Document Alert: A Ten-Year Prioritization of Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic

There is a new report, “A Ten-Year Prioritization of Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic,” prepared by The U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System Arctic Marine Transportation Integrated Action Team for the U.S. Department of Transportation.

I have quoted a portion of the Executive Summary below”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“This document, “A Ten-Year Prioritization of Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic” (Prioritization Framework), presents a framework to address Arctic infrastructure gaps by identifying needs that are considered to be critical requirements for a safe and secure U.S. Arctic Marine Transportation System (MTS) over the next decade.

“This report by the U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS) fulfills directive 1.1.2 under the White House National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR) 2014 Implementation Plan objective to “Prepare for Increased Activity in the Maritime Domain.” The deliverable for 1.1.2 is to “Deliver a 10-year prioritization framework to coordinate the phased development of Federal infrastructure through Department and Agency validated needs assessment by the end of 2016.” Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx tasked this action to the CMTS in a May 2014 memorandum.

“Using the CMTS 2013 report U.S. Arctic Marine Transportation System: Overview and Priorities for Action (CMTS 2013 Arctic Report) definitions, this Prioritization Framework organizes the U.S. Arctic MTS into five core components:

  • Navigable Waterways
  • Physical Infrastructure
  • Information Infrastructure
  • Response Services
  • Vessels

“The recommendations set forth for consideration in this report are grouped into three categories under each of the five primary components: (1) infrastructure considerations that require both near-term planning and implementation; (2) infrastructure considerations requiring near term planning for mid- to long-term implementation; and (3) infrastructure considerations requiring long-term planning and implementation. This categorization facilitates the discussion of many coordinated infrastructure needs while acknowledging planning and funding requirements and limitations.

“Over the past five years, with the continuing trend in diminishing Arctic sea ice, discussions and projections for the Arctic as a new international trade route have increased. Some vessels, particularly smaller recreational vessels, currently operating in the Arctic are neither designed nor equipped for hazardous Arctic conditions. 2 As sea ice retreats, the lack of U.S. Arctic infrastructure to support increased maritime activity grows more apparent. Limited nautical charts, aids to navigation, communication, emergency response, and rescue capabilities make operations difficult and potentially dangerous. Other elements contributing to accident risks in the Arctic include inadequate maritime infrastructure and environmental and economic uncertainties, all major challenges identified in the CMTS 2013 Arctic Report.

“To address some of these risks, a number of studies have examined the gaps and potential infrastructure needs of the U.S. Arctic MTS. These needs include not only physical infrastructure such as ports, support vessels, and communication networks, but also the informational infrastructure enabling mariners to operate safely, such as nautical charts and electronic aids to navigation. The NSAR Implementation Plan (IP) identifies separate actions related to Arctic communications and aviation infrastructure [Objectives 1.2 Sustain and Support Evolving Aviation Requirements; and 1.3 Develop Communication Infrastructure in the Arctic]. This report synthesizes existing information on Arctic MTS infrastructure and gaps in order to distill requirements for future infrastructure needs over the next decade.

“There are 43 recommendations put forward in this report for necessary elements of a comprehensive Arctic MTS. This framework necessarily involves elements of the traditional definition of infrastructure, but also includes communication, planning, management, environmental policies, regulatory implementation, and the human element, all of which are required for safe, secure, and successful maritime transportation.

“Of the total list of recommendations, 25 are near-term recommendations to address the current gaps in U.S. Arctic infrastructure.

Presumably there will be interest in what they say about icebreakers. There are mentions elsewhere in the document, but this is a quote of the specific icebreaker section.

“The current Federal fleet of Polar icebreakers consists of one medium icebreaker (USCGC Healy) and one heavy icebreaker (USCGC Polar Star). The Polar Star is the only active heavy icebreaker and is primarily used in the Antarctic. The Healy is used primarily to support science missions in the Arctic, but may also be used to support other Coast Guard statutory missions such as search and rescue or provide persistent command and control capability, as required.

