranks in DIRECTEMAR, they have been regular Navy officers.

DIRECTEMAR’s counterpart to our WPBs are the 16 Danubio Class, delivered 1999-2004.

  • 125 tons fl
  • 25 knots
  • 33.1×6.6×1.9 meters or 109x22x6.2 feet
  • one 12.7mm
  • 2 MTU 16V2000 M90 diesels 3,200HP
  • 2 off, 8 enlisted
Many of DIRECTEMAR’s small boats will look familiar. They have a number of USCG type boats procured through Foreign Military Sales, which have proven effective in countering illegal fishing activities.