“It is important to note that capabilities of Coast Guard icebreakers often far exceed minimum international standards for icebreaking vessels, such as International Association for Classing Societies. These standards identify minimum power and structural survivability requirements of a single purpose vessel operating in ice infested waters. Unlike commercial vessels that are built to perform single missions with minimal crews, Coast Guard assets are multi-purpose vessels that incorporate aviation support, command and control, and additional power and endurance requirements necessary to perform all missions. The Coast Guard has assessed all available commercial icebreakers and has determined no currently operating vessel meets these critical mission and performance requirements for either a heavy or medium icebreaker. As a result, acquisition of new assets is the only viable option for obtaining additional icebreaking capacity.

“The Coast Guard currently has an acquisition program that will replace the capabilities of the Polar Star when complete. Due to lengthy design and production and anticipated decommissioning of the Polar Star, the Coast Guard will not provide additional capacity within the 10-year horizon. While Coast Guard icebreaking support has been used to facilitate commerce in emergency situations, such as the 2014 fuel resupply in Nome, the Coast Guard does not intend to use these vessels to facilitate routine commercial maritime traffic or to support commercial drilling operations.”

So does not look like we will even be considering vessels like the AIVIQ or the icebreakers that had been being built for Shell Oil construction of which has been suspended.

In addition to icebreakers, it looks like this will have implications for SAR, AtoN, Communications, and Marine Environmental Protection.

 

 

 

Russians Building Missile Armed Arctic Patrol Vessel

Project23550IceClassPatrolVessel

Concept image issued by the Russian Ministry of Defence of the Project 23550 ice-class patrol ships for the Russian Navy. Source: Russian MoD

Janes360 is reporting that the Russian Ministry of Defense has awarded contracts for two new ice class patrol vessels that are reportedly capable of operating in ice up to 1.5 meters thick (approx. 5 feet).

The class is described (in Russian) by the MoD as being “without analogues in the world”, and combining “the qualities of tug, ice-breaker, and patrol boat”.

To me it looks an awful lot like the Norwegian Coast Guard vessel Svalbard or Canada’s Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship that is based on the Svalbard’s design.

Jane’s notes, “A concept image released by the MoD showed the vessel armed with a medium-calibre main gun on the foredeck (likely an A-190 100 mm naval gun), a helicopter deck and hangar, and two aft payload bays each fitted with a containerised missile launch system (akin to the Club-K system offered for export) armed with four erectable launch tubes – presumably for either Club anti-ship or Kalibr-NK land-attack missiles. Although billed as patrol boats, this level of armament makes them better armed than many corvettes.”

If these are in fact containerized missile systems, then they may simply be optional equipment, added to the conceptual image to give the ship a bit more swagger, and we may never actually see this. If you are breaking ice for a vessel following close behind, you may not want missiles with their warheads and high energy fuel located near the stern where a collision with a vessel following too close might rupture a missile and start a fire.

It does suggest that a few spaces for containers could turn almost any ship into a potential missile platform.

Contract Awarded for Remaining Webber Class

USCG_Sentinel_class_cutter_features

The Acquisitions Directorate has announced the award of a contract for the 26 remaining planned Webber Class Fast Response Cutters to Bollinger Shipyards LLC. Rather than the Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) I had hoped for, but really did not expect, this is a $318.6M contract for six with options for the remaining twenty in groups of four to six. It is really not to late to think about a MYP in FY2017 or 2018 since right now, neither the shipyard nor the Coast Guard have any definitive assurance that the remaining ships, beyond the first six in the contract, will be completed. Each additional year’s increment is dependent on future appropriations.

Currently the program has delivered 17 vessels. 15 more are under construction or have been funded. The 26 expected to be procured under this contract will complete the 58 in the program of record.

These vessels are 154×26.6×9.5 ft. 28 knots, with a crew of 22 (normally actually 24). They are armed with Mk38 mod2 or mod3 stabilized 25mm gun and four crew served .50 cal.

Coast Guard Denied Use of Laser Technology

The Afloat Forward Staging Base (Interim) USS Ponce (ASB(I) 15) conducts an operational demonstration of the Office of Naval Research (ONR)-sponsored Laser Weapon System (LaWS) while deployed to the Arabian Gulf. U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams

The Afloat Forward Staging Base (Interim) USS Ponce (ASB(I) 15) conducts an operational demonstration of the Office of Naval Research (ONR)-sponsored Laser Weapon System (LaWS) while deployed to the Arabian Gulf. U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams

This Navy Times story is one of several I have seen that report Rep. Duncan Hunter’s (R-CA) displeasure that the Coast Guard is unable to use some of its laser equipment because of FDA regulation.

“The equipment in question is the Electro-Optical Sensor System and the PEQ-15, a laser sight with an illuminator. ESS is a turret installed on Coast Guard helicopters, with a laser illuminator that can enhance camera images, while PEQ-15 is a rifle sight with a laser illuminator. The Coast Guard is not allowed to use ESS at all, while PEQ-15 can be used on a low setting.”

Representative Hunter has done us a favor in bringing attention to the issue, but ultimately I think he will find that the FDA oversight requirement is based in law and Congress will have to change it.

There is, after all, a reason for regulating the use of lasers. We don’t like it when they are directed at our aircraft or at ships. We don’t want to blind people we are attempting to rescue. (Incidentally where is the FDA regulation of lasers in  the hands of civilians?)

“Hunter wants to cut that red tape and allow the Coast Guard to certify its own laser systems, like the other military branches…”

That is all very well, but the Coast Guard probably does not have many laser experts who can do that, and we should not trust the word of our contractors. If Representative Hunter wants to introduce a bill to cut some of the read tape, by all means allow the Coast Guard to self certify if they develop the independent expertise to do that, but it would be more immediately useful if there was simply provision for DOD certification of Coast Guard equipment. This should include automatic application of DOD certification to any DOD type Coast Guard equipment used for the purpose for which it was certified.

 

ALaMO–Making the 57mm Round Smart

NSCfires57mm

The Navy has a program call “Navy’s Advanced Low Cost Munition Ordnance” or “ALaMO”

Justification as provided to Congress is here. The proposed budget includes $5.759M in FY2017, $25.984M in FY2018, and $24.982M in FY2019. The round is expected to be operational in 2020 (about the time the first OPC comes out).

“Advanced Low Cost Munition Ordnance (ALaMO) significantly increases 57mm MK 110 Gun Mount lethality and effectiveness against Fast Attack Craft and Fast In-Shore Attack Craft (FAC/FIAC). The 57mm ALaMO funding supports non-recurring engineering, design verification testing, environmental qualification, hazard classification, insensitive munitions and developmental testing. ALaMO will be qualified for USN use at the conclusion of the program.”

A US Naval Institute News story, “Wrapup: HASC Passes FY2017 Defense Bill With Reagan-Era Spending Levels,” indicates House Armed Services Committee interest in speeding up the program.

“A provision in the bill notes interest in the Navy’s Advanced Low Cost Munition Ordnance (ALaMO), a 57mm guided projectile that could be used on the LCS, and requests information on what it would take to achieve initial operational capability by 2019.”

Sounds like the Coast Guard should have a few of these rounds as well, both for small, fast, highly maneuverable targets, and to target specific areas on larger targets. We had some indication this was coming before.

Fatal Sinking, Five Dead–Response Delayed?

cp-bc-boat-sinking

CBC British Columbia is reporting the sinking of a whale watching tour boat that resulted in at least five deaths. Weather does not appear to have been the problem. There are reports that the Canadian Coast Guard response may have been delayed as a result of a fault in a recently remoted radio receiver.

Thanks to our Canadian friend Ken for bringing this to my attention. 

Document Alert: Cutter Procurement–Another Report to Congress

Once again, the Congressional Research Service’s Ronald O’Rourke has revised his “Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress” with the new edition issued April 15. This has got to be a hot topic because previous revisions were issued March 22, January 27, and December 14, 2015. That is four revisions in four months, on average every six weeks, but the latest is only 24 days after the previous edition. I have begun to sense, we may have turned a corner. The tone of the reports has changed over these four months, from, how long will it take us to reach the “Program of Record” (POR), to consideration of, if we should perhaps go beyond the POR.

The NSC, OPC, and FRC programs pose several issues for Congress, including the following:

“whether to fund the acquisition of a 10th NSC in FY2017;

“whether to fund the acquisition of four FRCs in FY2017, as requested, or some other number, such as six, which was the number projected for FY2017 under the Coast Guard’s FY2016 budget submission;

“whether to use annual or multiyear contracting for procuring FRCs;

“whether to use annual or multiyear contracting for procuring OPCs;

“planned procurement quantities for NSCs, OPCS, and FRCs;

“the cost, design, and acquisition strategy for the OPC;

“initial testing of the NSC; and

“rotational crewing of the NSC.”

The latest revision includes three substantial Appendices:

  • Appendix A. Planned NSC, OPC, and FRC Procurement Quantities (pp 17-22)
  • Appendix B. Funding Levels in AC&I Account (pp 23-26)
  • Appendix C. Additional Information on Status and Execution of NSC, OPC, and FRC Programs from March 2016 GAO Report (pp 27-34)

Appendix C is entirely new and appears to have been the reason for the revision.

Appendix A (p. 17-22) is a fairly detailed discussion of the results of the Fleet Mix Study and asks why we so seldom hear that the program of record is not enough to assure the Coast Guard to successfully accomplish its assigned missions.

The Fleet Mix Study was made public in 2012 long after its completion in 2009. It is due for a reexamination and the Commandant has said another will be done. When that happens, we seriously need to look at more than just more of the same assets. We need to look at additional technology, equipment, and weapons that might allow us to accomplish these missions without a major increase in personnel.

Looking at “Table A-3. Force Mixes and Mission Performance Gaps” (document page 18) I would note that if we get to Fleet Mix Analysis Phase 1 (FMA-1, an increase over the POR including 9 Bertholf class NSCs, 32 OPCs and 63 Webber Class FRCs, for a total of 104 vessels), we will have addressed all the “Very High Risk Gaps” found in the Fleet Mix Study that included SAR capability, “Defense Readiness Capacity,” and “Counter Drug capacity.” What will remain are “High” or lower risks in Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) and Living Marine Resources (LMR), and a low to very low risk to the Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations (AMIO) mission. This total of more than 40 NSCs and OPCs certainly should not be out of the question, after all the Coast Guard has included over 40 ships larger than a thousand tons for the last several decades.

Still, I would note that, no matter how many ships we have, the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission will always be at risk, unless weapons are available to quickly and reliably stop terrorists’ exploitation of a larger merchant vessel to make an attack. Guns alone are simply not up to the task. I have identified two weapons that might address this threat, (1) equipping our WPCs and possibly WPBs with light weight torpedoes that target a ships propellers or (2) equipping our larger ships with the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) which might allow our larger cutter to effectively support our smaller cutters and respond to an attack, even if the large cutter 200 miles from the targeted port. Either would also make our ships much more capable of making a meaningful contribution to Defense Readiness.

Malaysia’s New Patrol Boat–UAS Ready

MalaysiaNewGenerationPatrolCraft

IHS Jane’s 360 is reporting on Malaysian Coast Guard’s six projected “New Generation Patrol Craft (NGPC).”

“The NGPC has been based on a design by Germany-based Fassmer Shipbuilding Company. According to specifications provided by Destini, the platform features an overall length of 44.25 m an overall beam of 7.7 m and a design draught of 1.95 m. Powered by two 1920 kW MTU engines, the vessel can attain a top speed of 24 kt and a standard range of 2,000 n miles at 12 kt. The ship displaces 297 tonnes and can accommodate a crew of 41.”

This means they will be similar to, but slightly smaller than the Webber Class WPCs.

The unique thing about this class is that they are built to use a mini-Unmanned Aerial System, in this case the Thales Fulmar. NavalToday reports the purchase of these systems. Fulmar looks similar in size and capability to the Scan Eagle.

This certainly suggest that we could probably operate Scan Eagle, or something similar from the Webber class.

Photo: The Thales Fulmar

Mandatory Electronic Data Exchange for International Shipping Adopted by IMO

BairdMaritime reports,

“Mandatory requirements for the electronic exchange of information on cargo, crew and passengers have been adopted by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), as part of a revised annex to the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic (FAL).

“The IMO has said the change will help make procedures for a ship’s arrival, stay and departure from port easier once the FAL takes effect on January 1, 2018.”

This should of course facilitate commerce, but it is also an important part of the Maritime Domain Awareness System.

Canadian Coast Guard (also) Undermanned and Underfunded

980914-N-8492C-005 PEGGYÕS COVE, Nova Scotia (Sept. 14, 1998) Ð- Canadian Coast Guard Cutter CCGV Hudson (front) conducts Laser Line Scanning (LLS) operations with the lasted in US Navy developed high-tech equipment at the crash site of SwissAir Flight 111. US Navy photo by PhotographerÕs Mate 1st Class Todd P. Cichonowicz. (RELEASED)

980914-N-8492C-005
PEGGYÕS COVE, Nova Scotia (Sept. 14, 1998) Ð- Canadian Coast Guard Cutter CCGV Hudson (front) now the oldest major vessel in the Canadian Coast Guard, conducts Laser Line Scanning (LLS) operations with the latest in US Navy developed high-tech equipment at the crash site of SwissAir Flight 111. US Navy photo by PhotographerÕs Mate 1st Class Todd P. Cichonowicz. (RELEASED)

Professional Mariner has reported that a Transport Canada report found the Canadian Coast Guard ” …fleet is undermanned and desperately in need of new ships” and “that unplanned maintenance on aging Coast Guard vessels skyrocketed in 2014.”

My first reaction was of course that they have the same problems we do, but looking at the history of Canadian Coast Guard ship building it is apparent that while none of their ships are over 53 years old, with those built in the 80s the largest group, so maybe they are slightly better off. On the other hand, there was almost no large ship construction in the 1990s or later so they are facing block obsolescence.

I took a look at the documents. I have to admit, I did not read them all. They cover all modes and aspects of transportation. Volume One (pdf) is the basic report and it is 286 pages, and Volume Two (pdf) is the Appendices and it is 230 pages. However, I did use the search function to find every mention of Coast Guard and there were some interesting aspects.

For one thing, the Canadian Coast Guard is partially funded by user fees. The report then goes on to both complain that the user fees have not been raised since established and consequently have not kept up with rising demand and costs, and then also points out that user fees tend to make Canada less competitive. There is not a clear recommendation on this point.

“The government introduced user fees to recover part of the costs for navigation services, which have not changed since 1998. Approximately 15 to 30 percent of the Canadian Coast Guard’s operating costs ($27 million out of $190 million) are recovered from industry (see Figures 9 and 10); icebreaking fees are separate.”

They have a strong justification for the Coast Guard in claiming its inadequacies hurt Canada’s economic competitivenes.

“The underfunding of the Coast Guard seriously hampers its ability to discharge its mandate, which adversely affects Canada’s international competitiveness and trade. (p.13)”

The report finds that the Canadian Coast Guard’s lack of law enforcement authority (and implicitly weapons to back up that authority) results in inefficiencies.

“The Canadian Coast Guard As noted above, the Canadian Coast Guard is responsible for the safe and efficient movement of ships in Canadian coastal and inland waters. Canada is unusual in having a civilian coast guard. In other northern jurisdictions, such as Denmark, Greenland, Norway, Iceland, Finland, and Russia, and in the United States, the coast guard is a military or security organization. As a civilian body, the Canadian Coast Guard does not have the authority to enforce international and national laws and regulations pertaining to the sea, the environment, and sovereignty without RCMP officers present, even though Canadian Coast Guard vessels and staff may be the best placed to respond to critical events and detect illegal activity. This has resulted in an inefficient enforcement regime. Canada has also been slow to use maritime transport to promote development and strengthen sovereignty. Canada must ensure that it meets the challenges of increased maritime traffic in the Arctic, the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, the Seaway, the Pacific and the Atlantic. Because of existing governance arrangements and inadequate funding, the Canadian Coast Guard is not currently well equipped to do so.” (p.220)

The report found that current ship building plans including the requirement to buy Canadian would not addressing the problem of an aging fleet.

“As noted above and as depicted in Figures 1, 2 and 3, the Canadian Coast Guard fleet is aging, which has implications for maintenance as well as procurement. Given that 29 percent of the large vessels are more than 35 years old and close to 60 percent of small vessels are older than the design life of 20 years, it is not surprising that the number of major systems repairs required is increasing, vessel days are decreasing, and the number of ships out of service is increasing over time. The decrease in 2009 was as a result of money dedicated for repairs paid by the Economic Action Plan. Indeed, for such a critical piece of transportation infrastructure, the Canadian Coast Guard is not receiving the political attention, or the administrative and financial resources it requires. In 2014, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development found that the Canadian Coast Guard’s icebreaking presence in the Arctic is decreasing, while vessel traffic is increasing.26 In response, the Canadian Coast Guard, Transport Canada, and the Canadian Hydrographic Service are currently advancing the Northern Marine Transportation Corridors Initiative to support responsible marine development, enhance marine navigation safety, and guide future Arctic investments.27 In addition, the 2015 Report of the Independent Review of the M/V Marathassa Fuel Oil Spill Environmental Response Operation found that the Canadian Coast Guard lacked adequate staff to respond in any part of its region at any time.28 Not only is it understaffed, but its fleet is one of the oldest in the world and urgently requires renewal (individual ships average nearly 34 years of age).29 Without such renewal it will have to pull ships from service, further reducing reliability. However, under the National Shipbuilding and Procurement Strategy, which requires the Canadian Coast Guard to purchase ships from Canadian shipyards, it can only replace one ship a year, at most. At that rate, the median age of the fleet will not decrease. Other strategies, such as outsourcing or leasing, are not part of the strategy and thus cannot be deployed to meet short-term requirements. (p.221)

There may be beaurocratic power grab here, in that Transport Canada seems to want the Canadian Coast Guard transferred under it purview rather than the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. In fact the Canadian Coast Guard had been an agency of the Department of Transportation until 1994 when it was moved to Fisheries and Oceans.

“We have been concerned for some time that the separate and distinctive roles of Transport Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard [make for] a less than efficient model for a coordinated and timely response to a maritime emergency. The situation is further compounded by CCG having been placed under the administration of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans whose role has little in common with that of CCG.” “p.231)

The Canadian Coast Guard is organizationally a mid-point between the single agency multiple tasked broad authority USCG model and the multiple specialized agencies UK model. In some respects it also incorporates elements that would correspond to duties performed in the US by NOAA and National Marine Fisheries. Apparently it, like the USCG has had a problem fitting in any one department because of its multiple missions. While it is under the Department of Fish and Oceans, since 2005 it has been designated a “special operating agency” with greater autonomy.

Notably the prevailing Canadian attitude seems to be that, if anything, the CCG needs to be given weapons and law enforcement authority, bringing it closer to the USCG model, so perhaps it is an endorsement of sorts, for the way the USCG is structured.

Perhaps the USCG needs to be a “special operating agency” or “independent agency” as it is called in the US, as well; after all, there are already 27 (or more) of them, but that is a topic for another day.

Thanks to Lee for bringing this to my attention.